M., E. AND B. v. SWITZERLAND

THE LAW

1. The applicants raise various complaints about the confiscation

of their property under Articles 6, 7 and 14 (Art. 6, 7, 14) of the

Convention. The applicants also rely on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1

(P1-1), and a Treaty between Switzerland and Italy.

2. The Commission considers that the applicants, who were not

parties in the domestic proceedings, own 91% of the shares of the Sud

Provizel company. After the dissolution of the company they can

therefore claim to be victims of the measures complained of, within the

meaning of Article 25 (Art. 25) of the Convention.

3. The applicants complain under Article 1 of Protocol No.1 (P1-1)

of the confiscation of their property. However, Switzerland is not a

Party to Protocol No.1, and this part of the application is therefore

incompatible ratione materiae with the Convention within the meaning

of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

Insofar as the applicants complain of a breach of a Treaty

between Switzerland and Italy the Commission recalls that under Article

19 (Art. 19) of the Convention it is only called upon to examine

compliance with the undertakings of the High Contracting Parties under

the Convention. It follows that this part of the application is

incompatible ratione materiae within the meaning of Article 27 para.

2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

4.The applicants complain under Article 7 (Art. 7) of the

Convention that at the time when the property was obtained there was

no law providing for confiscation.

However, even assuming that this provision, which concerns

criminal offences, is applicable in the present case, the Commission

notes that in its decision of 13 October 1989 the Federal Court stated

that S.57 of the Swiss Civil Code provided a sufficient and independent

legal basis for the confiscation at issue. The Commission considers

that the Federal Court, which thereby referred to its own previous

case-law, did not exceed the limits of a reasonable interpretation. It

follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded

within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

5. The applicants complain under Article 6 (Art. 6) of the

Convention that in the domestic proceedings they were not duly heard.

The Commission notes that the applicants have not shown that they

attempted to intervene in the proceedings before the Cantonal Court or

that they obtained a decision of the Federal Court on the complaint

they are now raising before the Commission. The Commission need

nevertheless not decide whether the applicants have complied with the

requirements as to the exhaustion of domestic remedies within the

meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention since the

complaint is in any event inadmissible for the following reasons.

The Commission considers that the company was represented by a

lawyer who before the Cantonal Court had sufficient opportunity to put

forward written submissions, and expressly waived an oral hearing. It

follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded

within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

6. Insofar as the applicants complain under Article 14 (Art. 14),

taken together with Articles 6 and 7 (Art. 6, 7) of the Convention,

inter alia of discrimination with regard to other foreigners, the

Commission again need not examine whether in this respect the

applicants have complied with the requirements as to the exhaustion of

domestic remedies within the meaning of Article 26 (Art. 26) of the

Convention. It considers that the applicants have not sufficiently

substantiated in what respect other situations to which they refer are

comparable to their own situation or that any difference of treatment

was based on any of the grounds of discrimination prohibited by Article

14 (Art. 14) of the Convention. It follows that the remainder of the

application is also manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of

Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.