Typology Report(Nur in Englisch verfügbar; Periodische Erweiterung der Fallsammlung)

1 Introduction

1 Introduction

This typology report published by the Money Laundering Reporting Office (MROS) aims to provide financial intermediaries with practical examples of suspicious circumstances relating to money laundering and terrorist financing, thereby raising awareness of these facts.

Based on practical cases, MROS has compiled ex- amples to provide financial intermediaries with illus-

MROS Typology Report 2025 trations of indicators, potential risks, and methods used to combat money laundering and terrorist financing.

1 Introduction

The target audience are employees of the compliance departments and those in direct customer contact, as well as members of senior management responsible for due diligence.

This typology report is published on the MROS website. The collection is constantly being expanded.

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2 Typology report Vol. I

2.1 Case 1: Criminal mismanagement – Best practice for financial intermediaries

il nostro account The client’s atypical request prompted the finan- Preliminary remarks cial intermediary to refuse the transaction. It then This case illustrates a client’s attempt to transfer carried out clarifications in accordance with Art. 6 funds not via his personal account but via a bank AMLA4 on all business relationships linked to this nostro account. The point 4.4 of the Appendix to the specific client, i. e. those where he was the contract- AMLO-FINMA1 states that a client who wishes cer- ing party, beneficial owner, control holder or where tain payments not to be made directly from his or he held power of attorney rights. her own account, but via a financial intermediary’s

MROS Typology Report 2025 nostro account2 is a qualified indication of money Even though the transactional analysis did not relaundering. veal any suspicion of a specific predicate offence to money laundering, the discomfort of the situa-

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Facts tion generated by this qualified indication of money A financial intermediary’s client is active in the tex- laundering prompted the financial intermediary to tile industry. In particular, he was a shareholder and make use of its right to report on the basis on Art. CEO of a company specialised in the wholesale 305ter para. 2 SCC. of various industrial supplies and equipment. His wealth came from his professional activity.

2.2 Case 2: Fraud – Enabling scams by

The client expressed the wish to deposit several transit accounts hundred thousand Swiss francs in cash into a nos- Preliminary remarks tro account at the financial intermediary, which he This case illustrates the importance of financial inwould then transfer to his personal account. In this termediaries reporting transit accounts. way, the accounting entries would not have shown the client’s name on his account statements. In The use of a transit account constitutes a general view of this, the financial intermediary asked for exindication of money laundering, respectively a speplanations and then refused to execute the trans- cific indication of money laundering according to action, which is why no payments were made to or point 2.1.2 and 3.2.14 of the Appendix to the AMcredited to the nostro account. The client did not LO-FINMA5. When a financial intermediary reports insist on the transaction either. The financial intera transit account to MROS, the difficulty lies in idenmediary reported the case to MROS on the basis on tifying the predicate offence. Even if the use of a Art. 305ter para. 2 SCC3. transit account is an indication of an obstructionist act, MROS still needs to determine a predicate of- Based on the legal principles MROS transmitted the fence to money-laundering. information via its partner FIU to the competent international authority. This information was used to Facts provide mutual legal assistance within the criminal A Swiss financial intermediary noticed that the acproceedings conducted abroad which under Swiss tivities of several client companies were not in line law would constitute serious criminal mismanage- with the original aims indicated when the business ment according to Art. 158 para. 2 SCC. relationship was opened.

Ordinance of the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority on the Prevention of Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism (FINMA Anti-Money Laundering Ordinance, AMLO-FINMA), SR 955.033.0. Term for the account of a credit institution, which is held at a domestic or nowadays mostly foreign correspondent bank for the credit institution, in the credit institution’s own accountancy. Swiss Criminal Code, SR 311.0. Federal Act on Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (Anti-Money Laundering Act, AMLA), SR 955.0. Ordinance of the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority on the Prevention of Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism (FINMA Anti-Money Laundering Ordinance, AMLO-FINMA), SR 955.033.0.

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Following clarifications with the client and the sub- 2.3 Case 3: Fraud – Accounts in the name mission of contracts and invoices by the client, the of foreign financial intermediaries financial intermediary came to the conclusion that Preliminary remarks these documents were unclear, contained a large This case illustrates the extraordinary due diligence number of spelling errors and often lacked mean- duties of a Swiss financial intermediary if the coning. The financial intermediary was unable to verify tracting party is a foreign financial intermediary. the plausibility of the companies’ activities and did not understand the economic background of the When a foreign financial intermediary opens an ac- transactions. Moreover, the scale of the account count in Switzerland, the Swiss financial interme-

MROS Typology Report 2025 movements and balances suggested that these diary’s due diligence duties are reduced provided were transit accounts. The fact that the business that the foreign financial intermediary is subject to relationship involved a large number of counterpar- equivalent supervision and regulation in its country

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ties, often unknown and with no accessible infor- with regard to combating money laundering and mation, led the financial intermediary to conduct in- terrorist financing (in particular Art. 58 let. e AMdepth clarifications with the client and to attempt to LO-FINMA7 and Art. 65 para. 1 let. d AMLO-FINMA). verify the plausibility of the transactions and their In accordance with Art. 65 para. 2 let. a AMLO-FINpurpose. Since the client was unable to provide MA, the Swiss financial intermediary will request a the necessary information for plausibility verifica- declaration of beneficial ownership from the contion, the financial intermediary reported the case to tracting party if there are indications of money laun- MROS in accordance with Art. 9 AMLA6. Due to the dering or terrorist financing. numerous, mostly unknown counterparties, the financial intermediary did not identify any predicate Facts offense. However, he could not rule out money laun- A foreign financial intermediary, specialised pridering activities. marily in offering cryptocurrency payment solutions, opened an account with a Swiss financial MROS analysed the case and was able to link these intermediary. The foreign financial intermediary transit accounts to other reports and to a large- provided its customers access to a multi-currency scale fraud case in a neighbouring country. MROS payment solution, enabling them to access liquidity transmitted the information to the responsible pros- at any time. The foreign financial intermediary also ecution authority. maintained relationships with other financial intermediaries who hold sub-accounts with the Swiss Best practice for financial intermediaries financial intermediary. Foreign customers could The financial intermediary acknowledged the dis- buy cryptocurrencies on a platform operated by crepancy between announced and current activi- one of the foreign financial intermediaries holding ties on the accounts and he carried out clarifica- a sub-account. tions in accordance with Art. 6 AMLA. Furthermore, he identified counterparties, both senders and re- The Swiss financial intermediary received unforeceivers of funds and considered several accounts seen the notification of an aggrieved party’s comas transit accounts. Even if MROS does not forward plaint. The financial intermediary realized that a

the information to the competent law enforcement foreign client of the foreign financial intermediary authority within 40 days, it can subsequently iden- invested several thousand euros in a cryptocurrentify a predicate offense on the basis of relevant in- cy on the cryptocurrency platform. This amount formation received from other partner authorities was credited to the cryptocurrency company’s and, if necessary, report the case to the competent Swiss sub-account. After the notification of the law enforcement authority. Therefore, it is impor- Swiss financial intermediary, it turned out that this tant that financial intermediaries report such transit was probably a scam. But the funds were no longer accounts. available in Switzerland. The Swiss financial inter-

Federal Act on Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (Anti-Money Laundering Act, AMLA), SR 955.0. Ordinance of the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority on the Prevention of Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism (FINMA Anti-Money Laundering Ordinance, AMLO-FINMA), SR 955.033.0.

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mediary submitted a Suspicious Activity Report of Art. 9 para. 1 let. b AMLA. In particular, it could (SAR) to MROS. As a predicate offence the financial not rule out a link to an Italian criminal organisation. intermediary admitted fraud. Indeed, opensource research associated the prospect with a case of aggravated extortion and tax Based on the legal principles MROS transmitted the fraud on behalf of an Italian criminal organisation. information to a partner FIU. MROS carried out an in-depth analysis regarding Best practice for financial intermediaries this manager. The results confirmed the financial After receiving a copy of the aggrieved party’s com- intermediary’s suspicion. The manager was known

MROS Typology Report 2025 plaint, the Swiss financial intermediary immediately to Swiss and foreign law enforcement authorities. identified the holder of the sub-account to which Based on the legal principles MROS transmitted the potentially incriminating funds were credited. It the information to a Swiss police authority and to

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also identified the holder’s business model. Having a partner FIU. carried out these clarifications in accordance with Art. 6 AMLA8, the Swiss financial intermediary re- Best practice for financial intermediaries ported its suspicions to MROS. In practice, it is rare that information reported under Art. 9 para. 1 let. b AMLA leads to a transmission from MROS to the prosecution authorities (Art. 23

2.4 Case 4: Criminal Organisation – An para. 4 AMLA). However, as the ’first line of defence’

exemplary currency exchange office in the fight against money laundering, a financial Preliminary remarks intermediary who terminates negotiations in such This case shows the importance of submitting a a case enables MROS to provide administrative as- Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) to MROS accord- sistance within the meaning of Art. 29 cont. AMLA. ing to Art. 9 para. 1 let. b AMLA9 in case of terminat- This case underlines the importance of reporting ing negotiations. under Art. 9 para. 1 let. b AMLA, both in terms of the conduct of the financial intermediary who, as a ‘first The AMLA imposes a duty to file a report if the fi- line of defence’ against money laundering, prevents nancial intermediary terminates the negotiations to potentially criminal funds from being laundered in establish a business relationship, in particular if it Switzerland, and in terms of the operational analyknows or has reasonable grounds to suspect that sis of MROS, which was able to inform two partner the assets involved are subject to the power of dis- authorities, both national and international. In this posal of a criminal organisation (Art. 9 para. 1 let. b case, the currency exchange office did not receive in conjunction with Art. 9 para. 1 let. a no. 3 AMLA). a transmission notification from MROS, which does not mean that MROS remained passive. It used two Facts channels other than the transmission according to A Swiss currency exchange office received a phone Art. 23 para. 4 AMLA. call from the manager and control holder (of a company based in Northern Italy), which provided consulting services to companies. The manager in- 2.5 Case 5: Art work – Paintings from a tended to regularly cross the Italian-Swiss border Caribbean art gallery with cash amounting between EUR 30 000 and Preliminary remarks EUR 70,000 and intended to exchange the money This case illustrates the diligence with which a fiat the Swiss currency exchange office. The manag- nancial intermediary clarified transactions linked to er wished to remain discreet about the reasons for the art market. these transactions. Studies have shown that the art sector is at risk The currency exchange office refused the transac- from money laundering and terrorist financing. The tion and reported the case to MROS on the basis vast majority of market participants do not have

Federal Act on Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (Anti-Money Laundering Act, AMLA), SR 955.0. Federal Act on Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (Anti-Money Laundering Act, AMLA), SR 955.0.

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a connection to illicit activities, but there are risks settle the payment. The remaining balance was associated with these markets, and some jurisdic- paid through foreign exchange agreements in a tions do not have sufficient awareness and under- South American country in compliance with Censtanding of them. This results in a lack of investiga- tral Bank regulations. tive resources and expertise, and difficulties with pursuing cross-border investigations.10 Clarifica- While external sources that are tracking art auctions in accordance with Art. 6 AMLA11 enable the tions showed comparable prices for comparable financial intermediary to understand the economic artworks, the financial intermediary had strong con- background of a transaction linked to the art mar- cerns regarding the payments. The contract stipu-

MROS Typology Report 2025 ket, to document it and to detail the suspicious ac- lated the initial payment of USD 200,000 that was tivity report addressed to MROS. already made before signing the contract and the remaining USD 1,8 Mio. that had to be transferred

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Facts to the client’s bank account after the sale. Howev- Due to the transaction monitoring, a Swiss financial er, the contract did neither stipulate any rationale intermediary identified thirteen unexpected incom- for the split payments (limitations on daily transfers ing transfers totalling USD 1,8 Mio. originated from and lack of liquidity) nor anything about the need for a foreign art gallery at a personal account of one using an offshore account in the Caribbean. OSIclient. NT researches found out that the Prosecutor of a South American country accused the art gallery’s The financial intermediary tried to clarify the back- owner of money laundering in relation to bribery ground. As per the client’s feedback, the payments and corruption. were related to the sale of two paintings which were part of his divorce settlement and were supposed The financial intermediary exercised its right to to be sold to the foreign art gallery. According to communicate to MROS in accordance to Art. a contract with the art gallery, the client sold the 305ter para. 2 SCC12. The suspected predicate oftwo paintings for USD 1,1 Mio. and USD 0,9 Mio., fense was corruption. Based on the legal princia total value of USD 2 Mio.. An initial payment of ples MROS transmitted the information to a foreign USD 200,000 was already made, the remaining partner FIU. USD 1,8 Mio. had to be transferred after the sale. The payments to the client’s account were made Best practice for financial intermediaries from an account of the art gallery with a currency The financial intermediary immediately clarified the exchange office in South America (USD 800,000) origin of the paintings and the purchasing art galand from another account in the Caribbean (USD 1 lery. It asked for the contracts and compared the million). The total USD 1,8 Mio. was split up and paid prices with them on the market. The smurfing and in thirteen transactions, between USD 25,000 and payment through two different accounts (in particu- USD 105,000 each. lar one in a Caribbean country) created a feeling of discomfort and the financial intermediary reported Regarding the art gallery’s split payments, the client the matter to MROS. provided the following explanations: • First, the art gallery’s bank in the Caribbean has imposed a daily transfer limit, requiring the pay- 2.6 Case 6: Criminal Organisation –

ments to be made in instalments. ‘Ndrangheta’s life insurance policy • Second, the art gallery’s funds available in the Preliminary remarks Caribbean account, were not sufficient to cover This case illustrates the diligence of a life insurance the full purchase price. Due to this lack of liquid- institution which carefully checked who was paying ity the art gallery used two different channels to the premiums.

FATF Report Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing in the Art and Antiquities Market, published February 2023. Federal Act on Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (Anti-Money Laundering Act, AMLA), SR 955.0. Swiss Criminal Code, SR 311.0.

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Life insurance institutions are subject to the AMLA13 2.7 Case 7: Commodity Trading – by virtue of Art. 2 para. 2 let. c AMLA. The conclu- A diligent gold trader sion of life insurance contracts and the payment of Preliminary remarks high premiums can prove to be an attractive laun- This case illustrates that a financial intermediary dering vehicle for potential criminals. also must fulfil its due diligence duties with due care and attention in an ongoing business relation- Facts ship. A couple concluded a life insurance contract with a Swiss insurance institution. Two insurance poli- According to Art. 2 para. 3 let. c AMLA15 and Art. 5

MROS Typology Report 2025 cies were issued. After a while both policies were para. 1 let. a AMLO16, the professional purchase and assigned to a trust based in Italy. From then on, the sale for the account of third parties of banknotes trust paid the insurance premiums. Years later, the and precious metals falls within the scope of finan-

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trust requested the payment of the surrender value cial intermediation. of one of the policies into an account in Italy. The amount in question was over CHF 100,000. Facts A foreign company (hereinafter ‘Company A’) is a The request for payment came from a company customer of a Swiss commodity trader (hereinafter whose name differed slightly from that of the trust ‘the Trader’). Company A obtains its precious metto which the insurance policies had been assigned. als from European individuals and LBMA17 refiners. The insurance institution undertook clarifications in Company A sends its scrap of bars, loose jewelaccordance with Art. 6 of the AMLA. It came across ry, ingots, coins and industrial scrap to the Swiss an article referring to the minority shareholding of based commodity trader for processing. Once the the Italian trust by a ’Ndrangheta boss. materials received have been processed, the Trader credits company A’s weight accounts (depending Fearing that some of the premiums paid had been on the materials). Company A has the liberty to use contaminated, or that they came from funds under its weight accounts to acquire materials or to ask the control of a criminal organisation, the insurance the dealer to sell the materials and credit the equivinstitution reported the matter to MROS in accord- alent value to its bank account. For the Trader, Comance with Art. 9 AMLA. It suspected the partici- pany A was classified as a ‘normal’ risk customer. pation in a criminal organisation or the support of That said, a review of the due diligence file is carried such an organisation in accordance with Art. 260ter out every five years by the Trader, in accordance para. 1 SCC14. with its internal guidelines.

Best practice for financial intermediaries Recently, the trader noticed the following: The Swiss insurance institution identified the (minor) name difference of the trust requesting pay- • Company A submitted several requests to the ment of the surrender value, researched the Italian trader to modify its bank accounts. These retrust and promptly reported the matter to MROS, quests were also submitted by an employee of indicating the Italian account provided by the trust Company A who was not one of the persons aufor payment of the surrender value of the insurance thorized to issue such instructions. policy. • The Trader had difficulties in contacting directly the person authorized to give instructions. • Company A announced the appointment of a new managing director. The Trader took the usual steps required by its due diligence to validate

Federal Act on Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (Anti-Money Laundering Act, AMLA), SR 955.0. Swiss Criminal Code, SR 311.0. Federal Act on Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (Anti-Money Laundering Act, AMLA), RS.955.0. Ordinance on Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (Anti-Money Laundering Ordinance, AMLO), RS 955.01. The London Bullion Market Association (LBMA) coordinates as an independent authority the trade at the London Bullion Market, the most important over-the-counter trading centre for gold and silver in London.

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this change, but these were never completed. account (master account). The main difference be- The trader was subsequently informed that the tween a regular IBAN and a vIBAN lies in the acnew director would no longer be its contact. count matching. A classic IBAN is linked one-to-one

• The Trader found various errors in the docu- to one single physical account. A payment made ments sent by Company A. using the classic IBAN will be credited to the bank

• The Trader was informed by a third-party of pos- account to which the IBAN is linked. By contrast, a sible legal proceedings involving the controlling vIBAN is not matched to a physical bank account. shareholder of Company A. This information led It is a reference number used to redirect a payment the trader to do further research. The Trader to another IBAN linked to a physical bank account.

MROS Typology Report 2025 found negative press relating to money launder- Its balance is constantly zero. Several vIBANs can ing regarding Company A. be used by one account holder19.

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After reading the press article, the Trader decided Facts to immediately freeze Company A’s account and to A Swiss financial intermediary opened a business file a suspicious transaction report with MROS in relationship with a foreign bank. This foreign bank accordance with Art. 9 AMLA, as the information offered its clients the possibility of issuing vIBANs provided by Company A could be linked to the acts which were linked to the client’s wallets. Payments of which the controller was accused. The Trader made to the foreign bank’s clients via these vIBANs suspected an aggravated tax misdemeanour in ac- were pooled in the foreign bank’s account at the cordance with Art. 305bis para. 1bis SCC18. The Trader Swiss financial intermediary and then transferred attached Company A’s foreign bank accounts, the to the client in form of e-money into a wallet. KYC, the negative press article, the open invoices, Company A’s financial accounts and the docu- A client of a Swiss third-party bank transferred sevments used to open the business relationship. eral thousand Swiss francs to an account with an IBAN beginning with CH. The IBAN was verified by Based on the legal principles MROS transmitted the using a traditional IBAN verification tool (‘IBAN-Calinformation to a foreign partner FIU. culator’). It referred to the account opened with the Swiss financial intermediary. The client of the Swiss Best practice for financial intermediaries third-party bank complained of potential fraud. The Trader carried out clarifications as soon as the request to change bank accounts was received. It In fact, the Swiss financial intermediary had no dicarried out opensource research. It documented its rect business relationship with the client of the forsuspicious activity report with a clear and precise eign bank. The foreign bank’s client had no sub-acexplanation of its business relationship with Com- counts with the Swiss financial intermediary. The pany A. He provided information on Company A’s foreign bank was itself the beneficial owner of the bank accounts. funds transferred via the vIBANs. Thus, the foreign bank’s client who received payments via the vIBANs had a claim against the foreign bank. They were en-

2.8 Case 8: Fraud – The magic behind a titled to have these amounts booked as e-money in

virtual IBAN the wallet managed by the foreign bank. The vIBAN Preliminary remarks served only to redirect the amounts transferred to This case illustrates how a Swiss financial interme- the foreign bank’s end clients. diary was able to identify the end client of a foreign financial intermediary using virtual IBANs. However, the Swiss financial intermediary was able to identify the end client of the vIBAN by analysing A virtual IBAN or vIBAN is a pseudo account num- the comments of the fraudulent transactions. The ber that redirects incoming payments directly to name of the final beneficiary was mentioned in the an IBAN linked to a conventional ‘physical’ bank payment reference. The Swiss financial intermedi-

Swiss Criminal Code, SR 311.0. European Banking Authority (EBA), Report on virtual IBANs, May 2024.

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ary asked the foreign bank about the exact person- ket, to document it and to detail the suspicions adal details of the end client and reported the case dressed to MROS. with these details to MROS in accordance with Art.

9 AMLA 20. The suspected predicate offence was Facts

fraud. A Swiss financial intermediary had a business relationship with a client. In the KYC the client declared Based on the legal principles MROS transmitted the that the account was used for the purposes of asinformation to a foreign partner FIU. set management. The client intended to use this ac- count to manage funds from third parties.

MROS Typology Report 2025 Best practices for financial intermediaries As a financial intermediary providing services to a At a certain point the financial intermediary was inforeign financial intermediary, the Swiss financial formed in-house regarding a planned transaction

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intermediary reacted immediately to a complaint of several millions of euros on the client’s account. from a client of a third-party Swiss bank. It identi- The internal documentation mentioned that the fied the end client of vIBAN by analysing the com- amount would be the proceeds from the sale of a ments of the fraudulent transactions. It immediate- part of the client’s private art collection. This new ly reported the case to MROS. The Swiss financial activity on the client’s account was not in line with intermediary and the foreign financial intermediary the client’s KYC profile. Therefore, the financial inhave agreed that the latter will provide details of its termediary preventively blocked the account. clients using vIBANs. In the event of transmission to a criminal prosecution authority, the Swiss finan- Requesting clarification, the client declared to own cial intermediary cannot block the account of the an art collection and the expected incoming payforeign financial intermediary. In this case, it would ments on his account were from the sale of art reserve an amount equal to the potentially criminal work from his private art collection. The financial proceeds. intermediary insisted in more information. To this end, the financial intermediary requested an official valuation of the art work in order to determine 2.9 Case 9: Art work – An art collection whether the expected amount on the client’s acenhanced by a convicted curator count was in line with the market prices of the art Preliminary remarks work. In the documentation then provided by the This case illustrates the diligence with which a fi- client, the collection was valued by a curator who, nancial intermediary clarified transactions linked to after verification by the financial intermediary, had the art market. been convicted in Italy of a series of financial crimes committed by a group. Studies have shown that the art sector is at risk from money laundering and terrorist financing. The The financial intermediary refused the transaction vast majority of market participants do not have a and reported its suspicions to MROS in accordance connection to illicit activities, but there are risks as- with Art. 305ter para. 2 SCC23, attaching the foreign sociated with these markets and some jurisdictions accounts from which the assets should have come.

do not have sufficient awareness and understand- The suspected predicate offence was fraud in acing of them. This results in a lack of investigative cordance with Art. 146 SCC. resources and expertise, and difficulties with pursuing cross-border investigations.21 The clarifica- Best practice for financial intermediaries tions in accordance with Art. 6 AMLA 22 enable the The financial intermediary blocked the transaction financial intermediary to understand the economic when it noticed the discrepancy between the KYC background of a transaction linked to the art mar- and the amount that was going to be credited. The

Federal Act on Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (Anti-Money Laundering Act, AMLA), SR 955.0. FATF, Report Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing in the Art and Antiquities Market, February 2023. Federal Act on Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (Anti-Money Laundering Act, AMLA), SR 955.0. Swiss Criminal Code, SR 311.0.

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financial intermediary immediately began clarifica- A client started a business relationship with this tions. It investigated not only the client but also all Swiss crypto-currency broker and provided in this the persons involved in the suspicious transaction. context a copy of his passport, a proof of address The financial intermediary carried out clarifications and a live selfie. The client wanted to carry out in accordance with Art. 6 AMLA and found corre- transactions via a self-custodial portfolio. Explicitly, sponding indications that suggest that a suspicion he wanted to transfer the crypto currency Ethereum based on reasonable grounds has been confirmed. (ETH) from one wallet to another. The financial intermediary also clarified the back- ground of curator, who had written the expert opin- During the onboarding process, the crypto-cur-

MROS Typology Report 2025 ion on the art objects. The financial intermediary rency broker carried out a costumer due diligence reported its suspicions to MROS, indicating the check on the client and his background. Thereforeign account from which the funds might have fore, he checked the sanctions lists, media reports

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come. and OSINT (Open-Source Intelligence). According to press reports and other OSINT researches, the client appeared as a drug baron from a European

2.10 Case 10: Virtual Assets – The diligent country based in South America. He was said to

crypto-currency broker run an international money-laundering network for Preliminary remarks drug cartels. He had been arrested and was facing This case illustrates the responsiveness of a cryp- extradition to a North American country. to-currency broker who was able to block crypto-fiat transactions and quickly report the case to Following this information, the crypto-currency bro- MROS. ker blocked the profile preventing any transactions. The crypto-currency broker had nevertheless ob- Financial intermediaries are also persons who on a served attempts from the client to change ETH into professional basis accept or hold on deposit assets EUR by transferring them to an account in a Eurobelonging to others or who assist in the investment pean country. These transactions were automatior transfer of such assets; they include in particular cally refused and returned by the crypto-currency persons who trade for their own account or for the broker’s system due to the profile being blocked. account of others in banknotes and coins, money market instruments, foreign exchange, precious The crypto-currency broker filed a report to MROS metals, commodities and securities (stocks and in accordance with Art. 9 AMLA. It suspected serishares and value rights) as well as their derivatives ous offence to Narcotics Act25 in accordance with (Art. 2 para. 3 let. c AMLA 24). Art. 19 para. 2 NarcA.

Thus, a crypto-currency broker qualifies in general Based on the legal principles MROS transmitted the as a financial intermediary (Virtual Asset Service information to a partner FIU. Provider [VASP]). Best practice for financial intermediaries Facts The crypto-currency broker did researches regard- A Swiss crypto-currency broker, offering exchange ing its client in OSINT and not only on sanctions services (fiat to crypto and crypto to fiat), allowed lists. Based on the negative information, it immeits clients to use its services via a widget on its web- diately blocked the client’s profile to prevent any site or by downloading a self-custodial wallet. The transactions. Furthermore, it monitored the client’s Swiss crypto-currency broker operated via a Swiss activity and noticed attempts to change crypto-curfinancial intermediary and a foreign payment ser- rencies into fiat currencies. In his communication to vice provider. MROS, he provided details of the account held in a European country.

Federal Act on Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (Anti-Money Laundering Act, AMLA), SR 955.0. Federal Act on Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances (Narcotics Act, NarcA), SR 812.121.

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2.11 Case 11: Enabler – The lawyer and the transaction was subject to professional confia luxury car in the free port dentiality. Preliminary remarks This case illustrates the difficulty presented by law- A few months later, almost the entire amount credyer accounts used for atypical purposes under the ited to the car dealer was transferred to a bank guise of form R. account owned by a non-EU e-money institution in Eastern Europe. The account in Eastern Europe According to Art. 36 CDB 2026 and based on the was opened by the non-EU e-money institution to protection of professional confidentiality (see Art. have access to SEPA 28 transfers. The lawyer con-

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321 SCC27), depending on the circumstances, a law- trolled the non-EU e-money institution. According

yer may not provide precise information about the to further information obtained from the lawyer, beneficial owners of assets he holds on behalf of the funds were then transferred to an account at a

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clients. The lawyer as the contracting partner must bank administrated and controlled by the lawyer in therefore confirm that he is subject to professional a Caribbean country. However, he refused to give confidentiality within the meaning of Art. 321 SCC the bank any information about the identity of the and that the account/​custody account is used ex- seller of the luxury car. clusively for the purposes of his activity as a lawyer. On the other hand, as subject to professional con- The bank reported the case to MROS in accordance fidentiality, he is not required to specify for which with Art. 305ter para. 2 SCC. The suspected prediactivities the account/​custody account is used. cate offence is fraud in accordance with Art. 146 In accordance with the material scope of Art. 321 SCC. MROS forwarded the case to the competent SCC, form R must be signed by the lawyer who is Swiss law enforcement authority. bound by professional confidentiality. The financial intermediary is not obliged to carry out any checks Best practice for financial intermediaries in this respect. The financial intermediary was alerted by a transaction which did not fall within the scope of the Facts lawyer’s typical activities. The financial intermedi- A Swiss financial Intermediary maintained a busi- ary tried to obtain information about the cash inness relationship with a lawyer. The account served flow. Despite the lawyer’s initial denial, the financial for the lawyer’s typical business activities. A formu- intermediary insisted to receive more information lar R has been signed. when the funds were released. The financial intermediary finally obtained some information, but One day, the financial intermediary observed an in- nothing about the identity of the seller of the luxury flow of several million Euro from a car dealer on car. Unable to fully clarify the economic background the lawyer’s account. According to the lawyer he to the transaction and because of the use of the acted as an escrow agent between the car dealer account as a transit account, it reported the matter and a foreign company. The inflowing amount was to MROS. connected to the sale of a luxury car. The luxury car would be stored in a free port in Switzerland. The beneficial owner of the company was unknown to 2.12 Case 12: Sanctions Evasion – The fall the financial Intermediary. of the Syrian regime

Preliminary remarks The financial intermediary tried to clarify the sit- This case illustrates the importance to not only uation and to verify the transaction. The client re- checking the sanctions lists carefully but also doing fused to provide any further information invoking clarification in regard to suspicious transactions.

Swiss Banking, Agreement on the Swiss banks’ code of conduct with regard to the exercise of due diligence (CDB 20), 2020. Swiss Criminal Code, SR 311.0. Single Euro Payments Area; SEPA stands for the standardisation of cashless payments for transactions in euros within Europe.

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On 18 May 2011, the Federal Council issued the Or- with Art. 305ter para. 2 SCC31. The suspected preddinance imposing measures against Syria (hereaf- icate offence was bribery of foreign public officials ter the Syria Ordinance)29. In doing so, Switzerland in accordance with Art. 322septies SCC. aligned itself with the sanctions imposed on Syria by the European Union on 9 May 2011. The Syria Or- The case was forwarded to the competent Swiss dinance was revised on 8 June 2012. The sanctions law enforcement authority. against Syria were imposed because of the violent repression of the civilian population by the Syrian Best practice for financial intermediaries army and security forces. A list of persons subject The financial intermediary reacted immediately

MROS Typology Report 2025 to different sanctions (in particular financial sanc- after the fall of the Syrian regime. It carried out a tions) is annexed to the ordinance and frequently review of clients who might have links with the deupdated. posed regime. Based on new media coverage the

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financial intermediary identified a client in Switzer- According to the Syria Ordinance financial interme- land who was not subject to sanctions, but there diaries are obliged to block the bank accounts of were indicators that the client has a kinship to a listed persons and report them to the State Secre- person from the Syrian regime. Therefore, the fitariat for Economic Affairs (SECO). While submit- nancial intermediary suspected that the assets inting a report to SECO does not necessarily mean volved in the business relationship were being used that a SAR also needs to be sent to MROS, financial for money laundering purposes. The financial interintermediary due diligence and reporting duties un- mediary had a clear understanding of the difference der the AMLA still apply. If investigations into a pos- between the reporting systems (sanctions versus sible violation or evasion of sanctions also provide money laundering) and also understand the differindications of money laundering, then the financial ent areas of authority (SECO or MROS). Therefore, intermediary must carry out additional clarifica- the financial intermediary has been submitting the tions (Art. 6 AMLA30). Depending on the outcome SAR in a differentiated manner. of these clarifications, a SAR may be submitted to MROS.

2.13 Case 13: Commodity trading –

Facts The manufacturer of self-luminous After the fall of the Syrian regime in December technology 2024, financial intermediaries paid particular at- Preliminary remarks tention to possible clients linked to the deposed This case illustrates how embargo law can overlap regime. In this context, a Swiss financial intermedi- with anti-money laundering provisions in the conary has identified a client with a Syrian background. text of a ban on Russian gold imports. Checking the sanctions lists has shown, that the client was not subject to the EU or Swiss sanctions. On 28 February 2022, the Federal Council decided to adopt the sanctions imposed by the European However, the Swiss financial intermediary had fur- Union (EU)32 against Russia. Based on the EmbA33, ther concerns. And in fact, the client had received the Ordinance of 27 August 2014 on Measures Relarge donations from a member of his family which lating to the Situation in Ukraine34 (hereinafter rewas a politically exposed person (PEP). The finan- ferred to as the ‘Ukraine Ordinance’) was fully recial intermediary concluded that the origin of these vised on 4 March 2022. In accordance with Art. 14d donations could have been a result from a criminal Ukraine Ordinance, the acquisition of gold with an activity. It reported the case to MROS in accordance origin of the Russian Federation, which was export-

Ordinance on Measures against Syria, RS 946.231.172.7. Federal Act on Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (Anti-Money Laundering Act, AMLA), SR 955.0. Swiss Criminal Code, SR 311.0. Council Regulation (EU) No. 833/​2014 of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine. Federal Act on the Implementation of International Sanctions (Embargo Act, EmbA); SR 946.231. Ordinance imposing measures relating to the situation in Ukraine; SR 946.231.176.72

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ed after August 4, 2022, from the Russian Federa- 2.14 Case 14: Real estate – Arabian Gulf tion, as well as the import, transit and transport of estate at Lake Geneva this gold in and through Switzerland, is prohibited. Preliminary remarks A serious violation of Art. 9 EmbA is a felony under This case illustrates the importance of classifying Swiss law and may constitute a predicate offence the risks of a business relationship, specifically with to money laundering. regard to politically exposed persons (PEP), and the risks that can exist in the Swiss real estate sector. Facts On the basis of its regular due diligence, a Swiss In accordance with Art. 2a para. 1 let. a AMLA36,

MROS Typology Report 2025 financial intermediary found out that a client – be- politically exposed persons are individuals who are sides running its own watch brand – manufactures or have been entrusted with prominent public funcself-luminous technology as a main business ac- tions by a foreign country, such as heads of state or

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tivity. The innovative lighting elements contain tritiof government, senior politicians at national level, um, which enables ‘lighting without electricity’. Thissenior government, judicial, military or political partechnology is used to create products such as in- ty officials at national level, and senior executives of dexes for watch dials or lights in hospitals, but alsostate-owned corporations of national significance illuminated parts in sights, which are used as ac- (foreign politically exposed persons). In accordance cessories for mainly pistols and rifles, etc. with Art. 6 para. 3 AMLA, business relationships with foreign politically exposed persons and their The following in-depth transaction analysis identi- family members or close associates in terms of Art. fied incoming payments from a company in Central 2a para. 2 AMLA are deemed in every case to be Asia. When being asked about the unusual counter- business relationships with a higher risk. party, the client replied that the payments were in connection with the sale of watches to a custom- Facts er in Central Asia. Further clarifications detected, For several years a Swiss financial intermediary that’s this client was the subject of negative head- had a client who was a former magistrate from an lines and was portrayed as one of the top import- Arabian Gulf country. Due to the PEP status the reers of – allegedly – sanctioned Russian gold and lationship to this client was classified as ‘high risk’. jewelry. According to later publications in the European media relayed by various private investigative organi- The financial intermediary identified all transac- sations fighting international corruption, the former tions with this counterpart of his client and report- magistrate was the subject of numerous internaed the case to MROS in accordance with Art. 305ter tional complaints for misappropriation in his home para. 2 SCC35. The suspected predicate offence country. He was suspected of having embezzled was a serious violation of Art. 9 EmbA. tens of millions of USD.

Best practice for financial intermediaries Due to the negative press reports, the Swiss finan- The financial intermediary identified that a client cial intermediary reported two business relationwas incidentally active in the business of manufac- ships to MROS in which the client was the benefituring self-luminous technology, and he identified cial owner. These business relationships recorded a counterparty that was subject of bad publicity in assets worth several million CHF, which were unreconnection with the import of Russian gold. It iden- lated to the client’s salaries according to the notes tified all the transactions between his client and of the financial intermediary. The suspected predithis suspicious counterparty and reported them to cate offence was bribery of foreign public officials MROS, suspecting a potential circumvention of the in accordance with Art. 322septies SCC37. sanctions or a serious violation of the Swiss Embargo Act.

Swiss Criminal Code, SR 311.0. Federal Act on Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (Anti-Money Laundering Act, AMLA), SR 955.0. Swiss Criminal Code, SR 311.0.

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One of the two business relationships was opened 2.15 Case 15: Real estate – in the name of a company involved in the purchase The unemployed architect in a villa and sale of real estate. It has a ‘c/​o’ address with a Preliminary remarks trust company. MROS identified outflows of more This case illustrates the persistent behaviour of the than 10 Mio CHF to an account in the name of a financial intermediary following immediate cash notary’s office. These transactions involved the withdrawals after unusually large inflows. purchase of a property at Lake Geneva. The notary’s office account was held by another Swiss fi- According to point 2.1.2 of the Annex to AMLO-FIN- nancial intermediary. MROS issued this account on MA when assets are withdrawn shortly after they

MROS Typology Report 2025 the basis of a request pursuant to Art. 11a para. 2 are placed in an account (transit account), these ac- AMLA. The account was used by the notary’s of- tivities are considered an indicator of money launfice for client assets and was opened using Form R. dering, unless there is a plausible reason for the

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MROS attempted to obtain documents on the clar- immediate withdrawal arising from the customers ifications pursuant to Art. 6 AMLA, in particular the business activities.38. contract for the sale of real estate involving the former magistrate. To no avail. In fact, the notary’s ac-Facts count records transactions of several million CHF A Swiss financial intermediary opened a business that were not clarified by the bank since they fall relationship with a client, who considered himself under the typical activity of the notary. MROS was as an unemployed architect, who was a citizen of unable to identify the seller of the property. an Eastern European country. Over the first year after the account opening there were only few fi- Subsequently, the financial intermediary himself, nancial inflows. Later, within a short period of time, who received the request according to Art. 11a two companies transferred six major transactions AMLA notified MROS. However, the financial inter- to the client’s account. mediary reported another suspicious real estate transaction that had been subject of a seizure order One of the companies (company A) was owned by from a Swiss public prosecutor’s office. At the time, the client’s wife. The other company (company B) the account of the company sending the funds was was just recently established in the name of the clisubject of the order, not the account in the name of ent. Shortly after the receipt, the client withdrew the the notary’s office. Both accounts are held at the assets at the Swiss financial intermediary in cash or same bank, which is how it was able to make the transferred them to other accounts with third-party connection. intermediaries.

The case was forwarded to the competent Swiss Consequently, the financial intermediary asked the law enforcement authority. client for explanations regarding the transactions. and the client stated that these were ‘salaries’ paid Best practice for financial intermediaries to him in advance respectively ‘interest-free loans’. Exemplarily, the financial intermediary has cate- The client explained that one of the companies gorized the business relationship with the former (company A) owned a building that he purchased magistrate of an Arabian gulf country as ‘high risk’ with his own savings and the sums transferred were and carried out permanent media monitoring. At coming from the rental income of this building. In the first negative news, he identified the main cash regard to the purpose of the transactions, the cliflows. It highlighted the disproportion between the ent explained that the money would be used to purcash inflows and the client’s salaries and reported chase a villa. A mortgage would be negotiated with the matter to MROS. a third-party intermediary to which the funds were transferred.

Ordinance of the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority on the Prevention of Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism (FINMA Anti-Money Laundering Ordinance, AMLO-FINMA), SR 955.033.0.

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He also explained that the recently established ent’s controlling shareholder. The bulk of the cash company B received a large sum from a customer, inflows came from two trust company’s accounts who commissioned him for building a multi-party (Company B and C) with a third-party financial inhouse. Being asked for clarification, the client re- termediary. fused to reveal the identity of his customer. Irritated by the financial intermediary’s questions, the cli- After the transaction monitoring generated an alert ent denied to provide any documentation on these on the client’s account, the financial intermeditransactions and transferred most of the balance ary discovered additional irregularities. For exam- to an account opened in his name with a small re- ple, the financial intermediary found that the two

MROS Typology Report 2025 gional bank. trust Companies B and C had identical directors, although they were not domiciled at the same ad- The financial intermediary reported the case to dress. In addition, the client had its domicile at the

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MROS in accordance with Art. 305ter para. 2 SCC39. trust Company B.

Best practice for financial intermediaries When asked about the purpose of these incom- The sudden inflow of large sums of money and the ing transactions from the trust Company C by the cash withdrawals alerted the financial intermedi- Swiss financial intermediary, the client explained ary. It tried to clarify the matter with the client and that he was offering shares in art works to private remained persistent in its clarifications. Since the investors. These investors would become joint financial intermediary was unable to fully clarify the owners of the art works. The said investors are supmatter, it filed a suspicious activity report to MROS. posed to pay their shares into the account of the trust Company C, which would then be transferred to the account of his company, and would then be

2.16 Case 16: Commodity Trading – From paid in cash to purchase the art works in question

raw material to art work via a trust at auctions, at which cash transactions would be company common. In support of his explanations, the cli- Preliminary remarks ent presented contracts concluded with investors. This case illustrates the diligent behaviour of a fi- However, these contracts were redacted, drafted nancial intermediary maintaining a banking rela- in an unprofessional manner, and their terms and tionship with a client active in commodity trading. conditions sometimes differed substantially, even though they were supposed to relate to identical Commodity trading is subject to the AMLA only if it transactions. The financial intermediary also notis carried out on behalf of third parties. ‘Commodity’ ed that the company’s accounts were used by the refers to unprocessed raw materials from the min- client for apparently private expenses and that the ing, agricultural or energy sectors, such as crude oil, sums paid by the investors substantially exceeded natural gas, metals, ores and coffee40. For financial the price of the art works potentially purchased. intermediaries, monitoring trading accounts can be The financial intermediary found the client’s explachallenging due to the large volume of transactions. nations unconvincing and suspected investor fraud and misappropriation. It reported the business rela- Facts tionship with the trading company to MROS. A Swiss financial intermediary has a business relationship with a company (hereafter ‘client’) trading The case was forwarded to the competent Swiss in commodities. law enforcement authority.

Over a certain period, hundreds of thousands of Best practices for financial intermediaries Swiss francs entered the client’s account and were Despite the enormous volume of transactions that withdrawn in cash almost immediately by the cli- can be recorded on a traditional trading account,

Swiss Criminal Code, SR 311.0. FINMA, Circular 2011/​1, Financial intermediary activity within the meaning of the AMLA, Details of the Ordinance on Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (Anti-Money Laundering Ordinance, AMLO), RS 955.01, page 14.

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the financial intermediary identified passing trans- The crypto-currency broker correctly carried out actions and withdrawals in cash that appeared to the online identification process with the client him to be outside the scope of the traditional ac- when opening the account and starting the busitivity announced for the said business relationship. ness relationship. To create the profile, the client The financial intermediary clarified the matter and provided the crypto-currency broker with a copy identified that the account was allegedly being used of his passport, his phone number and address infor activities in the art sector. The financial interme- cluding proof of address, created a live selfie and diary critically scrutinized the information provided answered further identification questions during by the customer and uncovered contradictions the video call.

MROS Typology Report 2025 between the information provided by the customer and the actual circumstances. He reported the After the client had carried out a transaction via matter to MROS. the self-managed wallet, the custodian bank in-

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formed the crypto-currency broker that the client was suspected of fraud. In this context, the cus-

2.17 Case 17: Virtual Assets – Fluent todian bank had received a Swift message from

communication between a VASP and a third-party bank and a call from an aggrieved its Swiss bank party. This information strengthened the suspi- Preliminary remarks cion that the client might be involved in a fraud This case illustrates the responsiveness of a cryp- case. The crypto-currency broker carried out its to-currency broker who was able to block the profile own clarifications in accordance with Art. 6 AMLA, of a client after an alert of a Swiss financial interme- after receiving the information from the custodian diary for any future transactions. bank. The crypto-currency broker concluded that the suspicion of fraud against the client had been Financial intermediaries are also deemed to be per- substantiated. sons who on a professional basis accept or hold on deposit assets belonging to others or who assist in Therefore, the crypto-currency broker submitted a the investment or transfer of such assets; they in- suspicious transaction report to MROS. in accordclude in particular persons who trade for their own ance with Art. 9 AMLA; giving details of the transacaccount or for the account of others in banknotes tion hash, the wallet address, the sum in traditional and coins, money market instruments, foreign ex- currency converted into ETH and its equivalent in change, precious metals, commodities and securi- ETH. The suspected predicate offence was fraud ties (stocks and shares and value rights) as well as in accordance with Art. 146 SCC 41. In addition, the their derivatives (Art. 2 para. 3 let. c AMLA). crypto-currency broker blocked the customer’s profile, preventing any future transactions. A crypto-currency broker falls within the scope of financial intermediation as defined in the AMLA Based on the legal principles MROS transmitted the (Virtual Asset Service Provider [VASP]). information to a partner FIU.

Facts Best practice for financial intermediaries A crypto-currency broker offers exchange servic- Following the alert issued by the custodian bank, es (fiat to crypto and crypto to fiat). As a VASP, the the crypto-currency broker immediately clarified crypto-currency broker was affiliated to a self-reg- the situation regarding the customer suspected of ulatory organisation. Its potential clients could fraud. It then promptly reported the case to MROS, use the crypto-currency broker’s services via a attaching documentation relating to the wallet, the widget on the broker’s website or by downloading transactional hash and the amounts invested in vira self-managed wallet. The crypto-currency broker tual currencies. It also blocked the profile of the cusworked with a Swiss bank (custodian bank) to pro- tomer suspected of fraud for all future transactions cess its payment services. for prevention purposes.

Swiss Criminal Code, SR. 311.0.

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2.18 Case 18: Fraud – The manipulated ID The financial intermediary reported the case to

card MROS in accordance with Art. 9 AMLA42. The sus- Preliminary remarks pected predicate offence was fraud in accordance This case illustrates how financial intermediaries with Art. 146 SCC 43. deal with third-party alerts in the context of fraud attempts. Based on the legal principles MROS transmitted the information to a partner FIU. When it comes to suspicions of fraud or fraud at- tempts, the initial alert results from different sourc- Best practice for financial intermediaries

MROS Typology Report 2025 es: Often, a potential victim approaches the finan- On receiving the list with the names used, the financial intermediary to report a suspicion. In other cial intermediary immediately checked whether any cases, the financial intermediary receives a copy of accounts had been opened in its books with simi-

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a criminal complaint that indicates possible fraud- lar identities. He identified one account and acted ulent activity. Another possibility is that another immediately: He blocked the account and reported financial intermediary sends a request for the re- its suspicions to MROS before any funds could be payment of funds, for example by Swift message. credited. Finally, third-party information, such as a list of stolen identities, can also play an important role in raising suspicions of fraud. 2.19 Case 19: Dealer – The conscientious pharmacist Facts Preliminary remarks A Swiss financial intermediary had a business re- This case illustrates indicators where a dealer has lationship with a client of foreign nationality. The to report his suspicions to MROS. Swiss financial intermediary received information from a third party that several perpetrators tried to In accordance with art. 2 para. 1 let. b AMLA44 dealopen bank accounts with Swiss financial interme- ers are also subject to the AMLA when they deal in diaries, using false IDs. This was part of a large- goods commercially and in doing so accept cash. scale fraud attempt against temporary employment agencies in order to receive unlawful salary In accordance with Art. 8a AMLA, dealers are subpayments through these accounts. ject to special due diligence requirements if they accept more than CHF 100,000 in cash in the course This alert contained a list of names used to open of a commercial transaction. They must verify the those accounts in various Swiss financial interme- identity of the client and the identity of beneficial diaries with false IDs from a neighbouring country. owner and they must keep records. They must After conducting various researches in its databas- clarify the economic background and purpose of a es, the financial intermediary figured out, that one of transaction if it appears unusual, unless its legality the identities on the aforementioned list was used is clear. If there are indications that assets are the at his institution to open an account. The misused proceeds of a felony or an aggravated tax misde- ID card was manipulated in terms of identification meanor under Art. 305bis number 1bis SCC 45 or are numbers. The signature on the opening documents subject to the power of disposal of a criminal or

did not match that on the ID. And as well, the manip- terrorist organisation (Art. 260 ter SCC) or serve the ulated ID card used a fake photo. financing of terrorism (Art. 260quinquies para. 1 SCC) and, in case of suspicion of money laundering, pred- After the financial intermediary had been informed icate offence to money laundering, supporting or of this alert and hat carried out its due diligence du- participating in a criminal or terror organisation or ties, it blocked the account of the client concerned. terrorism financing, they must report to the MROS.

Federal Act on Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (Anti-Money Laundering Act, AMLA), SR 955.0. Swiss Criminal Code, SR. 311.0. Federal Act on Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (Anti-Money Laundering Act, AMLA), SR 955.0. Swiss Criminal Code, SR 311.0.

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Facts described as ‘dealing with the physical aspects of A client, resident in an Eastern Country and hold- the commodities trading (meaning: deal with cusing the nationality of that foreign country, visited a toms, inspection, shipping aspects) and not with pharmacy in Switzerland. He purchased medicines contracts’. The client accumulated significant revfor CHF 150,000, which he wanted to pay for in cash enues in particular through shares buyback provia a trustee to whom the invoices should be sent. grams. Surprised by the process and aware of its anti-money laundering duties, the pharmacist had the client In the beginning, the account transactions were sign a declaration form relating to the beneficial in line with the indications in the KYC (i. e. inflows

MROS Typology Report 2025 owner and asked him for explanation. The pharma- from same name account and from his employer cy tried to clarify the economic background and the for shares buyback, and a few personal expenses). origin of the funds in accordance with its AMLA due Then, the financial intermediary received an instruc-

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diligence duties. The client remained vague about tion to pay USD 400,000 to a company in the Middle this large purchase of medicines and the transac- East. An invoice was received to prove the purpose tion processing. Since the pharmacy did not receive of this payment. According to this invoice, which enough information to verify the plausibility of the was sent to the client in his individual capacity, he background of the transaction processing and the recently purchased 12 cars from this company in origin of the assets, he filed a report with MROS in the Middle East. accordance with Art. 9 AMLA. Based on the KYC, this transaction was not in line Based on the legal principles MROS transmitted the with account relationship, which is why the financial information to a partner FIU. intermediary asked for additional clarifications. The initial clarification received from the client was that Best practice for financial intermediaries the entity in the Middle East was his brother’s com- The payment of more than CHF 100,000 in cash pany, in charge of sourcing cars in the Middle East immediately aroused the pharmacist’s suspicions. and in order to be re-sold in a state of West Africa He had the client sign a declaration relating to the at a later stage. The client claimed to have a trading beneficial owner of the funds. He asked the client activity there. A few days later, the client explained for an explanation as to the origin of the cash. As inconsistently that the entity in the Middle East was his suspicions could not be allayed, he immediately his cousin’s company, that they are selling cars in reported the matter to MROS. a state of West Africa, and that the proceeds from the sale would be credited to his own account in the state of West Africa.

2.20 Case 20: Corruption – The unremitting

Financial Intermediary Due to the contradictory explanation received, the Preliminary remarks financial intermediary asked for additional confir- This case illustrates the importance of identifying mations, such as shareholding documentation of transactions that are not in line with the client’s KYC the company in the Middle East and the exhaustive profile, as the KYC is an instrument that also focus- cars purchase and re-sale contracts. A few hours es on the detection of unusual transactions and the later, the client cancelled the payment instruction. clarification of their economic background. The financial intermediary searched on public sources and identified a profile presenting an indi- Facts vidual named as owner of the said company in the A client was onboarded by a financial intermediary. Middle East. He was presumably the CEO of a fuel His account was intended to be used for wealth provider company, who was recently involved in a management activities. According to the KYC, the corruption and money-laundering case related to a client made his wealth through his over 20 years of state-owned firm. professional career in the commodities trading industry. During the onboarding process, his role was

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Pursuant to Art. 9 AMLA46, the financial intermediary reported the case to MROS for suspicions of money laundering in connection with the corruption of foreign public officials (Art. 322septies SCC 47).

Based on the legal principles MROS transmitted the information to the partner FIU.

Best practice for financial intermediaries

MROS Typology Report 2025 As the transaction did not correspond to the client’s KYC profile, the financial intermediary immediately clarified the economic background of this trans-

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action. Receiving contradictory explanations from the client, the financial intermediary unremittingly asked for further explanations and documents; always checking the information in parallel with OSI- NT research. The client finally interrupted his transfer order. The financial intermediary reported the case to MROS, who immediately got in touch with the FIU of the country of the company from which the funds were supposed to be transferred.

Federal Act on Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (Anti-Money Laundering Act, AMLA), SR 955.0. Swiss Criminal Code, SR 311.0

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3 Typology report Vol. II – Focus Enabler

3.1 Case 1: Enabler – Use of safe deposit Based on Art. 9 para. 1 let. a AMLA48, the financial

boxes intermediary submitted a suspicious activity report Preliminary remarks to MROS. The suspicion concerned the alleged This typology illustrates, by way of example, the role laundering of assets derived from bribery by forof an attorney in concealing the origin of assets, eign public officials in South America. MROS transparticularly through the use of safe deposit boxes. mitted the case to the competent law enforcement authority. Facts An attorney (hereinafter: the client), who maintained Best practice for financial intermediaries

MROS Typology Report 2025 two business relationships with a financial interme- In the course of opening the account, the financial diary, intended to open an additional account. The intermediary conducted an updated risk assessfinancial intermediary was aware that the client act- ment and identified new suspicious information

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ed as a trustee in three other business relationships. regarding the client. An internal investigation was As part of the onboarding process for the new ac- launched, during which both, the use of a safe and count, the financial intermediary conducted an en- the structured transfer (“smurfing”) of significant hanced due diligence review. This review revealed assets were uncovered. The timely report to MROS several negative media reports linking the client enabled swift transmission of the case to the comto alleged money laundering activities (bribery) in petent public prosecutor’s office. South America. Based on these findings, the financial intermediary initiated an internal investigation.

3.2 Case 2: Enabler – Board member /

During the course of this investigation, the finan- Trustee and a case of document cial intermediary discovered that one of the affect- forgery ed business relationships was associated with a Preliminary remarks safe. The intermediary had no knowledge of the This case highlights the importance of regularly vercontent of the safe. The client stated, that the safe ifying the beneficial owner in existing business relawas used to store assets belonging to his clients. tionships, particularly when changes in transaction Furthermore, the financial intermediary found out, behaviour are observed. Financial intermediaries that the client had received a transfer of EUR 20 are reminded of their duty to conduct ongoing due million into an account over which he held a general diligence in accordance with AMLA49. power of attorney. The amount was transferred in five separate tranches and originated from an East- Form A constitutes a document within the meanern European country. The transferring party was ing of Art. 110 para. 4 SCC50 in conjunction with an offshore company based in the Far East. This Art. 251 SCC (cf. Federal Supreme Court decision company was reportedly majority-owned by an in-6B_988/2015 of 08.08.2016, E. 4.2). A board memdividual who was mentioned in the negative media ber or trustee who signs Form A without being the reports and allegedly involved in money laundering actual beneficial owner may be criminally liable for activities in South America. document forgery under Art. 251 SCC.

Finally, the financial intermediary identified, that Facts one of the companies for which the client held a In late 2015, a Swiss company (hereinafter: the signatory authority may have been conducting ac- client) established a business relationship with a tivities requiring authorization as a financial inter- Swiss financial intermediary. According to the docmediary, without being affiliated with a self-regula- umentation submitted at the time, the company tory organisation (SRO). was intended to acquire and manage a property in

Federal Act on Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (Anti-Money Laundering Act, AMLA), SR 955.0. Federal Act on Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (Anti-Money Laundering Act, AMLA), SR 955.0. Swiss Criminal Code, SR 311.0.

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a neighbouring country. The client declared a Swiss • The client stated that the change in beneficial national residing in another neighbouring state as ownership was due to the transfer of shares to the beneficial owner in Form A. This individual also the European national, which had previously served as chairman of the board and acted as a been held in trust. trustee, holding a board position in a law firm, also • An excerpt from the share register dated August based in the same neighbouring country . 2024 showed the European national as the sole holder of all 150 registered shares of the com­ During the course of the relationship, the client pany. reported a change in the beneficial owner for the

MROS Typology Report 2025 account opened in 2015. While the original Form Based on these findings, the financial intermediary A from December 2015 listed the board member/ could not rule out that the original declaration of trustee as the beneficial owner, the updated Form A, the beneficial owner had been knowingly falsified.

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signed in 2023, named a European national residing It is presumed that the “new” beneficial owner had in a European State. The individual was retired and already been the actual beneficial owner at the outhad previously worked in a family-owned construc- set of the relationship in 2015, and that the trustee tion materials business located in the same town acted as a nominee. where the property was acquired and managed, as per the original KYC documentation. An official In accordance with Art. 9 para. 1 let. a AMLA, the document from October 2022 confirmed his place financial intermediary submitted a suspicious activof residence. ity report to MROS. MROS subsequently transmitted the case to the competent public prosecutor’s A transaction analysis revealed that, starting in Jan- office on suspicion of document forgery. uary 2019, the account had processed over 100 incoming payments, totalling approximately CHF 1.5 Best practice for financial intermediaries million and over 110 outgoing payments, amounting The notification of a new beneficial owner promptto around CHF 900,000. Incoming payments main- ed the financial intermediary to conduct a transacly consisted of rental income and internal trans- tion analysis, which revealed a significant change in fers from a bank in Europe. Outgoing payments transaction patterns. This monitoring led to further included operational costs (e.g. energy, insurance, investigations and raised questions regarding the taxes), substantial cash withdrawals (approx. CHF actual beneficial owner. Due to the suspicion that 500,000), and management fees paid to the law the board member/trustee had acted as a nominee firm, specifically to the declared beneficial owner. for several years, the financial intermediary reported the case to MROS. MROS was able to promptly A second account, opened in September 2023, transmit the case to the competent law enforcerecorded over 250 incoming payments totalling ment authority. around EUR 900,000 and more than 80 outgoing payments amounting to approximately EUR 500,000. These transactions also related primarily 3.3 Case 3: Enabler – Attorney and to rental income and property operating expenses. Oligarch Preliminary remarks

Several indicators suggested that the original dec- This case exemplifies how an attorney may use aclaration of the beneficial owner in 2015 may have counts formally covered by a Form R for investment been knowingly false: purposes that fall outside the scope of typical legal

• The location of the property matched the place activities. Forensic legal services – such as legal of business of the newly declared beneficial advice and representation in court – are protected ­owner. by professional secrecy under Art. 321 SCC51. Atyp-

• The board member/trustee was a seasoned fi- ical legal activities, such as asset management, are nancial professional. on the other hand not covered by this protection.

Swiss Criminal Code, SR 311.0.

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Facts 3.4 Case 4: Enabler – Fiduciary active in A Swiss financial intermediary maintained several the precious metals trade business relationships with an attorney, all of which Preliminary remarks were covered by Form R and operated as client ac- This case highlights the importance of thoroughly counts. assessing the economic activities of clients by financial intermediaries – particularly when dealing During a periodic review, the financial intermediary’s with fiduciaries operating across multiple sectors. transaction analysis revealed that the accounts in question were not linked to typical legal activities as Facts

MROS Typology Report 2025 defined under Art. 321 SCC. Specifically, substan- The financial intermediary maintained a business tial funds were credited to the attorney’s accounts relationship with a company (hereinafter: the clifrom another Swiss bank and from a bank in a for- ent). According to the commercial register, the

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eign country. The transmitting accounts were held company’s stated purpose was the trade, purchase, by companies fully owned by an oligarch from an sale, and import/export of precious metals. How- Eastern European country who was suspected of ever, the client informed the financial intermediary misappropriating public funds. that its actual business involved the purchase and sale of industrial waste. The authorised signatory The incoming funds to the attorney’s accounts for the client was fiduciary X, who also held a minorwere declared as dividend income, to which the oli- ity shareholding. Fiduciary X was additionally the garch was the beneficial owner. These funds were owner of fiduciary company Y, at which the client allegedly intended for investments in bonds and was domiciled via a c/o address. real estate. Over a ten-year period, the total incoming funds exceeded CHF 90 million. In light of these Information available to the financial intermediary findings, the financial intermediary requested the revealed that fiduciary X held executive roles in nusubmission of Form A for the relevant transactions. merous other companies, active in sectors ranging The attorney subsequently declared the oligarch as from luxury goods to corporate formation and adthe beneficial owner. ministration. The majority shareholder and beneficial owner of the client was primarily engaged in The financial intermediary exercised its right to re- the precious metals trade and resided in France. He port under Art. 305ter para. 2 SCC and submitted a also held executive functions in various companies. suspicious activity report to MROS. MROS transmitted the case to the competent public prosecu- Due to the c/o address and the absence of pertor’s office on suspicion of money laundering in- sonnel in Switzerland, the financial intermedivolving proceeds from criminal mismanagement. ary concluded that the client was, contrary to its own representations, a shell company domiciled Best practice for financial intermediaries in Switzerland. During ongoing monitoring of the The financial intermediary identified that the ac- business relationship, the financial intermediary count activity did not align with the client’s original- further observed that companies controlled by the ly declared professional activities. The transactions majority shareholder made numerous transfers to

no longer reflected typical legal services. The inter- the client’s account in Switzerland, without any dismediary requested the submission of Form A by the cernible link to the nature of the services allegedattorney, thereby enabling the identification of the ly provided. Funds from the client’s account were beneficial owner. Based on negative information subsequently transferred to companies in which ficoncerning this individual, the financial intermedi- duciary X also held interests. These payment flows ary reported the case to MROS, which was able to appeared economically irrational and raised suspipromptly transmit it to the competent law enforce- cions of concealment. ment authority.

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The financial intermediary submitted a suspicious During a periodic review of the business relationactivity report to MROS pursuant to Art. 9 para. 1 ship, the financial intermediary came across melet. a AMLA52. Based on additional findings, MROS dia reports suggesting that the client’s tax advisotransmitted the case to the competent public pros- ry firm had been used both for money laundering ecutor’s office. purposes by Russian business partners and to circumvent sanctions imposed on Russia. Further Best practice for financial intermediaries inquiries revealed, that after the sanctions came The financial intermediary conducted inquiries into into effect, payments from Russian counterpar- the role of the minority shareholder, fiduciary X, ties were received into the client’s accounts. These

MROS Typology Report 2025 and examined his business activities across var- counterparties were suspected of acting as proxies ious sectors. As the services allegedly rendered for sanctioned oligarchs. Restructuring activities could not be reconciled with the observed financial carried out immediately before or shortly after the

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flows, the financial intermediary submitted a report sanctions came into force were considered addito MROS. Based on its analysis and information tional indicators of suspicion. available through its databases, MROS was able to establish substantiated grounds for suspicion and The financial intermediary also began to question transmit the case to the competent law enforce- the accuracy of the information provided by the climent authority. ent in Forms A, K, and T, particularly in light of the suspected use of straw men.

3.5 Case 5: Enabler – Attorney and Based on these findings, the financial intermediary

sanctions against Russia submitted a suspicious activity report to MROS pur- Preliminary remarks suant to Art. 9 para. 1 let. a AMLA. MROS received This case illustrates the risks that may arise when two additional reports concerning the same factual financial intermediaries enter into business rela- constellation. tionships with attorneys whose activities extend beyond traditional legal representation. MROS subsequently transmitted a report to the competent public prosecutor’s office pursuant to Facts Art. 23 para. 4 AMLA53, due to reasonable suspi- A Swiss financial intermediary established a busi- cion of document forgery (in connection with “reness relationship with an attorney of Russian origin structuring” and potentially falsified new Forms T (hereinafter: the client), who had been residing in and A). At the same time, MROS notified the State Switzerland for over ten years. The client was the Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO) via adminowner of a company specialising in tax advisory istrative assistance under Art. 29 para. 2bis AMLA. services, primarily targeting Russian-speaking clients. The scope of services offered did not fall with- Best practice for financial intermediaries in the traditional practice of law, and the attorney Following the publication of press articles, the fiwas therefore not registered in the Swiss Bar Reg- nancial intermediary initiated a review of the busiister. Furthermore, the account held by the client ness relationship. It identified ongoing restructuring with the financial intermediary was not covered by activities involving the client’s business partners, in a Form R. which the client acted in a legal capacity, and established a link between the allegations raised in Characteristic for the business relationship was, the media and the facts uncovered during its interthat following the entry into force of sanctions nal investigations. The financial intermediary subagainst Russia, the client’s company began acting sequently reported the case to MROS, which was as trustee or nominee shareholder for various Rus- able to forward it promptly to the competent public sian-speaking clients. prosecutor’s office.

Federal Act on Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (Anti-Money Laundering Act, AMLA), SR 955.0. Federal Act on Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (Anti-Money Laundering Act, AMLA), SR 955.0.

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3.6 Case 6: Enabler – Life insurance, Since the conclusion of the insurance contracts, Offshore entity, and an unresolved premium payments had been processed via achomicide counts held by the Caribbean company at a Swiss Preliminary remarks bank and its Asian branch. The origin of the funds This case illustrates the duties of due diligence of appeared particularly suspicious, as they stemmed an insurance institution in connection with the pay- from the assets of the convicted individual, whose out of a surrender benefit. Insurance institutions wealth management activities were apparently consubject to the Insurance Supervision Act54 that deal tinued by the client – even after the assets had for- in direct life insurance qualify as financial interme- mally been transferred to the deceased wife.

MROS Typology Report 2025 diaries within the meaning of Art. 2 para. 2 let. c AMLA55. Based on these findings, the financial intermediary submitted a suspicious activity report to MROS pur-

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Facts suant to Art. 9 para. 1 let. a AMLA, on suspicion of A Swiss insurance company (hereinafter: the finan- bribery of foreign public officials under Art. 322sepcial intermediary) maintained a life insurance policy ties SCC56 and serious tax offences under Art. 305bis for a Swiss-based attorney (hereinafter: the client). para. 1bis SCC. The client intended to terminate the policy prematurely and claim the surrender benefit. In the course Best practice for financial intermediaries of the associated review, the financial intermediary The request for the surrender benefit prompted the conducted checks on both the client and a second financial intermediary to re-examine both life inpolicyholder, a Russian national residing in Switzer- surance policies and their underlying circumstancland. es. Particular attention was paid to the premium payments made by an offshore entity. The finan- The financial intermediary’s investigations revealed cial intermediary subsequently requested further that the premiums for both policies – amounting to information from both policyholders – the client over one million Swiss francs – had not been paid and the Russian national – and conducted parallel by the insured individuals themselves, but rather by open-source research on the paying entity. In light a company domiciled in the Caribbean. The client of the findings, the financial intermediary submitted explained that both he and the Russian national had a suspicious activity report to MROS. provided consulting services to the Caribbean company via a Swiss entity. According to the contractual arrangements, the employer was responsible for 3.7 Case 7: Enabler – The attorney covering the insurance premiums of the two con- and his pass through account sultants and settling them directly with the financial Preliminary remarks intermediary. This case illustrates the enhanced due diligence obligations of financial intermediaries in connection Further inquiries by the reporting financial interme- with third-party information relating to an investdiary uncovered significant grounds for suspicion: ment fraud. In the context of fraudulent schemes, the Caribbean company was owned by the wife various circumstances may trigger special duties

of a Russian national who had been sentenced to of due diligence under Art. 6 AMLA57. These inlife imprisonment for corruption, membership in a clude, for example, claims for restitution of previcriminal organisation, murder and tax fraud. The ously transferred assets, indications from alleged unresolved death of this wife further intensified victims, and official orders or decisions issued by doubts regarding the lawful origin of the assets un- competent law enforcement authorities. der review.

54 SR 961.01. Federal Act on Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (Anti-Money Laundering Act, AMLA), SR 955.0. Swiss Criminal Code, SR 311.0. Federal Act on Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (Anti-Money Laundering Act, AMLA), SR 955.0.

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Facts Based on these findings and the information con- A Swiss financial intermediary maintained a busi- cerning potential victims of fraud, the financial inness relationship with a licensed attorney domiciled termediary suspected that the business relationin Switzerland (hereinafter: the client). The associ- ship with the Swiss attorney was being used as a ated client account was opened with the submis- pass through account in a fraudulent investment sion of a Form R. scheme. It therefore submitted a suspicious activity report to MROS pursuant to Art. 9 para. 1 lit. a During the business relationship, the financial in- AMLA, on suspicion of money laundering involving termediary received a letter from a legal represent- proceeds derived from fraud as defined in Art. 146

MROS Typology Report 2025 ative acting on behalf of alleged victims of fraud. SCC58. These individuals believed they had purchased shares in a company X registered in a Southeast MROS subsequently transmitted the case to the

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Asian jurisdiction and had transferred substantial competent law enforcement authority pursuant to amounts to the account held by the intermediary’s Art. 23 para. 4 AMLA. client for that purpose. Best practice for financial intermediaries In the course of its analysis, the financial intermedi- Immediately upon receipt of the letter from the ary identified systematic transaction patterns, nota- victims’ legal representative, the financial intermebly closely timed incoming and outgoing payments. diary initiated internal investigations. It conducted It observed repeated incoming payments from var- a transaction analysis of the account opened with ious counterparties, which the client subsequent- Form R and identified typical characteristics of a ly transferred to accounts held at a bank in a Gulf pass through account – particularly closely timed state, where the investor relations officer allegedly incoming and outgoing payments. The financial responsible for distributing the shares of company intermediary promptly reported the case to MROS X was believed to reside. The individual transaction and submitted the results of its analysis, enabling amounts ranged from several thousand to over one MROS to transmit the case swiftly to the competent hundred thousand Swiss francs, with total transfers law enforcement authority. exceeding one million francs.

In light of these findings, the financial intermediary 3.8 Case 8: Enabler – Proceeds from requested a written explanation from the client. The medical tests client stated that he was acting under a mandate re- Preliminary remarks lating to the sale of a portion of the shares of com- This case illustrates the abusive use of a client acpany X. His assignment included verifying com- count as a vehicle for money laundering in connecpliance with anti-money laundering regulations, tion with a suspected fraud scheme. particularly through the identification of purchasers and the actual execution of the share transactions. Facts A Swiss financial intermediary maintained a busi- The financial intermediary further discovered that ness relationship with a company domiciled in Switcompany X was listed on several consumer protec- zerland (hereinafter: the client). The account was tion websites as suspicious. Moreover, it had been operated under a factoring model to claim reimmentioned by a supervisory authority in a neigh- bursements from health insurers for medical tests bouring country of Switzerland in connection with conducted, thereby ensuring remuneration for the an investment fraud. Publicly available sources also test centres and the responsible physicians. revealed that the managing director of the company X had previously been convicted in a European In the course of this business relationship, the ficountry for similar offences. nancial intermediary became aware of potential

Swiss Criminal Code, SR 311.0.

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irregularities involving the client following critical MROS subsequently submitted the case to the media reports. According to these reports, the lab- competent law enforcement authority. oratories responsible for the testing lacked their own billing infrastructure. Furthermore, there were Best practice for financial intermediaries allegations that a significant portion of the tests for Upon receipt of substantial incoming funds, the rewhich reimbursements had been claimed and paid, porting financial intermediary conducted a transhad, in fact, never been conducted. action analysis. The rapid transfer of funds to an attorney’s account raised red flags. The use of Against this backdrop, the financial intermediary the account as a pass-through vehicle prompted

MROS Typology Report 2025 subjected the client relationship to enhanced due the intermediary to file a suspicious activity report diligence. It was found that the client had received with MROS. Acting pursuant to Art. 11a para. 2 payments totalling more than CHF 10 million, pri- AMLA, MROS promptly submitted an inquiry to the

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marily from third-party companies. A substantial third-party financial intermediary where the attorportion of these funds was transferred shortly after ney’s account was held. receipt to an attorney’s account held with another financial intermediary.

3.9 Case 9: Enabler – An escrow

Based on these findings, the financial intermediary agreement and a straw man submitted a suspicious activity report to MROS pur- Preliminary remarks suant to Art. 9 para. 1 let. a AMLA59, on suspicion This case illustrates the role of legal professionals of money laundering in connection with fraud as in the establishment and administration of complex defined in Art. 146 SCC60. structures. Such arrangements foster opacity and hinder the economic traceability of transactions. Following receipt of the report, MROS, acting under Art. 11a para. 2 AMLA, requested the relevant doc- An escrow agreement is a contractually regulatumentation from the third-party financial interme- ed arrangement between the various parties to a diary where the attorney’s account was held and transaction, whereby an independent third party into which the client’s proceeds had been deposit- acts as a trusted intermediary to receive and dised. MROS’s analysis revealed that the account had burse funds or documents on behalf of the involved been used to redistribute funds – presumably orig- parties. The opening of such accounts by attorneys inating from fictitious tests – to various individuals is, in principle, not protected by professional confiwho used the money for private purposes (e.g. the dentiality within the meaning of Article 321 of the purchase of luxury watches, travel expenses, etc.). Swiss Criminal Code (SCC)61. The main beneficiary of these transactions was also the subject of criminal proceedings in Switzer- Facts land for misappropriation. He was listed as wanted A Swiss financial intermediary maintained a busiin Switzerland and was residing abroad. ness relationship with a law firm (hereinafter: the client), for which it operated several escrow ac- MROS further established that one of the credit counts. One of these accounts was used to process cards linked to the attorney’s account was formally repayments of a loan granted by a client of the law issued to a third party. However, an analysis of the firm to a foreign company. According to the client, credit card statements revealed that this individual this company was active in the oil and real estate had purchased airline tickets for the fugitive main sectors and, through a complex network of particibeneficiary. The attorney’s account at the third-par- pations, ultimately owned by a businessman of Far

ty intermediary was used to obscure the identity of Eastern nationality residing in Switzerland. the ultimate beneficiary of this mechanism.

Federal Act on Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (Anti-Money Laundering Act, AMLA), SR 955.0. Swiss Criminal Code, SR 311.0. Swiss Criminal Code (SCC), SR 311.0.

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The ownership structure was highly intricate, in- In another escrow account held by the same clivolving four Swiss companies located in different ent, the financial intermediary identified further cantons, each managed by different attorneys, and irregularities. This account showed high-volume supplemented by a Liechtenstein foundation. Nota- pass-through transactions in favour of a domicilbly, one of the involved attorneys was also a partner iary company. Upon inquiry, the client stated that of the client. The reporting financial intermediary the beneficial owner was a British trustee residing in suspected that the businessman residing in Swit- a Gulf state. The financial intermediary considered zerland was acting as a straw man for politically ex- this information not credible, as the same company posed persons (PEPs), whose names had appeared had previously been flagged in another case involv-

MROS Typology Report 2025 in the media as shareholders of the company repay- ing fiduciary structures. ing the loan. Approximately two weeks after the initial report,

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Following its internal clarifications, the financial the financial intermediary submitted a second susintermediary concluded that the escrow accounts picious activity report to MROS, again based on may have been used to facilitate transactions in fa- Art. 305ter paragraph 2 SCC. In this case as well, vour of PEPs who had been linked to allegations of there was a suspicion that the accounts were ulcorruption in international media reports. The sus- timately used for transactions benefiting PEPs. picion was reinforced by the excessive complexity MROS transmitted the case to the competent law of the structures and the lack of economic rationale enforcement authority. behind the transactions, which appeared to occur between entities controlled by the same beneficial Best practice for financial intermediaries owner. The financial intermediary monitored the transactions on the escrow account and verified the origin Based on the right to report under Art. 305ter para- of incoming funds. In doing so, it identified countergraph 2 SCC, the financial intermediary submitted parties that had been negatively reported in publica suspicious activity report to MROS. The suspi- ly accessible sources. It also recognised complex cion concerned money laundering in connection corporate structures through which funds were with the bribery of foreign public officials pursuant transfered to the attorney’s account. The intermeto Art. 322septies SCC. diary promptly submitted a report to MROS, which was then able to transmit the case to the competent law enforcement authority.