Russian Olympic Committee (ROC), Lyukman Adams, Kseniya Aksyonova, Victor Butenko, Timofey Chalyy, Elena Cherniaeva (Kozlova), Dmitriy Chizhikov, Artem Denmukhametov, Gulshat Fazlitdinova, Aleksey Fedorov, Ekaterina Galitskaia, Georgy Gorokhov, Elena Isinbaeva, Pavel Ivashko, Darya Klishina, Oxana Kondratyeva, Ekaterina Koneva, Vasiliy Kopeikin, Elena Korobkina, Ilia Krasnov, Vladimir Krasnov, Antonina Krivoshapka, Maria Kuchina, Denis Kudryavtsev, Anna Kukushkina, Alla Kuliatina, Alexandr Lesnoi, Sergej Litvinov, Danil Lysenko, Yuliya Maltseva, Alena Mamima, Nikolay Markov, Aleksandr Menkov, Anna Misochenko, Olga Mullina, Marina Pandakova, Elena (Yuelena) Panova, Marina Panteleyeva, Yulia Pidluzhnaya, Evgeniya Polyakova, Sergey Polyanskiy, Mariya Ponomareva, Alina Prokopeva, Vera Rebrik (Rebryk), Ekaterina Renzhina, Aleksey Reunkov, Vera Rudakova, Ilgizar Safiullin, Ivan Shablyuev (Shablyuyev), Sergey Sharypov, Anna Shchagina, Ilya Shkurenev, Sergey Shubenkov, Maksim Sidorov, Anzhelika Sidorova, Kristina Sivkova, Aleksei Sokirskii, Ekaterina Sokolenko, Ekaterina Strokova, Dmitri Tarabin, Irina Tarasova, Pavel Trenikhin, Sardana Trofimova, Daniil Tysplakov, Ivan Ukhov, Roman Yevstifeyev, Svetlana Vasilyeva, Natalia Vlasova, Tatyana Arkhipova v. International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF)

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND — A. Introductory Remark

4. Below is a summary of the relevant facts and allegations based on the parties’ written and oral submissions, pleadings and evidence adduced. Additional facts and allegations found in the parties’ submissions, pleadings and evidence may be set out, where relevant, in connection with the legal discussion that follows. While the Panel has considered all the facts, allegations, legal arguments and evidence submitted by the parties in the present proceedings, it refers in its award only to the submissions and evidence it considers necessary to explain its reasoning for the case.

5. In this regard, the Panel wishes to make clear that the case heard, and the award it renders, is not about “collective punishment” of athletes – a measure on which the Panel expresses no view. It is also not about the presumption of guilt of innocent athletes. It is only about the applicability (and indeed the application) of specific rules within the IAAF system and in the Olympic Charter with respect to the consequences for affiliate athletes of the suspension of the national federation to which they belong. The question whether the Claimant Athletes are directly or indirectly responsible for anti-doping rule violations, because of their actions, omissions or nationality, is not the object of this award and was not before the Panel.

(operative part of 21 July 2016)

B. Events in 2015

6. On 2 November 2015, ARAF (the All-Russia Athletics Federation) became RusAF (the Russian Athletics Federation). The CAS Panel will refer to the Russian federation as RusAF except where ARAF was used in contemporaneous documents.

7. On 9 November 2015, an independent commission (“IC”) presided over by Richard Pound QC submitted a report to the President of the World Anti-Doping Agency (“WADA”). The IC’s mandate was the examination of allegations made on television programs aired by the German television channel ARD, with particular reference to athletics in Russia and the IAAF. Amongst several recommendations made against various bodies, the report recommended that WADA should immediately declare ARAF to be non-compliant with the WADC.

8. On 13 November 2015, the IAAF Council provisionally suspended ARAF with immediate effect under Articles 6.11(b) and 14.7 of the IAAF Constitution. At the same time, it was decided that in order to regain full membership ARAF would need to satisfy a list of criteria, to be verified by a task force specifically appointed for such purpose (the “Taskforce”). The consequences of the suspension were described to be the following: “­ athletes, and athlete support personnel from Russia may not compete in International Competitions including World Athletics Series competitions and the Olympic Games;

• Russia will not be entitled to host the 2016 World Race Walking Team Championships (Cheboksary) and 2016 World Junior Championships (Kazan)

• that ARAF delegates the conduct of all outstanding doping cases to [the Court of Arbitration for Sport] CAS”.

9. On 25 November 2015, Mr Mikhail Butov, the General Secretary of ARAF, wrote to Mr Nick Davies, the Deputy General Secretary of the IAAF. By that letter, ARAF stated in pertinent part as follows: “In reply to your letter on 25 November I would like to confirm once again our recognize [sic] of suspension. We recognize suspension without a hearing”.

10. On 26 November 2015, the IAAF Council confirmed the full suspension of ARAF.

11. On 11 December 2015, the Taskforce’s terms of reference were posted on the IAAF’s website. Various conditions were set out for the reinstatement of RusAF (the “Reinstatement Conditions”). Verification criteria (the “Verification Criteria”) were set out in an annex.

C. Events in 2016

12. On 17 June 2016, the IAAF Council stated in a press release that Mr Rune Andersen, an independent chairperson of the Taskforce monitoring RusAF, had recommended that RusAF should not be reinstated to membership of the IAAF because several important Verification

(operative part of 21 July 2016)

Criteria had not been met, specifically: a. The deep-seated culture of tolerance (or worse) for doping that led to RusAF being suspended in the first place appeared not to have changed materially. b. A strong and effective anti-doping infrastructure capable of detecting and deterring doping had still not been created. c. There were detailed allegations, which were already partly substantiated, that the Russian authorities, far from supporting the anti-doping effort, had in fact orchestrated systematic doping and the covering up of adverse analytical findings.

13. As a result, the IAAF Council decided not to reinstate RusAF to IAAF membership. The consequence, said the IAAF Council, was that Russian athletes remained ineligible under IAAF rules to compete in international competitions (the “International Competitions”), as defined in the IAAF Competition Rules, edition 2015-2016 (the “Competition Rules”), including the European Championships and the track-and-field events at the 2016 Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil (the “Rio Olympic Games” or the “2016 Olympic Games”).

14. On the same day, the IAAF Council passed a rule amendment to the effect that if there were any individual athletes who can clearly and convincingly show that they were not tainted by the Russian system because they had been outside the country, and subject to other, effective antidoping systems, including effective drug-testing, then they should be able to apply for permission to compete in International Competitions, not for Russia but as a neutral athlete.

15. Further, the IAAF Council recommended that any individual athlete who had made an extraordinary contribution to the fight against doping in sport should also be able to apply for permission to compete in International Competitions (as a neutral athlete). The IAAF implemented a new rule in its Competition Rules, namely Rule 22.1A, and a new definition of “Neutral Athlete”.

16. As a result of such modifications, the pertinent provisions of the Competition Rules state as follows: DEFINITIONS Neutral Athlete As specified in Rule 22.1A, an athlete who is granted special eligibility by the Council to compete in one or more International Events in an individual capacity and who satisfies at all relevant times any conditions to such eligibility specified by the Council. All provisions in the Rules and Regulations that are applicable to athletes shall apply equally to Neutral Athletes, unless expressly stated otherwise; and any coach, trainer, manager, Athlete Representative, agent, team staff, official, medical or para-medical personnel, parent or any other Person employed by or working with a Neutral Athlete participating in an International Competition shall be an Athlete Support Personnel for purposes of these Rules.

(operative part of 21 July 2016)

RULE 22 Ineligibility for International and Domestic Competitions 1. The following persons shall be ineligible for competitions, whether held under these Rules or the rules of an Area or a Member. Any athlete, athlete support personnel or other person: (a) whose National Federation is currently suspended by the IAAF. This does not apply to national competitions organised by the currently suspended Member for the Citizens of that Country or territory; [...] 1A. Notwithstanding Rule 22.1(a), upon application, the Council (or its delegate(s)) may exceptionally grant eligibility for some or all International Competitions, under conditions defined by the Council (or its delegate(s)), to an athlete whose National Federation is currently suspended by the IAAF, if (and only if) the athlete is able to demonstrate to the comfortable satisfaction of the Council that: (a) the suspension of the National Federation was not due in any way to its failure to protect and promote clean athletes, fair play, and the integrity and authenticity of the sport; or (b) if the suspension of the National Federation was due in any way to its failure to put in place adequate systems to protect and promote clean athletes, fair play, and the integrity and authenticity of the sport, (i) that failure does not affect or taint the athlete in any way, because he was subject to other, fully adequate, systems outside of the country of the National Federation for a sufficiently long period to provide substantial objective assurance of integrity; and (ii) in particular the athlete has for such period been subject to fully compliant drug-testing in- and out-of-competition equivalent in quality to the testing to which his competitors in the International Competition(s) in question are subject; or (c) that the athlete has made a truly exceptional contribution to the protection and promotion of clean athletes, fair play, and the integrity and authenticity of the sport. The more important the International Competition in question, the more corroborating evidence the athlete must provide in order to be granted special eligibility under this Rule 22.1A. Where such eligibility is granted, the athlete shall not represent the suspended National Federation in the International Competition(s) in question, but rather shall compete in an individual capacity, as a “Neutral Athlete”.

17. The Panel shall refer to Rules 22.1(a) and 22.1A, and the new definition of “Neutral Athlete”, as the “Contested Rules”.

18. On 23 June 2016, the IAAF provided guidelines as to the application of Rule 22.1A (the “Guidelines”).

19. On 24 June 2016, the IAAF wrote to RusAF confirming the decisions which the IAAF Council had taken on 17 June 2016.

(operative part of 21 July 2016)

III. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT (“CAS”)

20. On 2 July 2016, the parties entered into an “Arbitration Agreement” (the “Arbitration Agreement”) under which they agreed to submit the dispute, which had arisen between them as to a number of issues, to arbitration at the Court of Arbitration for Sport (“CAS”) pursuant to Article R38 of the Code of Sports-related Arbitration (the “Code”), for adjudication according to an expedited procedure.

21. In the Arbitration Agreement the parties agreed inter alia that the Panel would be constituted as follows: Mr Luigi Fumagalli (President); Mr Jeffrey Benz and His Honour Robert Reid QC (Arbitrators).

22. The Arbitration Agreement, at its Article 2, identified the disputed issues to be the following (these were the only issues before the Panel in these proceedings): “2.1. Is IAAF Competition Rule 22.1(a) valid and enforceable in the circumstances of the present dispute? 2.2. Is IAAF Competition Rule 22.1A valid and enforceable in the circumstances of the present dispute? In particular (but without limitation), can IAAF Competition Rule 22.1A validly and/or lawfully exclude Russian track and field athletes from International Competition (as that term is defined in IAAF Competition Rule 1.1): 2.2.1. who are not currently subject to any period of ineligibility for the commission of an anti-doping rule violation?; and/or 2.2.2. who are part of the IAAF Registered Testing Pool?; and/or 2.2.3. on the basis that they have not lived or do not live outside of Russia? 2.3. Under the Olympic Charter, is the ROC entitled to nominate and is the IOC entitled to accept the entry of Russian track and field athletes to compete at the Rio Olympic Games even if they are not eligible to participate under IAAF Competition Rule 22.1(a) and 22.1A? 2.4. Under the Olympic Charter, if any Russian track and field athletes are eligible to compete at the Rio Olympic Games under IAAF Competition Rule 22.1A, is the ROC entitled to have them compete as representatives of Russia, or may they only participate in an individual capacity, not representing any country?”.

23. In the Arbitration Agreement the parties also agreed that the IOC would be invited to participate in the arbitration as an interested party with respect to issues 2.3 and 2.4. The IOC, however, in a communication dated 15 July 2016 finally decided “not [to] participate as a party to the abovementioned arbitration”.

24. On 3 July 2016, the Claimants filed a Request for Arbitration and Statement of Claim (the “Claim”).

25. On 10 July 2016, the IAAF filed a Response to the Claimants’ Request for Arbitration and Statement of Claim.

(operative part of 21 July 2016)

26. On 15 July 2016, an appeal was submitted by 67 of the 69 Claimants (the “Appeal”). Those two Claimants who are not party to the Appeal are 1) the ROC and 2) Ms Darya Klishina. The Appeal was heard at the same time as the Claim. It is the subject of a separate award (see CAS

27. On 19 July 2016, a hearing took place before the CAS Panel at the Maison de la Paix, Chemin Eugene-Rigot 2, 1202 Geneva, Switzerland.

28. At the hearing, the parties, by their counsel, made extensive submissions in support of their respective cases. One of the 68 Claimant Athletes, Ms Isinbaeva, personally present, rendered a declaration. At the conclusion of the hearing, finally, the parties expressly stated that their right to be heard and to be treated equally in the proceedings had been fully respected.

29. On 21 July 2016, the CAS Panel issued the operative part of this Award.

IV. SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES

30. The following outline of the parties’ positions is illustrative only and does not necessarily detail every submission advanced by the Claimants and the Respondent. The Panel has nonetheless carefully considered all the submissions made by the parties, whether or not there is specific reference to them in the following summary.

A. The Claimants’ submissions

31. The Claimants’ submissions may be summarized as follows:

a) IAAF Competition Rules 22.1(a) and 22.1A are inconsistent with the WADC

32. As a member of the Olympic Movement and in accordance with Rules 25 and 43 of the Olympic Charter, the IAAF is required to comply with the WADC.

33. Further, Article 3.8 of the IAAF Constitution requires the IAAF to “play a leading role in the fight against doping”. Therefore, any act which undermines the WADC would be a violation of its own Constitution. Consistently, IAAF Competition Rule 48.1 mandates that the CAS and other tribunals must respect the “policies and standards set out in the WADA Code” and as “accepted by the IAAF”. As a consequence, the CAS Panel must ensure that the IAAF’s decisions and rules do not contravene the WADC.

34. Harmonisation is both a key objective and a key element of the WADC.

35. Article 23.2.2 of the WADC specifies that “No additional provision may be added to a Signatory’s rules which changes the effect of the Articles”.

36. As can be seen from an IAAF press release dated 17 June 2016, the IAAF has made clear that

(operative part of 21 July 2016)

its decision not to reinstate RusAF and Russian athletes is based entirely on (i) the alleged deficiencies of the RusAF’s “anti-doping infrastructure” and “partly substantiated” allegations of “systematic doping” in Russia (the “Anti-Doping Breaches”) and (ii) the presumption that all Russian athletes are, as a result, “tainted by the Russian system” (the “Suspected Anti-Doping Breaches”).1

37. Accordingly, the Contested Rules have operated as a sanction for the RusAF’s Anti-Doping Breaches and for the Russian athletes’ Suspected Anti-Doping Breaches.

38. At the very least, Rule 22.1(a) has been applied as, in part, a sanction (even if also in part an eligibility rule). To determine the nature of Rule 22.1(a) it is necessary to consider its impact, not merely its description (CAS 2011/A/2658 BOA v WADA). It is also necessary to consider the perception of the rule.

39. Accordingly, Rule 22.1(a) has had the effect of a sanction which should properly come under the ambit of the WADC.

40. However, Rule 22.1(a) trespasses on and alters the effect of the mandatory provisions of the WADC: a. The Claimant Athletes are punished for the violations of others and for being “tainted by the Russian system”. Such guilt by association is akin to and expands on the bounds of Article 2.10 of the WADC. b. The Claimant Athletes are presumed to be tainted and bear the burden of rebutting that presumption. By virtue of Rule 22.1A the Claimant Athletes have to rebut the presumption to the standard of comfortable satisfaction. Thus, the burden and standard of proof mandated by Article 3.1 of the WADC have been turned on their heads. c. The period of ineligibility imposed on the Claimant Athletes for a suspected or presumed violation is self-evidently inconsistent with Article 10 of the WADC.

41. As a result, the application of Rule 22.1(a) is invalid and unenforceable (CAS 2012/A/3055 Riis Cycling A/S v the Licence Commission of the UCI at 8.36). If the IAAF wished to make amendments to the WADC, it would have to do so in accordance with Article 23.7 of the WADC.

b) Estoppel

42. Representatives of the IAAF were complicit in the failures for which ARAF and its athletes were suspended. Therefore the IAAF must be estopped from imposing Article 22.1(a) on the Claimant Athletes.

1 These defined phrases are taken from the Claimants’ submissions.

(operative part of 21 July 2016)

c) Lack of legal certainty

43. The application of the Contested Rules, in the circumstances of this case, must be declared invalid and unenforceable on the basis that it violates the principle of legal certainty (CAS 94/129 Quigley v UIT).

44. Rules must clearly distinguish between what is prohibited and what is not. To the extent that they do not, the lack of clarity must be resolved in favour of the athlete. The Contested Rules are unclear. The period of ineligibility to which the athletes are subject is indeterminate and therefore lacks legal certainty and there is no clear connection between the incriminated behaviour and the sanction because the Claimant Athletes are being punished as a result of the actions of others. Further, the criteria to be met under Rule 22.1A are vague. They also impose retroactive requirements, such as an athlete needing to prove that he has lived outside Russia.

d) Proportionality

45. The Claimants accept that there have been some serious failings within Russian athletics. However, the decision of the IAAF to exclude all Russian athletes from all International Competitions is disproportionate.

46. In particular, it is wrong to punish an athlete on the basis: a. of acts committed by administrators of the sport and not related in any way to the athlete’s own behaviour; b. the presumption of guilt based on nationality.

47. If the IAAF’s aim is to combat doping, there is no need to apply the Contested Rules because that aim is already exhaustively pursed by the WADC.

e) The Right to Equal Treatment

48. The application of Rules 22.1(a) and 22.1A(b) is discriminatory and, therefore, unlawful.

49. To comply with Rule 22.1A(b) a Russian athlete would need to live outside Russia. The implication is that the mere fact of living in Russia means that an athlete is doping.

50. Article 3.4 of the IAAF Constitution provides that one of the IAAF’s Objects is to prevent unfair discrimination. That object is violated if the IAAF adopts a rule which requires an athlete to live outside the county of their birth. It would also be a violation of the Olympic Charter (see the Fundamental Principles of Olympism), which binds the IAAF since it is a member of the Olympic Movement. Moreover, Article 3.11 of its Constitution requires the IAAF to “play a leading role in the achievement of the aims of the Olympic Movement”.

51. Rule 22.1A(b) is discriminatory regardless of whether it is recognised as a sanction or considered

(operative part of 21 July 2016)

to be a mere eligibility rule.

f) Legitimate expectations

52. The application of Rule 22.1(a) is contrary to the Claimants’ legitimate expectations and the terms of Rule 22.1A are too restrictive and contrary to the legitimate expectations of all Russian athletes.

53. As to Rule 22.1(a), the Claimant Athletes had a legitimate expectation that: a. They would not be punished for the conduct of others. b. Sanctions for doping-related conduct were limited to those in the WADC and Chapter 3 of the IAAF Competition Rules. They did not expect a new type of violation – presumed doping – based on nationality.

54. Accordingly Rule 22.1(a) is invalid and unenforceable.

55. As to Rule 22.1A, the Claimant Athletes had a legitimate expectation that in order to have the opportunity to return to International Competition they needed only to fulfil the November 2015 Eligibility Criteria proposed by the IAAF. Yet on 17 June 2016, the IAAF proposed totally new criteria under Rule 22.1A. On 23 June 2016, the IAAF published the Guidelines for applications made under Rule 22.1A. The Guidelines provide opaque criteria.

56. Rule 22.1A, coupled with the Guidelines, are impenetrable for any prospective applicant. They are not measurable and lack any legal certainty.

57. It is unfair and contrary to the legitimate expectations of all clean Russian athletes to be given just two weeks to meet an entirely new set of conditions, most of which are impossible for them to meet. By way of example: a. Only one of the Claimant Athletes happens to live outside of Russia. The other 67 cannot fulfil that condition. b. No athlete, no matter from where in the world they come, has any control over who conducts their doping control tests.

58. Accordingly, the application of Rule 22.1(a) is invalid and/or unenforceable. Alternatively, Rule 22.1A is invalid and/or unenforceable and any Russian athlete who submitted themselves to the reinstatement terms set out at Section 5 of the Verification Criteria published on 11 December 2015 should have the opportunity to participate at the Olympic Games.

g) The ROC’s right and duty to nominate athletes for the Olympic Games

59. There are no provisions in the Olympic Charter which prevent the ROC from entering Russian

(operative part of 21 July 2016)

athletes to compete at the 2016 Olympic Games. The Olympic Charter (see Rule 40) governs the admissions process over and above the IAAF Rules.

60. The IAAF set the qualification criteria, RusAF selects and recommends athletes to the ROC for entry, the ROC reviews and approves RusAF’s recommendations, the ROC then submits the list of athletes to OCOG, and the IOC accepts or refuses the ROC’s entries.

61. The IAAF’s role in setting the qualification criteria refers to the technical sporting eligibility criteria prescribed in the IAAF Documents – “Rio 2016 Qualification System” and “Rio 2016 Qualification System and Entry Standards” (“the IAAF Qualification Standards”).2

62. The IAAF Qualification Standards prescribe, for example, the numbers of qualifying athletes each National Olympic Committee (“NOC”) can enter per event. They are an exhaustive system for the selection of athletes to participate in the Olympic Games.

63. The IAAF is unable simply to add further qualifying criteria which are not limited to technical sporting eligibility. By selecting only those athletes who (i) meet the standards expressly set out in the IAAF Qualification System and (ii) have been recommended by RusAF, the ROC would be acting in full compliance with the Olympic Charter entry process.

64. As to its duty, the ROC is bound (see Rule 44(4) of the Olympic Charter) to enter those competitors that have been recommended by RusAF, subject only to those athletes meeting the standards expressly set out in the IAAF Qualification Standards.

65. The ROC and the IOC are obliged to act in accordance with the Olympic Charter. So, even if the IAAF persuaded the CAS Panel that Rule 22.1A constituted “qualification criteria” within the meaning and scope of the Olympic Charter, the ROC and IOC would be required to disregard it because it does not comply with the WADC (see submissions above) and it is discriminatory (see submissions above).

66. Therefore, the ROC is required to enter those competitors that have been recommended by RusAF subject only to those athletes meeting the standards expressly set out in the IAAF Qualification Standards. Further, the ROC and IOC are obliged to disregard the application of any rule which is contrary to the Olympic Charter, the WADC or any fundamental principle of law and which, as a consequence of its application, would result in the non-selection of an athlete otherwise eligible to participate at the Olympic Games.

h) Russian Athletes are entitled – and bound – to participate as Russian Athletes

67. In the event the CAS Panel finds the Contested Rules are valid and enforceable, it is nevertheless the case that the Claimant Athletes must compete as representatives of Russia and not as a Neutral Athlete as suggested by Rule 22.1A.

2 This is the Claimants’ definition.

(operative part of 21 July 2016)

68. The IOC has the sole authority to determine the nationality of competitors. Rule 41(3) of the Olympic Charter provides that competitors must have a nationality, which is deemed to be that of the NOC which enters the competitor.

69. The IAAF’s attempt to determine competitors’ nationalities is ultra vires, because its role is limited to setting the rules for participation and qualification (see Rule 26 and Bye-Law 1 to Rule 40 of the Olympic Charter).

70. The ROC has exclusive authority to represent its country at the Olympic Games (Rule 27(3) of the Olympic Charter), not RusAF. Any Russian athletes eligible under the IAAF Qualification Standards must compete as a representative of the ROC and, consequently, Russia.

71. Further, Rule 22.1A has no application at the Olympic Games (see Bye-law 9 to Rule 44 of the Olympic Charter). An entry of a Russian athlete is only valid if entered as a representative of the ROC. Any process the IAAF purports to establish in order to grant eligibility to an athlete as a “Neutral Athlete” has no application to the Olympic Games.

72. Accordingly, any Russian athletes competing at the Olympic Games can only do so as representatives of the ROC and, consequently, as representatives of Russia. There is no mechanism in the Olympic Charter which would allow for the application of the IAAF’s rules regarding “Neutral Athletes”.

i) The Claimants claims

73. In light of the foregoing, the Claimants requested the Panel to order as follows: “(a) IAAF Competition Rule 22.1(a) is invalid and unenforceable in the circumstances of the present; (b) IAAF Competition Rule 22.1A is invalid and unenforceable in the circumstances of the present; (c) Any Russian athlete who is not currently the subject of any period of ineligibility for the commission of an anti-doping rule violation may participate at the 2016 Olympic Games (subject to meeting the qualification standards for his or her event); (d) No Russian athlete shall be excluded from participation at the 2016 Olympic Games on the basis of where they live or on the basis of their nationality; (e) Without prejudice to the requests for relief above, no Russian athletes shall be excluded from participation at the 2016 Olympic Games if they have submitted themselves to the conditions set out at Section 5 of the IAAF’s Verification Criteria published on 11 December 2015; (f) The ROC is entitled to nominate and the IOC is entitled to accept the entry of Russian track and field athletes to compete at the Rio Olympic Games, even if they are not eligible to participate under IAAF Competition Rule 22.1(a) and 22.1A; (g) If any Russian athlete is entitled to compete at the 2016 Olympic Games further to the application of IAAF Competition 22.1A, they can do so as representatives of Russia;

(operative part of 21 July 2016)

(h) The IAAF to: (i) reimburse the Claimants’ legal costs; (ii) bear the costs of the arbitration”.

B. The IAAF’s response

74. The IAAF’s response to these submissions can be summarised as follows (for ease of reference, the same headings are used as were used when summarising the Claimants’ submissions but, clearly, they do not form part of the IAAF’s response):

a) IAAF Competition Rules 22.1(a) and 22.1A are inconsistent with the WADC

75. The Claimant Athletes are not excluded from International Competitions as a punishment for their own doping conduct; their exclusion is a necessary consequence of the fact that their national federation has failed to subject them to an anti-doping system that meets the mandatory requirements of the WADC and the IAAF Anti-Doping Rules. The pyramid system of governance and regulation of sport requires that they share the fate of their domestic federation, and bear the consequences of the actions and omissions, achievements and failures of that federation’s management.

76. As to the alleged inconsistency between the Contested Rules and the WADC, the Claimants have conflated and confused: a. Rule 22.1(a) which states that athletes affiliated to a suspended national federation are ineligible to participate in International Competitions; and b. Rule 22.1A which creates an exception to Rule 22.1(a), whereby an athlete affiliated to a suspended national federation may be deemed eligible to compete in International Competitions if he brings himself within one of three exceptions.

77. Rule 22.1(a) is simply a necessary consequence of the sanction imposed on the national federation for failure to live up to its obligations. The sanction is that the federation loses its membership privileges, which include the right to enter its athletes in International Competitions. Rule 22.1(a) merely confirms this point and gives it effect.

78. Rule 22.1A, on the other hand, does not impose ineligibility on anyone, but in facts provides a route to eligibility for an athlete affiliated to a suspended federation.

79. Rule 22.1(a) had existed since 2000, whereas Rule 22.1A had been brought in only in 2016.

80. The instant case can be distinguished from precedents relied on by the Claimants by virtue of the fact that Rule 22.1 sanctions the misconduct of the federation, not the athlete. The sanction must be ineligibility, otherwise the federation will not be incentivised to reform.

(operative part of 21 July 2016)

81. Such a sanction is not inconsistent with the WADC (see Articles 12 and 20.3.2 and also Rule 12.3 of WADA’s Model Rules for International Federations).

82. This kind of sanction has also been upheld by a CAS Panel in CAS 2015/A/4319.

b) Estoppel

83. First, the doctrine of estoppel has no place in doping cases since the implantation of the WADC. Secondly, if the doctrine of estoppel has any applicability at all in doping cases, it is only in the most exceptional of cases.

84. The IAAF accepts that former IAAF officials colluded with ARAF officials to delay results management of certain ABP cases until after the 2012 Olympic Games. But it is not correct to say that IAAF officials were involved in the conduct which resulted in ARAF’s suspension on 13 November 2015. There is not even any allegation that IAAF officials were involved in the systemic doping set out in the first WADA IC Report on which ARAF’s suspension was based. The cover up of the APB cases in 2011 did not cause the corruption but was incidental to it.

85. Further, the delaying of results management was apparently unknown to the Claimant Athletes, so none of them can say that it led them to change their behaviour or to believe that ARAF would not be held to its anti-doping obligations. They cannot point to any word or deed upon which they relied to guarantee their right to participate in International Competitions despite their national federation’s misconduct.

86. In fact, any concept of estoppel of misconduct applies against the Claimants for failing to bring their challenge seven months ago, when ARAF was first suspended and they were first excluded from International Competitions.

c) Lack of legal certainty

87. The rules are clear. The complaint that Rule 22.1(a) lacks legal certainty because the length of exclusion is indeterminate is without merit. The rule is clear that exclusion is a consequence of suspension of the national federation. Once the federation is reinstated to membership, the athletes can compete once more in International Competitions. Therefore the rule is clear and has legal certainty.

88. The argument that Rule 22.1A offends against legal certainty by introducing a retrospective requirement is merely a repeat of the legitimate expectation argument (see below).

89. The argument that the Rule 22.1A criteria are vague has no merit. First, it is not a rule involving a sanction. Instead it provides an exclusion to a sanction. Secondly, the rule needs to be framed flexibly to operate properly. Whilst it was true that it did not operate mechanically, it could not do so.

(operative part of 21 July 2016)

d) Proportionality

90. It is clearly rational for the IAAF to take the view that Rule 22.1 is essential to the fight against doping in sport. The IAAF has a significant “margin of appreciation” in deciding which restrictions to implement. The IAAF’s objective of making all athletes subject to WADCcompliant anti-doping rules can only be achieved by requiring each national federation to enforce those rules as a condition of membership. There need to be significant sanctions in the event of breach for the sake of public confidence and in order to incentivise change in federations and other institutions.

91. In order to mitigate the effects of Rule 22.1(a) as much as possible, the IAAF has added Rule 22.1A. Thus the IAAF has applied and fully respected the principle of proportionality.

92. The effect on innocent athletes, which is unfortunate, is outweighed by the benefits of retaining public confidence in the integrity of international competition and preventing other athletes from being cheated out of the medals, prize money and glory they deserve.

e) The Right to Equal Treatment

93. There is no discrimination on grounds of nationality in Rule 22.1A. The rules discriminate on grounds of non-compliance with the anti-doping responsibilities of a member, which is not only legitimate discrimination but necessary. They apply to any member, not just RusAF.

94. The Claimant Athletes’ applications for exceptional eligibility have failed not because they are Russian, or because they live in Russia, but because the Russian authorities have frustrated and corrupted all attempts to operate a drug-testing programme that can deliver any sort of objective assurance of integrity.

f) Legitimate expectation

95. Again, the Claimants’ arguments depend upon a mischaracterisation of Rule 22.1(a). The athletes are not punished for “presumed doping”. It is a necessary consequence of their federation breaching a condition of membership. Those membership rules have always been clear that suspension of membership leads to the exclusion of the member’s athletes from international competition.

96. As to what is said about the Verification Criteria, they are clear that they only become relevant if and when the Reinstatement Conditions have been met and RusAF has been reinstated to membership of the IAAF (see 5.1 and 5.3 of the Verification Criteria).

97. Rule 22.1A did not move the goalposts adversely to the Russian athletes. Rather, it created another goal for them to shoot at. Their opportunities to compete were enhanced, not restricted. Previously, the athletes, to compete, had to rely on RusAF being reinstated. Rule 22.1A provides a way for them to compete without RusAF being reinstated.

(operative part of 21 July 2016)

g) The ROC’s right and duty to nominate athletes for the Olympic Games

98. It is the international federations which have the sole right to set their sports’ eligibility rules for the Olympic Games (see Rules, 25, 26, 40 and 44 of the Olympic Charter). An NOC cannot enter an athlete who is not eligible to participate under an international federation’s rules. This has been recognised by, for example, the IOC in its “Declaration of the Olympic Summit” on 21 June 2016.

99. Accordingly, the ROC has no right to enter athletes for the Olympic Games who are not eligible under the Contested Rules.

h) Russian Athletes are entitled – and bound – to participate as Russian Athletes

100. The IOC can invite and has invited athletes to participate in the Olympic Games as independent Olympic athletes both when there is no NOC for a particular country and when there is one.

101. Otherwise, the IAAF agrees that only an NOC can enter athletes for the Olympic Games. But that does not mean that they compete as representatives of the NOC’s country (see Rule 6.1 of the Olympic Charter).

102. The IAAF’s role is not limited to technical matters. It has the right to take decisions on eligibility, including the right to decide that an athlete affiliated to a national federation which has been suspended for integrity reasons who has secured exceptional eligibility may not represent that nation in the competition but rather must compete in an individual capacity. This is because the national federation has forfeited its right to participate in international competitions. If its athletes could nevertheless represent it in international competitions, that consequence would lose its bite.

103. Whilst it is correct that only an NOC can enter athletes to compete in its team in the Olympic Games, it must do so in accordance with the IAAF’s eligibility rules, which include that an athlete qualifying as eligible under Rule 22.1A must compete in an individual capacity.

i) The Respondent’s claims

104. On the basis of the foregoing, the Respondent requested the Panel: “(a) to dismiss all of the Claimants’ claims; (b) to declare that, as a result of RusAF’s continuing (and unchallenged) suspension from membership of the IAAF, IAAF Competition Rule 22.1(a) applies, and therefore the ROC may not enter any athletes for the athletics programme in the 2016 Olympic Games (or nor may any athletes affiliated to RusAF compete in any other International Competition, as defined in IAAF Competition Rule 1.1) unless they have been granted exceptional eligibility under IAAF Competition Rule 22.1A;

(operative part of 21 July 2016)

(c) to declare that there is no good basis to disturb the decisions of the IAAF’s Doping Review Board to reject the Claimant Athletes’ applications to be granted exceptional eligibility under IAAF Competition (d) to declare that any athlete who is granted exceptional eligibility under IAAF Competition Rule 22.1A to participate in International Competitions and who is invited to compete in an International Competition (including the Olympic Games) by the organiser of that competition may only participate therein in an individual capacity, and may not be entered, and may not participate, in a representative capacity; and (e) further to its powers under CAS Code Article 64.5, to order the Claimants to pay all of the CAS arbitration costs of these proceedings and a contribution to the costs that the IAAF has incurred in these proceedings”.