Anorthosis Famagusta FC v. Hélder José Castro Ferreira & FIFA

VI. JURISDICTION

48. Article R47 of the Code provides as follows:

“An appeal against the decision of a federation, association or sports-related body may be filed with the CAS insofar as the statutes or regulations of the said body so provide

or as the parties have concluded a specific arbitration agreement and insofar as the Appellant has exhausted the legal remedies available to him prior to the appeal, in accordance with the statutes or regulations of the said sports-related body.”

49. Article R47 of the CAS Code confirms that an appeal against a decision of a federation, association or sport-related body, such as FIFA, may be filed “[...] insofar as the Appellant has exhausted all the legal remedies available to him prior to the appeal […]”, as is the case here.

50. The jurisdiction of CAS also derives from Article 50(1) of the FIFA Statutes (May 2024 Edition) (“FIFA Statutes”), as it determines that:

“Appeals against final decisions passed by FIFA and its bodies shall be lodged with CAS within 21 days of receipt of the decision in question.”

51. In addition, Article 50(2) of the FIFA Statutes states that “Recourse may only be made to CAS after all other internal channels have been exhausted”. The jurisdiction of CAS is not contested and is further confirmed by the signed Orders of Procedure, with respect to the Appellant and the Second Respondent.

52. In addition, clause 14 of the Supplementary Agreement relating to “Other Clauses” confirms that the Player and Club agree to the jurisdiction of CAS.

53. It follows that CAS has jurisdiction to hear, adjudicate and decide on the present dispute.

VII. ADMISSIBILITY

54. Article R49 of the Code provides as follows:

“In the absence of a time limit set in the statutes or regulations of the federation, association or sports-related body concerned, or of a previous agreement, the time limit for appeal shall be twenty-one days from the receipt of the decision appealed against. After having consulted the parties, the Division President may refuse to entertain an appeal if it is manifestly late.”

55. The admissibility of the Appeal is not contested by the Parties.

56. Under Article 50 of the FIFA Statutes, decisions adopted by FIFA legal bodies, such as the FIFA DRC, can be appealed within 21 days from their notification.

57. The Appealed Decision was rendered on 15 May 2025. On 11 June 2025, the Appealed Decision was notified to the Parties. Following this, on 27 June 2025 the Appellant lodged his appeal before CAS, i.e., within the 21 days allotted under Article 50 of the FIFA Statutes.

58. Furthermore, the appeal complied with all other requirements of Article R48 of the CAS Code, including the payment of the CAS Court Office fee.

59. It follows that the appeal is admissible.

VIII. APPLICABLE LAW

60. Article R58 of the Code provides as follows:

“The Panel shall decide the dispute according to the applicable regulations and the rules of law chosen by the parties or, in the absence of such a choice, according to the law of the country in which the federation, association or sports-related body which has issued the challenged decision is domiciled or according to the rules of law, the application of which the Panel deems appropriate. In the latter case, the Panel shall give reasons for its decision.”

61. According to Article 49(2) of the FIFA Statutes, the provisions of the CAS Code shall apply to the proceedings. Pursuant to the same article, the CAS shall primarily apply the various regulations of FIFA and, additionally, Swiss law.

62. Given that the Appealed Decision was rendered by the FIFA DRC, the FIFA Statutes and regulations – namely the June 2024 edition of the FIFA RSTP and the March 2023 edition of the FIFA Procedural Rules Governing the Football Tribunal (hereinafter the “Procedural Rules”), constitute the applicable law to the matter at hand and Swiss law shall be applied subsidiarily should the need arise to fill a possible gap in the FIFA regulations.

IX. MERITS

63. The Appellant argues that the Appealed Decision must be set aside because the present dispute was settled on 1 May 2025, before the issuance of the FIFA DRC decision rendered on 15 May 2025, and therefore the decision is moot and should never have been issued. However, FIFA argues that in the absence of any verifiable contemporaneous evidence, it questions the authenticity and timing of the Settlement Agreement. FIFA submits that the Appellant and the Player signed the Settlement Agreement after the Appealed Decision was notified with the sole purpose of avoiding the sporting sanctions imposed on the Appellant.

64. As a result of the above, the key issues for the Sole Arbitrator to determine are:

a. Was the Settlement Agreement signed on 1 May 2025, as the Appellant claims, or was it signed after the Appealed Decision was rendered and notified to the Parties and subsequently backdated to 1 May 2025, as FIFA submits?

b. If the Settlement Agreement was in fact signed after the Appealed Decision was notified and backdated to 1 May 2025, should the sporting sanctions imposed on the Club nevertheless be lifted?

A. Was the Settlement Agreement signed on 1 May 2025, as the Appellant claims, or

was it signed after the Appealed Decision was rendered and notified to the Parties and subsequently backdated to 1 May 2025, as FIFA submits?

The applicable burden and standard of proof

65. Under Swiss law, that is applicable subsidiarily, Article 8 of the Swiss Civil Code (SCC) states that: “[u]nless the law provides otherwise, the burden of proving the existence of an alleged fact shall rest on the person who derives rights from that fact”.

66. This position is supported by CAS jurisprudence which provides that “[i]n CAS arbitration, any party wishing to prevail on a disputed issue must discharge its ‘burden of proof’, i.e. it must meet the onus to substantiate its allegations and to affirmatively prove the facts on which it relies with respect to that issue.” (see CAS 2009/A/1909)

67. FIFA challenges the authenticity of the date reflected in the Settlement Agreement on the basis that it was allegedly backdated to 1 May 2025 (i.e., before the Appealed Decision was rendered and notified) for the purpose of avoiding sporting sanctions. It could be argued that FIFA bears the burden of proving its allegation that the Settlement Agreement was backdated.

68. However, the Sole Arbitrator considers that a strict application of the general rule may not be appropriate in the specific circumstances of this case. This conclusion follows from the application of the general principle of procedural fairness, which recognises that where one party is significantly better placed than the other to produce evidence of a given fact, that party bears a duty to substantiate and explain that fact (see CAS 2011/A/2384; CAS 2017/A/5045). Here, it is the Appellant itself (i.e., the party that negotiated and allegedly concluded the Settlement Agreement with the Player on 1 May 2025) that is better placed than FIFA to produce evidence as to the precise date on which the agreement was signed.

69. The Appellant negotiated and signed the Settlement Agreement with the Player. The Appellant therefore should have direct access to all the relevant documents and evidence showing when the agreement was actually concluded on that date. FIFA, on the other hand, was not involved in those negotiations and has no way of independently finding out or verifying the exact date when the agreement was signed. It would not be procedurally fair to require FIFA –a third party to the Settlement Agreement– to prove a date that is exclusively within the knowledge of the Appellant and the Player.

70. As a result, the Sole Arbitrator finds that the burden of proving the date on which the Settlement Agreement was concluded rests with the Appellant.

The date of the Settlement Agreement

71. The date on which the Settlement Agreement was concluded is central to the determination of this dispute.

72. The Sole Arbitrator notes that, according to Swiss law, namely Article 208, para. 2 of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code, settlement agreements have the same effect as a binding decision. Therefore, if such an agreement has been concluded prior to the issuance of a final decision, and the court is duly notified, the proceedings must be dismissed.

73. This was confirmed in CAS 2020/A/6793 para. 79 which provides: “[…] The parties’ decision incorporated in such agreement is binding, as this clearly stems from the provisions of Article 208, para. 2 of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code […]’. In addition, according to art 241 of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code: “[…] A settlement, acceptance of the claim or withdrawal of the action has the same effect as a binding decision […]” and “[…] the Court shall dismiss the proceedings”.

74. In light of the above, if, as according to the Appellant, the Settlement Agreement was signed before the Appealed Decision was made and notified to the Parties, there was no case for the FIFA DRC to consider in relation to breach of contract and no damages to be awarded to the Player. As a result, there would be no case for FIFA to decide and no registration ban to be imposed. Settlement would effectively bring the proceedings to an end and there would be no consideration of a sporting sanction in the form of a registration ban. However, as noted in CAS 2023/A/9876 paras. 80-82, registration bans are a harsh sanction for professional football clubs and that might lead a club to go to great lengths to avoid that sanction. Therefore, in circumstances where the date of the Settlement Agreement is disputed, the alleged signing date should be subject to scrutiny “to avoid opening a backdoor and an easy way out for the concerned party to avoid sporting sanctions once they have been imposed by the FIFA DRC and notified to the concerned party by means of a FIFA DRC decision” (CAS 2023/A/9876 para. 82).

75. At the hearing before CAS on 30 October 2025, Mr Kyriakos Prastitis, President of Anorthosis Famagusta, gave witness evidence in support of the Appellant’s case. Mr Prastitis explained that when he and his colleagues took over the Club in October 2024, he had to resolve several issues due to the mismanagement of the previous board. Mr Prastitis said he did not retain WhatsApp messages or emails because, in this case, he was able to resolve issues with the Player through phone calls and face to face meetings with his agent in Cyprus who he referred to as “Mr Costa”. Mr Prastitis said he ultimately agreed, at a meeting at the agent’s café, that the Player would be paid EUR 200,000 in compensation under the Settlement Agreement. The settlement negotiations were said to have taken place from November 2024, before being finalised on 1 May 2025.

76. Mr Prastitis said in evidence that, due to his lack of experience, he did not realise that he would need to retain emails and WhatsApp messages relating to the Settlement Agreement. Mr Prastitis said, at that time, he was just trying to keep the Club alive. Mr Prastitis said both he and the Club did not realise the need to notify FIFA of the Settlement Agreement when it was made on 1 May 2025. Mr Prastitis also said he only

realised notification was required in June 2025 when trying to use the FIFA Transfer Management System (“TMS”). The failure to notify the FIFA DRC that the case had been settled was said to have occurred due to an oversight, as the Club was dealing with over 30 other similar cases. Mr Prastitis was unsure whether it was he who drafted the Settlement Agreement or the Club’s CEO. In relation to the precise circumstances in which the Settlement Agreement was finalised, Mr Prastitis said he took the Settlement Agreement to the agent, Mr Costa, who sent it back to him signed having liaised with the Player. The process needed to draft and finalise the Settlement Agreement was said to have been concluded in three or four weeks. Mr Prastitis rejected the assertion by FIFA that the Settlement Agreement was backdated after the Appealed Decision had been provided. In relation to the registration ban imposed by the FIFA DRC, Mr Prastitis said that sanction (banning the Club from registering new players for two consecutive transfer periods) could potentially lead to the closure of the Club.

77. Despite the evidence given by Mr Prastitis, the date of the Settlement Agreement is strongly disputed by FIFA who emphasised the decision in CAS 2023/A/9876 (paras. 80 and 82), based on similar facts to the current case, which held that: “determining the signature date of the Settlement Agreement is of critical importance […]” and “[…] the alleged signing date must be stringently and carefully reviewed, so to avoid opening a backdoor and an easy way out for the concerned party to avoid a sporting sanction once they have been imposed by the FIFA DRC and notified to the concerned party by means a FIFA DRC decision”. The decision in CAS 2023/A/9876 also found that “[…] the majority of the Panel finds that the Appellant did not meet the required burden and standard of proof […] not a single written piece of evidence has been produced by the Appellant to support or corroborate that the Settlement Agreement was actually signed on 4 July 2023. In fact, there are no e-mails, WhatsApp messages, phone-logs or other documents on file that confirm any kind of communication between the Player’s and the Club’s legal representatives on the alleged date of signing”.

78. As the circumstances in this case are very similar to CAS 2023/A/9876, FIFA submits that there is no objective or credible timestamped evidence provided that the Settlement Agreement was concluded prior to the issuance of the Appealed Decision. These submissions are persuasive. If FIFA's submission is correct and the Settlement Agreement was backdated after the Appealed Decision was issued and notified, the Sole Arbitrator would have no basis to set aside the sporting sanctions imposed by the FIFA DRC.

79. The Sole Arbitrator notes that the absence of contemporaneous evidence relating to the signing of the Settlement Agreement undermines the Appellant’s case. In addition, the evidence given by Mr Prastitis contained insufficient detail of the precise circumstances in which the Settlement Agreement was negotiated, created and concluded, e.g. exactly where the Settlement Agreement was finalised, when and by whom.

80. The Sole Arbitrator notes that the First Respondent provided a short written witness statement dated 26 June 2025 in support of the Appellant’s case. However, it is unfortunate and detrimental to the Appellant’s case that the Player did not attend the hearing to give evidence in support of the Appellant. The First Respondent failed to

respond to correspondence from CAS concerning the hearing and failed to meaningfully engage with the CAS proceedings. Moreover, although the Appeal Brief stated that witness evidence in support of the Appellant’s case would be provided by Marinos Mitrou, former General Director of Anorthosis Famagusta and Mr Rafail Demetriou, CEO of Anorthosis Famagusta, it is unfortunate that none of these individuals gave evidence at the CAS hearing. In addition, the Player’s agent, Mr Costa, who was purported to have played a key role in finalising the Settlement Agreement, did not attend the CAS hearing to give evidence relating to the date of the Settlement Agreement. The lack of important witness evidence, and contemporaneous documentary evidence, in support of the Appellant inevitably undermines the strength of its case. As a result, the Sole Arbitrator finds that the Appellant has failed to discharge its burden to prove that the Settlement Agreement was concluded on 1 May 2025 before the Appealed decision was rendered and notified.

81. The Appellant submits that the facts in CAS 2013/A/3283 are similar to the present case. In that dispute, a settlement agreement had been concluded between the parties during the FIFA proceedings and prior to the issuance of a decision. That agreement had not been communicated to FIFA, like in the present case, but FIFA proceeded issuing a decision. However, that decision can be distinguished from the present case because, unlike this present case, there was no dispute about the date the settlement agreement was concluded. In addition, the CAS Panel were satisfied that the date of the agreement was correct, it had not been backdated and was agreed before the FIFA decision was notified to the parties. In addition, in CAS 2013/A/3283 the club had honoured the Settlement Agreement by paying the outstanding sums due to the player such that the subsequent FIFA DRC decision was redundant. As confirmed by the CAS Panel in that case: “[…] the Panel considers that the Settlement Agreement was not only effective and binding on the Parties, but its fundamental obligations, i.e. the payment of EUR 300,000 […] were duly executed.” As a result, the Panel concluded that “the Appealed Decision, which was taken in ignorance of the effective and binding Settlement Agreement, should be set aside […]” (CAS 2013/A/3283 paras. 67 and 70). The present case differs from CAS 2013/A/3283 in that what is contested between the Parties is the date on which the Settlement Agreement was concluded and whether its terms have been complied with is not in dispute in the present proceedings.

82. In all the circumstances of this case, given that the Appellant was unable to provide compelling evidence to confirm the date of the Settlement Agreement, the Sole Arbitrator finds that it is more likely than not that the Settlement Agreement was backdated to avoid the consequences of the sporting sanctions under Art. 17.4 of the FIFA RSTP.

83. The Sole Arbitrator notes that the Appellant was unable to provide sufficient documentary evidence or witness testimony to support or corroborate its assertion that the Settlement Agreement was signed on 1 May 2025, before the decision of the FIFA DRC on 15 May 2025. Therefore, as mentioned in paragraphs 46 and 77 above, the Appellant sought to use the Settlement Agreement as a “way out […] to avoid a sporting sanction once […] imposed by the FIFA DRC” (CAS 2023/A/9876 para. 82).

B. If the Settlement Agreement was in fact signed after the Appealed Decision was

notified and backdated to 1 May 2025, should the sporting sanctions imposed on the Club nevertheless be lifted?

84. It must be preliminarily noted that, under the Swiss law of obligations, a mere incorrect date in a contract does not automatically render it invalid, as it is not per se considered as an essential element under Swiss law (Ariane Morin; in Thévenoz/Werro (eds.), Commentaire romand, Code des obligations I, Art. 1-252 CO, 3rd edition, 2021, ad Art. 2 CO, N. 3-5; and WILHELM, C., "La date est-elle une condition de validité d'un contrat ?", Wilhelm Avocats, 26 February 2017). The CAS has confirmed this view in various awards i.e. CAS 2022/O/9346, paras. 63 ff, where the contract had likely been backdated (possibly due to the fact that a party misunderstood the legal relationship between two entities, and then tried to rectify this mistake by concealing the true timing of the assignment). In any event, the Sole Arbitrator notes that none of the Parties to the present proceedings is requesting that the Settlement Agreement be declared invalid.

85. Having made this preliminary observation and previously concluded, on the basis of the evidence, that the Settlement Agreement was not signed before the Appealed decision was made and notified, the Sole Arbitrator concludes that the Appealed Decision stands and should not be affected by a subsequent “horizontal” settlement of the financial claims between the Player and the Club when it comes to the “vertical” effects of Article 17(4) of the FIFA RSTP with respect to the sporting sanctions imposed on the Club.

86. The Appellant submits that, should the Sole Arbitrator not accept the above position regarding the date of the Settlement Agreement, they should still proceed to set aside the Appealed Decision. The Appellant submits the Appealed Decision should also be set aside because, although the Appellant concedes that it was responsible for a breach of contract during a protected period, Art. 17.4 of the RSTP lacks legal certainty and the sanctions imposed under it are arbitrary, unlawful and the registration ban imposed (for two consecutive transfer periods) is disproportionate.

87. The Appellant argues that its right to be heard has been violated by the FIFA DRC and the RSTP does not give FIFA the right to impose sporting sanctions in this case. The Appellant argues the existence of this right on its own is not enough to justify the imposition of such sanctions, without informing the party at risk of being sanctioned by first giving it the right to be heard. The Appellant submits that existing jurisprudence does not provide an automatic imposition of a registration ban under Art 17.4 of the FIFA RSTP.

88. FIFA disputes the Appellant’s submissions and asserts that sporting sanctions against the Appellant are fully justified by the FIFA RSTP. In particular, Article 13 of the RSTP clearly establishes that the only way a contract can be terminated is by the expiration of its term or by mutual agreement. Therefore “[a] contract between a professional and a club may only be terminated upon expiry of the term of the contract or by mutual agreement.” As a result, this regulation establishes one of the pillars underpinning the

RSTP and serves as a core objective of the football transfer system: the principle of contractual stability between professional players and clubs. FIFA refers to the Appellant as a “repeat offender”, engaging in serious misconduct that has persisted over time (see cases FPSD-14478, FPSD-14602, and FPSD-14612).

89. FIFA also submits in response that, irrespective of the Settlement Agreement, the financial claims fall within a horizontal dispute between the Appellant and the Player in relation to breach of contractual liabilities. However, the sporting sanctions imposed by the FIFA DRC form part of a vertical dispute between the Club and FIFA which can give rise to disciplinary measures under Art. 17 of the FIFA RSTP. As such, FIFA argues that settlement agreements do not have an annulling effect on the imposition of sporting sanctions (see CAS 2023/A/9876 and CAS 2021/A/8161 & 8162). FIFA argues that the Appellant’s claims that the sporting sanctions are disproportionate are without merit. FIFA submits that Art. 14 of the FIFA RSTP confirms that a single breach of contract in the protected period is sufficient to justify sporting sanctions in the form of a registration ban for two consecutive periods, and that this is just, proportionate and the regulatory standard.

90. The Sole Arbitrator finds that the FIFA DRC was entitled to form the view that the repeated pattern of contract termination by the Club, during a protected period, constitutes an aggravating factor that reinforces the justification for imposing sporting sanctions. This principle has been recognised by CAS (see CAS 2017/A/5056 para. 134) which states “[…] the mere fact that the Club was held liable for breaching four employment contracts with players [...] is a very serious aggravating factor, which in addition to the mandatory prerequisite of breaching the employment relationship within the 'protected period', may legitimately lead the FIFA DRC to impose sporting sanctions on the Club, regardless of whether the Club can be classified as a 'repeat offender'.”

91. The Sole Arbitrator considers that the Appellant’s arguments that the FIFA DRC did not respect its rights to be heard under EU law and Swiss law to be without merit. The Appellant was the subject of a number of cases before the FIFA DRC in relation to breach of contract. As a result, the Appellant had an opportunity in all these proceedings to exercise its right to be heard and make representations, given the likelihood that the FIFA DRC would impose sporting sanctions. Moreover, given the Appellant’s familiarity with proceedings before the FIFA DRC it knew, or ought to have known, that where there has been a breach of contract within a protected period the FIFA DRC were entitled to impose a sporting sanction under Art. 17.4 of the FIFA RSTP in the form of a registration ban.

92. The Appellant also submits that existing jurisprudence does not support the imposition of an automatic sporting sanction in the form of a registration ban in these circumstances but fails to particularise any persuasive jurisprudence to support this assertion. In fact, there is persuasive jurisprudence to the contrary which provides that sporting sanctions in the circumstances of this case are an inevitable consequence of the Appellant’s breach of contract and the FIFA DRC did not act arbitrarily (CAS

93. The Sole Arbitrator finds that, the fact that the Appellant has also appealed the other FIFA decisions to CAS, relating to similar circumstances, is immaterial and the FIFA DRC were entitled to impose sporting sanctions on the Appellant in the form of a registration ban relating to new players for two entire and consecutive periods. The registration ban imposed by the FIFA DRC in this case was the regulatory standard for a case of this kind pursuant to Art. 17.4 of the FIFA RSTP i.e. that “[The Club] shall be banned from registering any new players, either nationally or internationally, for two entire and consecutive registration periods […]”.

94. The Appellant submits that the imposition of the registration ban under Art. 17.4 of the FIFA RSTP is disproportionate. However, there is no evidence that Art. 17.4 of the FIFA RSTP is “evidently and grossly disproportionate”. Therefore, the Sole Arbitrator finds that the registration ban by the FIFA DRC was not disproportionate and this sporting sanction was a proportionate means of achieving the legitimate aim, to act as a deterrent to clubs to avoid breaching contracts in protected periods in contravention of the FIFA RSTP, and to safeguard contractual stability.

95. The Appellant also submits that the FIFA regulations are contrary to EU law, i.e. the right of free movement of workers and EU competition law. The Appellant emphasises that in the case of Diarra (C-650/22) in October 2024 it was held by the ECJ that Art. 17.4 of the RSTP was contrary to fundamental EU law principles. However, the Sole Arbitrator notes that, although the decision of the ECJ concluded that some aspects of the FIFA RSTP raised issues of EU law, it did not conclude that FIFA could not have rules to protect contractual stability. The Sole Arbitrator also notes that the specific factual circumstances of this case are not identical to that of Diarra. This case does not involve a breach of the FIFA RSTP where a player leaves a club without just cause or a situation in which a player’s new club actively induced the player to breach their contract, raising the potential issue of joint and several liability of a player and their new club.

96. In any event, in January 2025, in response to the decision in Diarra, FIFA implemented its Interim Regulatory Framework to address the infringements relating to the RSTP. The updated RSTP, including this framework, confirmed that in respect of Art. 17.4 of the FIFA RSTP “[a] sporting sanction shall be imposed (i) on any club found to be in breach of contract during the protected period […]. The club shall be banned from registering any new players, either nationally or internationally, for two entire and consecutive registration periods […] The club shall be able to register new players […] following the complete serving of the sporting sanction”. As a result of the above, and the Appellant’s admission of its breach of contract within a protected period, the Sole Arbitrator finds that the Appellant failed to operate in accordance with the principles of contractual stability required by the RSTP and therefore sporting sanctions were legitimately imposed by the FIFA DRC in accordance with Art 17.4 of the FIFA RSTP.

97. Having carefully considered the reasoning of the FIFA DRC for imposing sporting sanctions on the Club, and noting that the Club breached the Player’s contract in a protected period and has rightly been characterised as a “repeat offender”, the Sole Arbitrator concludes that the sporting sanctions imposed by the FIFA DRC on the Club

in the Appealed Decision are legitimate, proportionate and fully compliant with previous CAS jurisprudence, in particular CAS 2023/A/9876.

98. As a result of the above, the Appeal by Anorthosis Famagusta FC is dismissed.

99. The Sole Arbitrator reiterates that none of the Parties to the present proceedings is requesting that the Settlement Agreement be declared invalid. Indeed, the Sole Arbitrator notes that the Appellant is requesting that it be declared that the Settlement Agreement “retains its validity and enforceability”1 and none of the Respondents – critically, not the Player, who was both signatory to the Settlement Agreement and a counterparty to the present proceedings – has objected to its validity. For the sake of completeness, it is of note that neither Party has made any requests and/or presented arguments regarding the degree of compliance with the Settlement Agreement and, therefore, these issues are beyond the scope of the present arbitration proceedings.

X. COSTS

(…)

The Sole Arbitrator notes that the Appellant’s request for relief (point C)) reads as follows: “C. Declare that the contractual dispute between the Appellant and Respondent had been fully settled with the settlement agreement dated 01/05/2025 which retains its validity and enforceability”. For the reasons already mentioned, the Sole Arbitrator is not in a position to declare that the dispute was settled as of 1 May 2025.