Jersey Football Association (JFA) v. Union of European Football Associations (UEFA)

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

4. Below is a summary of the relevant facts and allegations based on the Parties’ written submissions, pleadings and statements adduced at the hearing. Additional facts and allegations found in the Parties’ written submissions, pleadings and statements may be set out, where relevant, in connection with the legal discussion that follows. While the Panel has considered all the facts, allegations, legal arguments and evidence submitted by the Parties in the present proceedings, it refers in its award only to the submissions and evidence it considers necessary to explain its reasoning.

5. On 7 December 2015, JFA submitted its application for membership in UEFA.

6. On 1 September 2016, UEFA issued a decision (the “Appealed Decision”), which was received by JFA on 6 September 2016, informing that, in accordance with the standard practice of UEFA, JFA’s membership application was examined by the UEFA administration and was discussed at a meeting of the UEFA Executive Committee on 25 August 2016, with the following outcome:

“Please be informed … the UEFA Executive Committee decided that the application should not be forwarded to the UEFA Congress, since the admission criteria set out in Article 5 of the UEFA Statutes are clearly not satisfied, in particular, since Jersey cannot be considered as an independent state within the meaning of this provision”.

7. Therefore, JFA’s application to become a member of UEFA was rejected by the Executive Committee of UEFA.

III. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COURT OF A RBITRATION FOR SPORT

8. On 15 September 2016, in accordance with Articles R47 and R48 of the Code of Sports-related Arbitration (the “Code”), JFA lodged a Statement of Appeal before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (“CAS”) against UEFA concerning the Appealed Decision.

9. On 26 September 2016, in accordance with Article R51 of the Code, the Appellant filed its Appeal Brief.

10. On 4 November 2016, in accordance with Article R55 of the Code, the Respondent filed its Answer. Together with its Answer, the Respondent objected to the jurisdiction of the CAS.

11. On 9 November 2016, the Appellant requested the CAS for an extension to file its submission on CAS jurisdiction.

12. On 11 November 2016, the CAS informed the Parties about the constitution of the Panel composed of the following members:

President: Mr José María Alonso Puig, attorney-at-law in Madrid, Spain Arbitrators: Mr Dirk-Reiner Martens, attorney-at-law in Munich, Germany Mr Jan Räker, attorney-at-law in Stuttgart, Germany.

13. On 30 November 2016, in accordance with Article R55 of the Code, the Appellant filed its comments on the issue of jurisdiction. The Appellant also filed comments on the substance of the Respondent’s Answer.

14. On 20 December 2016, the Panel decided not to bifurcate the proceedings and to deal with the issue of jurisdiction together with the merits.

15. On 17 February 2017, the CAS sent to the Parties a draft of the Order of Procedure.

16. On 6 March 2017, the Order of Procedure was signed by the Appellant.

17. On 9 March 2017, the Order of Procedure was signed by the Respondent while maintaining the challenge to CAS jurisdiction.

18. On 6 June 2017, the Appellant submitted a letter requesting permission (i) to present witness evidence in the person of Mr Philip Austin, President of the JFA, (ii) to provide the Panel and the Respondent with hearing bundles, and (iii) to provide the Panel and the Respondent with skeletons arguments.

19. On 8 June 2017, the CAS granted a one-day term to the Respondent to respond to the Appellant’s requests made on 6 June 2017.

20. On 8 June 2017, the Respondent opposed to all requests made by the Appellant.

21. On 9 June 2017, the Panel decided (i) to hear Mr Philip Austin, and (ii) to reject all other requests made by the Appellant on 6 June 2017.

22. On 28 June 2017, a hearing in this case was held at the CAS headquarters in Lausanne, Switzerland. The Panel was assisted by Mr William Sternheimer, Deputy Secretary General of the CAS. The following persons were present at the hearing on behalf of the Parties:

Appellant: Mr Christopher Hancock, Ms Belinda McRae, Mr Jonathan Crystal, Sir Philip Bailhache, Mr Philip Austin, Mr David Brookland. Respondent: Sir Daniel Bethlehem, Mr Jan Kleiner, Mr Adam Lewis, Mr Luca Tarzia, Mr Emilio Garcia, Mr Jacques Bondallaz. The Parties did not raise any objection as to the composition of the Panel and the procedure before CAS. Furthermore, the Parties expressly confirmed at the end of the hearing that their right to be heard had been respected.

IV. PARTIES’ POSITIONS ON JURISDICTION OF THE CAS — A. UEFA’s position

23. In its Answer to the Appeal Brief, UEFA argued that the CAS lacks jurisdiction to deal with this Appeal. The main arguments presented by UEFA are condensed below:

24. The JFA is not a member of UEFA.

25. UEFA states that the Appellant completely omits to explain why it would be at all in a position, as a non-member of UEFA, to invoke a provision of the UEFA Statutes.

26. Under Swiss law, the statutes of an association only bind and give rights to members of the association, but not to external third parties.

27. Only if a party acquires membership in an association, does the acquisition, and - correspondingly - the grant of membership status bind the association to the new member and the new member to the association. Only then are the statutes of an association binding on the parties. Only then is an arbitral clause contained in the statutes of the association binding on the parties.

28. In consequence, the UEFA Statutes also oblige and give rights only to members of UEFA and to UEFA itself. They are binding only in the legal relationship between UEFA and its members (and between UEFA members).

29. The Appellant, however, is not a member of UEFA. The UEFA Statutes do not grant any rights to Appellant as an external party, as a non-member.

30. There are some types of disputes between UEFA and non-members that are heard by the CAS pursuant to other specific arbitration clauses. For instance, the CAS hears disputes between

UEFA and clubs participating in UEFA Club Competitions in relation to such competitions. As another example, the CAS hears disputes in disciplinary matters, for instance between UEFA and players or clubs, which are subject to disciplinary sanctions.

31. However, such cases are totally different from the issue at hand. In such disputes, the jurisdiction of the CAS is based on specific arbitration clauses in specific regulations governing such clubs’ and players’ participation in UEFA’s club competitions.

32. Whenever disputes between non-members and UEFA are brought before the CAS, this is done based on specific regulatory provisions expressly providing for it, but never on the basis of the UEFA Statutes alone.

33. The purpose of Article 62 is not to create a jurisdiction for an indeterminate number of appeals. It is, to the contrary, the role of Article 62 to restrict, within the limited number of stakeholders who can rely on the UEFA Statutes, the ability to file a complaint with the CAS to parties who are ‘directly affected’.

34. UEFA argues that it is not even alleged, and it is undisputed, that the Appellant and UEFA have not entered into any separate contract or agreement to arbitrate this dispute.

The “Non-Exception”: Specific Agreement to arbitrate - the Gibraltar case

35. UEFA states that in that case, CAS jurisdiction only existed because there was an explicit and specific agreement to arbitrate between the parties. That explicit and specific agreement ha d to be found to exist precisely because, absent it, the CAS would not have had jurisdiction over a dispute between UEFA and a non-member.

36. When years after the dispute with UEFA the Gibraltar Football Association brought a new arbitration against FIFA before the CAS, the CAS was at great pain to identify the agreement to arbitrate between the parties. In its award, the CAS eventually accepted jurisdiction only based on a specific offer to arbitrate, and a respective acceptance of such offer. In other words: the CAS accepted jurisdiction on the basis of an agreement concluded between the parties - but no such agreement exists between the Appellant and UEFA.

37. In the view of UEFA, the example of Gibraltar confirms exactly that a membership applicant cannot invoke a jurisdictional clause contained in the UEFA (or FIFA) Statutes for the benefit of members, precisely because a membership applicant is not a member of UEFA.

B. JFA’s position

38. The JFA submitted a Reply to UEFA’s Answer on the issue of jurisdiction stating that the CAS has jurisdiction to decide the case.

39. The JFA states that the UEFA Statutes have two relevant but disjunctive provisions. The first (Article 61) concerns the CAS as an “Ordinary Court of Arbitration”, which contains an

exclusive list of who may bring a case to the CAS. The second (Article 62) concerns “CAS as Appeals Arbitration Body”, which contains no such limitation.

40. With respect to the provisions mentioned above, the JFA maintains the following:

(a) These provisions are worded disjunctively, and not conjunctively. (b) Both 61(1) and 62(1) have separate side headings in the margin of the UEFA Statutes which both say “jurisdiction”. (c) They apply to different capacities in which the CAS may adjudicate: (i) As an ordinary court of arbitration, unsurprisingly, jurisdiction to arbitrate is limited to the established UEFA family. The limitation to jurisdiction (side-headed in Article 61(1) as defining CAS’ jurisdiction in respect to such cases) is made explicitly. (ii) As an Appeals Arbitration Body, CAS jurisdiction under Article 62 is plainly defined differently and as a jurisdictional clause clearly separate from Article 61(1). As does the substantive wording, the side-heading to Article 62(1) makes it clear that Article 62 separately defines CAS jurisdiction in respect to such appeal cases. Article 62 does not specify that it is subject to Article 61(1); on the contrary, the plain and natural reading is that it is entirely and intentionally disjunctive. (d) UEFA’s argument as to a general principle of membership might have force if Article 61(1) had not created express limits on arbitration. It would certainly have force —although it would be unnecessary— if the stated limits were (as with the FIFA limits) plainly of general application. But a clear difference is created between the provisions. (e) Article 62(2) deals with the question who may bring the claim. It is worded in terms of “parties affected”. There is no cross-reference, whether explicit or implicit, to the limitations in Article 61(1). An applicant for membership is plainly a “party affected”. (f) Article 62(2) goes on to provide for WADA to count as an affected party in doping cases. The JFA observes: (i) This part of Article 62(2) is plainly worded to ensure that the first sentence of Article 62(2) (i.e. “only parties directly affected …”) does not provide an obstacle to WADA’s involvement, even though WADA is not a UEFA member. (ii) Article 62(2) does not address any obstacle in Article 61(1), i.e. the putatively exclusive list of those who can bring claims to the CAS. This is plainly because that list relates to jurisdiction under Article 61(1), not under Article 62(1). (iii) If UEFA’s argument is taken at the height it is pitched (i.e. only members may bring

claims to the CAS, and there is no need to construe the relevant association statutes), then this part of Article 62(2) would be ineffective. If a non-member inherently cannot be given under association statutes a right to bring a claim to the CAS, then it does not matter how explicit the association purports to confer such a right. As a nonmember it inherently receives nothing.

41. Finally, the JFA cites UEFA’s Regulations Governing the Implementation of the UEFA Statutes. In particular, it mentions Articles 1 and 2. The key part for JFA is Article 2(b) of the Regulations, which states the following:

“The application for admission must include the following: (…). b) a declaration whereby the association submitting the application undertakes to observe UEFA’s Statutes, regulations and decisions at all times”.

42. The JFA submits that the effect of Article 2(b) is that the applicant for membership immediately “undertakes to observe UEFA’s Statutes, regulations and decisions at all times”. Prior to membership, such an undertaking by the applicant would include issues such as exclusivity of CAS jurisdiction under Article 62 of the UEFA Statutes.

43. The JFA argues that much of the purpose and effect of Article 2(b) of the UEFA Statutes is to create a legal relationship between UEFA and the applicant prior to any decisions being made on membership or even on provisional membership.

V. PARTIES’ POSITIONS ON THE MERITS

44. The following is a brief description of the Parties’ submissions and arguments on the merits in this arbitration. It does not depict in detail all of the Parties’ arguments. However, they have all been taken into consideration by the Panel in its deliberations and drafting of the present award.

A. The Appellant: JFA

a) Standing to sue/standing to be sued

45. The JFA states that it is the association which has been affected by the decision taken by UEFA.

46. With respect to UEFA’s argument, that the English FA should also have been a Respondent and that UEFA alone therefore has no standing to be sued, the JFA argues that the English FA have never stated that their fundamental interests are at stake. In addition, the JFA stresses that it has kept the English FA fully informed from the very beginning of its intention to apply for membership in UEFA and that the English FA never indicated that it had any concerns in this respect.

47. Finally, the JFA states that it was admitted under a special form of membership relating to associations in the British Commonwealth under Rule 44*c) of the English Football Association Rules. Its affiliation to the English FA was never one of duty, but always one of choice, and no rights of the English FA are affected if such choice is reversed.

b) Ultra vires action of UEFA’s Executive Committee

48. First, the Appellant’s Appeal Brief states that the Appealed Decision was an ultra vires action by UEFA’s Executive Committee and that the Appealed Decision should be overturned for this reason alone, affirming that under the UEFA Statutes the power to admit a national football association to membership is vested in UEFA’s Congress.

49. The Appeal Brief refers to Article 6(2) of the UEFA Statutes which provides the following:

“The Congress shall have the power in its discretion to accept or refuse an application for membership”.

50. Therefore, the JFA states that when the Executive Committee purported to determine the application of JFA it was acting ultra vires.

51. During the hearing, the JFA pointed out that, under the UEFA Statutes, the appropriate body to reject a candidate for membership in UEFA is not the UEFA Executive Committee but the UEFA Congress. In this regard, the JFA mentioned the language of Article 23 of the UEFA Statutes:

“The Executive Committee shall have the power to adopt regulations and make decisions on all matters which do not fall within the legal or statutory jurisdiction of the Congress or another Organ”.

Such priority competence of the Congress is however stipulated in Article 6 of the UEFA Statutes. The subsidiary competence of the Executive Committee therefore does not come into play for this decision.

52. Moreover, the JFA stated that Article 13.2 lit. l) of the UEFA Statutes expressly assigns to the Congress the duty to consider membership applications, i.e. not only to engage in the formal act of taking a decision but also to carry out the relevant examinations and deliberations. The language of this article is the following:

“Matters within the power of Congress shall be the: (…)

l) consideration [emphasis added] of membership applications and the exclusion of a Member Association”.

c) Article 5 of the UEFA Statutes

53. Second, the Appellant based its claim that the Congress of UEFA should be ordered to accept JFA as a member of UEFA on the fact that JFA complies with all requirements for membership stated in Article 5 of the UEFA Statutes.

54. The JFA states that it is a national football association in the continent of Europe, and responsible for the organization and implementation of football-related matters in the territory of Jersey.

55. Although the JFA is “affiliated” to the English FA, that association does not result in the English FA having any jurisdiction in Jersey or over the JFA in relation to football -related matters nor does the English FA allow Jersey to vote in any proceedings of the English FA.

56. The JFA also argues that it is “based in a country recognized by the United Nations as an independent state” within the meaning of Article 5 as this Article does not require that there should be only one football association per “country recognized by the United Nations as an independent state”. This distinguishes Article 5 of the UEFA Statutes from the FIFA Statutes where Article 10.1 and the definition of country has this effect. Unlike the FIFA Statutes, in UEFA there is no requirement that there should only be one such football association per country. Consequently, in the JFA’s view and as an alternative to its other arguments, Jersey is located “in a country recognized by the United Nations as an independent state”, i.e. the United Kingdom.

d) Discrimination

57. The JFA maintains that the effect of Article 5 of the UEFA Statutes is that every country in Europe is either already in UEFA or entitled to apply to join (Monaco, Vatican City State), with the exception of:

(a) Jersey

(b) Guernsey

(c) Isle of Man.

58. This despite those three countries (together known as the Crown Dependencies) being the most constitutionally independent “non-sovereign territories” in the world, the JFA claims.

59. Therefore, the JFA states that the rule as applied by UEFA is discriminatory . Whilst it was rational to promote a rule to stop UEFA being drawn into future territorial disputes or secession issues, the consideration of Article 5 had to consider the position of the principal and permanent subjects of its application, namely the Crown Dependencies. The result of UEFA’s application of Article 5 is to leave the Crown Dependencies in a unique position of exclusion from international football.

e) Irrationality

60. The JFA states that to construe the eligibility rule in Article 5 as being either that of “recognition by the international community” or “UN membership” would be irrational for the following reasons:

(a) The rule goes beyond what is necessary to achieve the stated objective of avoiding UEFA being brought into territorial disputes;

(b) There is no evidence that UEFA considered the merits of the application of the new rule on the very limited number of countries affected; and

(c) The use in Article 5 of classic international law notions of independence as a yardstick for footballing nationhood was particularly inappropriate to be introduced in Europe in 2001 given that in modern Europe state sovereignty and independence are increasingly relative and disputed concepts. This has particular relevance to the position of Jersey as on a modern approach to meaningful independence in Europe, Jersey fulfils almost all of the requirements for state sovereignty - the exception being the use of military force external to its borders - as well as other classic requirements absent from modern definition.

61. The JFA’s Prayers for Relief contained in the Appeal Brief were the following:

“Jersey FA makes essentially four submissions.

First, it is submitted that the action of the Executive Committee in refusing the application was ultra vires.

Secondly, as explained in paragraphs 20-24 above, it is submitted that one construction of Article 5 is that Jersey FA is indeed “based in a country which is recognised by the United Nations as an independent state” (namely the United Kingdom).

Thirdly, it is submitted that it would be discriminatory, irrational and unfair to exclude the JFA from UEFA membership.

Fourthly, as explained in Appendix 1, it is submitted that, on an objective assessment, Jersey has sufficient characteristics of independence to be regarded for the purposes of Article 5 as an independent state.

The Jersey FA respectfully requests that the relief sought in the Notice of Appeal shoul d be granted, namely, an Order:

‘Directing the UEFA Executive Committee to transmit Jersey FA’s application for UEFA membership to the UEFA Congress which shall take all necessary measures to admit the Jersey FA as a full member of UEFA without delay’”.

B. The Respondent: UEFA

a) Standing to sue/standing to be sued

62. UEFA states that because the Appellant’s legal position is that of an affiliated county association of the English FA, the Appeal concerns fundamental interests of the English FA.

63. UEFA mentions that under CAS case law whenever fundamental interests of a third party are directly concerned - and thus potentially affected by a CAS award on the merits - this third party must be included in the respective proceedings in front of the CAS.

64. In line with the above, UEFA argues that, as the sole Respondent in the present proceedings, UEFA has no standing to be sued and the Appeal should be inadmissible or rejected on this ground alone.

b) The Procedure for UEFA Membership Applications

65. The admission procedure for UEFA membership is established in Article 6 of the UEFA Statutes and defined more in detail in the Regulations Governing the Implementation of the UEFA Statutes.

66. Pursuant to Article 1 of these Regulations, a national football association that wishes to become a member of UEFA must (i) submit a written application to the UEFA Administration, for (ii) submission to the UEFA Congress.

67. The written application must first be sent to the UEFA Administration. According to the long and well established practice of UEFA, this means that a first assessment is made by the UEFA Administration and the UEFA Executive Committee. In this framework, the UEFA Administration and the UEFA Executive Committee examine in detail whether the applicant meets all the necessary legal requirements for membership with UEFA.

68. UEFA states that only if, according to this first-step examination, the necessary legal requirements are met, the application file (upon a formal decision of the UEFA Executive Committee) is transmitted onwards to the UEFA Congress for the decision as to whether or not the applicant shall be admitted.

69. This second step, i.e. the decision of the UEFA Congress, is then a discretionary decision of the members of UEFA. This is reflected in Article 6(2) of the UEFA Statutes, which establishes that “The Congress shall have the power in its discretion to accept or refuse an application for membership”.

70. UEFA argues that this procedure was followed in this case, in the same way as in all other membership applications of the past years: over the course of several months, various meetings were held with representatives of the Appellant, documents were examined, explanations were given, and legal assessments were made as to the question whether the Appellant meets the necessary legal requirements for UEFA membership.

71. The reason provided by UEFA for this two-step examination is that, before the decision is taken by the UEFA Congress about a membership application, there must be an initial examination by the UEFA Administration and the UEFA Executive Committee as to whether the necessary legal requirements are met in the first place. If this first examination were not required, any random membership application would have to be forwarded to the UEFA Congress, even if it is totally without merit. This is what the relevant regulatory and statutory provisions of UEFA seek to avoid and indeed have avoided for several years now.

72. From a practical perspective, it is inconceivable for UEFA that the necessary legal assessment could be carried out during a UEFA Congress with the involvement of 55 Member Associations.

73. Accordingly, UEFA states that the above-described two-step mechanism has been the standard practice of UEFA over many years, and it has never been put into question, because it is a

guarantee of a fair treatment of all applications, that are considered in detail and within an appropriate time frame.

74. In addition to the above, according to UEFA this application of its regulations and Statutes is also perfectly in line with Swiss association law.

1. The substantive prerequisites for UEFA membership

75. There are three key elements that must be met in order to be eligible to become a UEFA member:

(i) The applicant must be “a national football association situated in the continent of Europe”.

(ii) The applicant must be “based in a country which is recognized by the United Nations as an independent state”.

(iii) The applicant must be “responsible for the organization and implementation of football-related matters in the territory of their country”.

76. Overall, therefore, the key criteria for membership presented by UEFA are as follows:

(i) The association must be a national football association, and not a regional association, situated in the continent of Europe;

(ii) The national football association must be based in a country recognised as an independent state by the majority of the members of the United Nations; and

(iii) The national football association must be responsible for the organization and implementation of football-related matters in the territory of its country recognised as an independent state.

77. The ratio of the current wording of Article 5 of the UEFA Statutes provided by the Respondent is that UEFA wanted to (i) protect its current member associations and prevent the fraction of such associations into several (regional) associations in their territory, which could then all apply for UEFA membership. Likewise, UEFA wanted (ii) to make sure that for future membership applications, a clear criterion - i.e. recognised independence of the respective country - would exist.

2. The JFA fails to meet several criteria for UEFA membership

78. First, UEFA states that the JFA is not a “national football association” as required by Article 5 of the UEFA Statutes.

79. UEFA states that the Appellant is a regional football association, affiliated to the English FA, arguing that this is confirmed by the Appellant itself on its website.

80. UEFA argues that the Appellant operates under the English FA and it does not have the necessary responsibility for organizing football on its territory.

81. UEFA recognizes that as a regional association (county association) of the English FA, the Appellant has some responsibility to organize football on local level. However, this responsibility can be exercised always and only within the framework established by the English Football Association.

82. It is only under the overall governance of the English FA that the Appellant has certain organizational responsibilities on its local level, i.e. for the territory of Jersey.

83. The Appellant has some limited competencies on its regional level, but only within the regulatory framework granted to it by the relevant national association, which in this sense is the “superior” body.

84. The responsibility of a county association is always and only subsidiary to the overriding responsibility of the English FA. The very fact that the Appellant only operates under the English FA demonstrates that it is not the Appellant, but the English FA that has such required responsibility. In this respect, UEFA cites the “Memorandum of Association” of the Appellant, which reads (in its Article 2) as follows:

“Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, the Association is able:

(…).

(12) to provide by rules, regulations, conditions, bye-laws, or otherwise, for deciding and settling all differences that may arise between associations, clubs, competitions, players or any persons who are members of or who are employed or engaged by any such association, competition or club, or any other person in reference to due compliance with the Laws of the Game (as from time to time prescribed by The Football Association Limited) or the rules, regulations, conditions or bye-laws of the Association or of The Football Association Limited, or in reference to contracts, or to any other matter of dispute or difference arising between such, or persons, or any of them, and whether the Association is concerned in such dispute or difference or not, and to make such provisions for enforcing any award or decision as shall be thought proper;

(…).

(14) to co-operate with The Football Association Limited in all matters relating to the game, including compliance with the Rules of The Football Association Limited and the rules and regulations of any body to which The Football Association Limited is affiliated;

(15) to adopt and carry out all such rules and regulations, conditions, bye-laws, agreements and arrangements of The Football Association Limited, as are now in existence and from time to time, and to comply with or to enforce the due compliance with the same unless and until the same shall have been duly varied in accordance with the terms thereof”.

85. The fact that the Appellant is legally integrated into the hierarchy established by the English FA is furthermore reflected also in the “Rules of the English Football Association”. Article 4 of these Rules establishes the following prerequisites for the status of a “County Association”:

“4 (a) Conditions of Affiliation

(i) Each County Association shall cover a defined area and shall neither extend nor alter such area without first having obtained the written consent of The Association and accordingly, only on the written confirmation by The Association shall an association be accorded the status of a County Association”.

86. As a final remark in this respect, the Respondent adds that football players born in Jersey (such as Graeme Le Saux) suffer no prejudice whatsoever due to Appellant’s non-membership with UEFA, precisely because the Appellant’s affiliation with the FA allows such players to be eligible to play for the national team of England. This is, again, a fundamental difference between this matter and the Gibraltar case.

87. Moreover, UEFA states that Jersey is not an independent State, and it is not recognized as such by any member of the international community.

88. UEFA argues that the Appellant fails to draw the one correct conclusion: the Appellant is not a country, it is not an independent state, it is not recognized as such, and it cannot therefore be a UEFA member.

89. While treaties and other international agreements concluded by the United Kingdom may be extended to the Crown Dependencies, a mechanism, known as Letters of Entrustment, has been developed to enable the Crown Dependencies to conclude treaties and agreements in their own right addressing certain matters, notably those concerned with international taxation. However, the defence and the international representation is the responsibility of the United Kingdom.

90. Finally, UEFA argues that Jersey is not recognized as an independent State by any other State, whether in Europe or elsewhere.

91. UEFA’s Prayers for Relief included in its Answer to the Appeal Brief were the following:

“Based on the foregoing, UEFA respectfully requests CAS primarily to issue an Award on Jurisdiction, declaring that CAS has no jurisdiction to hear this case.

164. Only for the sake of completeness, and under the express reservation of its plea of lack of jurisdiction made above, UEFA submits the following Prayers for Relief:

(a) Primarily: CAS shall declare this Appeal inadmissible;

(b) In any event, CAS shall reject all reliefs sought by Appellant, insofar as they are admissible;

(c) In any event, CAS shall confirm the Decision under Appeal; and

(d) In any event, CAS shall order Appellant to bear all of the costs of these arb itration proceedings and award UEFA a contribution of at least EUR 50,000 towards the legal fees and expenses that UEFA has incurred”.