Deutscher Fussball-Bund e.V. (DFB), 1. FC Köln, Nikolas Terkelsen Nartey v. Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA)

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

6. The present dispute concerns the registration of the Player with the DFB. Below is a brief summary of the main facts and allegations based on the Parties’ written submissions and the CAS file. Additional facts and allegations found in the Parties’ submissions, pleadings and evidence may be set out, where relevant, in other parts of this award.

7. The winter registration period 2016/2017, as defined by the DFB, lasted from 1 until 31 January 2017 (hereinafter the “Registration Period”).

A. The Communications exchanged between DFB and FIFA on the handling of the TMS

8. On 27 January 2017, the FIFA administration sent an email to the “TMS Manager” of the DFB, Mrs Berning. The Transfer Matching System (the “TMS”) is an online system for the registration of international transfers of football players that has been introduced by FIFA in 2010.

9. The email sent by the FIFA administration on 27 January 2017 read – according to the (uncontested) translation provided by the Appellants – as follows:

“We refer to the administrative proceeding for international transfers of minor players, which should be registered at your association and the applicable Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players.

First of all, we would like to confirm that the approval of the Sub-Committee of the Players’ Status Committee (hereinafter: the Sub-Committee) is a compulsory requirement for any international transfer of a

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minor player and must be obtained prior to any request for an international transfer certificate (ITC; cf. Art. 19 par. 4 of the Regulations).

In this regard, we wish in particular to draw your attention to Art. 8.2 par. 1 of Annexe 3 in combination with Art. 4 par. 3 of Annexe 3 of the Regulations, which stipulate, inter alia, that all data relating to the transfer instruction allowing the new association to request an ITC, including for a professional minor player, shall be entered into the transfer matching system (TMS) by the club wishing to register the (minor) player during one of the registration periods established by that association. When entering the relevant data, the new club shall, depending on the selected instruction type, upload all mandatory documents prior to the end of relevant registration period.

Furthermore, in consideration of the aforementioned provisions of the Regulations, we would like to clarify that the club wishing to register the minor player must immediately confirm and match the relevant data in TMS as soon as the Sub-Committee’s decision, whereby the Sub-Committee accepts the pertinent application for approval, is notified to the association concerned via TMS. Please note that it is the responsibility of the association in question to immediately forward decisions of the Sub-Committee notified to them via the TMS to their affiliated clubs (cf. Art. 2 of Annexe 2 of the Regulations). If the relevant decision of the Sub- Committee is passed and notified to the association concerned during the registration period in question, the new club must therefore not only enter but also confirm and match the relevant data in TMS before the end of the registration period in order to allow the new association to request the ITC for the minor player in the TMS in time (cf. Art. 4 par. 5 of Annexe 3 and Art. 8.1 par. 2 of Annexe 3 of the Regulations).

Finally, please be informed that this information is of a general nature and as such without prejudice whatsoever.

Thank you for your attention and for informing your member associations accordingly”.

10. On the same day, Mr Daub, another TMS manager of the DFB, responded to the above email – inter alia – as follows (uncontested translation provided by the Appellants):

“[…] many thanks for your email. Is there a reason why you are drawing our attention to the Regulations that we are already aware of?

In line with the practice in previous registration periods, we assume that the (information pertaining to) requests for an ITC for minors that will only be approved by the Sub-Committee following the end of the registration period, only needs to be entered by the new club in FIFA TMS once that approval has been granted. This means that requests that are placed within a registration period approved following the closure of the registration period in question, and only then must the relevant data (transfer agreement and TPO declaration) be uploaded into FIFA TMS by the new club”.

11. On 30 January 2017, the FIFA administration responded to Mr Daub’s email as follows (uncontested translation provided by the Appellants):

“[…] We are drawing your attention to the provisions of the Regulations that you are already aware of, because pursuant to the latest decision taken by the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee on 23

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November 2016, those provisions are to be strictly applied in terms of special exemptions from ‘validation exceptions’ in the transfer matching system (TMS). Pursuant to this decision, ‘validation exceptions’ in TMS can now only be approved if the prerequisites of the provisions in question are met. […]. We would be happy to discuss anything that is not clear or any questions you may have over the telephone”.

12. A couple of minutes later Mr Daub replied as follows (uncontested translation provided by the Appellants):

“OK, many thanks.

Could you please send me such decision? It is apparently not available on the internet […]”.

13. Still on the same day, the FIFA administration informed Mr Daub by email that due to confidentiality reasons the decision in question cannot be provided to the DFB.

14. To this email Mr Daub responded as follows (uncontested translation provided by the Appellants):

“Hence, we should observe rules which interpretation we do not know and which we never will know […].

You will understand that neither DFB nor its clubs can work with such remarks. In addition, we note that in case of a validation exemption related to a transfer of a minor it cannot be the duty of the DFB to inform FIFA that the request for approval has been submitted within the time-limit in the FIFA TMS for minors (same system). Here FIFA has to be able to realize the transfer (or the information) from the Minor – TMS to the Professional player – TMS itself. […]”.

B. The transfer of the Player

15. On 30 January 2017, the Player signed an employment contract (hereinafter “Contract”) with the Club. The Contract provided for a term from 31 January 2017 until 30 June 2020 and was conditional upon the registration of the Player by the DFB.

16. Still on 30 January 2017, the Club sent the mandatory documents for the request for the approval of the FIFA Sub-Committee to the DFB.

17. On the same day, the DFB confirmed that it had submitted the request to the FIFA Sub- Committee. Furthermore, the DFB advised the Club as follows (uncontested translation provided by the Appellants):

“The transfer agreement and the tpo-statement have to be uploaded in the System after the approval by FIFA. Hence these documents are not needed at the moment”.

18. On 27 February 2017, the FIFA Sub-Committee notified the DFB of its approval of the transfer of the Player. On the same day, the DFB informed the Club thereof. Furthermore, the DFB

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advised the Club that it may now finalize the transfer by uploading the club-related data and documents into the TMS.

19. On 28 February 2017, the Club entered the missing data and documents into the TMS.

20. On 1 March 2017, the DFB requested the ITC through the TMS. This request was blocked due to a “validation exception”, because the DFB had filed the request after the expiry of the Registration Period.

21. On 2 March 2017, the DFB contacted the FIFA administration in order to obtain an exemption from the “validation exception”. In its application for the exemption the DFB explained that the request to the FIFA Sub-Committee for the approval of the transfer of the Player had been filed before the end of the Registration Period and, thus, in time.

22. On 7 March 2017, the FIFA administration rejected the DFB’s application.

23. On 10 March 2017, the DFB renewed its application for an exemption of the “validation exception”.

24. On 14 March 2017, FIFA again rejected the DFB’s application.

C. The Proceedings before the FIFA PSC

25. On 16 March 2017, the DFB filed a request with the FIFA Players’ Status Committee (hereinafter the “FIFA PSC”) to obtain an exemption of the “validation exception”.

26. On 25 March 2017, the FIFA PSC dismissed the DFB’s request. The decision with grounds (“Appealed Decision”) was notified to the DFB on 28 March 2017. The Appealed Decision provides – inter alia – as follows:

“[…] in particular considering that the German club did not comply with its obligations in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Regulations as well as the formal decisions, the Single Judge – strictly applying the regulations – determined that the petition made by the DFB for permission to request an ITC for the player, Nikolas Terkelsen Nartey, and subsequently register the player for its affiliated club, 1. FC Köln, outside the registration period had to be rejected”.

27. The DFB forwarded the Appealed Decision to the Club and the Player on the same day.

III. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT

28. On 4 April 2017, the Appellants filed a statement of appeal with the Court of Arbitration for Sport (hereinafter the “CAS”) directed against the Respondent with respect to the Appealed Decision. The Appellant requested an expedited proceeding in accordance with Article R52 para. 4 of the Code of Sports-related Arbitration (the “Code”) without a hearing. Furthermore,

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the Appellants requested the appointment of a sole arbitrator and proposed to appoint Mr Ulrich Haas.

29. On 5 and 6 April 2017, the CAS Court Office acknowledged receipt of the Appellants’ statement of appeal and invited FIFA to comment on the various procedural requests.

30. On 6 April 2017, FIFA informed the CAS Court Office that it agreed with the appointment of Mr Ulrich Haas as a sole arbitrator and with the Appellants’ request that the procedure be expedited pursuant to Article R52, para. 3, of the Code.

31. On 10 April 2017, the Appellants filed their Appeal Brief within the time limit agreed upon by the Parties pursuant to Article R52, para. 3, of the Code.

32. On 12 April 2017, the CAS Court Office, on behalf of the President of the CAS Appeals Arbitration Division, advised the Parties that the dispute shall be submitted to Mr Ulrich Haas acting as sole arbitrator (hereinafter the “Sole Arbitrator”).

33. Still on the same day, the Respondent filed its Answer within the time limit agreed upon by the Parties pursuant to Article R52, para. 3, of the Code.

34. On 13 April 2017, the CAS Court Office forwarded to the Parties an Order of Procedure and invited them to return a signed copy.

35. On 13 April 2017, the Appellants returned a signed copy of the Order of Procedure to the CAS Court Office. The Respondent returned a signed copy of the Order of Procedure on 18 April 2017.

36. On 19 April 2017, the operative part of the award was notified to the Parties.

IV. THE POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES

37. The following is a summary of the Parties’ submissions and does not purport to be comprehensive. However, the Sole Arbitrator has thoroughly considered in its discussion and deliberation all of the evidence and arguments submitted by the Parties, even if no specific or detailed reference has been made to those arguments in the following outline of their positions and in the ensuing discussion on the merits.

A. The Appellants

38. The Appellants submitted, in essence, that they have a right to obtain the “exemption of the validation exception” from FIFA, because:

(a) the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (“RSTP”) only indirectly provide when a Club has to upload the Player’s data and mandatory documents:

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˗ in particular, no obligation to do so within the Registration Period follows from Article 4 paras. 2 and 3 RSTP; ˗ it is true that Article 4 para. 5 refers to Article 8.2 of Annex 3 RSTP. Para. 1 of this provision, however, does not stipulate when the data and/or the documents must be uploaded. According to the Appellants the provision simply says “that a club who wishes to register a player during one of the registration periods needs to enter the mandatory player data allowing the association to request the ITC. However, it does not say, when such data has to be entered”; ˗ the only prerequisite as to time may be found in Article 8.2 para. 2 of Annex 3 RSTP (to which Article 4 para. 5 RSTP refers). The provision states that at “the very latest, the ITC must be requested by the new association in TMS on the last day of the registration period”. By setting this deadline in respect of an ITC request, the provision also “indirectly … [sets] a time limit for a club to fulfil its upload obligations if it wishes to register the player in the registration period”, since Article 4 para. 5 of Annex 3 RSTP provides that the ITC request can only be initiated once the clubs have uploaded the relevant documents.

(b) In the case of a transfer of a minor a lex specialis contained in Article 19 para. 4 RSTP applies. The provision demands that all international transfers of minor players must be approved by the FIFA Sub-Committee and that “the sub-committee’s approval shall be obtained prior to any request from an association for an International Transfer Certificate …”.

(c) Article 19 para. 4 RSTP may collide with Article 8.2 para. 2 of Annex 3 RSTP. A member federation may be prevented by Article 19 para. 4 RSTP to request an ITC within the Registration Period, if the FIFA Sub-Committee only approves the transfer of the minor after the expiry of the Registration Period. In such case – with no fault of its own – the member federation is time-barred according to Article 8.2 para. 2 of Annex 3 RSTP from requesting an ITC. In order to prevent such results it is commonly accepted to soften the strict application of Article 8.2 para. 2 of Annex 3 RSTP. Thus, if the FIFA Sub-Committee issues its approval of the transfer of a minor outside the Registration Period the member federation may still request an ITC and register the player outside the Registration Period, provided that the application to the Sub-Committee was made within the Registration Period. Thus, Article 19 para. 4 RSTP supersedes Article 8.2 para. 2 of Annex 3 RSTP. It follows from the above that in the case of a transfer of a minor also the (indirect) time limit to upload the necessary documentation into the TMS deriving from Article 8.2 para. 2 of Annex 3 RSTP is not applicable, if the approval is granted by the FIFA Sub-Committee outside the Registration Period.

(d) The Appellants see themselves comforted in their interpretation of the rules by the training material provided by FIFA for the use of the TMS. According to the Appellants the training material exactly confirms their understanding of the RSTP. The Appellants, in particular, refer to a power point slide included in the training material, which evidences the various steps that must be observed in the transfer process related to minors. The second box of such slide indicates an activity that must be performed by

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the clubs. According thereto, the club has to enter all relevant information in the TMS. However, this second step only comes into play according to this slide once the new association “received approval from the sub-committee”. According to the Appellants the “wording ‘received’, i.e. the past tense confirms what is already abundantly clear from the alignment of the boxes, and from the arrows between them, namely that each step has to follow one another”.

(e) The Appellants argue that their interpretation of the relevant rules is also supported by FIFA practice, in particular vis-à-vis the DFB and the Club. In the past – according to the Appellants – “FIFA has always accepted if clubs uploaded the mandatory documents after the transfer period, provided that the ITC could not be requested earlier due to the Sub-Committee’s approval being still pending. In the years 2014-2016 alone, FIFA applied the interpretation of its own rules … [in line with the interpretation of the Appellants] in relation to DFB in 20 cases and in one case involving a transfer to the Club, and thereby constantly approved such understanding of its rules …”.

(f) Contrary to what the FIFA PSC held, the construction of the relevant rules by the Appellants did not grant an (undue) advantage to the Club. The Club and the Player signed the Contract before the end of the Registration Period. There is – according to the Appellants – “no possibility to circumvent this time frame as the employment contract has to be submitted to the Sub-Committee before the end of the registration period …. Further, any club has to have all other mandatory data available before the end of the registration period as the clubs do not know when the Sub-Committee issues its decision. If such decision is issued before the end of the registration period the association’s obligation according to Article 8.1 para. 2 Annex 3 RSTP automatically forces the clubs to upload the players’ data also before the end of such period”. In fact, according to the Appellant “a delayed Sub-Committee decision only causes disadvantages for the clubs as they cannot field the minor”.

(g) Alternatively, the Appellants base their request on customary law. Even if the RSTP should contain an implicit obligation for the clubs to upload the relevant data into the TMS prior to the end of the Registration Period, such understanding is superseded “by customary law (‘Observanz’, ‘Vereinsübung’)”. Customary law is a concept accepted under Swiss law which overrides express statutes of the association. According to the Appellants the emergence of customary law requires two elements, i.e. a long standing practice and a belief that this practice is binding (opinio necessitatis). The Appellants submit that both conditions are fulfilled in the case at hand:

˗ According to the Appellants, the practice existed for many years. “The instrument of an ‘exemption from a validation exception’ was introduced with the RSTP in 2010. … From this point onwards until at least the summer transfer period 2016 … FIFA constantly accepted that clubs uploaded the relevant documents after the end of the transfer period, provided that the ITC could not be requested during the transfer period because the association needed to wait for the Sub-Committee’s approval”. ˗ The opinio necessitatis follows from the longstanding practice and is all the more relevant in light of the complexity and ambiguity of the relevant rules.

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(h) The customary law that has been created through constant FIFA practice has the same rank as statutes and/or other regulations. Thus, a change of the customary practice – according to the Appellants – requires “a change of the RSTP to the effect that a club must upload the relevant documents within the transfer period because the Sub-Committee’s decision is still outstanding”. However, no such amendment of the RSTP has been enacted so far. It is true that a long standing practice may be replaced also by a new contradicting practice. However, no such divergent long-standing exists in the present case. In any event the emails sent by FIFA to the DFB on 27 January 2017 (and thereafter) are insufficient to set aside the customary law, since the latter “cannot be revoked merely by means of an email, much less by one which labels itself as ‘purely informal in nature’”.

(i) The Appellants submit that – independently from customary law – FIFA is estopped from invoking a requirement (whereby the necessary documents must be uploaded within the Registration Period) in light of the principle of venire contra factum proprium. Based on its long-standing practice to allow the clubs to upload the required information into the TMS after the expiry of the registration period, “FIFA has created amongst clubs a reasonable expectation that they can continue to do so”. According to the Appellants “it would fly in the face of basic notions of good faith if FIFA could suddenly change its course without giving the clubs sufficient time to adjust to FIFA’s new practice”. There can be no doubt – according to the Appellants – that FIFA in the present matter “failed to give the clubs sufficient time to adapt their operations”, as required also by CAS jurisprudence. In particular, the Appellants submit that the Club was “never informed before the end of the transfer period” of the change of practice and that FIFA failed to communicate its change of practice in an appropriate and clear manner. Furthermore, FIFA also failed to explain the new practice to the DFB “even when it was entirely obvious that the situation was completely unclear to the DFB”, i.e. “that the DFB had not received the message that FIFA had intended to send”. FIFA, however, “cannot in good faith invoke a change of practice if it refused to explain such change to the DFB, when the DFB (quite understandably) did not grasp that such a change was introduced and what it was about”.

(j) The Club has not been informed of the change of practice within the relevant Registration Period (or in any event the Club has been informed too late) and, thus, “had every reason to continue believing that it could upload the documents into TMS once the Sub-Committee had given its approval”. According to the Appellants, one cannot attribute the DFB’s knowledge to the Club, because “in the specific setting of the TMS, it is not the club that decides to make use of its association’s services in processing a transfer. Rather, it is FIFA that forces its member associations’ services upon their clubs”. It is, consequently, FIFA that – according to the Appellants – “created the risk of any miscommunication between its members and their clubs in respect of TMS matters” and that, therefore, “it is FIFA that must bear this risk”.

39. In light of the above, the Appellants submitted the following prayers for relief in their Appeal Brief:

“- to annul the Decision taken by the Single Judge dated 25 March 2017;

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• to grant DFB’s request for an exemption of the validation exception in respect to the transfer of Nikolas Terkelsen Nartey from FC Copenhagen to 1. FC Köln;

• subsidiarily, to order FIFA to grant DFB’s request for an exemption of the validation exception in respect to the transfer of Nikolas Terkelsen Nartey from FC Copenhagen to 1. FC Köln on the date of the arbitral award (operative part);

• to order FIFA to bear the entire costs of these arbitration proceedings; and

• to order FIFA to pay to the Appellants contribution towards his (sic!) legal fees and other expenses incurred in connection with these arbitration proceedings as well as the proceedings before the Single Judge, at least EUR 25,000”.

B. The Respondent

40. The Respondent submitted, in essence, the following:

(a) It fully shares the conclusion of the FIFA PSC according to which “the German club did not comply with its obligations in accordance with the applicable provision of the regulations” and therefore, “strictly applying the regulations – determined that the petition made by the DFB for permission to request an ITC for the … [Player] … and subsequently register the … [Player] for its affiliated club, 1. FC Köln, outside the registration period had to be rejected”.

(b) Article 6 para. 1 RSTP which establishes that players, as a general rule, may only be registered during one of the two annual registration periods serves to protect the integrity of the competition. This principle has been enshrined in the different versions of the RSTP more or less since 2001.

(c) The regulatory framework for the use of the TMS (which is recognized by all stakeholders taking part in football) is to be found in Annex 3 RSTP. Member federations and their affiliated clubs must strictly comply with these provisions. The relevant provisions are, in particular, the following:

˗ according to Article 8.1 para. 2 of Annex 3 RSTP the ITC request must be submitted at the very latest on the last day of the registration period of the new association; ˗ furthermore, Article 2 para. 4 of Annex 3 RSTP provides that the club must upload certain documents into TMS as soon as the agreement has been formed; ˗ it is the responsibility of the clubs to enter the transfer instructions into TMS (Article 3.1 para. 1 of Annex 3 RSTP); ˗ Article 8.2 para. 1 of Annex 3 RSTP states that all data allowing an association to request the ITC shall be entered into the TMS by the club wishing to register a player during one of the registration periods established by that association and that the new club shall upload at least the mandatory documents depending on the selected instruction type;

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˗ Article 4 para. 5 of Annex 3 RSTP provides that the procedure in relation to the ITC request can only be initiated once the club has complied with its obligations in line with the “preceding paragraphs” of this article. Article 4 para. 3 of Annex 3 RSTP, in particular, refers to Article 8.2 para. 1 of Annex 3 RSTP.

(c) The Respondent submits that if one reads the above provisions jointly, it “can be established beyond any doubt that the new club (the club where the player is to be registered) must duly accomplish all the necessary and technically possible steps in view of registering the player in the TMS within the relevant registration period”.

(d) In case of a transfer of a minor Article 19 para. 4 RSTP provides that the Sub- Committee’s approval shall be obtained prior to any request from an association for an ITC. However, neither this provision “nor any other provision contained in the Annex 2 of the Regulations do affect by any means the provision and the applicability of art. 8.2 para. 1 of Annex 3 of the Regulations relating to the obligations of a club wishing to register a (minor) player as a professional to enter all compulsory data and upload the mandatory documents to support the information entered in TMS … during one of the relevant registration periods. The provisions pertaining to the registration periods … have to be applied to the registration of any player regardless whether the player is a minor or not”.

(e) In the case at hand the Club did not comply with the provisions pertaining to the registration periods. It is uncontested that the Club only provided the compulsory data and uploaded the mandatory documents in the transfer instructions at hand on 28 February 2017, i.e. clearly outside the relevant Registration Period. The applicable provisions do not provide for any exception, which would release a club from complying with its obligations.

(f) The Respondent submits that the “training material provided by FIFA to associations and clubs” is irrelevant for the case at hand, because it contains an explicit disclaimer that reads as follows: “Please note that these explanations and clarifications are meant to facilitate the use of ITMS by the various users and to make them aware of their responsibilities. However, the information contained in this website is without prejudice to any decision that may be made on a specific matter in future by any of the competent decision-making bodies. Furthermore, please note that the wording of the applicable regulations will always prevail over the information contained in the present website”. Consequently, the applicable rules and regulations are not superseded by the “training material”. Irrespective of the above, the Respondent submits that – contrary to the Appellants’ submissions – the training material is in line with the relevant rules. This follows from the fact that the past tense is used in every box on the slide in question.

(g) The Respondent acknowledges that customary law may complement the statutes and regulations of an association. However, the Respondent disagrees with the Appellants insofar as to whether or not customary law may derogate the existing statutes, “in particular … in a situation in which the wording of the statutes is clear … in the interest of legal certainty customary law cannot be admitted contra legem”. In the unlikely event that CAS was to admit customary law contra legem, the Respondent submits that the alleged long-standing

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practice “was terminated by means of formal decisions of the single judge of the Players’ Status Committee passed on 23 November 2016, 23 February 2017 and 11 March 2017”. Consequently, the Appellants could no longer rely on the past standing practice of the FIFA administration at the relevant time, i.e. at the end of the Registration Period. This is all the more true considering that in the email dated 27 January 2017 FIFA informed the “DFB and its affiliated clubs of the change of the said practice by the Single Judge”.

(h) With regard to an alleged breach of the principle of venire contra factum proprium, the Respondent submits that there is “no obligation for FIFA as well as its competent deciding bodies to inform member associations, clubs or even players about a change of practice”. This is all the more true since the decision taken by the Single Judge dated 23 November 2016, which objected to the previous practice of the FIFA administration was “at that stage an isolated decision … [that] could not be considered as a clear and outstanding jurisprudence which had to be communicated, before being confirmed by other decisions”. Furthermore, the fact that FIFA only informed the DFB shortly before the end of the Registration Period cannot be held against the Respondent. Instead, this measure must be qualified as a “proactive communication of the FIFA Administration … [which] was done by courtesy in order to help and support the relevant parties concerned by international transfers of minors to be registered as professionals … in order for them to be able to duly comply with their regulatory obligations in a timely manner”.

(i) FIFA was also not under a duty to inform a “high ranking official” of the DFB of the change of practice. It is up to the national federations to ensure that their staff has the necessary training and know-how in order to fulfil their obligations. Consequently, the FIFA administration was correct when it “addressed its communication by email to the two persons listed in the TMS by the DFB as TMS Manager and regular TMS User”. Furthermore, the emails sent by the FIFA administration were “clear and undoubtedly underlined the fact that clubs intending to register a minor player as a professional have to enter all data and upload all mandatory documents related to the transfer in TMS prior to the end of the relevant registration period”. Consequently, FIFA “strongly believes that the … [DFB] had been in a position to understand that its affiliated clubs concerned intending to register minor players as professionals had to comply with their obligations … in a timely manner, prior to the end of the relevant registration period”. In view of the answer sent by the DFB’s employees to FIFA (“alles klar, vielen Dank!”), FIFA could “obviously not expect that the DFB did not understand the content of its mail, and as such, the Appellants could not legitimately argue in good faith that ‘it was entirely obvious that the situation was completely unclear to the DFB’”.

(j) It was the responsibility of the DFB to forward the information received from the FIFA administration to its affiliated clubs. FIFA in its email dated 27 January 2017 explicitly reminded the DFB of this duty. Thus, the DFB should “have at least forwarded this email to … [the Club] in order to share the information transmitted by FIFA Administration, as requested by the latter”. It is, therefore, the DFB’s sole responsibility that the Club was not duly informed of the change of practice.

41. The Respondent submitted the following prayers for relief:

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“that the appeal be rejected as to its merits and the challenged decision be confirmed in its entirety … [and] that all costs related to the present arbitration procedure as well as the legal expenses of the Respondent shall be borne by the Appellants”.