FC Karpaty v. FC Zestafoni

I. THE PARTIES

1. FC Karpaty (hereinafter referred to as “Karpaty” or the “Appellant”) is an Ukranian professional football club having its seat in Lviv, Ukraine. The Appellant is affiliated with the Football Federation of Ukraine (hereinafter referred to as the “FFU”) and currently competes in the Ukrainian Premier League. The FFU is a member both of the Union of European Football Associations (hereinafter referred to as the “UEFA”) and of the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (hereinafter referred to as the “FIFA”).

2. FC Zestafoni (hereinafter referred to as “Zestafoni” or the “Respondent”) is a Georgian professional football club having its seat in Zestafoni, Republic of Georgia. The Respondent is affiliated with the Georgian Football Federation (hereinafter referred to as the “GFF”) and currently competes in the Georgian Premier League. The GFF is also a member of UEFA and FIFA.

VI. LEGAL ANALYSIS

VI.1 Jurisdiction of the CAS

70. The jurisdiction of the CAS, which is not disputed and which has been confirmed by the parties in signing the Order of Procedure, derives from Article 67 of the FIFA Statutes.

71. It follows that the CAS has jurisdiction to decide this dispute.

VI.2 Admissibility

72. Article R49 of the Code provides as follows:

“In the absence of a time limit set in the statutes or regulations of the federation, association or sports -related body concerned, or of a previous agreement, the time limit for appeal shall be twenty-one days from the receipt of the decision appealed against. After having consulted the parties, the Division President may refuse to entertain an appeal if it is manifestly late”.

73. The grounds of the Appealed Decision were notified on 12 March 2014 and the Statement of Appeal filed on 2 April 2014. This was within the required twenty one days set in Article R49 of the Code and in Article 67.1 of the FIFA Statutes.

74. Furthermore, no objection has been raised by the Respondent in this respect.

75. It follows that the appeal is admissible.

VI.3 Law applicable to the merits

76. Article R58 of the Code provides as follows:

“The Panel shall decide the dispute according to the applicable regulations and the rules of law chosen by the parties or, in the absence of such a choice, according to the law of the country in which the federation, association or sports-related body which has issued the challenged decision is domiciled or according to the rules of law, the application of which the Panel deems appropriate. In the latter case, the Panel shall give reasons for its decision”.

77. The matter at stake relates to an appeal against a FIFA decision, and reference must hence be made to Article 66.2 of the FIFA Statutes which states that:

“The provisions of the CAS Code of Sports-Related Arbitration shall apply to the proceedings. CAS shall primarily apply the various regulations of FIFA and, additionally, Swiss law ”.

78. In light of the above, the fact that the parties did not refer to any specific law but only to the RSTP, the Sole Arbitrator is of the view that the law applicable to the present appeal shall be primarily the FIFA regulations and Swiss law as a subsidiary.

79. In relation to which FIFA regulations should be applicable to the present case, the Sole Arbitrator, as the DRC found in the Appealed Decision, confirms that in accordance with Articles 26.1 and 26.2 RSTP, and considering that the matter before the DRC was filed on 29 May 2012 and the Player was registered with the Appellant on 1 March 2012, the RSTP 2010 edition is applicable to the matter at hand as to the substance.

VI.4 The merits of the Appeal

80. The core principle applicable by CAS is the de novo principle resulting from Article R57 of the Code. According to Article R57 of the Code, the Sole Arbitrator has full power to review the facts and the law of the case. Furthermore, the Sole Arbitrator may issue a new decision which replaces the decision challenged or may annul the decision and refer the case back to the previous instance.

81. Based on the parties’ submissions and oral argument, the issues for determination are the following:

a) Is Zestafoni entitled to receive training compensation?

b) Depending on the answer to (a) above, pursuant to the FIFA regulations, who is responsible for paying Zestafoni training compensation?

c) Depending on the answer to (b) above, is the amount of training compensation awarded in the Appealed Decision in accordance with the FIFA regulations?

d) Depending on the answer to (c) above, what is the amount of training compensation due to Zestafoni?

a) Is Zestafoni entitled to receive training compensation?

82. As a starting point, the Sole Arbitrator notes that the importance of developing young players is reflected in the RSTP and, in particular, in the regulations concerning the payment of training compensation. Article 20 and Annex 4 RSTP set out the system whereby a player’s training club shall be compensated by the player’s new club for the entire period the training club effectively trained the player between the ages of 12 and 21 subject to the factual question of whether the player’s training has in fact been completed earlier.

83. The FIFA training compensation system ensures that training clubs are adequately rewarded for the efforts they have invested in training their young players. The objective of training compensation is thus to ensure that training clubs are sufficiently compensated for the cost incurred in training their young players. This concept is aimed at maintaining the competitive balance between clubs and allows them to continue training and dev eloping players in the knowledge that they will be adequately compensated for their efforts. Training compensation therefore plays an important role in the development of young players and in maintaining the stability and integrity of the sport.

84. Article 20 RSTP provides:

“Training compensation shall be paid to a player’s training club(s): (1) when a player signs his first contract as a professional and (2) each time a professional is transferred until the end of the season of his 23rd birthday. The obligation to pay training compensation arises whether the transfer takes place during or at the end of the player’s contract. The provisions concerning training compensation are set out in Annex 4 of these regulations”.

85. Article 1(1) of Annex 4 RSTP provides:

“A player’s training and education takes place between the ages of 12 and 23. Training compensation shall be payable, as a general rule, up to the age of 23 for training incurred up to the age of 21, unless it is evident that a player has already terminated his training period before the age of 21. (…)”.

86. Article 2(1) of Annex 4 RSTP provides:

“Training compensation is due when: i. (…); or ii. a professional is transferred between clubs of two different associations (whether during or at the end of his contract) before the end of the season of his 23rd birthday”.

87. It is not in dispute between the parties that the Player was registered as a professional with Zestafoni for the period 30 August 2005 until 1 January 2012 before he moved to Ukraine after the expiry of his contract with Zestafoni.

88. Furthermore, the Appellant does not dispute whether Zestafoni is entitled to training compensation. Rather, the Appellant contends that Zestafoni must claim such compensation from FC Lviv as the Player’s immediate club after his transfer from Georgia.

89. It is further not in dispute that Zestafoni has received no training compensation for the Player, whether from FC Lviv or from Karpaty.

90. For the present purposes, the Sole Arbitrator does not need to address the issue of whether the Respondent (the Player’s former club) has offered the Player a new contract before the expiry of his current contract within the meaning of Article 6(3) of Annex 4 RSTP in order to be entitled to receive training compensation. This is so because the said provision placed under

the heading “Special provisions for the EU/EEA” is inapplicable in the present dispute since the interested parties are not from EU/EAA countries.

91. It therefore follows that Zestafoni is entitled to training compensation from the Player’s new club after leaving Zestafoni in the beginning of 2012.

b) Pursuant to the FIFA regulations, who is responsible for paying Zestafoni training compensation?

92. Article 3(1) of Annex 4 RSTP provides:

“3. Responsibility to pay training compensation” 1. On registering as a professional for the first time, the club with which the player is registered is responsible for paying training compensation within 30 days of registration to every club with which the player has previously been registered (in accordance with the player’s career history as provided in the player passport) and that has contributed to his training starting from the season of his 12th birthday. The amount payable is calculated on a pro rata basis according to the period of training that the player spent with each club. In the case of subsequent transfers of the professional, training compensation will only be owed to his former club for the time he was effectively trained by that club”.

93. On the other hand, Article 5(1) and (2) of Annex 4 RSTP provides:

“5 Calculation of training compensation 1. As a general rule, to calculate the training compensation due to a player’s former club(s), it is necessary to take the costs that would have been incurred by the new club if it had trained the player itself. 2. Accordingly, the first time a player registers as a professional, the training compensation payable is calculated by taking the training costs of the new club multiplied by the number of years of training, in principle from the season of the player’s 12th birthday to the season of his 21st birthday. In the case of subsequent transfers, training compensation is calculated based on the training costs of the new club multiplied by the number of years of training with the former club”.

94. Articles 3(1) and 5(1) and (2) RSTP read in combination with Article 2(1)(ii) of Annex 4 RSTP, providing that training compensation is due when a professional is transferred between clubs of two different associations (whether during or at the end of his contract) before the end of the season of his 23 rd birthday, leave no doubt that the new club with which the player is registered is responsible for the training compensation to his former club for the time he was effectively trained by that club.

95. The Appellant asserts that the new club of the Player is FC Lviv with which the Player entered into a contractual relationship on 10 February 2012 and was only loaned to Karpaty on 29 February 2012.

96. On the contrary, the Respondent avers that the registration of the Player with FC Lviv was only a formal one and the legal connection between them was fabricated only to avoid payment of the training compensation by Karpaty and to circumvent the FIFA regulations.

97. It is clear from the parties’ assertions that the core issue for determination is the establishment of which club the Player transferred to after leaving Zestafoni and if Karpaty has standing to be sued in the present case.

98. As properly noted by the Appellant, according to the CAS jurisprudence and Swiss law, applicable pursuant to the FIFA Statutes and to Article R58 of the Code, a party has standing to be sued (légitimation passive) and may thus be summoned only if it has some stake in the dispute because something is sought against it (CAS 2006/A/1189; CAS 2006/A/1192; CAS 2008/A/1518). In other words, the defending party has standing to be sued if it is personally obliged by the “disputed right” at stake (CAS 2006/A/1206; CAS 2008/A/1468; CAS

99. In that respect, it is necessary to determine if Karpaty has some stake in the dispute because something is sought against it and it is thus personally obliged by the “disputed right”.

100. The Sole Arbitrator is of the opinion that it is necessary to explore if the Appellant is the new club of the Player as per the meaning ascribed to this term in the RSTP and as such is obliged to pay training compensation to the Respondent.

101. According to the definition in the RSTP, the new club is the club that the player is joining. In that regard, the Sole Arbitrator deems it appropriate to note that in his view such joining is an issue of fact, not of mere formality.

102. The Sole Arbitrator recalls here the relevant facts and highlights some serious inconsistencies in the chain of events laid forth by the Appellant.

103. Following a match played against Zestafoni in the qualification phase of the UEFA Europa League on 29 July 2010, the Appellant became interested in the Player and began to closely follow his performance. As acknowledged by the Appellant, somewhere in the summer of 2011 it gave clear signs to the Player’s representatives of its readiness to hire the Player at the end of his contractual relationship with the Respondent.

104. In August 2011, the Appellant’s website announced that the Player and Karpaty signed a contract providing that the Player would join the Appellant as of the beginning of 2012. A photo of the Player and official of the Appellant holding the club’s jersey with number 88 designated for the Player was uploaded on the club’s website. The Appellant’s explanation that the publications on its website and other media were released only as a precaution measure in order to exclude potential competitors for the Player’s signature is not convincing. At the very least, it appears that the Appellant was in close contact with the Player with a view to attract him once the contract of the Player with Zestafoni would expire on 1 January 2012.

105. In his witness statement, the Player confirms that he refused to extend his contract with Zestafoni because of the Appellant’s interest to sign him shown in the summer of 2011. At the

same time, the witness explains that he had no direct contacts with the Appellant. The witness statement does not give much detail on how and under what circumstances the Player was approached by FC Lviv. The Sole Arbitrator notes that, contrary to what was stated in the Appeal Brief, the Appellant did not summon the Player to orally confirm the contents of his statement, or enable the Sole Arbitrator to question and/or seek clarification. On its own, the Player’s witness satement cannot prove on a balance of probability that the Player did not have an agreement with Karpaty already before his contract with Zestafoni had expired. The Sole Arbitrator cannot give any weight to the Player’s sole written statement, especially as he is still employed by the Appellant.

106. In a contemporaneous statement, the Appellant admits the fact that “up to this moment preliminary agreement between FC Karpaty and footballer M. is concluded (…)”. Therefore, the Appellant admitted to the Respondent that it had concluded a (preliminary) agreement with the Player even before the employment contract between FC Lviv and the Player dated 10 February 2012 was entered into.

107. In the beginning of 2012, the Player left Zestafoni and moved to Lviv, Ukraine, the home city of the Appellant. The Player further joined a training camp of Karpaty held in Turkey within the period 22 January - 5 February 2012. Thus, his pre-seasonal preparation and training was exclusively connected with Karpaty.

108. Following the receipt of the Respondent’s letter of 17 January 2012 claiming training compensation for the Player, the Appellant answered on 7 February 2012 (i.e., after the training camp in Turkey) that “we are not refusing the obligation to pay the training compensation to the club which has been involved in training of the player as provided in the FIFA Regulations on the Status of the Players, edition 2010”. The only reservation made by the Appellant related to the amount of such compensation which in the Appellant’s view should have taken into account the earlier completion of the Player’s training that allegedly occurred before he reached the age of 21. The Appellant further proposed a payment plan of the training compensation due for the Player. Therefore, as of that time, the Appellant was aware of its duty to pay training compensation to the Respondent, albeit in a reduced amount.

109. On 10 February 2012, the Player and FC Lviv (a club of third category playing in the second ranked Ukrainian football division) signed an employment contract valid until 31 December 2013 whereby the Player would be employed by FC Lviv against a remuneration in accordance with unspecified staff prescription. The contract was registered with the professional football league of Ukraine on 1 March 2012. The Appellant’s submissions do not shed much light on the involvement of FC Lviv with the Player and specifically how and when FC Lviv got informed of Karpaty’s hesitations. As stated in the witness statement, the Player was offered a contract by that club and was promised that FC Lviv would find him a new club from the Premier league quickly. Not surprisingly, this new club turned out to be the Appellant which was willing to obtain the services of the Player since a long time ago. At any rate, the evidence in the record shows that FC Lviv, despite signing on 10 February 2012 a contract valid until 31 December 2013 (i.e. for almost two years), never foresaw to keep the Player in its squad.

110. After 19 days only, on 29 February 2012, FC Lviv loaned the Player to Karpaty until 31 December 2012 pursuant to a loan contract dated 29 February 2012, entered into between FC Lviv, Karpaty and the Player. According to its terms, FC Lviv transferred to Karpaty 100% of the sporting rights for the Player until 31 December 2012 against a fee of UAH 6,000 (equal to appr. EUR 575), VAT included, payable by Karpaty before 1 March 2012, that is before the end of the registration period. The amount of the fee seems embarrassingly low as it was agreed as a lump sum for the entire period of the contract and not as monthly remuneration.

111. By a supplementary agreement to the loan contract of the same date, the parties agreed that the fee for the transfer of rights under the loan would be in the amount of UAH 400,000 (equal to appr. EUR 36,700) to be paid by Karpaty by 15 April 2012 with partial payments being acceptable. It seems peculiar and remained unanswered for what reason the parties to the loan signed the supplementary agreement on the same date amending the amount of the fee and prolonging the originally agreed maturity date of payment. Whatever such reasons, the agreed fee (be it under the original loan contract or under the supplementary agreement thereto) is not of such considerable amount for obtaining the services of a foreign national team player. This does not fully correspond with the prospect of good financial opportunity allegedly sought by FC Lviv. Further, the payment under the supplementary agreement was executed on 11 April 2012; that is to say after the registration of the loan contract with the FFU on 1 March 2012. The Sole Arbitrator is mindful of the fact that, as of the date of payment, the parties were already in conflict regarding the training compensation for the Player.

112. On 29 February 2012, the Appellant and the Player entered into an employment contract valid until 31 December 2012 which was registered with the FFU on 1 March 2012. It is not fully comprehensible why a talented and skilled promising player would under unclear financial conditions sign a contract with a club struggling at the bottom of the second ranked Ukrainian division and suffering financial troubles and would stay there only for 19 days before moving to the Appellant’s team.

113. It is not disputed that the Player did not play a single match for FC Lviv or attend training exercises ever since he signed with that club.

114. According to a transfer contract dated 9 July 2012 entered into between FC Lviv, Karpaty and the Player, the sport and economic rights of the Player were fully transferred to the Appellant for an agreed fee of UAH 900,000. No evidence was presented as to if this amount was ever transferred by Karpaty to FC Lviv.

115. The circumstances of the present case bear strong resemblance to the ones discussed in case CAS 2009/A/1757 where the respondent club was ordered to pay training compensation after having hired a player through a Maltese club in breach of FIFA regulations. The Sole Arbitrator does not find it appropriate to depart from the reasoning of the panel in that case:

“Furthermore, bearing in mind what has been said above and, in particular, since it is Inter that has benefited from the training efforts invested by MTK, it is also Inter that should be obliged to pay any sum of training compensation determined by the Panel. In this respect, Pieta Hotspurs does not appear to have benefited from

the training efforts invested by Inter because, as the record shows, the player was only registered with that club for 9 days and never even played a competitive match in Malta.

It may be noted that in certain previous cases (for example, CAS 2008/A/1521), referred to above) CAS was reluctant to oblige a new club to pay training compensation in circumstances where the new club may really not have known that it might be liable to pay training compensation in the event of the transfer of the player, for example, as the new club was not privy to any negotiations that may have taken place between the player and his previous club (see, in particular, paragraph 65 of the Award in CAS 2008/A/1521). However, the Panel considers that the present case represents a different set of circumstances and notes, in particular, that Inter has not suggested that it was unaware that it might be obliged to pay training compensation in the case of F. Indeed, the facts of the case point to the opposite conclusion.

As a related matter, the Panel also observes that it is difficult to understand why a player who is rated highly and who has captained the Hungarian under 19 team and who has attracted the attention of Inter Milan should elect to move to a club in Malta and stay there for little more than a week before moving on to Italy. No doubt this unusual pattern of movement was also what the DRC had in mind when, at paragraph II.16 of its Decision, it stated as follows: “Yet the Chamber deemed it important to emphasize that should it become aware of any blatant circumvention of the regulations or that a party makes abuse of its legal rights, such stance would be severely punished”.

116. Likewise, it is Karpaty that has benefited from the training efforts invested by Zestafoni in relation to the training of the Player and thus it is Karpaty that should be obliged to pay training compensation to be determined by the Sole Arbitrator. In this respect, the Appellant failed to prove that FC Lviv has ever benefited from the training efforts in the Player since the latter was formally linked with that club for some 19 days and never played a match for it.

117. Similarly, as was the case in CAS 2009/A/1757, the Appellant has not suggested that it was unaware that it might be obliged to pay training compensation. On the contrary, before the dispute was referred to the DRC for resolution, the Appellant recognized in principle its duty to pay training compensation to the Respondent with respect to the Player, although arguing the exact amount claimed by Zestafoni.

118. Further, as reflected in the above-referred case, the Sole Arbitrator is not satisfied with the Appellant’s explanation as to why a talented skilled player who has attracted the attention of top Russian and Ukrainian clubs (as stated in the witness statement) should elect to join a second class team and to stay there for just 19 days before moving to a premier league team which happened to be exactly the Appellant.

119. The Appellant denies the applicability of the precedent in CAS 2009/A/1757 given the standing to be sued of Inter Milan was not challenged in that case. It is irrelevant if the respondent there did challenge its standing to be sued and such challenge was dismissed or the panel implied ex officio that Inter Milan was the right respondent and thus it had standing to be sued.

120. It therefore follows that Karpaty is liable to pay Zestafoni training compensation.

c) Is the amount of training compensation awarded in the Appealed Decision in accordance with the FIFA regulations?

121. Having found that Karpaty is responsible to pay training compensation to Zestafoni, it remains for the Sole Arbitrator to decide whether the training compensation awarded in the Appealed Decision is in accordance with the FIFA regulations.

122. Article 1(1) of Annex 4 RSTP provides that a player’s training and education takes place between the ages of 12 and 23. Training compensation shall be payable, as a general rule, up to the age of 23 for training incurred up to the age of 21, unless it is evident that a player has already terminated his training period before the age of 21. In the latter case, training compensation shall be payable until the end of the season in which the player reaches the age of 23, but the calculation of the amount payable shall be based on the years between the age of 12 and the age when it is established that the player actually completed his training.

123. Further, Article 4(1) and (2) of Annex 4 RSTP provide that in order to calculate the compensation due for training and education costs, clubs of different associations are divided into four categories in accordance with the clubs’ financial investment in training players. The training costs are set for each category and correspond to the amount needed to train one player for one year multiplied by an average “player factor”, which is the ratio of players who need to be trained to produce one professional player. The training costs, which are established on a confederation basis for each category of club, as well as the categorisation of clubs for each association, are published on the FIFA website (www.FIFA.com). They are updated at the end of every calendar year.

124. Under FIFA circular Nr. 1264 of 19 May 2011, which was the circular applicable when the Player joined Karpaty, the training and education costs applicable to category II clubs were EUR 60,000 per season.

125. The Appellant asserts that the Player completed his training before he reached the age of 21. In support of this assertion, the Appellant refers to: the number of matches played by the Player with the first team of FC Zestafoni in relevant periods; the participation of the Player in the national teams of Georgia; the recognition of the Player as the best Georgian footballer during the season 2010/2011. Therefore, the Appellant claims that, should the CAS confirm that Karpaty has standing to be sued, the training compensation (if any) must be determined in consideration of Player’s training period having completed at the end of season 2007/2008.

126. The Respondent argues that these factors do not prove the completion of the Player’s training before the age of 21 requiring reduction of the compensation.

127. In the Appealed Decision, the DRC accepted that the specific circumstances in the case do not trigger payment of reduced training compensation as a result of early completion of the Player’s training period before his age of 21.

128. In particular, the DRC noted that in the season 2007/2008 the Player had played in 10 matches with the Respondent’s first team, however also playing 5 matches for the Respondent’s second

team in the same season. Hence, the DRC concluded that it could not be established that the Player was a regular first team player during the season 2007/2008. In addition, the fact that the Player was voted the best player in Georgia in the 2010/2011 season did not imply that his training period had been completed.

129. Article 20 and Annex 4 RSTP set out the system whereby a player’s training club shall be compensated by the player’s new club for the entire period the training club effectively trained the player between the ages of 12 and 21 subject to the factual question of whether the player’s training has in fact been completed earlier.

130. The decision on whether and when the formation of a player has been completed has to be taken on a case-by-case basis, taking into due consideration all the circumstances and the evidence produced.

131. Pursuant to Article 12.3 of the FIFA Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber edition 2010,“[a]ny party claiming a right on the basis of an alleged fact shall carry the burden of proof”. In relation to the fact of earlier completion of the Player’s training before the age of 18, the Sole Arbitrator confirms that the burden of proof lies with the Appellant.

132. The Appellant has adduced evidence to its submission demonstrating that starting from the 2007/2008 season (10 August 2007 - 20 May 2008), already at the age of 18, the Player (born on 1 May 1989) began playing for the first team of Zestafoni on a more regular basis. In that season the Player took part in 10 out of 26 Championship matches and 4 out of 11 Cup matches for his club. The Sole Arbitrator concurs with the conclusion of the DRC that such amount of matches played for the particular season (roughly one third of all the club’s matches) is not sufficient to prove earlier completion of the Player’s training as of that season.

133. In the following seasons, however, the Player’s statistics with respect to participation in the first team matches were considerably improved. In the season 2008/2009, the Player played in 23 out of 33 Championship matches (70%), 4 out of 4 Cup matches (100%), 2 out of 2 Europa League matches (100%); season 2009/2010 - 32 out of 36 Championship matches (89%), 3 out of 3 Cup matches (100%), 3 out of 4 Europa League matches (75%); season 2010/2011 - 30 out of 36 Championship matches (83%), 4 out of 5 Cup matches (80%), 3 out of 6 Champions’ League matches (50%).

134. The Player’s participation in the season 2011/2012 (2 out of 36 Championship matches, 0 out of 7 Cup matches, 4 out of 4 Champions’ League matches) is not indicative since as of that time the Player apparently had already been contacted by the Appellant and the Player was reluctant to extend his contract with the Respondent which obviously must have caused tension with his club as a result of which the Player was moved to the second team.

135. The Sole Arbitrator also notes that as of the 2008/2009 season, the Player began to be summoned for the first national team of Georgia and played in three games during that period.

136. The above figures were not addressed by the DRC in the Appealed Decision. The DRC ended the discussion by reference to the 2007/2008 season only when the Player was truly not a regular player of the team.

137. The Sole Arbitrator is aware of the strict approach adopted by the DRC and the CAS when establishing the early completion of the player’s training before the age of 21. On the other hand, the number of matches played with the first team and the value of the player for that club have been identified in CAS jurisprudence as factors determining the earlier completion of

138. Regarding whether the Player’s training was completed, the Sole Arbitrator states that the number of matches played is not per itself necessarily decisive. As a matter of fact, a player could be required to play on a regular basis although his formation is not yet finished, according to the standards of other stronger teams. In the case at hand, however, the Sole Arbitrator notes that during the relevant period Zestafoni was a Premier league team, it regularly finished on top position in the championship and played in the UEFA competitions. A team with such record, class and striving for the best results (for the standards and the level of the Georgian football) would hardly allow itself to use in its first team untrained players on a regular basis.

139. As regards the value of the Player for the club, the Sole Arbitrator is comforted with the evidence gathered and accepts that the Appellant has demonstrated that the Player was recognized by the club for having significant technical skills. Further, the Player was given nonamateur statute already since the 2005/2006 season at the age of 16.

140. Therefore, the Sole Arbitrator concludes that, considering the specific circumstances of the case, the Player had completed his training as of the beginning of the season 2008/2009 when he was regularly playing for the Respondent. Therefore, the Appealed Decision should be amended accordingly.

141. In its Appeal Brief, the Appellant maintains that according to jurisprudence and practice, a player’s training period ends before the season during which he plays regularly with his team, which is the “season a quo” the team is no longer entitled to any training compensation. In the present award, the Sole Arbitrator confirmed that understanding. In contrast to its previous statement, the Appellant however claims that the Player completed his training during the 2007/2008 season, thus at the end of May 2008.

142. For the reasons stated above, the Sole Arbitrator already denied that the Player had completed his training in the season 2007/2008. The Sole Arbitrator finds that a player’s training period ends before the season during which he plays regularly with his team and not immediately after the preceding season when he was not fully trained yet. A simple logic leads to the corollary that to achieve the status of a regular player he must have gone through some additional training during pre-seasonal preparation of the club. Therefore, it cannot be assumed that the Player completed his training at the end of season 2007/2008 (end of May 2008) when he was not a regular player. For the purposes of determining the training compensation under the RSTP, the training of a player is considered to take place not only during the season but during the entire

cycle of the year including the period before the first matches of the season. That is why the Sole Arbitrator deems it correct that in casu the training of the Player completed before the beginning of the 2008/2009 season (end of August 2008) when he became a regular player.

d) What is the amount of training compensation due to Zestafoni?

143. Having established that Karpaty is responsible to pay Zestafoni training compensation, the Sole Arbitrator finds that the amount of training compensation owed by Karpaty to Zestafoni for the Player’s training compensation must be determined according to the exception in Article 1(1) of Annex 4 RSTP: “A player’s training and education takes place between the ages of 12 and 23. Training compensation shall be payable, as a general rule, up to the age of 23 for training incurred up to the age of 21, unless it is evident that a player has already terminated his training period before the age of 21 …”.

144. In the latter case, training compensation shall not be payable until the end of the season in which the player reaches the age of 23, but the calculation of the amount payable shall be based on the years between the age of 12 and the age when it is established that the player actually completed his training.

145. In relation to the specific amount due for the aforementioned period, Article 5(1) of Annex 4 RSTP states that in calculating training compensation “(…) it is necessary to take the costs that would have been incurred by the new club if it had trained the player itself”. This amount is calculated by taking the training costs of the new club multiplied by the number of years of training.

146. For the reasons stated above, the Sole Arbitrator finds that the period with relation to training compensation for the Player starts on 30 August 2005 (date of registration with the Respondent) and ends on 31 August 2008 (completion of training before the 2008/2009 season) and amounts to 36 months.

147. As established above, the period during which the Player was effectively trained by the Respondent was in the range of 36 months divided in the following segments:

– year 2005: 4 months (September to December inclusive); – year 2006: 12 months (January to December inclusive); – year 2007: 12 months (January to December inclusive); – year 2008: 8 months (January to August inclusive);

Total: 36 months (30 August 2005 - 31 August 2008)

148. It is not in dispute that Karpaty has been classified as a category II club by UEFA. The training costs applicable to category II clubs are EUR 60,000 per season. Therefore, training compensation due by Karpaty to Zestafoni for the Player must be in the amount of EUR 180,000 (EUR 60,000/12 = EUR 5,000 x 36 months = EUR 180,000).

149. The Appellant pleaded that the training compensation as calculated by the DRC is disproportionate and should be reduced accordingly. Of course, any compensation due in

respect of player training should not be “disproportionate”. In this connection, since the FIFA multiples are based on real training costs incurred by clubs and the calculations of the DRC are herewith modified, the Sole Arbitrator is perfectly satisfied that the award in this case complies with the relevant provisions of the FIFA regulations.

150. In view of all the above, the Sole Arbitrator finds that the Appealed Decision passed on 31 October 2013 shall be set aside, and the appeal filed by Karpaty partially upheld.

151. Karpaty is therefore ordered to pay Zestafoni a total amount of EUR 180,000 as training compensation. Since the Appealed Decision is being amended, interest from the said amount shall accrue at an annual rate of 5% with effect from thirty days upon the date of notification of the present award.

152. Any other requests submitted by the parties to the Sole Arbitrator are accordingly dismissed.