Evangelia Trikomiti & European Gymnastics v. Gymnastics Ethics Foundation

V. JURISDICTION

99. Article R47 of the CAS Code provides as follows:

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“An appeal against the decision of a federation, association or sports-related body may be filed with CAS if the statutes or regulations of the said body so provide or if the parties have concluded a specific arbitration agreement and if the Appellant has exhausted the legal remedies available to it prior to the appeal, in accordance with the statutes or regulations of that body. […]”.

100. The Panel notes that, on 20 February 2025, the GEF, Ms Trikomiti and EG entered into an arbitration agreement (the “Arbitration Agreement”), whose clause 3 provides that “each Party agree that any appeal of the Decision, or any other decisions, determinations or rulings made by the Panel in the Proceedings, shall be made to the CAS only, and not to any other court or authority” and that “any appeal shall be made pursuant to Section C of the CAS Code (Articles R47 to R59)”. Moreover, the Panel notes that the GEF has not disputed the jurisdiction of the CAS, which it also expressly confirmed by its signature of the Order of Procedure.

101. As a result, the Panel finds that it has jurisdiction over the present appeals proceeding.

VI. ADMISSIBILITY

102. Article R49 of the CAS Code provides as follows: “In the absence of a time limit set in the statutes or regulations of the federation, association or sports-related body concerned, or in a previous agreement, the time limit for appeal shall be twenty-one days from the receipt of the decision appealed against. The Division President shall not initiate a procedure if the statement of appeal is, on its face, late and shall so notify the person who filed the document. When a procedure is initiated, a party may request the Division President or the President of the Panel, if a Panel has been already constituted, to terminate it if the statement of appeal is late. The Division President or the President of the Panel renders her/his decision after considering any submission made by the other parties. […]”.

103. Moreover, according to the Arbitration Agreement, “any appeal shall be made pursuant to Section C of the CAS Code (Articles R47 to R59)” and “any appeal made under this clause 3 shall be filed with CAS within 21 days from the receipt of the Decision, per Article R49 of the CAS Code”.

104. The Panel notes that the Statement of Appeal was filed on 27 February 2025, i.e. within 21 days from the issuance of the Decision, and that the other conditions set out in Article R48 of the CAS Code are also fulfilled. The Panel therefore concludes that the present appeal is admissible.

VII. APPLICABLE LAW

105. Article R58 of the CAS Code provides as follows: “The Panel shall decide the dispute according to the applicable regulations and, subsidiarily, to the rules of law chosen by the parties or, in the absence of such a choice, according to the law of the country in which the federation, association or sports-related body which has issued

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the challenged decision is domiciled or according to the rules of law that the Panel deems appropriate. In the latter case, the Panel shall give reasons for its decision”.

107. The Panel also notes that, as per clause 3.4 of the Arbitration Agreement, “[t]he law applicable 107. to the merits of any appeal shall be the same as the law applicable to the Proceedings pursuant 107. to Article 1 of the FIG Code of Discipline 2021, per Article R58 of the CAS Code”. 108. The Panel further notes that Article 1 of the FIG Code of Discipline provides that: “[…] This Code governs all the disciplinary proceedings […]. In the absence of a specific provision in this Code, in the WADA Code or in other disciplinary provisions of the FIG Rules, the Disciplinary Authority shall rule according to the general principles set out in this Code and according to the general principles of justice, fairness and equality. It shall apply the general principles of Swiss law, and principles acknowledged internationally. The FIG Member Federations, gymnasts, officials (judges, coaches, medical staff and others) as well as the FIG Authorities are bound by the FIG disciplinary rules”. 109. The Panel shall therefore apply the rules and regulations of the FIG, and, in the absence of specific provisions therein, decide according to general principles of Swiss law and internationally recognised principles.

VIII. PROCEDURAL MATTERS

110. The Panel will explain in this section the decisions it took during the arbitration on certain procedural requests.

A. Appellants’ request for production of records related to the FIG Review

111. In their Appeal Brief, the Appellants requested that the Panel order the FIG to produce (or, alternatively, order the GEF to obtain from the FIG and produce) “the full records of the scores awarded by the FIG experts on the FIG Review”. The Appellants argued that the FIG Report undermined any case against Ms Trikomiti and that such data would allow all Parties to understand the conclusions reached in the FIG Report. In addition, the Appellants submitted that the FIG, even if not formally a party to the present arbitration, was an interested party in any proceedings under the FIG Code of Discipline pursuant to Articles 10 and 30 of the FIG Code of Discipline.

112. On 30 May 2025, the GEF objected to the Appellants’ request, noting that it had received the FIG Report, which summarised the FIG Review for the scores of Ms Lewinska and Ms Tugolukova, and adding that it was not in possession of any additional document that was not already available to the Appellants. The GEF further submitted that the Panel had no authority to compel a third party (in this case, the FIG) to produce documents or submit evidentiary measures. Moreover, the GEF argued that the Appellants already had in their possession a spreadsheet containing the raw data of the scores assigned by the expert judges to the 20 gymnasts concerned. The GEF further contended that, in any event, the Appellants had failed to demonstrate how the documents requested would be relevant for the outcome of the present

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proceedings, since the question of whether the scores awarded were ultimately correct was not directly relevant to the issue at hand.

113. On 11 June 2025, following the CMC during which the above request was discussed, the Panel dismissed the Appellants’ document production request.

114. Article R44.3 of the CAS Code, which applies to the present appeals procedure pursuant to Article R57 of the CAS Code, provides as follows:

“A party may request the Panel to order the other party to produce documents in its custody or under its control. The party seeking such production shall demonstrate that such documents are likely to exist and to be relevant”.

115. The Panel first notes that the FIG is not a party to the present proceedings and that, as a result, the Panel has no power to order the FIG to produce documents (MAVROMATI/REEB, The Code of the Court of Arbitration for Sport, Commentary, Cases and Materials, 2nd ed., 2025, Article R44.3, par. 34; CAS 2012/A/2756, par. 3.12 and 3.18). Moreover, and in any event, the Appellants failed to explain why the production of “the full records of the scores awarded by the FIG experts” during the FIG Review were relevant to decide this case. This holds true, in particular, as both the FIG Report and the spreadsheet containing the scores given during the FIG Review are on record. As a result of the foregoing considerations, the Panel dismissed this document production request.

B. Appellants’ request for production of GEF interview notes

116. Likewise in their Appeal Brief, the Appellants requested the Panel to order the production of any notes taken of the GEF’s initial interviews in the present matter, noting that the testimonies of Ms Aliprandi and Ms Piscupescu during the DC hearing made it evident that such notes had been taken. The Appellants contended that such interview notes should be in the case file as the case turns on the evidence provided, in particular, by Ms Piscupescu and Ms Aliprandi, and that these witnesses changed their evidence. Moreover, the Appellants submitted that it was a matter of equality of arms to have on record the investigation notes from both sides, EG and the GEF.

117. On 30 May 2025, the GEF objected to such request, submitting that the documents requested would be irrelevant for the outcome of the present proceedings as they were internal preparatory materials used by the GEF in its initial assessment of the case and that, in any event, the relevant witnesses had each submitted a witness statement and would be available for cross-examination at the hearing.

118. On 11 June 2025, following the CMC during which the above request was discussed, the Panel granted the Appellants’ document production request so far as it related to any notes taken by the GEF of its initial interviews with Ms Aliprandi and Ms Piscupescu. This decision was based on the Panel’s consideration that the testimonies of Ms Aliprandi and Ms Piscupescu were of significant relevance to the case and that the Panel’s assessment of their testimonies would benefit from knowing the contents of the initial testimonies given by those witnesses before the GEF, especially in view of the Appellants’ argument that those witnesses had given inconsistent evidence. The Panel notes that the GEF subsequently provided the

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interview notes within the time limit set by the Panel.

C. Appellants’ request for admission of their hearing bundles

119. On 22 September 2025, the Appellants filed three hearing bundles with the CAS Court Office.

120. On 23 September 2025, the Respondent objected to the hearing bundles being added to the case file, arguing that (i) the renumbering of the exhibits only a few days before the hearing would create unnecessary confusion for the Panel and the witnesses; and (ii) the Appellants took this opportunity to introduce numerous new exhibits that did not form part of the record of this arbitration, without even alleging any exceptional circumstances within the meaning of Article R56 of the CAS Code.

121. On 24 September 2025, the Appellants provided their comments as to the admissibility of their hearing bundles, arguing that all the exhibits in the hearing bundles were not ‘new’ within the meaning of Article R56 of the CAS Code. Rather, those documents were already exhibited to the submissions before the DC and, accordingly, were in the possession of the Parties since 2024. Moreover, the documents had been referenced explicitly in the Appeal Brief. In any event, such circumstances would constitute exceptional circumstances justifying the hearing bundles being added to the case file.

122. On 24 September 2025, the CAS Court Office informed the Parties that the Appellants’ hearing bundles filed on 22 September 2025 were inadmissible. The reason behind this decision was that, even if any of the documents not forming part of the record of this arbitration had been introduced in the previous instance already and even if they had been referenced in the Appeal Brief (neither of which was specifically established by the Appellants by reference to each of the documents concerned), the fact remained that the Appellants had had the opportunity to introduce those documents into the record of this arbitration during two rounds of written submissions, but had chosen not to do so. Instead, the Appellants waited until two days before the hearing to submit those new exhibits, leaving hardly enough time for the Respondent to review the bundles to prepare for whatever might happen at the hearing in relation to those documents. As the Appellants failed to provide any explanation for their decision to not introduce those documents earlier, let alone an explanation that would meet the threshold of “exceptional circumstances” within the meaning of Article R56 of the CAS Code, the Panel did not find it appropriate to admit the hearing bundles.

IX. MERITS

123. The Panel agrees with the Appellants that it is not entirely clear from the Decision which actions or omissions of Ms Trikomiti precisely the DC found to have been established, and to have amounted to a violation of the applicable rules. While the DC did refer specifically to certain actions, in particular Ms Trikomiti having allegedly instructed Ms Piscupescu to change her score for Ms Lytra’s Ball routine (para. 81 of the Decision), it resorted elsewhere to a rather general reference to “the core allegations” made by Ms Aliprandi and Ms Piscupescu (para. 85 of the Decision).

124. Against this background, the Panel found the following specification in GEF’s Answer useful:

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“It is GEF’s case that Ms Trikomiti, having seen in real time the scores entered by the Judges’ Panel members and the members of the Superior Jury, requested certain members of the Superior Jury to lower their scores or to input a specific score, with the intention of triggering the block system. Once this was done and the scores of the Judges’ Panel members were blocked, Ms Trikomiti, acting in her capacity as President of the Superior Jury, was in a position to request that the Judges’ Panel members amend their scores. This manipulation was to the detriment of Ms Lewinska and Ms Lytra, and was intended to unduly favour Ms Tugolukova” (emphasis added).

125. The Panel does not consider that this formulation of the GEF’s case goes beyond the subjectmatter of the Decision. This view seems to be shared by the Appellants, who have responded to this case at the hearing without objection. Accordingly, the Panel’s analysis of the merits will be based on the GEF’s case as formulated above. For ease of reference, the Panel will refer to the GEF’s case by adopting the ‘label’ used by the parties, namely score manipulation.

126. It is undisputed between the Parties, and the Panel has no reason to doubt, that Ms Trikomiti was, at all relevant times, bound by the FIG regulations at issue in this case, specifically the FIG Code of Discipline, the FIG General Judges’ Rules, the FIG Code of Ethics, the FIG Technical Regulations, the FIG Code of Conduct and the FIG Code of Points, including the Appendix thereto. It is likewise common ground between the Parties, and the Panel agrees, that if Ms Trikomiti engaged in score manipulation, this would amount to a violation of the following provisions:

- Article 3 of the FIG Code of Disciplinary:

“Any infringement of the Statutes, Rules and Regulations […] as well as of the principles of integrity and sports fairness by the FIG member Federations, gymnasts, officials (judges, coaches, medical staff or others) […] is liable to sanctions provided for by the Statutes and this Code.

These principles are infringed should someone:

- Not abide by the FIG written Statutes, rules, regulations, decisions and directives; [...]

- Act in such a way so as to influence the course or the result of the competitions in an improper way;

- Show unsatisfactory and/or biased judging at competitions;

[...]” (emphasis added).

- Section 1. of the FIG General Judges’ Rules:

“Judges officiating at competitions have to:

- maintain integrity of all decisions, showing no preference or bias

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[…]

- respect the judges’ oath and the FIG Code of Ethics” (emphasis added).

- Article 2(g) of the FIG Code of Ethics:

“The FIG members, officials, judges and participants of FIG events are not permitted to demonstrate undue pressure or influence the vote or the direction of decisions made in the FIG, and especially must avoid any cooperation sought by influencing the work and evaluation of the judges” (emphasis added).

- Article 7.12.1 of Section 1 of the FIG Technical Regulations:

“The following oath shall be delivered by a judge in person or virtually during the opening ceremony of the World Championships, and other important international events:

«In the name of all the judges and officials, I promise that we shall officiate in these World Championships (or any other official FIG Event) with complete impartiality, respecting and abiding by the rules which govern them, in the true spirit of sportsmanship»

Sporting justice, ethics and honesty are the basis of a fair judgment.

If a judge does not abide by his oath, he incurs the risk of being sanctioned as provided for by the Statutes and the Code of Discipline. The judge in question may be denounced to the GEF Disciplinary Commission by the TC. These provisions shall also be applicable to the elected members of the TCs and the Jury of Appeal who have not abided to their duty of neutrality, of respect and the application of the rules and the COP.

[…]” (emphasis added).

- Section II(3) of the FIG Code of Conduct:

“The judge and the official commit to:

• Absolute fairness, impartiality, and consistency in all judging situations.

[…]” (emphasis added).

127. What is heavily disputed between the Parties, however, is whether Ms Trikomiti did in fact manipulate any scores. Accordingly, the Panel’s main task in this arbitration is to assess the evidence before it and to decide whether any score manipulation by Ms Trikomiti was established under the applicable standard of proof. For the reasons set out below, the Panel finds this to be the case (see section A. below). Moreover, the Panel finds that the sanctions imposed in the Appealed Decision on Ms Trikomiti (see section B. below) and EG (see section

C. below) are lawful.

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A. Score Manipulation by Ms Trikomiti

1. Burden and standard of proof

128. The GEF asserts that Ms Trikomiti violated Article 3 the FIG Code of Discipline, read in conjunction with other FIG regulations, by manipulating scores at the RGEC. Per Article 18(5) of the FIG Code of Discipline, the GEF “shall have the burden of establishing that an infringement of this Code has occurred”. Consequently, the GEF bears the burden of proving that Ms Trikomiti committed the violation(s) that the GEF asserts she committed. 129. According to the next sentence of the same provision, the “standard of proof […] shall be the balance of probabilities (a standard that implies that on the preponderance of the evidence it is more likely than not that an infringement of this Code has occurred)”. Neither Ms Trikomiti nor the GEF have called into question that the applicable standard of proof as is that of a balance of probabilities. EG, by contrast, argued in closing that given the seriousness of the allegation, a stricter standard of proof should apply. The Panel is not persuaded by this argument. Article 18(5) of the FIG Code of Discipline explicitly provides for a balance of probabilities. The Panel does not consider such standard of proof to be incompatible with Swiss law, let alone public policy, and notes that the same burden of proof has been accepted by other CAS tribunals for allegations of competition manipulation (CAS 2020/A/7596, paras. 179 et seq. with further references). 130. However, the Panel is also not convinced by GEF’s argument that because of the nature of score manipulation as a concealed action, the Panel should not apply the balance of probabilities standard too strictly. Leaving aside the question of whether that standard of proof is open at all to a ‘less strict’ application, the GEF does not in fact allege any concealed action by Ms Trikomiti. Instead, the GEF alleges that Ms Trikomiti manipulated scores very openly, even publicly. This being so, it does not matter for the assessment of the evidence in the present case that, in other cases of alleged score manipulation, the alleged conduct may be more concealed and therefore less likely to have been witnessed by others.

2. Admissible means of evidence

131. The FIG Code of Discipline does not provide for any restrictions in respect of admissible means of evidence. Instead, it provides in Article 18(1) that infringements “may be established by various types of evidence such as written statements, audio or video recording, confession or others”, and alludes in Article 18(2) to witness testimony. Therefore, the means of evidence relied upon by the Parties in this arbitration, in particular oral and written witness testimony, are admissible means of evidence. That said, if a witness is not called to appear at the hearing, this may affect the evidentiary value of the witness testimony (see NOTH/HAAS, in ARROYO, M.: Arbitration in Switzerland – The Practitioner’s Guide, 2nd ed, Article R44, para. 41; cf. also Swiss Federal Tribunal, judgment of 31 May 2012,4A_682/2011, paras. 4.1 et seq.). This holds true, in particular, if the counterparty challenges the contents of the written witness statement or has indicated that it seeks to cross-examine that witness.

3. Principles for the assessment of evidence

132. As highlighted by the Swiss Federal Tribunal (decision of 17 January 2013,4A_538/2012, para. 5.1), the free assessment of evidence is a pillar of international arbitration. However, the

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Panel wishes to highlight the following evidentiary principles by which it will be guided in its assessment of the evidence. 133. Firstly, multiple pieces of evidence can have a cumulative effect (CAS 2013/A/3124, para. 12.3; CAS 2017/A/4937, para. 51; CAS 2022/A/8653, para. 195 with further references). This is sometimes described by a ‘strands in a cable’ metaphor: while each strand of evidence by itself may not be strong enough to meet the burden of proof, the cable created by all strands together may be sufficient to prove the relevant fact (CAS 2015/A/4059, paras. 134. Secondly, the Panel is not persuaded by the Appellants’ argument made at the hearing that one may not instead resort to circumstantial evidence if direct evidence proffered in support of a certain allegation is found to be unreliable. As mentioned before, it is the Panel’s task to assess the evidence as a whole. There is no reason why the Panel should disregard all other pieces of evidence if one piece of evidence (whether direct or circumstantial) proves unreliable. Whether those other pieces of evidence are sufficient to prove the allegation is a different question. 135. Thirdly, in respect of witness testimony specifically, the position under Swiss law is as follows according to the Swiss Federal Tribunal (decision of 1 September 2020,5A_550/2019, para. 9.1.3.1.): “The focus here is not on credibility as a personal characteristic, but rather on the credibility of the specific statement [references omitted]. Although this principle was developed by the Swiss Federal Tribunal for criminal proceedings [...], it also applies to civil proceedings, as the concept of ‘general credibility’ is considered to be of little use in the psychology of testimony [references omitted]. The specific statement should be examined by methodical analysis of its content (presence of reality criteria, absence of fantasy signals) to determine whether the information relating to a specific event stems from the actual experience of the person being questioned [reference omitted]”.

Panel’s translation from the German original:

„Dabei steht nicht die Glaubwürdigkeit als persönliche Eigenschaft, sondern die Glaubhaftigkeit der konkreten Aussage im Vordergrund [references omitted]. Diesen Grundsatz hat die bundesgerichtliche Rechtsprechung zwar für den Strafprozess entwickelt […], doch beansprucht er auch für den Zivilprozess Geltung, denn in der Aussagepsychologie wird das Konzept einer ’allgemeinen Glaubwürdigkeit’ als wenig brauchbar bewertet [references omitted]. Es soll die konkrete Aussage durch methodische Analyse ihres Inhalts (Vorhandensein von Realitätskriterien, Fehlen von Fantasiesignalen) darauf überprüft werden, ob die auf ein bestimmtes Geschehen bezogenen Angaben einem tatsächlichen Erleben der befragten Person entspringen [reference omitted]”.

136. According to Swiss law jurisprudence, examples of indications of truthfulness of witness statements include logical consistency, a high level of detail, a disorganised account of the events witnessed, spatial-temporal connections, descriptions of interactions, the reproduction of conversations or the description of unusual details and trivialities, of the witness’ own psychological processes and of those of the person with which the witness interacted (see,

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e.g., Zurich Court of Appeal, decision of 15 September 2021, SB190206, para. 2.1.3; decision of 21 February 2012, SB110639, para. 3.3). The more of those indications of truthfulness are present, the more likely it is that the witness is giving a truthful account of its perception/recollection of the relevant events. 137. Moreover, potential motivations for a witness to lie may be of relevance when determining the likelihood of a witness intentionally making untrue statements (see CAS 2018/A/5906, same holds true for proven instances of the same witness lying before on a matter of relevance to the testimony in question (see, for example, CAS 2019/A/6319, para. 86). 138. That said, the Panel is very conscious of the fact that witness testimony may be subjectively true, and therefore show many of the foregoing indications of truthfulness, but may still be objectively untrue because the witnesses’ good faith perception or recollection of the witnessed events may not accord with reality (cf., for example, CAS 2012/A/2699, para. 94).

4. Assessment of the evidence

139. In its Answer, the GEF relied on three distinct allegations of score manipulation by Ms Trikomiti: in relation to Ms Lytra’s Ball routine, Ms Lewinska’s Ball routine and Ms Lewinska’s Ribbon routine, the GEF alleges that Ms Trikomiti interfered in each case with Ms Piscupescu’s DB score. Those allegations will be dealt with in turn in sections a. to c. below.

140. The Panel notes that the GEF referred in its pleadings also to other alleged conduct by Ms Trikomiti that the GEF considered inappropriate. However, such alleged conduct was mentioned in the Answer under the heading “other circumstantial evidence”, indicating that it was invoked by the GEF not as a separate violation of the FIG’s regulations, but rather as evidence supporting the three distinct allegations identified in para. 139 above. This is also consistent with the fact that such further alleged conduct by Ms Trikomiti did not consist of specific requests for score changes by SJ members as described in the GEF’s formulation of its own case. Accordingly, the Panel will deal with such alleged conduct by Ms Trikomiti in the context of its assessment of the evidence for the three specific violations alleged by the GEF.

a. Alleged interference during Ms Lytra’s Ball routine

141. According to the GEF, Ms Trikomiti verbally instructed Ms Piscupescu to change the SJ’s DB score for Ms Lytra’s Ball routine from initially 9.5 to 9.0, so that the JP’s DB score was blocked and Ms Trikomiti could thereafter request the JP to change its DB score from 10.0 to 9.0. These scores as such are undisputed, and they are confirmed by screenshots from the SmartScoring system. What is heavily disputed, however, is whether Ms Piscupescu changed the DB score from 9.5 to 9.0 points because Ms Trikomiti requested her to do so.

142. Based on the totality of the evidence, especially the below-mentioned pieces of evidence, the Panel finds that it is more likely than not that Ms Trikomiti did request Ms Piscupescu to change her score from 9.5 to 9.0, and thereby violated Article 3 of the FIG Code of Discipline and the other provisions mentioned in para. 126 above.

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(i) Ms Piscupescu’s testimony

143. Above all, the Panel found Ms Piscupescu’s testimony in respect of the score change for Ms Lytra’s Ball routine credible, for the following reasons.

144. Firstly, Ms Piscupescu did not merely generically allege that Ms Trikomiti requested her to change her score, but instead provided details of what happened. For instance, Ms Piscupescu mentioned in two of her statements that Ms Trikomiti said the initial score of 9.5 was “too much”. Another example is her testimony that Ms Trikomiti was “leaning towards” Ms Piscupescu and Ms Todorova or, per another statement, that Ms Trikomiti would “turn to her right side” when speaking to them. Contrary to Ms Trikomiti’s argument in one of her witness statements, Ms Piscupescu had made those statements about Ms Trikomiti leaning towards her even before Ms Trikomiti argued in one of her witness statements that it was too loud for Ms Piscupescu to hear her. As a further example of relevant circumstantial details, concerning spatial-temporal connections as a further criterion for truthful testimony, Ms Piscupescu mentioned that “[d]uring the break after Group A of the 1st day of Qualification – 23rd of May”, “in the judges room” (or, per GEF’s initial interview notes, in the “superior judge – meeting room”), Ms Trikomiti criticised her for her initial score given for Ms Lytra’s Ball routine.

145. Secondly, Ms Piscpescu’s testimony was rich in the description of her emotions at the time, such as “I have never felt so intimidated, pressured and uncomfortable during any other judging experience”, “I did not feel free to judge […], I felt pressured […] and even intimated” or “to me it was strange [because there was no block justifying a request to change her score]”). Likewise, she repeatedly described the emotions she felt Ms Trikomiti had, e.g. “ET then get mad” or that Ms Trikomiti “showed clearly […] her disappointment after I didn’t give the score she wanted/expected”.

146. Thirdly, Ms Piscupescu’s testimony regarding her scoring for Ms Lytra’s Ball routine was entirely consistent throughout the many statements she was asked to give. Already in her first interview with the GEF on 3 June 2024, she testified (according to the GEF’s interview notes, whose accuracy was not disputed in this regard) that Ms Trikomiti had asked her to lower the score for Ms Lytra’s Ball routine. She gave materially identical testimony on that point in a letter to the PGA dated 19 June 2024, in written statements to the GEF dated 21 June 2024 and 4 September 2024, at the DC hearing and at the hearing in this arbitration. While Ms Piscupescu’s testimony was consistent in substance over time, she did not make identical statements either. Instead, she often used different words and sometimes referred to details not mentioned in other statements. This gave the impression that she put her recollection of a real event into words each time she was questioned about it, rather than merely repeating a fictitious story that she had invented and memorised.

147. Contrary to the Appellant’s argument, the Panel does not find that the consistency of Ms Piscupescu’s testimony is undermined by the fact that she did not mention any request to change her score for Ms Lytra’s Ball routine in her written statement to the GEF dated 29 April 2025 and in EG’s interview notes of 3 June 2024.

148. In her 29 April 2025 statement to the GEF, Ms Piscupescu expressly confirmed all her previous statements and merely responded to one specific argument made in the Appeal Brief.

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Hence, there was no reason for her to expressly repeat her earlier testimony in that document, and her failure to do so does not cast any doubt on the consistency of her testimony.

149. EG’s interview notes of 3 June 2024, in turn, do contain the following alleged statement by Ms Piscupescu (not purporting this to be a verbatim quote of what Ms Piscupescu said): “Nobody approached me for my scores during the event. I did not see any incorrect procedure”. However, Ms Piscupescu has denied having made such a statement, and the Panel notes that Ms Aliprandi and Ms De Cossio have likewise challenged the accuracy of the interview notes as regards their own interviews with EG. Instead, Ms Piscupescu explained in her written testimony in this arbitration that the question EG asked was whether she had been approached by anyone from a national delegation, to which she responded that this was not the case. While Ms Piscupescu was challenged in cross-examination about what she said during the EG interview, the Appellants did not challenge Ms Piscupescu’s very specific recollection of the questions she was asked by EG during that interview. Also, neither EG’s interview notes nor the witness statement of Ms Worthmann or Mr Boutard (who both conducted the interview with Ms Piscupescu) suggested that Ms Piscupescu had made her alleged statement in response to a different question. Therefore, the Panel is not convinced that the alleged statement by Ms Piscupescu as reflected in EG’s interview notes was made outside the context of a question by EG as to whether Ms Piscupescu had been approached by any national delegations about her scores. That being so, even if the alleged statement had been made in those words, it would not be a confirmation by Ms Piscupescu that she had not been approached by Ms Trikomiti about her scores.

150. Moreover, and in any event, Ms Piscupescu testified that she did not believe that it would make any difference if she told EG about Ms Trikomiti’s requests. According to Ms Piscupescu, EG had seen with their own eyes what had happened at the RGEC, and had not done anything about it, leading her to conclude that EG would support Ms Trikomiti. The Panel notes that Ms Aliprandi similarly testified that she did not have the impression that EG was interested in hearing what had really happened at the RGEC. As it has remained undisputed that those interviews were very short and as the Panel does not find it established that they involved any specific questions about scoring manipulation from within the SJ, the Panel finds it plausible that Ms Piscupescu did not feel comfortable speaking up vis-à-vis EG, being the organiser of the very event in which, according to Ms Piscupescu, scores had been manipulated by Ms Trikomiti. Regardless of whether she was justified in assuming that reporting her allegation to EG would be of no use, that feeling of hers does provide a convincing explanation for her not mentioning her allegation against Ms Trikomiti in that interview. Coupled with the fact that she had already reported that same allegation to the GEF before the interview with EG, the Panel does not consider that the (undisputed) omission of this allegation by Ms Piscupescu in her interview with EG carries any material weight.

151. Fourthly, the Panel notes that, in at least two instances, Ms Piscupescu readily acknowledged things she did not witness, even though they might have incriminated Ms Trikomiti. In particular, in one of her written statements to the GEF, Ms Piscupescu testified that during her conversation with Ms Trikomiti in the judges’ meeting room after Ms Lytra’s Ball routine, she felt that Ms Trikomiti was trying to convey the message that Ms Piscupescu should, for the rest of the competition, follow Ms Trikomiti’s instructions on the scoring; however, she volunteered to clarify that Ms Trikomiti “did not explicitly say it as such”, i.e., that this was merely Ms Piscupescu’s interpretation of what Ms Trikomiti said. Similarly, even though in

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connection with Ms Lewinska’s Ball routine, Ms Piscupescu readily admitted that she did not hear what Ms Trikomiti said to the JP. Those parts of her testimony suggest that Ms Piscupescu was not simply on a mission to give testimony detrimental to Ms Trikomiti.

152. Fifthly, the Panel is not persuaded by the Appellants’ argument that Ms Piscupescu had a motive to give false testimony against Ms Trikomiti because Ms Piscupescu allegedly held a personal grudge against Ms Trikomiti. In particular, this argument implies that Ms Piscupescu was intentionally lying (as opposed to being genuinely mistaken), which the Panel finds difficult to reconcile with the indications of truthfulness listed above.

153. Moreover, Ms Piscupescu must have been aware, and has confirmed in her oral testimony in this arbitration that she was in fact aware, of the very serious nature of the allegations she has made against Ms Trikomiti. She must have known that those allegations could seriously affect Ms Trikomiti’s career in RG, and that Ms Piscupescu herself was also taking a significant risk in making those allegations, in particular if they were found to be untrue. The Panel readily accepts that Ms Trikomiti’s daughter qualifying – unfairly, in Ms Piscupescu’s view – to the Olympic Games instead of Ms Piscupescu must have been very difficult for Ms Piscupescu to deal with. In fact, Ms Piscupescu openly confirmed this in her oral testimony before the Panel. Moreover, she mentioned the 2012 event at the very beginning of her first interview with the GEF, and explained that it made her want to become a judge, showing how this event has had a lasting influence on her. However, even acknowledging that the 2012 events were a very difficult and influential experience in Ms Piscupescu’s life, it is quite a leap to conclude that this would make her give false testimony, subject to sanctions of perjury, against the mother of her then-competitor, approximately 12 years after the fact.

154. This holds true, even more, as there is no indication on record that anyone ever noticed any grudge that Ms Piscupescu held against Ms Trikomiti. One would have expected any such grudge to have shown, in particular, during their collaboration on the TC. However, to the contrary, Ms Piscupescu testified that she and Ms Trikomiti worked well together in the TC. The Appellants have not called this into question. In fact, Ms Trikomiti herself testified that she had a friendly relationship with all TC members and trusted all of them. Theoretically, this does not of course exclude that Ms Piscupescu purposefully hid a grudge against Ms Trikomiti for 12 years so she could ‘take revenge’ when the opportunity presented itself. In that case, however, she would hardly have volunteered to disclose the source of that grudge at the very beginning of her first interview with the GEF. The Panel finds it much more plausible that, as explained by Ms Piscupescu herself, she mentioned her experience from 2012 because she was reminded of it by many others after what happened at the RGEC, was asked how she could let that happen given her personal history, and decided that she needed to do something so that similar things would not happen again. In other words, while the events in 2012 may well have provided additional motivation for Ms Piscupescu to make a report to the GEF, this does not mean that she lied.

155. Sixthly, the Panel is not convinced by the Appellants’ argument that Ms Piscupescu’s testimony was tainted by an alleged bias in favour of Ms Lewinska. In support of this argument, the Appellants relied on Ms Piscupescu’s testimony that Ms Lewinska had been “severely underscored”, which is indeed inconsistent with the finding in the FIG Report that Ms Lewinska was in fact overscored. However, even if one assumed that the FIG Report gave the only ‘correct score’, and that Ms Piscupescu was therefore wrong in saying that Ms

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Lewinska was underscored, it does not follow that Ms Piscupescu was biased, as opposed to genuinely mistaken.

156. The Panel observes that the Appellants have never suggested that the scores given by Ms Piscupescu herself to Ms Lewinska were so high (or those given by her to Ms Tugolukova so low) as to show any bias in favour of Ms Lewinska. Indeed, any such suggestion would have been difficult to square with the fact that the scores given by Ms Piscupescu to Ms Lewinska for both Ball (10.4) and Ribbon (11.0) were lower than those given by the JP (11.4 and 11.1), while those for Ms Tugolukova (11.6 and 10.5) were higher than the JP’s scores (10.8 and 10.0). If Ms Piscupescu’s own scoring did not show any bias in favour of Ms Lewinska, the Panel does not find it plausible that any bias would then afterwards surface and cause her to make false allegations against Ms Trikomiti.

157. Instead, the Panel finds another explanation for Ms Piscupescu’s statement more plausible: if one considers the FIG Report to have given the ‘correct’ scores, it follows, in the words of that report, that “there is a clear trend that the official result book shows overrated scores for all gymnasts“. In other words, in the view of the experts who conducted the FIG Review, the judges at the RGEC were more generous with scores than they should have been. This holds true also for Ms Piscupescu’s own scoring, both in relation to Ms Lewinska (where her scores in Ball and Ribbon where higher than the FIG Report) and Ms Tugolukova (where her Ball score was higher than the FIG Report). It is on the basis of the actual scoring at the RGEC, which the FIG Report found to be too high in general, that Ms Piscupescu thought Ms Lewinska had been underscored while Ms Tugolukova had been overscored. This much, in turn, is consistent with the FIG Report, according to which Ms Lewinska was overscored merely by 1.6 points, while Ms Tugolukova was overscored by 7.95 points.

158. In sum, the Panel does not find it established that Ms Piscupescu was in any way biased towards Ms Lewinska, and therefore does not accept that her testimony could be unreliable as a result of such bias.

159. Seventhly, the Panel does not accept the Appellants’ argument that Ms Piscupescu’s testimony is unreliable due to what the Appellants consider was untruthful testimony by Ms Piscupescu on other matters relevant to this case. This argument again implies that Ms Piscupescu lied about her scoring for Ms Lytra’s Ball routine. As mentioned before, the Panel finds this unlikely in view of the multiple signs of truthfulness identified above.

160. Moreover, the Panel does not find it established that Ms Piscupescu intentionally lied on other matters. As regards her scoring of Ms Lewinska’s Ball routine, the Panel finds it likely that, to the contrary, she was telling the truth (see section b. below). With respect to Ms Piscupescu’s testimony that, during a TC meeting before the start of the TGEC, Ms Trikomiti “made it clear that she wished for the CYP gymnast to take the Olympic quota”, the Panel agrees with the Appellants that it is unlikely for Ms Trikomiti to have said such a thing, especially as no other TC member confirmed it. However, the Panel also notes that different witnesses have described Ms Trikomiti’s behaviour during that same meeting quite differently, with Ms Aliprandi, Ms De Cossio and Ms Piscupescu testifying that Ms Trikomiti singled out Ms Lewinska and Ms Lytra in a negative way during the video session, while Ms Todorova, Ms Bedoshvili and Ms Vilyayeva testified that that was not the case. This suggests that, unless three witnesses were lying, that Ms Trikomiti’s behaviour during that meeting left

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room for interpretation, in particular as regards her evaluation of the performances of the Contenders. In addition, Ms Piscupescu has never claimed she remembered the precise words used by Ms Trikomiti, instead resorting to the rather vague assertion that Ms Trikomiti had “made it clear” what her preference was in respect of the Olympic quota. This being so, the Panel finds it entirely possible that Ms Piscupescu’s testimony on this point reflected her genuine interpretation, which may have been a mis- or overinterpretation of something that Ms Trikomiti said, and that Ms Piscupescu thought “made it clear” that Ms Trikomiti wanted Ms Tugolukova to obtain the Olympic quota.

161. Eighthly, given the very specific instruction that she recalls having received from Ms Trikomiti as regards Ms Lytra’s score, the Panel finds it very unlikely that Ms Piscupescu’s testimony in this regard is based on a genuine misunderstanding or a lapse of memory. Rather, the Panel is convinced that this is what happened, if Ms Piscupescu did not lie (which the Panel finds unlikely for the reasons mentioned above).

(ii) Ms Trikomiti’s, Ms Todorova’s and Ms Bedoshvili’s testimony

162. Overall, the Panel considers that the truthfulness of Ms Piscupescu’s testimony is not called into question by the testimonies of Ms Trikomiti, Ms Todorova and Ms Bedoshvili. In essence, Ms Trikomiti denied having requested Ms Piscupescu to change her score for Ms Lytra. Ms Todorova said she did not hear any such request, but would have heard it, had one been made. Ms Bedoshvili, in turn, claimed that Ms Trikomiti had not been involved at all in the judging of any of the three gymnasts competing for the Olympic quota. The Panel finds those testimonies less credible than that of Ms Piscupescu, in particular for the following reasons.

163. Firstly, Ms Trikomiti testified that she had agreed with Ms Aliprandi in advance that, in order to avoid any conflict of interest, Ms Trikomiti would not resolve any blocked scores for the Contenders, and therefore also not judge their routines to be prepared for any blocked scores. Ms Bedoshvili and Ms Todorova testified that Ms Trikomiti had informed the TC of such agreement prior to the start of the competition.

164. This testimony is contradicted by what the Panel found to be Ms Aliprandi’s highly credible testimony. According to her, no such prior agreement existed (except for an agreement that Ms Trikomiti would not decide on any interventions by her own national federation). Instead, Ms Aliprandi gave very detailed and vivid testimony of how Ms Trikomiti, just before the three gymnasts competing for the Olympic quota started performing their routines, suddenly asked Ms Aliprandi to take over the judging from Ms Trikomiti. For instance, during her oral testimony before the DC, Ms Aliprandi stated that Ms Trikomiti “was very nervous at that moment, and she was not able, so much so that she turned to me and said ‘I can’t judge’”. This testimony, which is difficult to reconcile with any prior agreement on Ms Trikomiti not judging those routines, was consistent with three previous written statements and the oral testimony of Ms Aliprandi at the hearing. The fact that she used different words each time she described that sequence supports rather than undermines the credibility of the testimony.

165. Ms Trikomiti, by contrast, rather generically stated that she had “agreed with”, “told” or “discussed […] many times before the competition began” with Ms Aliprandi that Ms Trikomiti would not judge the three gymnasts contending for the Olympic quota. She did not

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mention when, where or in which context those conversations are supposed to have taken place. Neither did she provide any description of those conversations that would have positively signalled testimony based on genuine recollection. In addition, while two of Ms Trikomiti’s written statements expressly referred to Ms Aliprandi’s testimony on whether Ms Trikomiti judged the routines of those three gymnasts, Ms Trikomiti’s testimony did not engage at all with Ms Aliprandi’s lively description of how Ms Trikomiti asked her on the spot to take over judging as she could not do it.

166. While Ms Bedosvhili and Ms Todorova testified that Ms Trikomiti had informed the TC prior to the start of the competition that she would not judge any of the three athletes competing for the Olympic quota, this was not confirmed by any of the other TC members. Moreover, the Panel is reluctant to attach significant weight to this testimony in view of the other issues with the testimony of Ms Bedosvhili and Ms Todorova on related issues as mentioned below.

167. Similarly, the Panel does not consider that Mr Thingvold’s testimony is of any help to Ms Trikomiti on this point. He merely testified that he and a colleague from the Jury of Appeal told Ms Trikomiti in Budapest before the start of the competition that they thought it was better if she did not get involved in the scoring of those three athletes, and that Ms Trikomiti agreed. However, there is no indication in Mr Thingvold’s testimony that Ms Trikomiti reacted in any way that would have suggested that she had already discussed and agreed as much with Ms Aliprandi – which would have seemed a natural reaction had such prior agreement existed.

168. Moreover, the Panel is not convinced by the Appellants’ suggestion that Ms Aliprandi is giving false testimony to disassociate herself from the judging at the RGEC as regards the Contenders. Apart from the fact that the same motive would exist for Ms Trikomiti, Ms Bedoshvili and Ms Todorova, the Panel found Ms Aliprandi’s testimony on this particular situation during the RGEC credible based on the indications of truthfulness mentioned above. In addition, in her very first interview with the GEF, Ms Aliprandi stated that she would step down from the TC in view of what happened at the RGEC. In subsequent testimony, she confirmed that she had declined to become TC President (or remain on the TC as an ordinary member). This further reduces the plausibility of the Appellant’s suggestion that Ms Aliprandi would give false testimony as she thought it would help her career in RG.

169. Secondly, Ms Trikomiti testified that she did not in fact play any role in respect of the scores given to the Contenders and that, instead, it was Ms Aliprandi who handled any blocked scores (and interventions) for those three gymnasts. Again, this testimony is supported by Ms Todorova, who testified she was not aware of any involvement of Ms Trikomiti in the judging of the three gymnasts, and by Ms Bedoshvili, who stated that, in relation to the Contenders, Ms Trikomiti “was not involved and did not judge. The fact that she did not judge was obvious to me since she did not participate in any of our discussions for these gymnasts and I could see that she was sitting looking at her computer the entire time”.

170. This testimony is difficult to reconcile with the fact that, as confirmed by Ms Piscupescu and also by Ms Trikomiti herself, Ms Trikomiti asked to see the score sheets of Ms Piscupescu and Ms Todorova for Ms Lewinska’s Ribbon routine. The Panel fails to see why Ms Trikomiti would have done so if it were true that she had decided not to be involved at all in the scores of Ms Lewinska. Indeed, Ms Trikomiti herself could not provide any reason for her request

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to see the score sheets, instead testifying that she no longer remembered why she did so. As it is rather surprising for Ms Trikomiti to request to see the score sheets for a routine in whose judging she allegedly was determined not to get involved, the Panel does not find it likely that Ms Trikomiti would remember such unusual request, but not the reason why she made it. Similarly, the Panel considers that Ms Todorova’s credibility was not helped by the fact that she claimed not to be aware of any involvement by Ms Trikomiti in the judging of the Contenders, but failed to mention that Ms Trikomiti asked to see her score sheet for one of those gymnasts. Likewise, Ms Bedoshvili’s testimony that Ms Trikomiti was looking at her computer all the time (during the judging of the Contenders) cannot be correct – at some point, Ms Trikomiti must have communicated with someone to ask, as she undisputedly did, to see the score sheets of Ms Piscupescu and Ms Todorova for Ms Lewinska’s Ribbon routine.

171. Thirdly, the Panel finds it difficult to accept Ms Trikomiti’s testimony, which she reiterated in multiple witness statements, that she did not speak at all to any judges during the RGEC about any scores (but rather communicated with them exclusively via SmartScoring, and only in case of blocked scores).

172. This testimony is directly contradicted by the credible testimony of Ms Piscupescu that Mr Trikomiti verbally requested her to change her score for Ms Lytra’s Ball routine (see section (i) above). It is also contradicted by Ms Aliprandi’s and Ms Piscupescu’s testimony that Ms Trikomiti did speak to Ms Piscupescu about her score for Ms Lewinska’s Ball routine, which the Panel finds credible as well (see section b. below).

173. Moreover, this testimony is contradicted by Ms Aliprandi’s and Ms Piscupescu’s testimony that Ms Trikomiti stood up to speak to the JP members after Ms Lewinska’s Ball routine. Ms Aliprandi’s testimony in this regard was again highly detailed and vivid, and was confirmed by Ms Piscupescu (who however stated she did not know what Ms Trikomiti had said). The Panel sees no reason at all why Ms Aliprandi or Ms Piscupescu should have lied about this particular instance, especially because they (rightly, in the Panel’s view) did not even seem to find it inappropriate for Ms Aliprandi to verbally request a score change from the JP after the scores had been blocked – indeed, Ms Aliprandi herself explained that “on the judges' tablet, a message came up that the score was to be changed, so she was speeding up the time to tell the judges to change”. For the same reason, contrary to the Appellants’ argument, the Panel considers that Ms Aliprandi’s failure to mention this incident in any of her statements prior to the hearing before the DC was not an indication of false testimony. Instead, she obviously did not find this incident very significant and only mentioned it as a further detail when describing what she witnessed after Ms Lewinska’s Ball routine.

174. While Ms Bedoshvili and Ms Todorova testified that they did not see Ms Trikomiti stand up and speak to JP members, this does not mean it did not happen, especially because Ms Aliprandi was the only witness sitting right next to Ms Trikomiti. In addition, the Panel found rather curious, and unconvincing, Ms Bedoshvili’s statement that Ms Trikomiti “wouldn’t just have time to […] stand up”. Similarly, the Panel does not find credible the testimony of both Ms Bedoshvili and Ms Todorova that, allegedly, there would have been no time for any requests by Ms Trikomiti to other judges that they change their scores. This is inconsistent with their own testimonies that, prior to entering their scores, they themselves often discussed with their fellow DB/DA SJ members (and, in Ms Bedoshvili’s case, even with Ms Aliprandi). The Panel fails to see why there would have been time for such discussions, but not for

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Ms Trikomiti to make a verbal request for a score change. Ms Bedoshvili’s and Ms Todorova’s testimony about an alleged lack of time for any requests for a score change is also belied by the undisputed fact that almost two minutes passed between Ms Piscupescu’s change of her score for Ms Lytra’s Ball routine.

175. As a final point on whether Ms Trikomiti was involved in the judging of the Contenders, the Panel notes that Ms Moltubakk testified as follows:

“I observed several instances of what l presume was communication between the SJ president and SJ members. This happened several times, but certainly after the exercises of Lewinska and Tugolukova on the second day (clubs and/or ribbon). l observed this visually, as leaning forwards, turning to the sides, and maintaining this position for some time. l cannot know if anything was said, or what, and I cannot be sure exactly at which moments this happened. However, being familiar with the typical running of the competitions, l believe communication happened after the end of exercises and before the SJ members should submit their independent scores”.

176. While Ms Moltubakk commendably clarified that she could not be sure if anything was said, her visual perception does align with Ms Aliprandi’s and Ms Piscupescu’s testimony on Ms Trikomiti’s interactions with Ms Piscupescu. This reinforces the Panel’s view that Ms Trikomiti’s, Ms Bedoshvili’s and Ms Todorova’s testimony on Ms Trikomiti allegedly not being involved in the judging of the Contenders lacks credibility.

177. Fourthly, Ms Trikomiti testified that it was “physically impossible” for her to speak to Ms Piscupescu from where she was sitting because of the distance between the two of them. The Panel also notes Ms Todorova’s testimony before the DC that it was “impossible, like almost impossible to hear someone if you are not next to him or if they don’t scream at you”, adding that she had to raise her voice (but not shout) to even speak to Ms Piscupescu right next to her.

178. Having seen a photograph of the seating of the SJ members during the RGEC, the Panel is not convinced that, even considering the music and other noise in the arena, it was outright impossible to communicate with someone seated three seats away, which was the number of seats between Ms Trikomiti and Ms Piscupescu. This holds true, in particular, if Ms Trikomiti, as would be consistent with the testimony of Ms Aliprandi, Ms Piscupescu and Ms Moltubakk, turned to her side and leaned towards Ms Piscupescu when speaking to her.

179. The Panel is aware that Ms De Cossio seems to have testified at the DC hearing that, due to the noise at the RGEC, it was very difficult for her to hear what Ms Aliprandi, who was sitting one seat away from her, was saying (this is according to the undisputed submission by the Appellants; this part of the DC’s hearing transcript was not submitted to the Panel). However, “very difficult” is not the same as “impossible”. Moreover, Ms Bedoshvili testified that Ms Trikomiti would in some cases discuss scores with Ms De Cossio, who was sitting two seats away from Ms Trikomiti, with both of those seats constantly occupied – contrary to two of the three seats between Ms Trikomiti and Ms Piscupescu, where the SmartScoring staff sometimes left their seats. In any event, given possible variations in the speaking volume, the direction in which something is said, the hearing capacity and attentiveness of the person to whom something is said, and the level of noise at the relevant time, the Panel prefers to rely

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on what Ms Aliprandi and Ms Piscupescu have testified hearing or seeing Ms Trikomiti actually do, which aligns also with Ms Moltubakk’s testimony, rather than relying on Ms De Cossio’s testimony as to how difficult she found it to understand what Ms Aliprandi was saying.

180. Fifthly, the Panel considers that the reliability of Ms Trikomiti’s testimony suffered from her insistence that her assignment of Ms Piscupescu to DB only after her arrival in Budapest was “standard procedure”. Similarly, it did not further the credibility of Ms Bedoshvili and Ms Todorova that they avoided any statement on whether the assignment was unusual, instead pointing (in their written witness statements to the DC) in almost identical words to the absence of any objections from any TC member, before highlighting in later testimony (again in similar words) that all TC members were allegedly ready to judge all panels.

181. Based on the FIG’s statement provided to the GEF on 10 April 2025, and the testimonies of Ms Aliprandi, Ms De Cossio, Ms Piscupescu and even Ms Todorova (who, in crossexamination at the hearing, conceded that “it was late according to the rules”), the Panel finds it established that it was clearly unusual for TC members to learn only days before the RGEC that they would be judging something else than the score component they had been asked to prepare ahead of that same event. This holds true, in particular, for the assignment of DB to Ms Piscupescu. The Appellants have not challenged her testimony that, at the 2023 Rhythmic Gymnastics European Championship (the “2023 RGEC”), she had been asked well in advance of the event to prepare video clips and educational material for judges’ instructions in relation to Execution, and was then assigned to judge Execution on the SJ. This testimony aligns with the written witness statement of Ms De Cossio, who testified that well before the 2023 RGEC, she had been asked to prepare DB, and then was assigned that same role on the SJ. The Panel also notes Ms Aliprandi’s testimony before the DC, where she recalled that when Ms Piscupescu learnt of her judging assignment at the RGEC, she asked in surprise “But why do I have the DB?”.

182. There was no plausible explanation given by Ms Trikomiti for why she did not adopt for the RGEC the same approach as for the 2023 RGEC, i.e. assign the SJ roles to Ms Piscupescu and Ms De Cossio according to the roles they had been asked to prepare ahead of the competition. Instead, at the hearing, she merely stated that there were no formal rules on the timing of the assignment, and that the judges were ready – neither of which explains why she acted in a way that was both unusual and contrary to what had been done at the 2023 RGEC. This unusual last-minute assignment of Ms Piscupescu to DB, and Ms Trikomiti’s insistence that this was completely normal, lends additional credibility to the GEF’s case, given that it is precisely the SJ DB panel in relation to which Ms Trikomiti has been accused of manipulation.

183. Sixthly, Ms Trikomiti stated in her report to the GEF of 20 June 2024 that “[o]verall, the judging was good” at the RGEC and that “[u]nfortunately, the atmosphere changed on the evening of 23rd May 2024 following the first day of qualification […] triggered by the judge from Poland and other members and officials of the Polish federation who were disappointed at the scores awarded to Ms Lewinska […] and who reacted to this by launching a social media campaign […]”. Similarly, Ms Todorova testified that “[t]here was no special atmosphere”. Accordingly, it is their testimony that there was nothing out of the ordinary on 23 May 2024 (at least before the PGA started complaining in the evening). This portrayal is

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conspicuously at odds with the testimony of multiple witnesses, in particular as regards the atmosphere after seven out of eight scores for Ms Lewinska’s routines had been blocked. Ms Piscupescu testified that the crowd was booing the scores of Ms Lewinska and that Ms Piscupescu herself was “left crying”, while she also “saw a lot of judges confused, angry, disappointed or even crying”. Ms Aliprandi confirmed that “[s]ome of my colleagues cried”. Ms Suter testified that “the body movements of the [JP members] […] reflected a great astonishment” (while she confirmed that other blocked scores during the competition did not evoke any reactions from the JP members). Ms Ahlquist and Ms Foster stated that the atmosphere amongst the judges was “very tense”, while Ms Lazsányi mentioned that “almost all the judges on the panel were disappointed”. The Panel finds it difficult to believe that those two SJ members and four JP members made this all up. It is equally difficult to believe that Ms Trikomiti and Ms Todorova were not aware of any of this happening. Accordingly, Ms Trikomiti’s and Ms Todorova’s testimony that everything went well on 23 May 2024 seems to be a rather clear embellishment of the real events, in an apparent attempt to defend Ms Trikomiti.

184. Seventhly, the Panel considers that Ms Trikomiti’s reliance in her testimony on the TC Review and the FIG Review was equally self-serving.

185. Specifically, Ms Trikomiti claimed that the scores given at the RGEC were correct because they were confirmed by the TC Review. She did not seem to see any problem with the undisputed fact that the TC Review was conducted exclusively by persons who had themselves been on the SJ during the RGEC. This is surprising because, in the very same statement, she argued that Ms Moltubakk and Ms Sawade would be “clearly conflicted” to participate in the FIG Review as they had previously made clear that they did not agree with the judging a the RGEC (for the avoidance of doubt, the Panel notes that it is unclear whether these two persons in fact participated in the FIG Review). Also, Ms Trikomiti did not mention the fact that, according to witness statements given previously by Ms Aliprandi and Ms De Cossio, there was serious disagreement during the TC Review on the correct scores, with Ms Aliprandi and Ms De Cossio being largely aligned in their views while Ms Bedoshvili consistently scored lower for Ms Lewinska and higher for Ms Tugolukova.1 This disagreement impacted the overall result of the TC Review because, as testified by both Ms De Cossio and Ms Trikomiti herself, the scores were averaged whenever there was any significant difference. Equally, Ms Trikomiti did not respond to Ms Aliprandi’s testimony that, at one point during the TC Review, Ms Bedoshvili even pointed out that there would be problems if the TC Review gave scores that were too different from those given at the RGEC. This statement by Ms Bedoshvili raises further concerns not only as regards the reliability of the TC Review, but also regarding the credibility of Ms Bedoshvili’s testimony in this arbitration. Likewise, Ms Trikomiti failed to mention that there was disagreement between Ms Aliprandi and Ms Bedoshvili as to the DA score that had been given for Ms Lewinska’s Ball routine, when Ms Worthmann sent the results of the TC Review to the participants of the review. It is rather surprising for Ms Trikomiti to simply omit in her testimony all the above obvious issues with the TC Review, none of which have been effectively challenged by the Appellants, and to claim instead, without any reservation, that the TC Review confirmed the correctness of the judging at the RGEC.

See, in particular, Aliprandi’s 4th and 7th Statement, and De Cossio’s 4th Statement.

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186. In similar fashion, Ms Trikomiti relied in her testimony on the FIG Report to highlight that the blocking system worked, but failed to note that according to the same report, Ms Lewinska should have received a significantly higher score than Ms Tugolukova and, therefore, should have qualified for the Olympic Games instead of her.2 Similarly, the Panel notes that, according to the transcript of her testimony before the DC, Ms Bedoshvili was very evasive when the GEF tried to elicit her view on the very big differences between the FIG Report and the results of TC Review.

187. In summary, Ms Trikomiti’s testimony in respect of the TC Review and FIG Review gives the impression of a selective reproduction of reality in an attempt to find support for her own testimony. Also, Ms Bedoshvili’s role in the TC Review, and her evasive testimony about it before the DC, provide further reason for the Panel to approach her testimony with caution.

188. Eighthly, Ms Trikomiti refused, during her testimony before the DC, to answer the question whether she was expecting a grandchild, and suggested that her son and Ms Todorova were merely friends. Similarly, Ms Todorova refused to reveal the identity of the father of her (at that time future) child, and to indicate whether she was in any romantic relationship with any member of the Trikomiti family.

189. It has been established, inter alia through Ms Todorova’s confirmation at the hearing, that Ms Trikomiti’s son is the father of Ms Todorova’s child. Ms Todorova has also confirmed, in her written witness statement in this arbitration, that she considers herself engaged with Ms Trikomiti’s son, even though she argued that her statement before the DC, whereby she was not “officially engaged to anyone”, was correct because the formalities of an engagement according to Bulgarian custom were not fulfilled.

190. As Ms Todorova is the main witness supporting Ms Trikomiti’s denial of any wrongdoing, those personal matters were of obvious relevance to the DC’s assessment of whether Ms Todorova was an independent witness. Ms Trikomiti’s and Ms Todorova’s refusals to answer questions about it, and their (at least) misleading answers about Ms Todorova’s relationship with Ms Trikomiti’s son not only give rise to a suspicion of coordinated testimonies, but also indicate that they felt they had something to hide. Ms Todorova’s apology at the hearing for her refusal at the DC hearing to disclose the identity of the father of her (then) future child is commendable, but does not detract from the foregoing conclusion. In particular, the Panel is not convinced by her explanation that those were very private matters and she was being overprotective of her (then) future child. As to Ms Todorova’s reference to the private nature of this issue, the Panel notes that the GEF’s questions at the DC hearing were triggered by the GEF finding in the public domain an invitation to Ms Todorova’s and Mr Trikomiti’s son’s gender reveal party. Moreover, Ms Todorova did not take any issue at the DC hearing with the question of whether she was pregnant, and concerning the due date. Instead, she only refused to answer those further questions that would have revealed her personal relationship with a close family member of Ms Trikomiti. Such selective answering of questions about her pregnancy is inconsistent with the explanation of her being overprotective of her (then) future child.

1st Statement, para. 33.

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191. Ninthly, the Panel finds that there is a plausible motive for Ms Trikomiti to try and lower the score of Ms Lytra. Contrary to the Appellants’ suggestion, at this early stage of the competition, which is the moment that counts, Ms Lytra was still considered a direct competitor of Ms Tugolukova for the Olympic quota. Ms Tugolukova, in turn, was competing for Ms Trikomiti’s own national federation (for completeness, the Panel does not find it decisive that she also holds Russian nationality). She was also affiliated to the gymnastics club operated by Ms Trikomiti’s daughter. While Ms Trikomiti testified that this is the only club in Cyprus for elite level gymnasts, this does not detract from the fact that Ms Tugolukova qualifying to the Olympics is clearly favourable to the club operated by Ms Trikomiti’s daughter. In addition, Ms Trikomiti’s husband was on the Executive Committee of the Cypriot National Olympic Committee at the relevant time. Of course, it does not automatically follow that Ms Trikomiti would take the risk of manipulating scores to ensure the outcome certainly hoped for by her federation, her daughter and her husband. However, the existence of those multiple ties makes score manipulation in favour of Ms Tugolukova more likely than if no such ties had existed.

192. Finally, if Ms Trikomiti did request Ms Piscupescu to change her score for Ms Lytra, she had an obvious incentive to lie about it in her witness statements, given in particular the legal and reputational consequences of such score manipulation. Also, the Panel considers that it would be very difficult for Ms Todorova to give testimony against Ms Trikomiti, who is the grandmother of her child and the mother of her partner. As regards Ms Bedoshvili, it may be that she did not in fact hear any request from Ms Trikomiti to Ms Piscupescu – after all, Ms Trikomiti would have turned to her right to speak to Ms Piscupescu, whereas Ms Bedoshvili was sitting one seat away from Ms Trikomiti to her left. Also, Ms Bedoshvili was scoring Ball and Ribbon herself, suggesting that she may have not been paying attention to what Ms Trikomiti said to someone else while Ms Bedoshvili was occupied with her own scoring. That said, the Panel is troubled by some of Ms Bedoshvili’s testimony, which was partly shown to be incorrect and partly seemed biased or evasive in favour of Ms Trikomiti.

193. In conclusion, the Panel finds that, more likely than not, Ms Trikomiti requested Ms Piscupescu to change her score for Ms Lytra’s Ball routine, thereby creating a blocked score. For the avoidance of doubt, the Panel confirms that, contrary to the Appellants’ argument, the ‘field of play doctrine’ does not prevent the Panel from making this finding. That doctrine is meant to prevent, in principle, interference by judicial bodies with sporting results (see, ex multis, CAS 2008/A/1641, para. 24 et seq.). This, however, is not at all what is at issue here. The Panel is not asked to re-judge the gymnasts’ routines at the RGEC, and amend the results of that competition, if necessary, but rather to determine whether Ms Trikomiti engaged in score manipulation and therefore violated multiple FIG rules and regulations. The ‘field of play doctrine’ has no relevance for this disciplinary matter. In any event, as rightly noted by the Respondent, one recognised exception to the ‘field of play’ doctrine is if the decision in question was tainted by fraud or bad faith (see CAS 2004/A/704, para. 3.17; CAS 2008/A/1641, para. 37; CAS OG 02/007, para. 16). The allegation of score manipulation at stake here falls squarely within the scope of that exception.

b. Alleged interference in relation to Ms Lewinska’s Ball routine

194. In relation to Ms Lewinska’s Ball routine, the GEF asserts that Ms Trikomiti verbally instructed Ms Piscupescu to change her score from 10.4 to 10.6. For the following reasons,

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while the Panel finds that the GEF discharged its burden of proving such request on a balance of probabilities, the Panel does not consider that the GEF has established that this constitutes a case of score manipulation.

195. Both Ms Piscupescu and Ms Aliprandi have testified that Ms Trikomiti verbally requested Ms Piscupescu to change her score. Ms Aliprandi’s testimony, in particular, was very detailed and extremely rich in her description of her own thoughts and emotions, and her interaction with Ms Trikomiti. For instance, in her testimony before the DC, Ms Aliprandi testified as follows:

“At one point, I turn to the right and ask Evangelia what she was doing and why. I think she heard me, because we were very close. The problem: she acted as if I didn't exist, and I assure you that I am a generally calm person. I went into a state of shock, because I couldn't believe what was happening. It has never happened to me, never, in any competition. She was very nervous. I remember that she also turned red in the face and my colleagues were very surprised by the DB. And I remember the look in my face, that they looked at me with wide eyes as if to say: 'What should we do? What is happening?’.

[…]

It made me feel uncomfortable in that situation. And it seemed unmanageable, both the situation and Evengelia’s behavior. It didn’t seem like her either. I mean, she was really out of her mind”.

196. Moreover, the Panel does not agree with the Appellants that Ms Piscupescu’s testimony on this particular request by Ms Trikomiti changed over time. While it is true that Ms Piscupescu initially testified that Ms Trikomiti asked her to “change” her score and later stated that she was asked to raise her score, this is not a contradiction, but rather a specification. Contrary to what the Appellants seemed to suggest, there is no testimony of Ms Piscupescu on record in which she claimed that she was requested to lower her score for Ms Lewinska’s Ball routine. Moreover, while it is true that Ms Piscupescu did not mention this allegation in her initial interview with the GEF, the Panel does not consider that this would, in and of itself, suggest that Ms Piscupescu was lying. This holds true even more as Ms Piscupescu herself testified that the request to change her score came after the score was blocked, which may explain why she only mentioned the incident about Ms Lytra’s Ball routine, where Ms Trikomiti’s request created a block, in her initial interview with the GEF.

197. As to Ms Aliprandi’s testimony, the Appellants’ main challenge, and understandably so, is that Ms Aliprandi testified, both in her written statement to the PGA of 18 June 2024, and in her oral testimony before the Panel, that Ms Trikomiti had requested Ms Piscupescu to lower her score. This is contradicted not only by the testimony of Ms Piscupescu herself before the Panel that she was requested to raise her score, but is also difficult to reconcile with the undisputed fact that, as confirmed by SmartScoring screenshots, Ms Piscupescu did raise her score, from 10.4 to 10.6. The Panel considers that this part of Ms Aliprandi’s testimony cannot be correct. For the following reasons, the Panel does not, however, accept the Appellants’ suggestion that this means Ms Aliprandi was deliberately lying (much less, that she must have been lying in all other testimony against Ms Trikomiti as well).

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198. The Panel finds it highly unlikely that Ms Aliprandi was intentionally lying, in particular in view of the fact that her testimony was the most detailed and most vivid of any witness in this arbitration. Her testimony was also consistent in its core parts despite Ms Aliprandi having given no less than eight statements over a period of more than a year. At the same time, despite the material consistency, she always used different words and sometimes added, sometimes omitted details of less (or no) relevance. Moreover, the differences between her and Ms Piscupescu’s testimony essentially exclude any collusion between the witnesses against Ms Trikomiti (not that one was suggested by the Appellants). Furthermore, the Panel has already found above that it is not convinced Ms Aliprandi had any motivation to intentionally give false testimony.

199. What the Panel does find quite possible, however, is that there was a genuine misperception or false recollection on the part of Ms Aliprandi in relation to Ms Trikomiti’s request that Ms Piscupescu raise her score. There are two elements in her testimony making this more than a theoretical possibility: firstly, when pressed at the hearing to specify which words she actually heard Ms Trikomiti say, she responded “To change the score, yes. I did hear this word, change. […] She pronounced the word change” (emphasis added; Ms Aliprandi used the English word “change” in this part of her testimony multiple times although otherwise testifying in Italian). The Panel notes that the same word also appeared in Ms Aliprandi’s letter to the PGA, where she stated that Ms Trikomiti “spoke to the two SJ DB judges to change the score (the note to be entered) – to lower it” (emphasis added). The same term again appeared in her testimony before the DC, where she said that Ms Trikomiti “kept looking down and to the right and… asking to change” (emphasis added). Secondly, Ms Aliprandi testified quite vividly how shocked she was herself about the scores in all score components going down. For instance, in her written statement to the GEF of 19 June 2024, she stated the following: “ALL the judges’ PANELS were blocked and the scores were changed. I witnessed this and kept saying stop and watch the total score go down. That’s the thing that shocked me the most”. Similarly, in her oral testimony before the DC, she said that “[a]t first glance, I'm honest, I was really in shock”. The Panel does not find it difficult at all to see how, having heard Ms Trikomiti request a “change” of the score, and having been shocked by all score components instantly going down a lot, Ms Aliprandi became convinced that what Ms Trikomiti asked for was in fact a lowering of the score. This reinforces the Panel’s conclusion that Ms Aliprandi’s reference to a request by Ms Trikomiti to lower the score was not an intentional lie. This apparent genuine mistake in Ms Aliprandi’s testimony did, however, cause the Panel to assess her other testimony particularly carefully for potential similar mistakes. That said, the Panel considers that the risk of a mistake was particularly high after Ms Lewinska’s Ball routine, given the above-mentioned circumstances and the fact that

multiple witnesses have confirmed that the atmosphere amongst the judges at that particular moment was very tense.

200. For the reasons already set out in relation to Ms Lytra’s Ball routine, the Panel does not consider that the testimonies of Ms Trikomiti, Ms Todorova and Ms Bedoshvili could call into question that Ms Trikomiti did ask Ms Piscupescu to change her score for Ms Lewinska’s Ball routine, from 10.4 to 10.6. An additional reason for doubting the reliability of their testimony is that all three of them quite clearly sought to downplay the number of blocks on Ms Lewinska’ scores on 23 May 2024, which included a block of all four score components for her Ball routine.

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201. Ms Trikomiti, Ms Todorova and Ms Bedoshvili all initially testified that blocks are a normal occurrence in RG. In their later testimony, Ms Trikomiti and Ms Bedoshvili testified that they could not tell if the number of blocks for Ms Lewinska was unusual, because only the SJ President sees the number of blocks and they had not (previously) acted as SJ President at a competition whether the automatic blocking system had been used. The Panel found this testimony evasive at best, for the following reasons.

202. Based on the testimony of Ms Aliprandi, Ms Piscupescu, Ms de Cossio, Ms Suter, Ms Ahlquist, Ms Moltubakk and Ms Lazsányi, the Panel finds it established that the number of blocks for Ms Lewinska was very exceptional. All of those seven witnesses are experienced judges, and it is noteworthy that one of them (Ms Motubakk) did not herself judge at the RGEC, but rather participated as a spectator. The Panel sees no reason why those seven witnesses should have lied, much less as all of them provided plausible reasons for their view that the blocks on Ms Lewinska’s scores on 23 May 2024 were unusual. This is made even less likely by the fact that there is no sign (or even suggestion by the Appellants) of any coordination between the testimony of those witnesses. Accordingly, it would be a very remarkable coincidence indeed for all of them to decide individually to give false testimony.

203. The reasons provided by those seven witnesses for their view that the blocks were unusual included that (i) it is difficult for high-ranking gymnasts to have blocks, in particular in DA or DB, as they have clearer routines, (ii) the number of blocks for Ms Lewinska was disproportionate to the number blocks for other high-level gymnasts at the RGEC, and (iii) there were no blocks for much higher scores that Ms Lewinska received in the final for the same routines. None of those observations would have required any previous experience with the block system. Instead, they are either based on an assessment of how likely it is to have a significant difference in score between the JP and the SJ, or on an observation of the blocks that occurred during the RGEC. As a result, it is a rather surprising coincidence that Ms Trikomiti, Ms Todorova and Ms Bedoshvili, despite being experienced judges themselves, all avoided to offer any views on the number of blocks for Ms Lewinska. Their references to blocks being a normal occurrence, or to a lack of own experience with the block system, appeared rather as pretexts than as credible justifications for such avoidance.

204. In view of the above, the Panel finds it established that Ms Trikomiti did ask Ms Piscupescu to change her score from 10.4 to 10.6. However, the Panel is not satisfied that this request even falls under the GEF’s own formulation of its case. As mentioned above, it is the GEF’s case that Ms Trikomiti provoked blocked scores by requesting Ms Piscupescu to change her scores – so that, after the block occurred, she could use her undisputed power under the applicable rules to determine the final score. The problem with this allegation is that Ms Piscupescu’s score of 10.4 (which she confirms having given herself freely, after having corrected her initial score of 10.3) already created a block, given that the difference compared to the JP’s DB score (11.4) exceeded the threshold of 0.5. Accordingly, the request to change the score from 10.4 to 10.6 did not create a block. Instead, it must have been made after the system had already automatically blocked the DB score. Indeed, this was expressly confirmed by Ms Piscupescu herself in her written witness statement in this arbitration, in which she stated that “I do recall that in this particular case, I was instructed by the President of the Jury to adjust the score following the block” (emphasis added).

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205. The Panel is not convinced that such request by a SJ President to change an already blocked score is in violation of the FIG’s rules. In particular, the Panel notes that Article 1.3 of the Appendix to the FIG Code of Points specifically empowers the SJ President to overrule a judge who refuses to change his/her blocked score. While the wording of Article 1.3 appears to refer only to the overruling of a score of a JP member, the Panel finds it established that, in practice, it is well accepted that the SJ President also has the power to request that the relevant SJ member changes his or her score. This follows already from the explanation of the block system given by the FIG’s Sports Event Manager, Ms Martinet, to Ms Worthmann prior to the RGEC (see para. 15 above). In addition, this is precisely what happened, multiple times, at the RGEC. For instance, Ms Piscupescu herself testified that the SmartScoring screenshots submitted by the Appellants in relation to her score changes for the Ball routines of Ms Boryana, Ms Berta, Ms Atamanov and Ms Millet, and for the Ribbon routine of Ms Berta, all related to cases in which, after a block had occurred, Ms Trikomiti requested her to change her score. Similarly, Ms Abduramanova, the SJ member in charge of DA, testified that she changed her score for Ms Lewinska’s Ball routine from 7.1 to 7.6 (which ended up being the final score) after being requested to do so via SmartScoring, to resolve the block that had occurred in view of the JP’s score of 7.9. There is no suggestion by the GEF that those (or any other) instances of Ms Trikomiti requesting score changes by SJ members to resolve blocked scores at the RGEC amounted to score manipulation. As a result, the Panel fails to see why this should be any different in the case of the blocked DB score for Ms Lewinska’s Ball routine. While it is unclear why Ms Trikomiti’s requests for a score change was made verbally, rather than through SmartScoring, the Panel does not consider that the applicable rules provide for a mandatory way of communicating score change requests.

206. This does not mean that the sheer number of blocks on Ms Lewinska’s routines on 23 May 2024, all of them resulting in a significant lowering of her scores (which, according to the testimony of Ms Moltubakk, is likewise very unusual), might not raise the question as to whether the scoring of those routines was above board. However, the GEF did not allege any specific actions of interference by Ms Trikomiti regarding any of the seven blocked scores other than the DB score for the Ball routine, and none of the other SJ members have testified that Ms Trikomiti interfered with their judging, or that they witnessed her interfering with the judging of other SJ members. Ms Trikomiti’s request for a change of the DB score, in turn, came after the block and, therefore, did not violate the FIG’s rules. Accordingly, there is no sufficient basis for the Panel to find any score manipulation by Ms Trikomiti in respect of Ms Lewinska’s Ball routine (and, much less, in respect of her Hoop routine in relation to which the GEF did not make any specific allegations).

c. Alleged interference in relation to Ms Lewinska’s Ribbon routine

207. In its written submissions, the GEF asserted that Ms Trikomiti interfered indirectly with Ms Piscupescu’s DB score for Ms Lewinska’s Ribbon routine. It is not entirely clear to the Panel whether the GEF maintained this allegation at the hearing, given that it was no longer mentioned in the GEF’s closing argument where the GEF seemed to list the specific actions of Ms Trikomiti that the GEF considered amounted to score manipulation.

208. However, even assuming that the GEF maintained the allegation that Ms Trikomiti manipulated Ms Lewinska’s score for the Ribbon routine, the Panel does not find such allegation established on a balance of probabilities. The only evidence proffered for this

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allegation is the testimony by Ms Piscupescu that she was asked by Ms Todorova to refrain from entering her score for DB prior to Ms Todorova discussing the intended score with Ms Trikomiti, because Ms Todorova allegedly felt Ms Trikomiti may consider the intended score to be too high. Importantly, Ms Piscupescu did not testify that she saw or heard Ms Trikomiti do or say anything that would amount to a request that she change her score for Ms Lewinska’s Ribbon routine. She only testified that after she had put her score (without waiting for any potential requests from Ms Trikomiti), Ms Trikomiti looked at her angrily, and that it took longer than usual for the final score to be announced.

209. The Panel does not consider that this evidence is sufficient for the GEF to discharge its burden of proof on this particular allegation. It is necessary for the GEF to establish a specific act or omission by Ms Tritkomiti that amounts to score manipulation. Ms Piscupescu’s testimony that Ms Trikomiti seemed angry with her scoring, and that it took longer than usual to publish the score, might be regarded as circumstantial evidence underscoring a bias in favour of Ms Tugolukova, but is not evidence of any act that could, in and of itself, be qualified as score manipulation. Therefore, the Panel dismisses the GEF’s allegation of score manipulation in relation to Ms Lewinska’s Ribbon routine.

B. Sanctions imposed on Ms Trikomiti

210. While the Appellants argued that the Panel’s power to decide de novo implied its power to amend the sanctions imposed by the DC, they did not make any specific argument as to whether, and why, the sanction imposed on Ms Trikomiti would have to be changed (assuming that she was found to have manipulated scores). However, contrary to what the Respondent seemed to suggest, the Panel does not consider that this should prevent the Panel from determining whether the sanction imposed was proportionate. Instead, the Panel finds itself obliged to do so. The principle of proportionality is a fundamental principle of Swiss law and, therefore, directly applicable in view of the Parties’ choice of law.

211. That said, the Panel is mindful of the well-established CAS jurisprudence whereby CAS panels should not ‘tinker’ with sanctions imposed by the previous instances, but should amend sanctions only if they are “evidently and grossly disproportionate to the offence” (see, ex 202). The Panel has found Ms Trikomiti to have manipulated the score of Ms Lytra’s Ball routine. Moreover, in line with CAS jurisprudence, the Panel considers that the manipulation of sporting results is a serious breach of sporting fairness, which at the same time undermines the trust of athletes, coaches, other participants and the public at large in the integrity of sports. As such, score manipulation warrants a significant sanction, not only as a proportionate response to the wrongdoing but also to deter future breaches. As a result, the Panel does not consider that a period of ineligibility of four years, and the annulation of her FIG Judge Brevet, is grossly and evidently disproportionate in the present case. This takes into account also that, as TC President and SJ President, Ms Trikomiti was subject to the highest standards of integrity (as acknowledged by herself at the hearing), which renders her violation of the rules particularly serious.

212. The Panel wishes to reiterate that the present proceedings are purely disciplinary in nature. Accordingly, the applicable standard of proof was a mere balance of probabilities, a comparatively low threshold that requires only that the alleged conduct be more likely than

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not, rather than proved with any heightened degree of certainty. The conduct at issue does not amount to a criminal or quasi-criminal offence, nor does it carry the gravity of sanctions typically associated with such matters. Rather, it concerns an infraction of ethical obligations, to be assessed within the disciplinary framework and the principles of proportionality that govern matters of this nature.

213. Therefore, the Panel confirms the sanctions as imposed on Ms Trikomiti by the DC.

C. Sanction imposed on EG

214. The Decision held EG liable, under Article 4 of the FIG Code of Discipline, for Ms Trikomiti’s score manipulation, and imposed as a sanction a reimbursement of GEF’s investigative costs in the amount of CHF 8,000.

215. Article 4 of the FIG Code of Discipline reads as follows, in its relevant part:

“The Federations are also liable for the behaviour of their members, gymnasts, judges and officials as well as for any other person assigned by them to officiate during a competition. They are liable for the implementation of any sanction of the FIG imposed against those persons. Any failure of a Federation to implement any sanction of the FIG may lead to a disciplinary action against the Federation concerned” (emphasis added).

216. The Appellants do not dispute, and the Panel agrees, that Ms Trikomiti qualified, in her role as TC President SJ President, as a “judge” within the meaning of Article 4 of the CoD. If one saw this differently, she would qualify as an “official” (also in view of her being the TC President at the time) or as an “other person assigned […] to officiate officiating during a competition”. Article 4 of the FIG Code of Discipline explicitly provides that the “Federations”, which defined term includes Continental Unions pursuant to Appendix 1 to the FIG Code of Discipline, “are liable for the behaviour” of the judges assigned by them to a competition. EG selected Ms Trikomiti as its TC President, which automatically made her SJ President at the RGEC. The Panel does not hesitate to find that this means that EG effectively assigned Ms Trikomiti as a judge to the RGEC. This being the case, it follows from the express language of Article 4 of the FIG Code of Discipline that EG is liable for Ms Trikomiti’s behaviour as SJ President at the RGEC.

217. Article 4 of the FIG Code of Discipline does not mention any requirement of fault on the part of EG. Indeed, its wording is very similar to provisions in other sporting rules that have been found by CAS to impose strict liability (see, in particular, CAS 2013/A/3139, para. 97; CAS 2014/A/3625, paras. 89).

218. In respect of the Appellants’ argument that EG must be able to exculpate itself, the Panel first notes that, according to CAS jurisprudence, strict liability does not violate Swiss law (see, CAS 2002/A/423, para. 17; CAS 2013/A/3139, para. 101). In addition, even if one considered that EG must have the possibility to exculpate itself, the Panel does not find that EG managed to do so. The liability in Article 4 of the FIG Code of Discipline is clearly tied to EG having “assigned” Ms Trikomiti. Consequently, any exculpation would seem to have to relate to that assignment, i.e., require a showing that EG did not bear any fault in its selection of Ms Trikomiti. However, even if one considered that the point of reference for the exculpation

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would be Ms Trikomiti’s misconduct, such that EG could exculpate itself by establishing that it could not have prevented such misconduct, this would not help EG. This is because EG has sought to exculpate itself exclusively by reference to its investigations conducted after the RGEC. This, however, happened not only after EG’s selection of Ms Trikomiti, but also after Ms Trikomiti’s misconduct. The Panel fails to see how any actions of EG after the violation had already occurred could show that EG did not bear any fault. Accordingly, even if one assumed that EG had the possibility to exculpate itself, it has failed to do so.

219. As to the specific sanction imposed, i.e., the reimbursement of an amount of CHF 8,000, the Panel notes that Article 25 of the FIG Code of Discipline refers to the types of sanctions foreseen in the FIG Statutes, and that Article 34 of the FIG Statutes provides as follows:

“Disciplinary measures which can be imposed amongst others on a Member Federation, on a legal entity or on an individual are the following:

[…]

9. the financial fine

[…]

17. or any other sanction which could be proposed by the [DC]”.

220. The Panel considers that, if one does not qualify the amount of CHF 8,000 as a fine (that will then be used to reimburse the GEF for its investigative costs), it is at least a sanction proposed by the DC within the meaning of Article 34(17) of the FIG Statutes. Given the rather moderate amount, the Panel also does not consider the sanction to be evidently and grossly disproportionate.

221. In addition, the Panel does not accept EG’s argument that upholding the Decision in this regard would open the door to arbitrary cross-financing of the GEF by third parties. Firstly, there was no showing of arbitrariness in respect of the sanction in the present case, and any argument of arbitrariness in future cases could be advanced to the competent judicial body in those cases. Secondly, EG is not a random third party, but rather the entity that assigned Ms Trikomiti to the role in which she committed a serious violation of the FIG Rules.

222. Consequently, the Panel confirms the sanction imposed by the DC on EG.

X. COSTS

(…)

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