Anna Chicherova v. International Olympic Committee (IOC)

III. The Russian Olympic Committee shall ensure full implementation of this decision.

V. This decision enters into force immediately”.

III. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT

77. On 25 October 2016, in accordance with Article R47 of the Code of Sports-related Arbitration (the “CAS Code”), the Athlete filed a Statement of Appeal with the Court of Arbitration for Sport (the “CAS”) challenging the Appealed Decision and requesting the following prayers for relief:

“1. The decision of the Respondent dated 4 October 2016 in the matter BRT III – 007 shall be annulled. 2. The CAS shall hold that the Respondent does not have any competence to initiate and/or conduct any disciplinary proceedings against the Appellant. In the alternative the CAS shall hold that the Respondent does not have any right to change the results of the Appellant at the 2008 Olympic Games. 3. The Respondent shall be ordered to pay an adequate sum as damages and an adequate compensation for the reputational harm done for missing the Rio Olympic Games. 4. The Respondent shall be ordered to pay all costs and fees relating to the preparation and conduct of this arbitration, including, but not limited to, those of Appellant’s attorneys, experts and advisors, which the Appellant reserves the right to produce in due course”.

78. In her Statement of Appeal, the Athlete submitted the following procedural requests:

“A. The Panel shall not be composed of any arbitrators that are on the official list of the Court of Arbitration for Sport.

B. The President of the Panel shall be determined by the two arbitrators, and should the two arbitrators appointed by the parties not agree, by the President of the Cantonal Court of the Canton of Vaud.

C. The deadline to file the appeal brief shall be extended for 10 days, i.e. until 14 November 2016”.

79. In her Statement of Appeal, the Athlete submitted the following disclosure requests:

“A. Any documentation on any testing performed by the Beijing laboratory on any of the Beijing samples (complete raw data / results of the entire analysis (LC, GC traces of the sample as well as MS/MS fragmentation maps from all analysed peaks) and the detailed methodological description for the (re- )analysis on all the Appellant’s urine samples.);

B. Full disclosure of the Standard Operating Procedures of the tests carried out on the Appellant’s urine samples at the Beijing and the Lausanne laboratories;

C. Confirmation that there are no additional documents regarding the chain of custody of any of Beijing samples apart from the documents received until today;

D. Detailed documentation on the storage conditions at the Lausanne laboratory as well as the Beijing laboratory for the Appellant’s sample (including in particular the automatic temperature recordings at the Lausanne laboratory as well as the video recordings);

E. Full disclosure of the communication between the Respondent and the Lausanne laboratory regarding the re-analysis program of the Beijing Olympic Games;

F. Full disclosure from the Respondent of any food and drinks (including samples) which the Appellant was provided by the Beijing Olympic Games Organizing Committee at the 2008 Olympic Games.

G. The Respondent shall be ordered to hand out the full information on the validation of the testing procedure as well as all other tests carried out on the Appellant’s urine sample (validation package including proof of suitability of the method which includes in particular full transparency on about the specificity and the sensitivity of the applied tests (i.e. all the detailed numbers on how large was testing population, how many positive controls were included, how many negative controls were included in the test population to obtain test measurements for specificity and sensitivity))”.

80. In her Statement of Appeal, the Athlete nominated Dr. Dominik Kocholl, Attorney-at-Law, Innsbruck, Austria, as an arbitrator, however she also stated the following:

“17 According to R48 CAS Code Appellant herewith nominates Mr. Dominik Kocholl, Austria, as its Arbitrator. This nomination is, however only been made in order to comply with the appeal requirements, and can under no circumstances be construed as acceptance of the closed list of arbitrators which are exclusively allowed to arbitrate on CAS Panels. For this reason and pursuant to her procedural request Appellant herewith nominates Dr. Lucien Valloni, Switzerland, as arbitrator for Appellant’s side”.

81. Further, in relation to the composition of the Panel for this case, the Athlete stated the following in her Statement of Appeal:

“Composition and Functioning of the Arbitral Tribunal

13 Appellant is well aware that all the arbitrators of the arbitrator list have been appointed by the ICAS which maintains a very close connection to Respondent, which is the International Olympic Committee. In fact, the president of the Respondent has been until recently a very influential member of ICAS.

14 For this reason the Appellant asks ICAS to take all the necessary steps to ensure the independence of the Panel of Respondent. It has to be ensured that the Respondent has absolutely no and not even indirect influence on the composition of the Panel and the taking of its decisions. For this reason the Appellant requests that the Panel will be only composed of arbitrators that are not members of the CAS list of arbitrators. Furthermore, the President of the Panel shall be determined by the two arbitrators appointed by the parties, and – if these two arbitrators do not agree on a president – by the President of the Cantonal Court of the Canton of Vaud or by another arbitration institute.

15 The present appeal, and in particular the necessary choice of an arbitrator of the CAS list of arbitrators, can under no circumstances be interpreted as agreement on the way the panel is composed and the way the decisions are taken according to the rules of the CAS Code. Thus, Appellant reserves the right to appeal against the composition of the Panel and to bring the case to an independent tribunal if the composition of the panel and the way of the decision making should not be performed in a manner which is satisfactory for Appellant”.

82. On 2 November 2016, in accordance with Article R53 of the CAS Code the IOC nominated Mr Mark A. Hovell, Solicitor, Manchester, England, as an arbitrator.

83. On the same day, the CAS Court Office wrote to the parties confirming that the Athlete’s deadline to submit her Appeal Brief was extended by 10 days.

84. On 9 November 2016, the Athlete wrote to the CAS Court Office, inter alia, requesting certain further information regarding Mr Hovell. Further, the Athlete requested a further extension of 10 days to submit her Appeal Brief.

85. On 10 November 2016, Mr Hovell wrote to the CAS Court Office providing the information which was requested by the Athlete.

86. On the same day, the IOC wrote to the CAS Court Office stating that counsel for the parties had been in contact and agreed that the Appeal Brief would be lodged by 8 December 2016 and the IOC’s Answer would be lodged by 31 January 2017. Both deadlines were not going to be extended any further.

87. On 17 November 2016, the Athlete wrote to the CAS Court Office challenging Mr Hovell’s appointment as an arbitrator in this case.

88. On 30 November 2016, in accordance with Article R54 of the CAS Code, and on behalf of the President of the CAS Appeals Arbitration Division, the CAS Court Office informed the parties that the Panel appointed to this case was constituted as follows: President: Judge Mark L. Williams SC, Judge, Sydney, Australia Arbitrators: Dr. Dominik Kocholl, Attorney-at-Law, Innsbruck, Austria Mr Mark A. Hovell, Solicitor, Manchester, England

89. On 7 December 2016, Mr Hovell submitted a further letter to the CAS Court Office addressing the points raised by the Athlete in her letter dated 17 November 2016.

90. On 7 December 2016, the Athlete wrote to the CAS Court Office stating as follows:

“As already mentioned in the Appeal Statement, the Appellant herewith fully upholds her requests regarding the composition of the Panel and herewith challenges the choice of arbitrators from the closed list of arbitrators as well as the appointment of the Panel’s President. In particular, the Appellant is worried by the Panel’s President’s appointment through the Australian Olympic Committee as chairman for the appeal tribunals for various national federations prior to 2012 Olympic Games. Furthermore, the Appellant reserves her right to challenge any of the arbitrators should additional information become available”.

91. On 8 December 2016, the CAS Court Office wrote to the parties acknowledging receipt of the Athlete’s letter dated 7 December 2016, and stated that since the letter did not constitute a formal challenge in accordance with Article R34 of the CAS Code, it was not going to be dealt with further.

92. On 8 December 2016, in accordance with Article R51 of the CAS Code, the Athlete filed her Appeal Brief with the CAS, reiterating the same four prayers for relief stated in her Statement of Appeal dated 25 October 2016, except for request 2 and 3 which had been altered as follows:

“2. The CAS shall hold that the Respondent does not have any competence to initiate and/or conduct any disciplinary proceedings against the Appellant. Subsidiary, the CAS shall hold that (i)the Respondent does not have any right to state that the Appellant has committed an anti-doping rule violation pursuant to the IOC Anti-Doping Rules applicable to the Games of the XXIX Olympiad in Beijing in 2008, (ii) to disqualify the Appellant from the Women’s high jump event in which she placed 3rd upon the occasion of the Olympic Games Beijing 2008, and (iii) to withdraw the bronze medal, the diploma, and the medallist pin obtained in the Women’s high jump event of the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games. 3. The Respondent shall be ordered to pay an adequate sum as damages and an adequate compensation for the reputational harm done for initiating the disciplinary proceedings against the Appellant and for missing the Rio de Janeiro Olympic Games”.

93. In her Appeal Brief, the Athlete reiterated procedural requests A and B stated in her Statement of Appeal dated 25 October 2016, along with the following amendments and additions:

“C. The Panel shall order an independent scientific expert to review the scientific validity, sensitivity and general reliability of the analysis applied to establish the presence of Turinabol in the Appellant’s alleged Beijing sample. Such expert shall in particularly give a statement on the probability of false positive findings.

D. The Panel shall order an independent expertise whether the athletes participating in the Beijing Olympic Games were aware of a possible re-analysis program of the Respondent and the consequences this would have had for the athletes to keep proof for the future.

E. The Panel shall order the Respondent to provide readable and translated copies of the Documentation of the Chain of Custody of the alleged Beijing [sic] of the Appellant and give the Appellant the possibility to comment on them.

F. The Panel shall order a detailed analysis of the bottles and caps covering the alleged Appellant’s urine samples by an independent professional investigator in order to review whether they have been tampered with and whether there has been a similar practice applied on the alleged Appellant’s urine samples as in the Sochi laboratory (possible replacement of the Appellant’s urine by a third party and/or adding of a prohibited substance into the Appellant’s urine samples).

G. The Appellant shall be given the opportunity to present further evidence regarding the possibility of the replacement of the Appellant’s urine by a third party and/or adding of a prohibited substance into the Appellant’s urine samples should additional evidence come up”.

94. In her Appeal Brief, the Athlete submitted the following disclosure requests:

“A. Any documentation on any testing performed by the Beijing laboratory on any of the Beijing A sample (complete raw data / results of the entire analysis (LC, GC traces of the sample as well as MS/MS fragmentation maps from all analysed peaks) and the detailed methodological description for the (re-) analysis on all the Appellant’s urine samples).

B. Any documentation on any testing performed by the Lausanne laboratory on the alleged Beijing A Sample of the Appellant (complete raw data / results of the entire analysis (LC, GC traces of the sample as well as MS/MS fragmentation maps from all analyzed peaks) and the detailed methodological description for the (re-)analysis on all the Appellant’s urine samples).

C. Any documentation on any testing performed by the London laboratory and the Lausanne laboratory on the London Sample(s) of the Appellant (complete raw data / results of the entire analysis (LC, GC traces of the sample as well as MS/MS fragmentation maps from all analyzed peaks) and the detailed methodological description for the (re-)analysis on all the Appellant’s urine samples).

D. Any documentation on any testing performed by the Daegu laboratory and the Lausanne laboratory on the Daegu Sample(s) of the Appellant (complete raw data / results of the entire analysis (LC, GC traces of the sample as well as MS/MS fragmentation maps from all analyzed peaks) and the detailed methodological description for the (re-)analysis on all the Appellant’s urine samples).

E. Any documentation on any testing performed by the Lausanne laboratory on the different urine samples which were tested in the same sequence on 8/9 and 29/30 June 2016 as the Appellant’s alleged Beijing Sample (complete raw data / results of the entire analysis (LC, GC traces of the sample as well as MS/MS fragmentation maps from all analyzed peaks) and the detailed methodological description for the (re-)analysis on all the Appellant’s urine samples).

E. Full disclosure of the Standard Operating Procedures of the tests carried out on the Appellant’s urine samples at the Beijing and the Lausanne laboratories.

F. Confirmation that there are no additional documents regarding the chain of custody of any of Beijing samples apart from the documents received until today.

G. Detailed documentation on the security mechanisms applied as well as the storage conditions at the Lausanne laboratory as well as the Beijing laboratory for the Appellant’s alleged Beijing samples (including in particular the automatic temperature recordings in the storage box right after the sample is taken, the automatic temperature recordings during the time in the Beijing laboratory, the automatic temperature recordings during the transport from the Beijing to the Lausanne laboratory, and the automatic temperature recordings at the Lausanne laboratory as well as the video recordings).

H. Full disclosure of the communication between the Respondent and the Lausanne laboratory regarding the re-analysis program of the Beijing Olympic Games.

I. Full disclosure from the Respondent of any food and drinks (including samples) which the Appellant was provided by the Beijing Olympic Games Organizing Committee at the 2008 Olympic Games.

J. Full disclosure from the Russian Olympic Committee and the Russian Athletics Federation of any food and drinks (including samples) which the Appellant was provided during the months before the 2008 Olympic Games.

K. The Respondent shall be ordered to hand out the full information on the validation of the testing procedure as well as all other tests carried out on the Appellant’s urine sample (validation package including proof of suitability of the method which includes in particular full transparency on about the

specificity and the sensitivity of the applied tests (i.e. all the detailed numbers on how large was testing population, how many positive controls were included, how many negative controls were included in the test population to obtain test measurements for specificity and sensitivity)).

L. Disclosure of the alleged decision of the IOC and the reasons thereof not to enter the testing at the Beijing Olympics into the ADAMS System.

M. Disclosure of all the connections of the “independent witness” “A. Zimmermann” to the Respondent, the WADA, the IAAF, the ICAS, and the Lausanne laboratory (meaning full disclosure of all her professional relationships with these organizations today and in the last seven years).

N. Disclosure of the BOCOG and/or the Respondent’s decision to choose the Lausanne laboratory for the re-analysis of the Appellant’s urine samples”.

95. On 13 December 2016, the IOC wrote to the CAS Court Office stating its position regarding the Athlete’s challenge of its appointment of Mr Hovell as an arbitrator. In summary, the IOC rejected the Athlete’s challenge.

96. On 14 December 2016, Dr. Kocholl replied to the CAS Court Office regarding that challenge stating inter alia that it was his understanding that “it should be and was solely the decision of ICAS…, which 12 arbitrators were selected for the CAS Ad hoc Division during the Rio de Janeiro Olympic Games 2016”.

97. On 15 December 2016, the CAS Court Office wrote to the parties and provided the Athlete with a deadline of 20 December 2016 in which to confirm whether she wished to maintain her challenge of Mr Hovell’s appointment.

98. On 19 December 2016, the IOC wrote to the CAS Court Office requesting that the deadline for submitting its response to the Athlete’s disclosure requests be extended to the time of filing the IOC’s Answer, for the purposes of procedural efficiency and on the basis that the IOC’s counsel was going to be on leave over the Christmas period.

99. On 19 December 2016, the CAS Court Office wrote to the parties informing them that the President of the Panel had decided to grant the IOC’s request to address the Athlete’s disclosure requests in its Answer.

100. On 20 December 2016, the Athlete wrote to the CAS Court Office, inter alia, maintaining her challenge of Mr Hovell’s appointment as an arbitrator and requested that the ICAS render a decision in that regard. Moreover, the Athlete requested information regarding the persons at ICAS who would be rending such a decision and stated that “such formal decision of the ICAS is even more important as the Appeal Division’s President did not step down from her position given the first appointment of Prof. Matthew Mitten who was through his nationality directly involved in the matter”. The Athlete also stated that she upheld her challenges “against the other members of the Panel as well, and she expects an additional decision of the ICAS pursuant to her challenge filed on 7 December 2016”. In particular, the Athlete expressed concerns regarding the appointment of Judge Williams SC as

President of the Panel, and requested Judge Williams SC to provide further information regarding his background.

101. On 21 December 2016, the CAS Court Office wrote to the parties acknowledging receipt of the Athlete’s letter dated 20 December 2016 and confirmed that the ICAS Board would render a decision regarding Mr Hovell’s appointment in due course pursuant to Article R34 of the CAS Code. Further, the CAS Court Office stated the following:

“Concerning the Appellant’s concerns with respect to her letter of 7 December 2016, I kindly inform the Appellant as follows:

– Her objection to the choice of arbitrators from the closed list of arbitrators as well as the appointment of the President of the Panel has been expressly dealt with in my letter of 1 November 2016 pursuant to which “The Appellant is advised that since she has decided to refer the matter to CAS arbitration, the procedural rules of the Code will apply strictly. The Appellant is furthermore advised that each arbitrator nominated in the present matter will have to sign a statement of independence and will have to disclose any information which could affect her/his independence or impartiality”. This is the reason why I have stated in my letter of 8 December 2016 that her reservations about the composition of the Panel were noted.

– The above is also relevant with respect to the Appellant’s request that the President of the CAS Appeals Arbitration Division steps down from her role for the appointment of the President of the Panel. In this respect, the Appellant is advised that the President of the CAS Appeals Arbitration was not made aware of any possible conflict of interest of Mr Matthew Mitten in the present matter, since the latter spontaneously resigned from his function, and that such circumstance cannot constitute a ground for challenge.

– The Appellant’s general reservation of her right to challenge any of the arbitrators in abstracto cannot constitute a formal challenge of Messrs Mark Williams SC or Dominik Kocholl as per the provisions of Article R34 of the Code. Only challenges against arbitrators as per the Code shall be dealt with”.

102. On 21 December 2016, Judge Williams SC wrote to the CAS Court Office providing information on his background, as requested by the Athlete. This was duly forwarded to the parties by the CAS Court Office.

103. On 6 January 2017, the ICAS Board rendered its decision regarding the appointment of Mr Hovell, which concluded as follows:

“The Board of the International Council of Arbitration for Sport hereby rules:

1. The petition for challenge the nomination of Mr Mark Andrew Hovell filed on 17 November 2016 by Ms Anna Chicherova is dismissed.

2. The costs of the present order shall be determined in the final award or in any other final disposition of this arbitration”.

104. On 9 January 2017, the Athlete wrote to the CAS Court Office stating the following (emphasis added by the Athlete):

“The Appellant refers to the decision of the ICAS Board dated 6 January 2017 which was signed by Michael

B. Lenard.

Unfortunately, it seems as if the decision was not taken without the involvement of people being extremely close to the Respondent. Michael B. Lenard is a former Vice-President of the United States Olympic Committee, a former member of its Executive Committee and Board of Directors, and a former member of the Board of Directors of the Organizing Committee for the 1996 Olympic Games. In such position he is clearly connected to the Respondent. Moreover, Michael B. Lenard was the President of several CAS Ad-hoc Divisions at the Olympic Games. Due to such position it is clear that he should not have decided on this question which would have put in question his own credibility. For all these reasons it is crystal clear that Michael B. Lenard could not have been included in the decision making progress on the Appellant’s challenge. Let alone all the questions which would need to be asked on the way Michael B. Lenard was appointed as ICAS member.

The Appellant herewith formally protests against such decision and request detailed information on the way such decision was taken. In particular, the Appellant requests clarification on the ICAS members involved in the decision.

The Appellant reserves all her legal rights due to such violation of her procedural rights”.

105. On 9 January 2017, the CAS Court Office wrote to the parties acknowledging receipt of the Athlete’s letter dated 9 January 2017, and informed the Athlete that “as indicated on the Order on Challenge, the decision was taken by the ICAS Board but that Mr John Coates, as Vice-President of the IOC, had decided to recuse himself in the context of the present matter. Furthermore, the Appellant is advised that the CAS is not the appropriate forum if she wishes to challenge the Order rendered”.

106. On 9 January 2017, the Athlete wrote a further letter to the CAS Court Office, stating that new evidence had come to light recently, in the form of a scientific article regarding the application of the applied turinabol test. The Athlete also stated the following (emphasis added by the Athlete):

“The renown [sic] scientist Arthur T. Kopylov has analysed the applied Turinabol test in more detail and has come to the conclusion that the results are not reliable and require a careful revision by the scientific community. Until today there are no control samples, post administration assays [sic], there is a lack of real standards as well as contradictions to previous and current research and many other questionable aspects.

For this reason the Appellant herewith files Arthur T. Kopylov’s paper on the “Critical Assessment of the Current WADA Approach for the Detection of 4-Chlorodehydromethyltestosteron” which was published in the Journal of Analytical Sciences, Methods and Instrumentation, in December 2016, p 65-82.

Furthermore, the Appellant herewith calls Arthur T. Kopylov as a witness and requests the Panel to invite Arthur T. Kopylov as a witness in this case. Should Arthur T. Kopylov not follow the Panel’s invitation the Appellant requests that Arthur T. Kopylov is interrogated by state courts”.

107. On 31 January 2017, in accordance with Article R55 of the CAS Code, the IOC filed its Answer to the Athlete’s Appeal. In its Answer, the IOC made the following requests for relief: “In light of the above, the IOC respectfully requests that the CAS Panel issues an award holding that:

I. The Appeal filed by Mrs Anna Chicherova is dismissed.

II. The IOC is granted an award for costs.

III. Any and all prayers for relief shall”8.

108. In its Answer, the IOC submitted the following responses to the Athlete’s procedural requests:

“a. Panel composition

365. This request is moot.

b. President designation

366. This request is moot.

c. Designation of independent scientific expert

366. This request is to be rejected.

367. This request is not substantiated.

368. The method in question is a well established and proven one.

370. The WADA report and the Statement of Prof Ayotte show the arguments of Dr. Kopylov to be meritless.

371. The Panel will be able issue an informed decision on the basis of these elements.

d. Expertise on awareness of re-analysis

372. This request is to be rejected.

373. This request is not serious and does not deserve discussion.

e. Readable Beijing Documents

374. The Respondent has provided the best copies it could.

375. The Respondent refers to the description provided in the brief.

8 The Panel notes that this request for relief appeared to be incomplete, but has quoted the request verbatim.

376. In the Respondent’s opinion, the documentation as provided allows to cover all the elements relevant to this case (i.e. elements in connection with the Samples N˚ 1846073).

f. Analysis of the bottles

377. This request is to be rejected.

378. The occurrences in Sotchi [sic] are of an extraordinary nature and cannot be per se a reason to conduct additional investigations in the absence of any substance in the allegation of urine substitution.

379. It can be noted that in Sochi, the samples were “cleaned” not spiked with a doping substance.

380. The prohibited Substance found is a long term metabolite, i.e. not a substance, which could be used for spiking. These metabolites were not even reported in 2008.

381. There is not the slightest plausibility in a tampering scenario and the gratuitous insinuations of the Appellant shall be not be given weight.

g. Further evidence

372. This is not a request”.

109. In its Answer, the IOC submitted the following responses to the Athlete’s disclosure requests:

“a. Documentation on analysis of the A-Sample 1846073 in Beijing

383. This request is to be rejected.

384. The requested documentation does not exist and is without any relevance for the outcome of this matter. The only relevant analysis are the ones performed in Lausanne.

385. Since the analysis was negative, no analytical documentation has been issued. The Doping Control Report (negative) and the Distribution for screening analysis Form relative to this Sample are included in the Beijing documentation are the only documents available existing to date.

386. The Respondent notes that the inclusion of the data concerning other samples will only serve a strategy of flooding the case with irrelevant elements.

b. Documentation on analysis of the A-Sample 1846073 in Lausanne

387. The A-Sample Documentation is provided with this brief.

388. This corresponds to what is to be provided in accordance with the ISL and the applicable TD2009LDOC.

389. Further requests shall be rejected and reference is made in this respect to the position of the Laboratory, which is in control of the data …

c. Documentation on analysis of the A-Sample 1846073 in London and Lausanne

390. This request is to be rejected.

391. The negative results are a fact.

392. There is no relevance in connection with only relevant analysis, which are the ones performed in Lausanne on a sample collected in 2008.

393. Since the analysis was negative, no analytical documentation has been issued.

394. The Respondent notes that the inclusion of the data concerning other samples will only serve a strategy of flooding the case with irrelevant elements.

d. Documentation on analysis of the Daegu Sample

395. This request is to be rejected.

396. The IOC has no authority over this sample.

397. In any event, the analytical data regarding this sample is without relevance in relation with this matter.

e. Documentation on other samples tested in the same sequence

398. The request is to be rejected.

399. All the analytical data, which has to be provided is included in the Laboratory Document Packages.

400. The IOC is not in control of further data.

401. These samples are in any event third party samples and data cannot be communicated. Reference is made to the position of the Laboratory Director…

402. Batch procedures are standard laboratory has procedures in place to avoid/control any risk of crosscontamination. In this case such is excluded.

f. Provision of SOPs

403. The request is to be rejected.

404. The IOC is not in possession of SOPs.

405. The request has been forwarded to the Laboratory. Reference is made to the position of the Laboratory Director.

g. Additional documents Beijing

406. What could be obtained has been provided.

h. Security Mechanism of LAD

407. The request is to be rejected.

408. The request has been forwarded to the Laboratory. Reference is made to the position of the Laboratory Director.

i. Communication in regard of the re-analysis program Beijing

409. The Respondent has provided with this brief the mission order and the list (edited) as well as a statement (with exhibits) mentioning elements specific to the Appellant.

410. The request is to be denied for the rest as the Appellant is not entitled to have access to elements, which do not concern her own situation.

j. Disclosure by ROC and ARAF of food and drinks

411. These requests are to be rejected.

412. These requests are addressed to entities, which are not parties.

413. In any event, their sole purpose is to create confusion.

414. Turinabol is not an ingredient in regular food and drinks.

k. Validation data

415. The request is to be rejected.

416. The request has been forwarded to the Laboratory. Reference is made to the position of the Laboratory Director.

l. Implementation of Adams

417. This request is without purpose.

418. In 2008, the Respondent had not implemented Adams yet.

419. There is nothing else to report, explain or disclose in this respect.

m. Questions regarding Ms Andrea Zimmermann

420. This request is to be rejected.

421. The Respondent has no link with Mrs Zimmermann.

422. Questions to witnesses are to be asked in due time.

n. Choice of LAD to re-analyse the Appellant’s samples

423. The mission order confirms the decision to entrust the LAD with the re-analyse i.a. the Appellant.

424. There is nothing else to be disclosed”.

110. On 1 February 2017, the CAS Court Office wrote to the parties and, inter alia, invited the parties to inform the CAS Court Office by 8 February 2017 whether they wished for the Panel to hold a hearing or whether they wished for the Panel to render an award solely on the written submissions.

111. On 6 February 2017, the CAS Court Office wrote to the parties informing them, inter alia, the any of the Athlete’s remaining procedural requests would be dealt with at the hearing, if any, and in the final award.

112. On 7 February 2017, the CAS Court Office wrote to the parties granting the Athlete 7 days in which to state which disclosure requests she maintained and the reasons therefor.

113. On 8 February 2017, the Athlete wrote to the CAS Court Office insisting that a hearing be held in this matter, and noted that the IOC’s exhibit 13 was not submitted with the Answer. On the same day, the CAS Court Office wrote to the IOC requesting it to submit a copy of exhibit 13 at its earliest convenience.

114. On 8 February 2017, the IOC wrote to the CAS Court Office stating its preference for a hearing to be held but noted that as a matter of principle, it was “opposed to any procedural requests outside the customary ones”. The IOC also submitted a copy of exhibit 13 and stated that it was a merely a result of human error rather than a deliberate withholding of the exhibit.

115. On 10 February 2017, the CAS Court Office wrote to the parties informing them that the Panel had determined to hold a hearing in this matter, and that they would be available for a hearing on 30 and 31 May 2017. The parties were invited to submit their availability on those dates by 17 February 2017.

116. On 14 February 2017, the Athlete wrote to the CAS Court Office stating, inter alia, the following:

– The Athlete stated that the LAD responded to some of the disclosure requests on behalf of the IOC, which raised doubts about its independence and protested that the IOC was allowed to disguise the LAD’s statements as its own.

– The Athlete stated that the CAS Court Office appeared to have decided on the admittance of the LAD’s letter dated 27 January 2017 instead of the Panel. The Athlete protested against this decision and reminded the CAS Court Office to “strictly refrain from attempting to somehow influence the Panel in the future”.

– The Athlete maintained all of the disclosure requests contained in her Appeal Brief dated 8 December 2016 and addressed each one9. The Athlete requested the Panel to grant her the necessary information and documents.

– The Athlete requested the Panel to inquire as to the current status of a research project which Dr. Kopylov was undertaking and to consult such a project.

– The Athlete requested the Panel to declare exhibit 13 of the IOC’s Answer as inadmissible due to its late submission.

117. On 16 February 2017, the IOC wrote to the CAS Court Office stating that it would be available for a hearing on 30 and 31 May 2017.

118. On 17 February 2017, the Athlete wrote to the CAS Court Office stating that she would be available for a hearing on the proposed dates. On the same day, the CAS Court Office wrote to the parties confirming that a hearing would be held on 30 and 31 May 2017.

119. On 20 February 2017, the CAS Court Office wrote to the parties on behalf of the Panel, informing them, as follows, of the Panel’s decision regarding the Appellant’s various disclosure requests:

“The Appellant’s disclosure requests

The Panel has discussed at length the various disclosure requests made by the Appellant and has considered the Respondent’s Answer together with the letter from the Appellant dated 14 February 2017.

The Panel notes it has the ability, pursuant to Article R44.3 of the CAS Code, to order the “other party” (i.e. the Respondent) to produce documents in its possession or under its control, should the Panel determine that these are likely to exist and to be relevant.

The Panel notes that a number of the disclosure requests relate to documents that are, or may be, in the possession of third parties. The most prominent third party is the Lausanne Laboratory. The Panel notes that the Respondent has contacted the Director of the Laboratory, who has provided some evidence and statements, and the Panel understands that the Director will be available for examination at the hearing. The Panel is not able to make any direct disclosure orders against the Laboratory or other third parties, as such, the Appellant will have to deal with those third parties at the hearing.

Specifically, the Panel has considered each request and makes the following determinations or requests (using the lettering applied by the Appellant - which contains two (E)s):

(A) The Panel would like the Respondent to expand on its response within 14 days from the receipt of the present letter. It seems a test was taken on the A Sample in Beijing. What documentation (or “raw data”) would normally be produced for such a test, where the outcome was negative? Has that

9 For the sake of brevity, the Panel has not quoted or summarised all of the submissions by the Athlete in her letter in this

award, but notes that it took all of the submissions into consideration when making its decisions.

documentation been destroyed, lost, misplaced, etc? The Panel would like to know why it “does not exist”.

(B) This request has been satisfied.

(C) The Panel allows this request and orders the Respondent to provide the Appellant with the required documentation within 14 days from the date of this letter.

(D) The Panel notes that the Respondent has no authority over this documentation and denies this request.

(E) The Panel denies this request. It is not appropriate for other athletes’ test data to be passed to the Appellant. The Panel understands that Dr. Kuuranne will be available for examination at the hearing.

(E) The Respondent is ordered to enquire from the Laboratory how many and which of the SOPs were directly relevant to the re-testing of the Appellant’s samples and to provide any answer to the Appellant and the Panel within 14 days of this letter. Thereafter, the Appellant will have 14 days to address in more detail the relevance of these to its submissions in the present case.

(F) The Respondent is ordered to explain within 14 days of this letter exactly what documentation would normally be available to check the chain of custody of any sample and then to state if they have all been provided or whether any are missing, as opposed to stating “what could be obtained has been provided”.

(G) This request is denied. The Appellant will have the opportunity of examining Dr. Kuuranne at the hearing, as it appears that he will be called to give evidence.

(H) The Respondent is ordered to confirm within 14 days of this letter whether there are any communications between itself and the Laboratory relating to the Appellant’s retesting and to provide any copies. Otherwise, this request is denied. The Appellant will have the opportunity of examining Dr. Kuuranne and Dr. Budgett at the hearing, as the Respondent has indicated that they will be called at the hearing.

(I) This request is denied. The Panel is not persuaded that such documentation would exist. Further, unless the Appellant is alleging contamination or sabotage, the Panel fails to see the relevance of the request.

(J) This request is denied, for the reasons set out in (I) above. Further , the request relates to the ROC and the IRAF, and the Panel has no power to order production from those bodies.

(K) The Respondent is ordered to request from the Laboratory details of its method validation data and to provide any answer to the Appellant and the Panel within 14 days of this letter, notwithstanding the reference to 5.4.4.2.3 of the ISL in the letter from Dr. Kuuranne of 27 January (Exhibit R-42) .

(L) The Respondent is ordered to inform the Panel and the Appellant within 14 days from the date of this letter, whether it was its practice to put into ADAMS details of tests taken from 2007 (or

another time before ADAMS was implemented) and, if so, from when, and if the Appellant’s initial negative results were within that period, why her results were not included.

(M) This request is denied. The Appellant will have the opportunity of examining Mrs Zimmermann at the hearing if the Respondent calls her to give evidence, as indicated.

(N) This request is denied. The Appellant will have the opportunity of examining Dr. Kuuranne and Dr. Budgett at the hearing, assuming the Respondent calls them to give evidence as indicated in the Answer”.

120. In the same letter as above, the CAS Court Office informed the parties that the late filing of the IOC’s exhibit 13 was admissible, as the Panel was satisfied that “it was simply a clerical error that resulted in the late filing. It was clearly referred to in the Answer and is not considered a supplemental exhibit”.

121. In the same letter as above, the CAS Court Office informed the parties of the Panel’s decision regarding Dr. Kopylov, which was as follows:

“The Panel notes that pursuant to Article R51 of the CAS Code, it is for the Appellant to present her own evidence, witnesses and experts. Article R44.3 of the CAS Code is for situations where the Panel determines to appoint its own expert. The Panel has determined to accept the late filing of the paper written by Dr. Kopylov by the Appellant, as it is satisfied that this was submitted once the Appellant was aware of the same and well before the filing of the Answer, in accordance with Article R56 of the CAS Code. However, the Panel declines the invitation to call Dr. Kopylov itself.

Further, the Appellant has not requested that it be now able to call Dr. Kopylov as a witness. The Panel anticipates that she may look to do so now and invites the Appellant to confirm this within 7 days from the date of this letter, further granting the Respondent 7 days thereafter to respond to such request, should it be made”.

122. On 27 February 2017, the IOC wrote to the CAS Court Office requesting guidance from the Panel regarding the scope of the Athlete’s disclosure request C.

123. On 27 February 2017, the CAS Court Office wrote to the parties informing them that Mr Tiran Gunawardena, Solicitor, Sydney, Australia had been appointed as an ad hoc clerk in this matter.

124. On 27 February 2017, the Athlete wrote to the CAS Court Office confirming that she wished to call Dr. Kopylov as a witness, but as she could not contact him, requested the Panel to invite him to attend the hearing and should he not follow the Panel’s invitation, that he should be interrogated by state courts.

125. On 28 February 2017, the IOC wrote to the CAS Court Office requesting an extension for providing its answers to the remaining disclosure requests. On the same day, the CAS Court Office wrote to the parties inviting the Athlete to state her position on the extension request by 3 March 2017.

126. On 3 March 2017, the Athlete wrote to the CAS Court Office stating, inter alia, the following:

– The Athlete stated that the Panel’s denial of some of her disclosure requests amounted to a violation of her right to be heard and the right to a fair trial pursuant to Article 29 of the Swiss Constitution and Article 6 of the EHRC.

– The Athlete reiterated her request for the Panel to grant the full disclosure request C stated in her Appeal Brief and stated that a refusal to do so would amount to a violation of her right to be heard and the right to defend herself.

– The Athlete refused to consent to the extension request of the IOC.

127. On 6 March 2017, the IOC wrote to the CAS Court Office stating, inter alia, the following:

– Dr. Kopylov would be a scientific expert, not a witness of fact.

– Pursuant to Articles R57 and R44.2 of the CAS Code, it is the responsibility of the parties to bring their own witnesses and experts.

– The IOC noted that the Athlete had already appointed an expert, Dr. De Boer, who was in a position to evaluate the merits (or lack thereof) of Dr. Kopylov’s publication.

– The IOC noted that Dr. De Boer had cooperated with Dr. Kopylov on a previous case cited by the Athlete herself (CAS 2016/A/463210), which implied that the Athlete “should probably be in a position to find and contact Dr. Kopylov and to have him as expert, should Dr. Kopylov agree to do so”.

128. On 7 March 2017, the IOC submitted its answers to the remaining disclosure requests of the Athlete11.

129. On 8 March 2017, the Athlete wrote to the CAS Court Office stating, inter alia, the following:

– The Athlete reiterated that she did not consent to the extension of time.

– Pursuant to Article 164 of the Swiss Civil Procedure Code (“CPC”), the fact that the IOC unjustifiably denied to satisfy the disclosure requests ordered by the Panel should be interpreted to the disadvantage of the IOC.

– The IOC’s actions amounted to a clear violation of the Athlete’s right to be heard and right to a fair trial.

11 For the sake of brevity, the Panel has not set out all the points made by the IOC in this letter. To the extent that the

points made are essential to explain the reasoning of the Panel in its decision, they have been referred to in the merits section of this award.

– The Athlete reiterated her protest at the actions of the CAS Court Office, requested that the extension of the deadline not be granted and requested the Panel to take into account the IOC’s unjustified refusal to cooperate, when appraising the evidence.

130. On 16 March 2017, the Athlete wrote to the CAS Court Office and, inter alia, reiterated her request for the Panel to invite Dr. Kopylov as a witness and that Dr. Kopylov be interrogated by state courts should he not accept the Panel’s invitation.

131. On 27 March 2017, the CAS Court Office wrote to the parties on behalf of the Panel and stated the following:

“1) The Appellant’s repeated requests for the Panel to call Dr. Kopylov as a witness or expert

The Panel notes that the Appellant has now requested the Panel to call Dr. Kopylov as a witness/expert and that he be interrogated by state courts should he not accept the Panel’s invitation, on four separate occasions.

On 20 February 2017, the Panel already declined the invitation to call Dr. Kopylov either as a witness or an expert pursuant to Article 44.3 and Article R57 of the CAS Code. Having considered all the submissions of both parties since then, the Panel reiterates its conclusion that it will not call Dr. Kopylov as an expert or witness pursuant to Article 44.3 and Article R57 of the CAS Code. Further, it will not request state courts to compel Dr. Kopylov to testify as a witness or expert.

This decision by the Panel is final and accordingly, the Panel kindly invites the Appellant to refrain from requesting the Panel to call Dr. Kopylov as an expert or witness any further.

2) The late inclusion of Dr. Kopylov as a witness/expert of the Appellant

However, the above does not preclude Dr. Kopylov from attending the hearing altogether, as the Appellant may call him as one of her witnesses/experts.

That said, the Panel notes that the Appellant failed to include Dr. Kopylov as a witness in her Appeal Brief and did not submit a witness statement or brief summary of expected testimony for him as was required under Article R51 of the CAS Code. Accordingly, if the Appellant wishes to now belatedly call Dr. Kopylov as a witness, she must do so pursuant to Article R56 of the CAS Code, i.e. there must be exceptional circumstances for doing so.

Despite repeatedly requesting that the Panel invite Dr. Kopylov as a witness/expert, the Panel notes that the Appellant has, to date, not identified any exceptional circumstances for why Dr. Kopylov should be belatedly allowed as a witness/expert for the Appellant.

Therefore, the Panel now provides a final opportunity for the Appellant to clarify, within 7 (seven) days, what exceptional circumstances there are for her late submission of Dr. Kopylov as a witness/expert for the Appellant under Article R56 of the CAS Code. In this regard, the Panel draws a distinction between the late admission of Dr. Kopylov’s report (which has already been admitted to the file) and the late inclusion of Dr. Kopylov as a witness/expert – which the Appellant is now invited to provide justification for.

Further, the Appellant is requested to clarify (with reasons) whether Dr. Kopylov is being called as a party appointed expert or a witness of fact. Based on the submissions to date, the Panel is of the opinion that he is a scientific expert, and not a witness of fact.

Once the Appellant has submitted her comments on the above, the Respondent will get an equivalent deadline to submit its response. In the event that the parties are in disagreement, the Panel will render a final decision in respect of the issue.

3) The responsibility to bring Dr. Kopylov to the hearing

To clarify matters for both parties, in the event that the Panel allows the late inclusion of Dr. Kopylov as an expert or (if convincingly established) also a witness of fact for the Appellant (which will be decided as outlined above), pursuant to Articles R44.2 and R57 of the CAS Code, it will be the sole responsibility of the Appellant to make Dr. Kopylov available at the hearing.

For the abundance of clarity, if Dr. Kopylov refuses the Appellant’s request to attend the hearing, and the Appellant wishes to file a request with state courts to compel his attendance, then that is the sole responsibility of the Appellant.

If the Panel decides to accept Dr. Kopylov as an expert or (if convincingly established) also a witness of fact, and Dr. Kopylov ultimately attends the hearing, then the Panel would be happy to hear his testimony. However, with the exception of assistance with visa requirements (if necessary), the Panel is not able to assist the Appellant in procuring Dr. Kopylov’s attendance.

4) The Respondent’s submission of 7 March 2017

The Panel has decided that the Respondent’s letter of 7 March 2017 is admissible and is therefore admitted to the file.

5) English translations for Exhibits R-44b and R-44c

Further to the above, the Panel requests the Respondent to provide certified English translations of Exhibits

132. On 27 March 2017, the Athlete wrote to the CAS Court Office, inter alia, reiterating her disclosure requests B and E regarding all the Standard Operating Procedures of the tests carried out on the Athlete’s urine samples at the Beijing laboratory and the LAD.

133. On 28 March 2017, the IOC wrote to the CAS Court Office stating, inter alia, the following:

– The Athlete’s requests to obtain data on negative analysis was not supported by any rational explanation. The allegations of “mix ups” were unsubstantiated and even if it were justified, the correct request would be for a DNA analysis.

– The Athlete’s request in this regard corresponded to a “fishing exercise” which was in complete contradiction with the provisions and rules of the WADC and makes a mockery of the presumptions set forth in the applicable regulations.

– The IOC stated that the Athlete was “pursuing a strategy of deliberate harassment and procedural flooding. The IOC may be in a position to sustain such strategy. However, if procedural requests are not kept to what is relevant and required for a good reason by the applicable rules, this kind of strategy will render anti-doping impossible to sustain by anti-doping organisations, which do not have the same financial strength. Further, laboratories must be protected from senseless requests, which result in complete waste of working resources”.

134. On 31 March 2017, the Athlete submitted a list of attendees for the hearing.

135. On 3 April 2017, the IOC wrote to the CAS Court Office submitting a list of attendees for the hearing. In the event that Dr. Kopylov was to attend the hearing, the IOC reserved the right to call Professor Mario Thevis as a supplementary expert. On the same day, the IOC also submitted English translations of the exhibits requested by the Panel and reiterated its request that the Athlete be made to pay the associated costs.

136. On the same day, the CAS Court Office wrote to the parties stating that the issue of costs related to the translations would be dealt with in due course and that a final decision on the disclosure requests would be reserved until the end of the hearing. Until then, the Panel was not in a position to grant any further disclosures requested.

137. On the same day, the Athlete wrote to the CAS Court Office stating, inter alia, that there were exceptional circumstances for allowing Dr. Kopylov as a witness, mainly being that his findings only surfaced after the submission of the Appeal Brief. The Athlete also stated that Dr. Kopylov should be deemed an expert witness, however also as a “sachverständiger Zeuge” (witness with background as an expert).

138. On 4 April 2017, the Athlete wrote to the CAS Court Office stating that the IOC only provided the names of attendees at the hearing after the deadline of 31 March 2017, so she therefore requested the Panel to not admit any of the IOC’s witnesses to the hearing.

139. Also on 4 April 2017, the IOC wrote to the CAS Court Office stating, inter alia, that it would not oppose the appearance of Dr. Kopylov at the hearing as “expert-witness”, so long as the IOC was allowed to then call Prof. Thevis or Dr. Geier.

140. On 20 April 2017, the CAS Court Office wrote to the parties on behalf of the Panel, stating that the list of attendees for the hearing was for organisational purposes only, and therefore the Athlete’s request for the Panel to not admit any of the IOC’s witnesses was rejected.

141. On 4 May 2017, the CAS Court Office wrote to the parties providing them with a draft hearing schedule outlining how much time was to be allocated to each witness. The CAS Office requested the parties to mutually agree the schedule, as far as possible, and provided the parties with a deadline of 11 May 2017 in order to provide this. The parties agreed on a schedule which assisted in the efficient conduct of the hearing.

142. On 24 May 2017, the CAS Court Office wrote to the parties providing them with the finalised hearing schedule.

IV. THE HEARING

143. A hearing was held on 30 and 31 May 2017 at the CAS premises in Lausanne, Switzerland. The parties did not raise any further objection as to the composition of the Panel. The Panel were all present and was assisted by Mr William Sternheimer, Deputy Secretary General at the CAS and Mr Gunawardena as ad hoc clerk. The following persons attended the hearing, as counsel: i. The Athlete: Dr. Thilo Pachmann and Mr Oliver Schreier; ii. IOC: Mr Jean-Pierre Morand and Mr Nicolas Français.

144. In addition to the Athlete, Mr Howard Stupp and Ms Tamara Soupiron, who were there as IOC representatives, the following witnesses gave evidence before the Panel across the two days of the hearing. All the witnesses were physically present. Each of the witnesses who had submitted a written statement confirmed its content. The witnesses provided their oral testimony in English, Russian or German. Where testimony was provided in Russian, translations in English were provided by the translator provided by the Athlete at the hearing (Ms Elena Ocheva). Where testimony was provided in German, translations in English were provided by the counsel for the Athlete (Mr Schreier) with counsel for the IOC (Mr Morand) and Dr. Kocholl reviewing and verifying the accuracy of the translations.

145. Testimony was provided by:

For the Athlete:

Witness / Expert Role / Position i. The Athlete Appellant ii. Prof. Hans-Michael Riemer: Legal expert iii. Dr. Douwe De Boer: Witness / Scientific expert iv. Mr Indrek Tustit: Witness

For the IOC:

Witness / Expert Role / Position v. Dr. Richard Budgett: IOC Medical and Scientific Director vi. Dr. Tiia Kuuranne: LAD Director / Witness / Scientific expert vii. Ms Andrea Zimmermann: Witness viii. Mrs Elizabeth Fulton: Witness ix. Dr. Norbert Baume: LAD Deputy Director / Witness x. Prof. Christiane Ayotte: Scientific Expert

146. The contents of the respective statements, depositions and evidence have been summarised below12.

For the Athlete:

i. The Athlete testified that she had never knowingly taken any prohibited substance and that she had never asked anyone to give her such a substance. She never took the risk of using steroids because she was always competing. She knew that she could be tested at any time. She had been tested on many occasions between 2003 and 2015 and never tested positive. Before and after Beijing 2008, she competed in 18 events, was subject to drug tests on many occasions and never tested positive. Before her suspension in July 2016, she thought that she was in a good position to win the gold medal in Rio 2016, as she jumped the same height to win the Russian National Championship as was later necessary to win the gold medal in Rio 2016. Her partner, Andrey Silnov, won the goldmedal in Beijing in the men's high jump – they had the same coach and training regime, and he did not test positive. The entry form for London 2012, bore her signature. However, the Athlete testified that the entry form for Beijing 2008 did not bear her signature, and she did not recognise the writing. She said that no one from the Russian Olympic Committee (“ROC”) ever showed her the entry form and that no one ever showed her the Beijing ADR. She was admitted to hospital on 6 June 2016 for 2 days, and would have attempted to travel to Lausanne for the testing and analysis if she had not been in hospital, as she regarded it as very important to witness the process for herself. There were problems with getting away from the training camp in late May, as she needed to organise a visa and also to organise nursing care for her daughter. However, she was planning to be in Lausanne but for her stay in hospital. In cross examination, she said that she knew that the Olympic Games were bound by rules, as she had previously competed in the Athens 2004. She knew that part of those

12 The summary which follows intends to give an indication of a few material points touched on at the hearing. The Panel,

in fact, considered the entirety of the declarations rendered at the hearing and/or contained in the relevant witness statements.

rules were the anti-doping rules (WADC). She knew that the Russian athletics team had been suspended from international competition in May 2016, and that there were lengthy debates involving the IAAF and she hoped that despite the suspension of the Russian athletics team she would be able to compete in Rio 2016. She knew, as her sample from the Daegu World Championships in 2011 had been reanalysed by IAAF, that the procedure adopted was to split her B-Sample into B1 and B2 samples. She conceded that she was aware in 2008 that her samples may be retested at any time, up to the limitation period of eight years. ii. Prof. Dr. Hans-Michael Riemer is a professor of law and the former judge of the Swiss Federal Tribunal (“SFT”). He was retained by counsel for the Athlete to answer four questions. Firstly, is the ISL 2016 the applicable basis for the re-analysis? His answer started from the premise that according to Appendix 1 of the Beijing ADR, ‘doping control’ is defined as the whole process from urine collection until the disciplinary proceeding. Although the WADC provides that ISL revisions shall become effective immediately, the ADR should be interpreted in dubio contra stipulatorem, and thus in the absence of explicit regulation, the applicable codes are the WADC 2003, the ISL 2008 and the IST 2003. Secondly, is the automatic disqualification after eight years excessively binding pursuant to Article 27 of the SCC? He said that, similar to the decision of 27 March 2012, as the automatic disqualification effectively results in the worldwide stigmatisation of the Athlete (who is viewed as a fraud without the possibility to defend herself), this is a far reaching occupational ban for the Athlete which is excessively binding. Thirdly, is the automatic disqualification of results without necessity to prove fault after almost 8 years legally admissible? He said that although Swiss law permits associations to issue fines, an athlete has an interest in restoring their reputation by demonstrating innocence, but that such a possibility after eight years is not readily available. Thus a contractual stipulation to the contrary also violates Article 27 of the SCC (personality rights do not allow excessive binding) and the right to a fair trial. Fourthly, if only the first five athletes in Beijing 2008 gave a urine sample, and the

consequence ultimately is that the bronze medal was awarded to the sixth place athlete, is this a violation of the mandatory provision of equal treatment of all athletes? His answer was that it obviously violates the principle of equal treatment which exists in Swiss association law, as explained in his writing in the Berner Commentary. He said that all possible candidates should be tested. When asked whether it was reasonable to test the first five athletes in the hope that only a maximum of two may have committed a doping offence, he said that it was not. In cross examination he was taken to the headings “Doping Control” in Article 5 and “The analysis of samples” in Article 6 of the Beijing ADR, and said that they cannot be looked at separately. He asserted that it would be difficult for an athlete to understand which provisions apply. He understood that the provision for automatic disqualification meant that the athlete has no available defence of innocence, but questioned whether it was legally sound. He adhered to the proposition that automatic disqualification was

unacceptable and that was important to be able to defend oneself. He said that the rules of an association must comply with the higher principles of Swiss law. He referred to many instances in which the SFT had not allowed rules of an association to stand if they did not comply with those higher levels of Swiss law. In short, the rules of an association cannot displace state law. He did not accept the proposition that in a sporting contest governed by a contractual arrangement between an athlete and an association, such arrangement was permissible despite state law. When pressed with the proposition that the WADC and associated rules had been applied by sporting bodies for some 15 years without successful challenge, he asserted that he did not know of any decision which accepted the legality of such a regime. He was challenged as to the notion of a presumption in civil law and the consequences if one could not rebut a relevant presumption. Prof Reimer said that a period of eight years, or two Olympic cycles, was excessive to allow re-testing. Ultimately he asserted that a four year period would be satisfactory, but conceded that this was both a legal and a political opinion. In re-examination, he said that if an association wished to apply the future rules, it would have to be stated succinctly and clearly in the relevant document. In this case, under Swiss law the Beijing ADR prevailed over a more general code such as the WADC 2003. He said that it was highly unusual to allow in a contractual setting, the right of one party to change the rules for a future testing procedure. In conclusion, Prof. Reimer made a statement to the Panel in which he acknowledged that the use of prohibited drugs was dangerous, and must be controlled; however it was fundamental that the laws of the State should not be ignored. iii. Dr. Douwe De Boer has qualifications in biochemistry and experience in doping control and testing. He is a former director of the WADA accredited laboratory in Portugal. He has considerable experience in reporting on and giving evidence in cases of alleged doping. His experience over some 30 years has involved him witnessing in excess of 300 B-Sample procedures. On 1 June 2016, he was requested by Dr. Pachmann to assist as a scientific observer in a case of an PAAF relating to the Athlete. His first report, contained observations during

his involvement on that day. He arrived at the LAD at about 8:15 AM on 8 June 2016. After a discussion with the laboratory director, Dr. Kuuranne, it was clear that she had not been told that the procedure was to take place on that day. Shortly afterwards, Mr Berezov, a representative of the ROC also arrived. Dr. De Boer concluded that the IOC had scheduled the procedure for the re-testing of the Athlete’s sample but apparently did not inform the LAD. After some delay, the procedure of opening, splitting and resealing the B-Sample commenced at 4 PM, as had been described in the minutes prepared by Ms Zimmermann. He said that no microscope was used to review whether or not the bottle containing the sample showed marks and scratches which could indicate tampering. He acknowledged that use of a microscope was not part of the testing and he stated that he had never seen a microscope used in a B-Sample opening, but later in evidence said that perhaps one needed a microscope in this case. Dr. De Boer was unable to be present on the following day when the re-testing was to continue,

as he had booked a flight. He said that he would tell the LAD director before 8 AM on 9 June 2016 whether he would be able to change his schedule. Before 8 AM on the following morning, he told the LAD director that he would not be present. The conclusions set out in his first report did not contain any criticism of the splitting and retesting procedure. He prepared a further report in relation to his observations at the LAD on 29 June 2016 for the handling of the B2-Sample. He said that the process commenced at about 8:30 AM on that day in his presence as a scientific observer. The analysis of the sample started at about 4:35 PM. He returned on 30 June 2016 and the results of the analysis were available during that morning. The only criticism of the procedure contained in his report was that without adjusting adequately the background in one of the positive urine samples, a bias in the identification procedure of the compound of interest may create a controversy in respect to the confirmation method. In evidence he said that 8 June 2016 was an exceptional day, according to him, because the LAD did not know that he was coming. He was surprised when the independent witness told him that he may have to testify in front of the CAS. In cross examination he said that he had only acted as a scientific observer on two or three other occasions, and agreed that there is no reference to the role of scientific observer in any rules. He said that he did not look specifically at the bottle, but that he just observed the process from a distance. He spoke to Dr. Pachmann on the morning of 8 June 2016, when Dr. Pachmann was in Korea. It was put to him that Dr. Pachmann did not ask him to try to postpone or delay the procedure which was going to occur on 8 June 2016, and he did not dispute that proposition. In cross examination, it was suggested that he had seen nothing to raise the possibility that the result of the re-analysis was wrong. He said that there were a few matters which might have biased the result, and he expanded upon those when he returned to give evidence on the second day of the hearing. He said that he had checked or verified the integrity of the chain of custody documents, and in his view, the chain of custody was incomplete. He said that the information supplied was far from complete. The chain of

custody documents were submitted as evidence. He pointed, for example, to the entry on page 7 of the sample receiving form, and noted that simply because the sample was received did not establish its integrity, and also noted some indecipherable Chinese handwritten notations beside the entry 1846073. He confirmed that he was present simply as an observer and that he had not been given authority by the client to verify the integrity of the seal on the sample. iv. Mr Indrek Tustit is a friend of the Athlete. He had sent an email dated 6 June 2016 to Dr. Pachmann advising that the Athlete had been admitted to hospital that day with stomach pains. He said in evidence that he had no reason to doubt that her illness was genuine, and he was not cross examined.

For the IOC:

v. Dr. Richard Budgett is the Medical and Scientific Director of the IOC. He submitted a written statement. He was in charge of planning and implementing the re-analysis of stored samples. In response to feedback from WADA, the WADA Independent Commission Reports and the McLaren Report, a large number of samples were targeted for re-analysis from Beijing 2008 and London 2012. There were an unexpectedly large number of AAFs from the initial batch of about 400 samples, and ultimately about 1,000 samples from Beijing and 400 samples from London were re-analysed. The name of the Athlete was mentioned in the list of Russian athletes in respect of which WADA had specifically recommended a re-analysis of samples. There were 62 AAFs from samples collected in Beijing, 18 of which were from Russian athletes, and all 18, including that of the Athlete, contained turinabol. He said that the IOC relied upon the split B-Sample procedure so as to give more protection to the Athlete. The present case involving the Athlete was the only one in which the splitting and re-analysis occurred without the presence of an athlete's representative. He was cross examined as to the correspondence immediately before the events of 8 June 2016. He did not accept that the IOC imposed an unreasonable deadline on the Appellant or her representatives. vi. Dr. Tiia Kuuranne has been the director of the LAD since 1 June 2016. She provided an affidavit and a further report, both dated 27 January 2017 (both submitted as evidence). She explained the situation in relation to the B-Sample split scheduled for the morning of 8 June 2016, noting that her instructions included a comment to hold the 8:30 AM slot pending a response from the Athlete’s lawyer on Monday. When Dr. De Boer arrived on the morning of 8 June 2016, he did not have any document linking his presence to any sample code or a document attesting to his authorisation to act on behalf of any person. She confirmed that the procedures carried out on 8 June and 29 June were as summarised in the statements of Ms Zimmermann and Ms Fulton. She stated that the use of a microscope to review bottle caps for scratches and marks is neither mandatory nor a routine method of inspecting the sample container. She noted that Dr. De Boer was present when the B2-Sample was returned to the freezer room which has a

temperature reader clearly visible outside the storage room, and further that no questions were raised by him about the prevailing temperature conditions. She said that throughout the re-testing process the LAD and the IOC were in frequent contact regarding the planning of the processes which would meet the needs of the athletes and their representatives and the requirements of the analytical processes without sacrificing the reporting timelines. As to the possible bias suggested by Dr. De Boer, she said that when using reference collection samples the initial concentration may be inappropriately high to be comparable with the sample and therefore require adjustment. However in the case of the B2-Sample the comparison is made to the other positive sample and not to ES636.

Consequently, there was no bias in the identification procedure or any controversy regarding the confirmation procedure. Dr. Kuuranne said that there were no strict guidelines for the appointment of an independent witness, and that there may be occasions where an independent witness would be engaged in five or six separate sample procedures. vii. Ms Andrea Zimmermann was the independent witness at the opening of the B1- Sample at the LAD on 8 June 2016. The report of that process was submitted as evidence at the CAS, as was a statement from her. There was no challenge to the chronology of the process set out in her report. The process commenced at about 11am in the presence of representatives of the LAD, the IOC, the ROC, as well as Dr. De Boer (described as a scientist observer and not legal representative for the Athlete). After Dr. De Boer called the Athlete's lawyer and confirmed that he had no authorisation to sign any document during the opening process, the session was postponed until further instructions were received from the IOC. The session resumed at about 4pm and the opening process was documented and confirmed by Ms Zimmermann. Ms Zimmermann was cross examined to suggest that she was not a truly “independent” witness. She confirmed that she had worked at the CAS from 2003 until 2013, and then had been involved with operating a travel company. After 2013, she had two or three assignments from the CAS, and after 14 June 2016 she was working for CAS as counsel for about 60 % of her time. At the time of her acting as the independent witness on 8 June 2016, she did not know that she was going to be offered a position with the CAS starting on 14 June 2016. She had previously worked with counsel for the IOC, Mr Morand, about 14 years ago. The only time that she acted as an independent witness was on 8 June 2016. It was not suggested to her that she did, or recorded, anything which was contrary to the recognised obligations of an independent witness. viii. Ms Elizabeth Fulton was the independent witness to the B2-Sample splitting on 29 June 2016. Her minutes of the procedure were provided as evidence in the IOC’s written submissions. Dr. De Boer was present as the representative of the Athlete. There was no cross examination as to the procedure set out in her minutes. Ms Fulton stated that

she acted as an independent witness in approximately 70-80 instances for the IOC, and was paid CHF 100 an hour for her services. ix. Dr. Norbert Baume is the deputy director of the LAD. In his affidavit, he described the documents which evidence the chain of custody, including the delivery of the samples from Beijing to the LAD which were received by him personally on 20 October 2008. Subsequently, on 24 March 2016 the LAD was asked by the IOC to re-analyse 433 samples. The initial testing procedure (“ITP”) described in the LDP was initiated on 6 April 2016 for a batch containing the sample 1846073, and this sample was found to be suspect on 19 April 2016. The high number of samples that were declared suspect after the ITP, as well as the strategy agreed between the IOC and LAD, to perform a second testing

before reporting the A-Samples, lead to a more specific procedure to validate the ITP results. The analytical report on sample 1846073 was issued on 4 May 2016 and indicated the result as a PAAF. Dr. Baume said in evidence that the LAD followed the ISL and did not address the IST. He was cross examined as to security, and said that three people had had key access to the freezer room during the period of approximately 8 years in which the samples were stored. In March 2017, the LAD had upgraded to the highest level of security involving a camera and a code. He agreed that, as set out in his email of 7 June 2016, it is occasionally difficult to find an independent witness on short notice. He further agreed that as the LAD is not aware of the name of the athlete involved, he was unable to check the independence of the witness chosen to be present at a relevant sample procedure. He agreed that there were no written criteria to enable the evaluation of potential independent witnesses in June 2016. x. Prof. Christiane Ayotte is the director of the WADA laboratory in Montréal. After filing the Appeal Brief, the Athlete became aware of a paper prepared by Dr. Arthur T Kopylov, containing criticisms of the testing procedure for Turinabol. There was a significant amount of correspondence between the parties and the Panel in relation to the question of whether Dr. Kopylov would attend the hearing. Ultimately, as he stated in a short email in May 2017, Dr. Kopylov was unable to attend. The IOC filed evidence in response to the proposed evidence of Dr. Kopylov. Although the views of Dr. Kopylov were not subject to testing in evidence, the Athlete’s closing submissions maintained that he should be heard. In deference to the argument, the Panel notes the following conclusions of Prof. Ayotte. Prior to 2012, testing for turinabol or its metabolites was only effective in a window of detection of a few days. A study by Timofei Sobolevsky and Dr. Grigory Rodchenkov in 2012, reported in a peer reviewed article, noted that testing for metabolites which can be detected for much longer in the body after the ingestion of the parent compound than the metabolites which had been targeted in the past, extended the window of detection from a few days to 50 days or more. The views of Dr. Kopylov were the subject of examination and adverse comment by the IOC Disciplinary Commission in

two decisions in September 2016 (both were submitted in evidence). A report by WADA (also submitted in evidence) was based on a report by Prof. Ayotte. Prof. Ayotte was retained by the IOC to provide an opinion as to the paper by Dr. Kopylov. Her findings formed the basis of the WADA report of 25 January 2017. She said that the detection and identification of long term metabolites by WADA accredited laboratories was scientifically valid, and that, in short, the views expressed by Dr. Kopylov, were invalid. Her evidence before the Panel was very clear and persuasive. She asserted that it was impossible to have a false-positive in such testing. Her laboratory had been engaged in approximately 28,000 testing procedures per annum. Prof. Ayotte gave convincing evidence as to the validity of the new testing regime searching for longterm metabolites of turinabol.

147. The party representatives and all the witnesses/experts were invited by the President of the Panel to tell the truth subject to the sanctions of perjury. The parties and the Panel had the

opportunity to examine and cross-examine the witnesses/experts. The parties then were given the opportunity to present their cases, to make their submissions and arguments and to answer questions posed by the Panel. The Athlete herself was also then allowed to submit her final closing remarks in full length. The hearing was then closed and the Panel reserved its detailed decision to this written Award.

148. Upon closing the hearing, the parties expressly stated that they had no objections in relation to their respective rights to be heard and that they had been treated equally in these arbitration proceedings, other than those previously advanced by the Athlete. The Panel has carefully taken into account in its subsequent deliberation all the evidence and the arguments presented by the parties, both in their written submissions and at the hearing, even if they have not been summarised in the present Award.

V. THE PARTIES’ SUBMISSIONS

149. The following summary of the parties’ positions is illustrative only and does not necessarily comprise each and every contention put forward by the parties. The Panel, however, has carefully considered all the submissions made by the parties, even if no explicit reference is made in what immediately follows.

A. The Athlete’s Submissions

In summary, the Athlete submitted the following in support of her Appeal.

150. The Appealed Decision should be annulled for the following reasons:

– The Athlete never signed the Beijing Entry Form, so she was not bound by the Beijing ADR, and the IOC Disciplinary Commission therefore did not have the jurisdiction to render the Appealed Decision.

– In the alternative, the IOC “severely and systematically violated the agreement with the Appellant and almost all the procedural rules contained therein”. In particular, the IOC applied a retesting method which was never agreed between the two parties and the IOC was not entitled to apply rules retrospectively in that way.

– The most important violation of the Athlete’s procedural rights was the violation of her right to be heard when the B sample was opened and split. Even if the ISL 2015 was applied, such a rule would violate the basic procedural rights of the Athlete and could not be applied.

– Finally, the entire re-testing program – “which stigmatizes the Appellant as [a] fraudster after more than eight years without any possibility to show her innocence or at least no fault” – is highly questionable as it took away the Athlete’s mandatory human rights. This, and the rules applied in rendering the Appealed Decision must be considered as excessively binding in the sense of Article 27(2) of the SCC.

– The IOC, “as a monopoly organisation”, implemented extremely unfair rules which would be illegal under Article 6 of the Swiss Federal Act on Cartels and other Restraints of Competition (“Cartel Act”).

i. The Athlete’s claim that she did not sign the Beijing Entry Form and was therefore not bound by the Beijing ADR

151. At the hearing, the Athlete testified that she did not sign the Beijing Entry Form. Whilst she did not make any mention of this in her written submissions, the Athlete submitted that she only became aware of this once the IOC submitted a copy of the Beijing Entry Form with its Answer and saw that it contained a signature which was not hers. The Athlete did not hypothesize as to who may have signed the document, but she simply reiterated that it was not signed by her. As she did not sign the Beijing Entry Form, the Athlete argued that she was therefore not bound by the Beijing ADR, even though she did participate in Beijing 2008.

152. The Athlete submitted that entry into an Olympic Games is a contractual relationship, and because no contract had been entered into between the Athlete and the IOC, she was not bound by any terms of the proposed contract (i.e. the Beijing Entry Form). In any event, the Athlete noted, the Beijing Entry Form would only have created a contractual relationship between the Athlete and the Beijing Organising Committee (“BOCOG”), and not the IOC. Consequently, as the BOCOG was a Chinese legal entity, the Panel would need to look at Chinese law in order to determine which regulations would be applicable - if any.

ii. There was no legal basis for the IOC to apply a “sample splitting” procedure on the Athlete’s samples according to the ISL 2016

153. The Athlete argued that the IOC contradicted itself regarding the question of the applicable version of the ISL. The IOC stated in its letter dated 18 May 2016 that the re-testing process would take place pursuant to ISL 2015. However, in the Appealed Decision, the IOC held that ISL 2016 was applicable, not ISL 2015. The IOC stated that this was a result of the application of the Rules in combination with the WADC 2003, to which the Rules refer. The Athlete stated that since the participation in the Olympic Games is a single event only, the Athlete never agreed to a future set of rules which the IOC was not even aware of at the time.

154. Whilst the Beijing ADR provided for a re-testing of the Athlete’s sample within 8 years, the rules did not specify the exact process and framework applicable in such a re-analysis. It also did not refer to any other legal document and the WADC applicable at that time (i.e. WADC 2003) and as a result did not provide for any such re-analysis. Moreover, the wording contained in the WADC 2003 was not sufficient to apply any future ISLs based on a new WADC.

155. As the Athlete’s doping control sample was taken on 24 August 2008, pursuant to Articles 5.3 and 6.4 of the Beijing ADR, the applicable ISL was ISL 2008. Article 5.2.2.12 of ISL 2008 referred to the possibility of “re-sealing samples for future re-testing”, however that Article “did not

contain any provisions addressing the issue of applicability of section 5.2.2.12 in time”. Further, the Athlete stated that:

“…it was not until 2015 that provisions addressing the issue of applicability of the ISL section relevant here in time have been included in the ISL. Section 5.2.2.12.9 of the ISL 2015 contains an explicit provision according to which further analysis of doping samples shall be performed under the ISL and Technical Documents in effect at the time the further analysis is performed. More particularly, the athlete may not be held to have consented to the doping samples of 2008 being further analyzed under the ISL and Technical Documents in effect at the time the further analysis is performed, as provided for by section 5.2.2.12.9 of the ISL 2015. Yet, such consent is indispensable for any action performed on the basis of the said provision to be considered lawful”.

156. The application of present rules on ongoing proceedings is firmly established in Swiss law. According to Article 404 of the CPC, the procedural rules apply which are in force at the time when the proceedings are commenced. The Athlete argued that the ‘doping control’ encompasses the entire process (including control, analysis, re-analysis and proceedings) which makes it clear that the rules applicable in 2008 when the same was taken are applicable.

157. The Athlete submitted an expert legal opinion from Prof. Dr. Hans Michael Riemer, an expert on Swiss Association law. The Athlete asked Prof. Riemer the following question: “Are the ISL 2016 on which the IOC bases its re-analysis applicable on the case at hand?”.

158. Prof. Riemer’s written response was as follows:

“The urine collection took place in 2008 (under the Beijing ADR), while the IOC applies the new WADA- CODE 2015 and the ISL 2016 to the current procedure. Art 5.3 para. 1 Beijing ADR stipulates that: “Doping control conducted by the IOC, BOCOG and any other Anti-Doping Organization under Article 5.2.3 shall be in conformity with the International Standard for Testing in force at the time of Doping Control”. According to Appendix 1 Beijing ADR, Doping Control is defined as the whole process from urine collection till the disciplinary proceeding. The urine collection in 2008 represents therefore the beginning of the Doping Control, so the Standards which were introduced or modified later, don’t apply. Art 5.3 para. 1 Beijing ADR must at least be interpreted in dubio contra stipulatorem in such a way and in favour of Mrs. Chicherova. The general reference in the introduction of the WADA Code 2003 that the ISL revisions shall immediately become effective changes nothing in this respect. It would have been necessary to explicitly regulate, that the new provisions also apply to Doping Controls, which have already begun. Consequently, the IOC should have had applied the Beijing ADR, the WADA Code 2003, the ISL 2008 and the IST 2003 to the re-analysis”.

159. Accordingly, the only regulations applicable to the Beijing samples were the Beijing ADR, the WADC 2003, ISL 2008 and IST 2003. All those regulations only foresaw the application of a sample splitting procedure as an exception in case there was not sufficient urine left in the A- Sample. In the case at hand, it was undisputed that there was sufficient urine remaining in the A-Sample for re-testing. Further, the Athlete stated that:

“It was due to the Respondent’s fault only that such sufficient amount of urine was not properly re-sealed, and hence, completely useless. For this reason there was, hence, no reason whatsoever to apply the provision where no urine remains of the A Sample for possible re-testing remains. The Respondent would have had to apply

art. 5.2.2.12.1.1 as sufficient urine remained. The Respondent is not allowed to cover its lack of due process regarding the re-sealing of the A Sample by applying subsidiary rules that were meant for other cases only”.

160. The IOC did not follow its own rules and applied a completely different re-testing procedure. The IOC applied a sample splitting procedure without granting the Athlete the rights foreseen in ISL 2008. The Athlete argued that such behaviour should not be accepted.

iii. The IOC violated not only the ISL 2008 but also ISL 2016 by not having an independent witness reviewing the sample opening and splitting procedure

161. The Athlete noted that an “A. Zimmermann” was chosen to be an independent witness at the opening of her B-Sample on 8 June 2016. The Athlete noted that this was Ms Andrea Zimmermann, who was a CAS counsel before and after the opening. Accordingly, given the links between the IOC and the ICAS (and therefore the CAS), Ms Zimmermann could not have been an “independent” witness and appointing her as such meant that “the International Standards of any version would have been heavily violated”.

iv. Given the latest WADA reports, the identity of the Athlete’s alleged Beijing samples is questionable and not proven by the IOC

162. The Appellant notes that the WADA Independent Commission Reports referred to the “highly questionable behaviour of the Lausanne laboratory in the past. Obviously, the Lausanne laboratory destroyed certain urine samples of Russian athletes without the agreement of the WADA”. The Athlete claimed that the fact the 67 samples provided by Russian athletes were destroyed “prevented any reanalysis of the samples following the raising of suspicions that some positive samples had been illegally swapped for clean ones”.

163. The Athlete claimed that it was thus possible that sample swapping was also practiced in Beijing, during the bulk transport of the samples or at the LAD. Replacing positive samples with negative samples requires clean urine with a similar composition of the athlete concerned. “This might well be the reason why the Appellant’s A Sample from the Beijing Olympic Games were “unsealed” when the samples were re-analysed”. The Athlete claims that this could have been a result of someone checking to see whether the urine was suitable for exchange.

164. The Athlete stated that the McLaren Report did not clarify the allegations regarding the general problems with the current and past doping control system. The Athlete therefore reserved the right to present additional information in that regard should new information surface. Against this background however, the Athlete stated that it was “very questionable” and unacceptable that the LAD was chosen for the re-resting.

165. According to Article 6.1 of the Beijing ADR, the choice of the WADA-accredited laboratory used for the analysis was determined by the BOCOG, which was the Beijing laboratory. Accordingly, the IOC’s choice of using the LAD was illegal.

166. The Athlete claims that she would have never consented to her samples being tested at the LAD, given the public criticisms and its lack of independence from the IOC. Moreover, there

is no provision whatsoever in the IOC’s rules and regulations, particularly the Beijing ADR, that allows it to choose a different laboratory for the re-analysis. Article 6.5 of the Beijing ADR states only that the IOC is entitled to choose another place for a secure storage. The choice of another laboratory was not foreseen.

167. The Athlete claimed that given the possibility of the loss of samples by the LAD and the practice of sample swapping, the chain of custody was not secure. Further, it was not possible to review whether the samples tested by the IOC in 2016 were the same samples as those tested in Beijing 2008, and it was not even possible to review whether the A and B sample belonged to the same athlete. Moreover, to the knowledge of Dr. De Boer, the independent witness, Ms Zimmermann, did not review the samples with a microscope to check whether there were any traces of tampering with the urine bottles.

168. The Athlete stated that the IOC has failed to discharge its burden of proof in relation to the chain of custody and the IOC’s prayers for relief could be dismissed directly.

v. The IOC violated numerous applicable International Standards

169. The Athlete noted that the IOC admitted that “the A-samples were not individually resealed nor transported in sealed containers”. This meant that the Athlete’s alleged samples were completely unprotected for at least six days during their transport from Beijing to Lausanne, i.e. between 14 October 2016 and 20 October 2016. Moreover, it was unclear on which date the urine samples left the Beijing laboratory, so it was even possible that the samples were not even stored in the Beijing laboratory. The Athlete noted that no readable or fully translated copies of documentation had been provided to her.

170. The Athlete also stated that the confirmation letter written by Mr Roland Daettler from the transporting company was dated a year after the end of the transport. The Athlete therefore requested the opportunity to cross-examine all the persons involved in the handling of her urine samples.

171. The Athlete alleged that her samples were not individually registered when they arrived at the LAD in 2008, which clearly indicated that the Beijing samples were never sent to the LAD for the purpose of re-analysis.

172. The Athlete rejected the IOC’s attempt to justify its omission in sealing the samples and only transporting sealed samples by stating that “resealing of A-Samples (or transport in sealed containers) was not a requirement pursuant to the then applicable ISL (2008)”. The Athlete submitted that the transport of the samples is regulated by the International Standard for Testing (“IST”) and not by the relevant ISL. Accordingly, ISL 2008 is irrelevant in this regard.

173. Whilst the IOC did not address this issue in the Appealed Decision, the Athlete submitted that “almost all of the provisions for the Requirements for transport of Samples and documentation according to art. 8, art 9.2 and art. 9.3 were violated” as follows:

– In violation of Article 8.3 of IST 2003, after the administration of the tests, the Athlete’s samples were not stored in a manner that protected their integrity, identity and security.

– In violation of Article 9.3.1 of IST 2003, the transport system of the samples, i.e. a bulk process of unsealed samples without any registration of samples, did not protect the integrity, identity and security of the samples.

– The IOC did not develop a system for recording the chain of custody of the samples and sample collection documentation and given the fact that many samples had gone missing, there was also no confirmation that the samples had really arrived at their intended destination (which was a violation of Article 9.3.2 of IST 2003).

– The entire sample collection session documentation was to be sent as soon as practicable after the completion of the sample collection session to the Athlete. As readable copies were not provided until July 2016, the Athlete argued that it was not sent to her on time, in violation of Article 9.3.5 of IST 2003.

– In violation of Article 9.3.6 of IST 2003, the IOC failed to check the chain of custody at the arrival of the bulk process of unsealed samples at the LAD, as the integrity of the samples might have been compromised.

174. The Athlete submitted that the abovementioned violations were also violations of the IST 2009, IST 2012 and IST 2015. As the requirements and structure of Article 8 and Article 9 of IST 2009, IST 2012 and IST 2015 were quite similar, the question of which IST shall be applied was irrelevant.

175. The Athlete also submitted that “several other severe and continuous violations of the International Standards and the [IOC’s] rules and regulations have occurred”:

– Until the time of the filing of the Appeal Brief, in violation of Article 7.2.5 of the Beijing ADR, the IOC failed to provide any information on the A-Sample laboratory packages of the Beijing laboratory and the LAD.

– The LDP of the B1 and B2-Samples were not provided within the period required under the applicable ISL 2008 (10 days pursuant to Article 5.2.6.13). The B1 sample LDP was provided only after 20 days and after the B2-Sample analysis had already begun (i.e. on 29 June 2016). The documents relating to the chain of custody which should have been provided within the same period were only provided on 13 July 2016, i.e. 34 days after the B1-Sample re-analysis on 9 June 2016.

– “According to art. 5.2.4.3.2.6 of ISL 2008, the Athlete and/or her legal representative would have been authorized to attend the B confirmation”.

– According to Article 5.2.4.3.2.6 of ISL 2008, the independent witness should have reviewed in detail whether there were any signs of tampering with the alleged B- Sample of the Athlete. However, to the knowledge of Dr. De Boer, no one reviewed the alleged B-Sample of the Athlete with a microscope which should have been necessary given “today’s sample swapping techniques”.

– “Most importantly, the entire structure foreseen in the Beijing ADR for the proceedings were overturned by the [IOC]. The proceedings carried out do not have anything to do [with] what should have happened. This is not acceptable at all”.

176. The Athlete submitted that:

“All these violations of the Beijing ADR and the International Standards of Laboratory confirm that the principle of strict liability must not be applied in the present case as all these findings could have easily influenced the testing results. It is not comprehensible at all how the Respondent can even dare to proudly state that “no departures of the International Standards Laboratory” exists. This is ridiculous given all the violations of the International Standards of Laboratory and Testing, let alone all the violations of the prevailing ADR. The assumption according to art. 3.2.1 Beijing ADR on which the [IOC] relies on to justify its testing is, hence, not applicable at all”.

177. The Athlete submitted that the IOC bore the burden of proof in respect of the validity of the AAF and it had not lived up to this burden.

vi. The IOC violated the Athlete’s right to be heard during the re-testing of her Beijing sample

178. The Athlete submitted that the procedure of splitting and re-testing her sample without her being present constituted a grave infraction of her right to defend herself. The Athlete quoted Article 6(3) of the EHRC and argued that it “specifically guarantees the universal right to defend oneself, if charged with a criminal offence, and it is well established in Swiss law that these principle also applies to disciplinary proceedings of associations”. Further, she argued that in Switzerland, the right to defend oneself was unequivocally established in Article 29(2) of the Swiss Constitution and represented a part of the general principle of the right to a fair trial (Article 29(1)). She submitted that this right comprised the right to express oneself to the matter at hand, to be involved with the taking of evidence and to be involved in the procedure and the right of inspection of records. Further, a part of the right to be heard is the right to a person facing allegations to contribute to and participate in the procedure of taking essential evidence which can influence the decision in the case.

179. The Athlete submitted that this same right was also provided for in Article 7.2.5 of the Beijing ADR, which stated:

“The IOC President […] shall, in confidence, promptly notify the Athlete of:

a) […]

c) the right of the Athlete and/or the Athlete’s representative to attend the B sample opening and analysis if such analysis is requested;

d) the Athlete’s right to request copies of the A and B sample laboratory package which includes information as required by the International Standard for Laboratories; …”.

180. The Athlete further argued that ISL 2008 provided her the right to participate in the opening and re-testing of her sample as Article 5.2.2.12.1.2 stated (emphasis added by the Athlete):

“The opportunity shall be offered to the Athlete, or to the representative of the Athlete to be present at the opening of the sealed “B” bottle […]

When opening the “B” Sample, the Laboratory will divide the Sample into two bottles and the Athlete or the Athlete’s representative will be invited to seal one of the bottles using a tamper proof evident method if the analysis of the first bottle reveals an Adverse Analytical Finding, a confirmation shall be undertaken, if requested by the Athlete or his/her representative, using the second bottle”.

181. The Athlete submitted that the IOC therefore “incorrectly assumed” that there was no entitlement for her to participate in the opening and splitting of the B-Sample, sealing of the B2-Sample and analysis of the B1-Sample. Further, the IOC was “surely not “offering” the Athlete the opportunity to attend the first phase of this procedure, but was pretending to comply with the specific rules agreed between the parties”. The Athlete also argued that the IOC’s actions were in violation of Article 7.2 of the WADC 2003, which provided for similar rights to an athlete.

182. The Athlete went on to argue (emphasis added by the Athlete):

“A dynamic referral of art. 6.4 Beijing ADR would lead to a limitless application of the newest version of the International Standard of Laboratories, which in turn would lead to the athletes being stripped of rights that were once granted to them, which were agreed upon and on which the athletes rely upon when participating in the Olympic Games. A further consequence is, there is always a lower technical standard which applies at the time of collection of the samples and a disproportionately high technical standard – in testing, not in procedural rights – at the time of re-testing. The re-analysis is however based on inaccurate or outdated technical standards for the collection and preservation of samples. This inexorably leads to a constellation in which the athletes right to defend themselves is severely undermined. The referral in art. 6.4 Beijing ADR is static. If the [IOC] does not agree with that statement, it is to be assumed, that the rules are unclear in this respect. Such rules therefore need to be interpreted in dubio contra stipulatorem, that is, against the person who established them. It is not possible to hold something against the athlete if no provision was implemented in the contractual set-up which specifically provides for the application of the latest version of the International Standard for Laboratories”.

183. The Athlete submitted that she had specifically communicated to the IOC repeatedly that she wanted to attend the opening and splitting of the B-Sample, sealing of the B2-Sample and the analysis of the B1-Sample and wanted to be accompanied by scientists and her legal representative13. However, the IOC did not allow her to do this as they scheduled the entire

13 The Athlete once again referred to this being part of her human rights, granted by Article 6 EHRC and Article 29(2) of

the Swiss Constitution, and that this was explicitly provided for by Article 5.2.2.12.1.2 of ISL 2008.

re-testing process just 8 days after the Athlete was first informed that a PAAF was found, despite the fact that the IOC took more than 2 weeks to inform the Athlete of the PAAF. Moreover, the IOC waited 8 years to re-test her sample.

184. The Athlete argued that the IOC’s sole objective was a swift procedure, at the expense of allowing the Athlete to sufficiently defend herself. Further:

“The reason for this behaviour is that the [IOC] wished to demonstrate to the world that even only the slightest indication of a possible anti-doping violation will be severely punished. How else can the [IOC’s] continuous public announcements on its own website regarding the number of athletes which were sanctioned be explained?”

185. The Athlete submitted that “the cost of this expedited “justice” is that the legal rights conferred to a person facing serious and career-annihilating allegations are being bulldozered [sic] away by the [IOC]”.

186. The Athlete submitted that her counsel, Dr. Pachmann, was the only person who was authorised to act as her representative but he was unable to attend the re-testing procedure “due to a tightly packed schedule and insufficient notice-time”. Despite this, Dr. Pachmann attempted to propose suitable dates in June and July 2016, as the presence of the Athlete’s counsel and external scientific expert were essential to enable her to properly defend herself against the IOC’s allegations.

187. However, the IOC responded to him by stating that there was no entitlement for the Athlete, her counsel or experts to be present and also only offered 2 dates which were only 5 days after the originally proposed dates. The Athlete stated that as she was training in Russia for the upcoming Rio 2016 Olympics, and given that the PAAF was only established almost 8 years after her sample was collected, this was “everything but reasonable”. The Athlete submitted that not only did the IOC’s behaviour “seriously undermine the right to be heard of the [Athlete], but also demonstrates the arbitrariness of the [IOC], in direct contravention of art. 9 Swiss Constitution. It was therefore clear, that the [IOC] had absolutely no intention of coordinating with the [Athlete]”.

188. The Athlete stated that the IOC’s attempts to accommodate her were “inadequate” as the dates offered were on such short notice that it would have known that she was unable to travel at that time. Further, the IOC was aware that her counsel, Dr. Pachmann, was in South Korea on teaching arrangements during the offered dates. To make matters worse, it was “incomprehensible” that the IOC questioned whether the Athlete was actually forced to go to the hospital. The Athlete noted that sudden “acute and persistent stomach pains” are “hardly ever preannounced” and “contrary to the preposterous claims” of the IOC, the Athlete “did not have any chance whatsoever to attend the B Sample opening and splitting”.

189. The Athlete rejected the IOC’s claims that she had not made a reasonable proposal of alternative dates. The Athlete also rejected the IOC’s claim that the process had to run its course in a timely manner before Rio 2016. The Athlete submitted that even if the re-resting had be conducted on 27 June 2016, there would have been enough time for the process to run its course and accordingly, the wish of the Athlete to conduct the initial proceedings on 27, 28 and 29 June 2016 should have been respected.

190. The opening and splitting of the Athlete’s B-Sample and sealing of the B2-Sample ultimately took place on 8 June 2016, while she was still in hospital, and this represented a crucial and non-repeatable step in the current process. The IOC clearly violated Article 5.2.2.12.1.2 of ISL 2008, Article 6.4 of the Beijing ADR, Articles 29 and 32 of the Swiss Constitution and Article 6 EHRC. These violations cannot be cured retrospectively.

191. The Athlete submitted that Dr. De Boer was not a representative of the Athlete, and argued that this was confirmed by the way the LDPs for the B1- and B2-Samples were completed. The Athlete noted that Dr. De Boer was not even mentioned in the B1-Sample LDP. Therefore, it was “contradictory to retrospectively consider Dr. Douwe De Boer as “the representative” of the Appellant …, just to attempt to somehow heal the blatant violation of the Appellant’s right to be heard”.

192. The Athlete submitted that even though Dr. De Boer attended the procedure, this did not make him her representative, as he was solely acting as ‘an observer’. “It is on the other hand, contradictory and abusive to appoint an independent witness pursuant to art. 5.2.2.12.10 [ISL 2016], if the [IOC] truly believed, that Dr. Douwe De Boer was the representative of the [Athlete]”.

193. The Athlete submitted that manner in which the opening, re-sealing and re-testing of the Athlete’s sample was conducted raised serious doubts as to the integrity of the her sample and the compliance with the relevant ISL. “It was clear that the process conducted on 8 and 9 June 2016 was unprepared, unprofessional and shrouded in a cloud of confusion”. As a consequence of this confusion and miscommunication, the process was – perhaps deliberately – postponed and Dr. De Boer was unable to witness the re-testing of the Athlete’s B1-Sample. This further demonstrated that the IOC was “systematically hindering” the Athlete’s right to defend herself. When confronted with these allegations, the Athlete claimed that the IOC simply stated that it did not agree with the Athlete’s position, without offering any explanations.

194. The Athlete rejected the IOC’s claim that Dr. De Boer voluntarily decided not to attend the B1-Sample splitting, and the IOC’s claim that attendance by Dr. Pachmann and Dr. De Boer were not an obligation, but merely an opportunity. The IOC clearly violated Article 5.2.4.3.2.6 ISL 2008, which stated that “the Athlete and/or his/her representative […] shall be authorized to attend the “B” confirmation”.

195. The Athlete also submitted that it was unjustifiable that the IOC, despite having the samples for almost 8 years, would wait until 2 months before Rio 2016 to notify the Athlete of the PAAF. Worse still, the IOC conducted their scientific procedure and re-testing little over a week after the notification.

196. The Athlete quoted the panel in CAS 2010/A/216114, which stated that:

“It is now established CAS jurisprudence that the athlete’s right to attend the opening and analysis of her B sample is fundamental and, if not respected, the B sample result must be disregarded. This is so even if denial of that right is unlikely to affect the result of a B sample analysis”.

197. The Athlete concluded that:

“… the right of the [Athlete] to be heard, guaranteed by art. 29 para. 2 and art. 32 Swiss Constitution and art. 6 EHRC have been violated, by not allowing the Appellant to witness the opening and splitting of the B- Sample, the re-sealing of the B2-Sample and the re-analysis of the B1-Sample. This violation cannot be healed retroactively, as the Appellant’s sample has already been opened and tested and there is none left, to conduct the procedure again. The severity of the violation consequently leads to the test, which was conducted by the [IOC] on 8 and 9 June 2016 and 29 June 2016 being null and void”.

vii. The IOC violated the Athlete’s right to be heard by not providing her with the requested documentation regarding her A and B samples

198. The Athlete submitted that her right to be heard comprised of the right to access all the files of the procedure. In Switzerland, this right is established in Article 29(2) of the Swiss Constitution. This right serves to guarantee that the party concerned knows the basics on which the tribunal rests its decision on. The Athlete argued that the right to access the documentation of the case is also condition sine qua non for the effective participation in the process and the general right to be heard. This right also includes the right to have files which are wrong or incomplete, be corrected. The right to access the files is also a precondition for the right to a fair trial, pursuant to Article 6 of the EHRC.

199. The Athlete argued that Article 32(2) of the Swiss Constitution firmly established the right to be notified as quickly and comprehensively as possible of the charge brought against an individual. The Athlete submitted that this was the reason the IOC included Article 7.2.8 into the Beijing ADR, according to which:

“[…] It shall allow the Athlete or other Person concerned an opportunity to adduce any relevant evidence, which does not require the use of disproportionate means (as decided by the Disciplinary Commission), which the Athlete or other Person deems helpful to the defence of his case in relation to the result of the test, or other anti-doping rule violation, either orally before the Commission, or in writing, as the Athlete or other Person concerned so wishes”.

200. Specifically, Article 7.2.5 of the Beijing ADR stated the following (emphasis added by the Athlete):

“The IOC President or a person designated by him shall, in confidence, promptly notify the Athlete or other Person concerned, the Athlete’s or other Person’s chef de mission, the International Federation concerned and a representative of the Independent Observer program of:

a) the adverse analytical finding;

b) the Athlete’s right to request the analysis of the B sample or, failing such request, that the B sample analysis may be deemed waived;

c) the right of the Athlete and/or the Athlete’s representative to attend the B sample opening and analysis if such analysis is requested;

d) the Athlete’s right to request copies of the A and B sample laboratory package, which includes information as required by the International Standard for Laboratories;

e) the anti-doping rule violation or of the additional investigation that will be conducted as to whether there is an anti-doping rule violation;

f) the composition of the Disciplinary Commission”.

201. The Athlete submitted that after being informed of the PAAF on 23 May 2016, she requested the IOC to provide her with the relevant documentation no fewer than 11 times. She argued that this proved beyond reasonable doubt that the IOC had no intention to provide her with the resources to effectively defend herself against the allegations. The Athlete noted that she was not even in possession of the B1-Sample documentation by the time the IOC started the B2-Sample analysis, all “while constantly keeping up the pressure by issuing ludicrously short deadlines which were sometimes even unilaterally cut short by the [IOC] itself”. Accordingly, there can be no question that the IOC infringed upon her right to have access to the files of the IOC.

202. The Athlete rejected the IOC’s position that the provision of documentation was not a prerequirement to conduct a sample analysis or its claim that there was no need to provide any documentation which was unrelated to the sample being analysed. The Athlete maintained that she had the right to access any and all the information that may have been necessary in the procedure. The Athlete also argued that, pursuant to Article 82 of the Swiss Code of Obligations (“CO”), the IOC was “mandatorily prevented” from continuing any re-testing until she had provided her with the necessary documentation. Further, contrary to the IOC’s claim, there was nothing in Article 7.2.5 of the Beijing ADR “precluding or limiting the granting of access to the necessary documentation pertaining to the case”. Accordingly, “it was simply the will of the [IOC] to deny the [Athlete] her right to defend herself, which led to a clear violation of the right to access of documents pursuant to art. 6 EHRC and art. 29 para. 2 Swiss Constitution”.

203. The Athlete noted that when she requested the IOC to provide documentation regarding the sample temperature, this was once again denied and the IOC stated, inter alia, it would be expected of a WADA-accredited laboratory to avoid any mistakes during parallel analysis and that this request was justifiably rejected. The Athlete argued that this was also a violation of her right to be heard and her right to defend herself.

204. The Athlete noted that on 12 July 2016, she once again requested the IOC to provide the necessary documentation. While some documents were provided, it was still largely incomplete and was even partially in Mandarin and therefore incomprehensible for the Athlete or her counsel, and therefore needed to be translated. On 13 July 2016, the IOC refused to provide the Athlete with the LDP related to her A-Sample as they claimed it was neither relevant nor required.

205. The Athlete concluded that the IOC systematically hindered her from actively defending her legal rights by refusing to provide her with the necessary documentation and referred to the IOC’s actions as a “trickle-down right to access of files”.

viii. The IOC unjustifiably acted in an extreme hurry, violating the Athlete’s right to be heard due to its own fault

206. The Athlete rejected the IOC’s claims that she had ‘obstructed’ the re-testing of her samples and claimed that it was the IOC Disciplinary Commission who rendered the Appealed Decision valued their right to go on two weeks’ vacation before Rio 2016 over her right to defend herself and/or be heard in a case where her entire sporting career was at stake. Moreover, the Athlete argued that this was all the more striking given that the IOC could have re-tested her sample at any time up to 4 years prior, as a turinabol test was available even before London 2012.

207. Given the huge amount of re-testing that needed to be done, it was clear from the beginning that the IOC would need to act in an extreme hurry. The Athlete argued that this situation was solely the fault of the IOC and raised the principle of nemo auditor suam proprium turpitudinem alle-allegans, meaning that no one shall be heard, who invokes his own guilt.

208. The Athlete argued that the IOC’s behaviour was contradictory as on one hand, it did not stick to the 24 hour deadline foreseen in Article 7.2.13 of the Beijing ADR, but on the other hand, the IOC did not give her the necessary time to review the sample opening and splitting in person. The IOC simply did what it felt like to support its claims, and that was not acceptable.

ix. The IOC is barred from initiating a disciplinary procedure as it failed to appeal the negative decisions taken when analysing the Athlete’s Beijing samples

209. The Athlete submitted that the IOC was barred from acting against her by virtue of violating the rule contained in Article 12.5 of the Beijing ADR, which states:

“The time to file an appeal to CAS shall be twenty-one (21) days from the date of receipt of the decision by the appealing party”.

210. The Athlete noted that the abovementioned Article set a strict time limit to all challenges made in respect of decisions regarding ADRVs – including decisions that no ADRV was committed. Moreover, it was undisputed that the Athlete’s urine sample was first tested on 24 August 2008 (during Beijing 2008), and resulted in a negative finding.

211. If the above test resulted in an AAF, disciplinary proceedings would have commenced immediately15. However, if no AAF was found, no further action is taken and it results in a decision of non-commission of an ADRV, which remains in force unless appealed. “Moreover, since the decision on the non-commission of an anti-doping violation serves as basis for awarding medals and honours to the athlete, the decision serves to grant the athlete concerned with a legitimate expectation that the matter is resolved with binding legal effect (res judicata) and may not be set aside or reversed by the Respondent at their discretion, without first being subject to judicial review by the competent arbitral tribunal”.

15 Pursuant to Articles 7.2.1, 7.2.2, 7.2.3, 7.2.4, 7.2.5 etc. of the Beijing ADR.

212. While Article 6.5 of the Beijing ADR provided for the storage and delayed testing of samples for various reasons, most predominantly for scientific purposes, it did not allow for arbitrary review of the IOC’s prior decision without due process. If during the re-testing certain samples resulted in an ADRV, the IOC could not simply issue a new decision on the existence of this ADRV as this would leave two conflict decisions in relation to the same subject matter. “Since both decisions have equal legal force, the only way in which the earlier – ostensibly wrong – decision may be set aside is by way of appeal pursuant to article 12.2 of the Beijing ADR”. In order to pursue that right, the IOC would have had to appeal the first decision within 21 days (as provided in Article 12.5 of the Beijing ADR), which it failed to do.

x. The IOC only had the right to analyse the Athlete’s samples during Beijing 2008

213. The Athlete submitted that according to Article 5.1 of the Beijing ADR, the Athlete agreed to allow the IOC to carry out “Doping Control during the Period of the Olympic Games. This means clearly that the entire process, including analysis needs to be carried out during the Olympic Games. Would the [IOC] wanted to carry out Doping control after the Period of the Olympic Games, the [IOC] would have had to make this clear”. The Athlete argues that the IOC is basing its entire re-testing program on Article 6.5 of the Beijing ADR, which is in clear contradiction to what was stated in Article 5.1 of the Beijing ADR.

214. The Athlete submitted that it was quite clear that the IOC has changed Article 6.5 of the Beijing ADR without informing athletes of the consequences the new provision may have. The Athlete noted that Article 6.5 of the relevant anti-doping rules for Athens 2004 stated as follows:

“6.5 Storage of Samples and delayed analysis

Samples shall be stored in a secure manner at the laboratory and may be further analysed”.

Whereas the same provision was amended in the Beijing ADR to state as follows:

“6.5 Storage of Samples and delayed analysis

Samples shall be stored in a secure manner at the laboratory or as otherwise directed by the IOC and may be further analysed. Consistent with Article 17 of the Code the ownership of the samples is vested in the IOC for the eight years. During this period, the IOC shall have the right to re-analyse samples (taken during the Period of the Olympic Games). Any anti-doping rule violation discovered as a result thereof shall be dealt with in accordance with these Rules. After this period, the ownership of the samples shall be transferred to the laboratory storing such IOC Anti-Doping Rules – 07.05.2008(F) Page 10 samples, provided that all means of identification of the Athletes will be destroyed and that proof of this destruction shall be provided to the IOC”.

215. The Athlete submitted that an athlete reading the Beijing ADR could easily have skipped this amendment as it was “completely unusual”. Under Swiss law, such unusual provisions are illegal unless it was duly brought to the attention of the athletes concerned. The Athlete submitted that the athletes participating in Beijing 2008 were not aware of the newly introduced provisions which allowed the IOC to perform re-testing for several years. The athletes needed

to be informed about these changes as they would have had to take additional precautions to defend themselves for several years, including keeping records of all food and drink taken during that time.

216. The Beijing ADR indicated that doping control was only possible during the period of Beijing 2008 and the re-testing of samples was limited to the choice of the BOCOG only – the IOC had no right to choose another laboratory for re-testing.

217. The Athlete argued that if new obligations of athletes were to be introduced, or if waivers of their rights were to be established, a clear basis in the relevant sports organisation’s regulations were required. The athletes needed to be made aware of such far reaching new provisions and it was not admissible to change the content of paragraphs with unclear meanings as the rules and regulations of private associations could be revised and amended quite easily.

218. The Athlete also argued that it was imperative to take into account CAS jurisprudence regarding the contra proferentem principle. The CAS has repeatedly confirmed that this principle was a general principle of Swiss law and that it was also applicable to matters related to the regulatory framework of sports organisations16. When applied to the regulatory framework of sports organisations, the contra proferentem principle entails that any ambiguous, or otherwise unclear, statutory regulation must be interpreted against the sports organisation that drafted it17. In other words, shortcomings in a regulatory framework cannot result in disadvantages to the athletes concerned.

219. As an example, the CAS has held:

“Since FIFA had several chances to […] codify the regulations on the club’s obligation to release their players to the Olympic Games, it must bear the legal disadvantageous consequence in not doing so”18.

“[…] inconsistencies in the rules of a federation will be construed against the federation […]”19.

220. The Athlete submitted that both the IOC and WADA have failed, for a considerable period of time (i.e. approximately 10 years), to formulate their rules and regulations in a coherent and consistent manner with regard to the issues presently relevant. In light of the CAS jurisprudence on the contra proferentem principle cited above, the IOC and WADA need to bear the “legal disadvantageous consequences” of their actions. These consequences were, in effect, that they could not perform a re-test with a B-Sample splitting on the Athlete’s samples.

16 The Athlete cited, amongst others, the following CAS cases as evidence: CAS 2007/A/1396 & 1402, CAS 17 The Athlete cited, amongst others, the following CAS cases as evidence: CAS 2008/A/1622, 1623 & 1624, and CAS

xi. The IOC’s re-testing program violates Swiss law

221. The Athlete argued that this was a unique situation in which the IOC wanted an ‘automatic correction of results’, and in the IOC’s disciplinary proceedings there were no proceedings foreseen which would give the Athlete the possibility to defend herself legally and prove that this was a case of no fault and/or no negligence.

222. The Athlete cited Rule 39(4) of Chapter 3 of the IAAF Competition Rules 2008, which stated:

“Disqualification of Results

4. In addition to the above, where an athlete has been declared ineligible under Rule 40, all competitive results obtained from the date the positive sample was provided (whether in-competition or out-ofcompetition) or other Anti-Doping Rule violation occurred through to the commencement of the period of provisional suspension or ineligibility shall, unless fairness requires otherwise, be annulled, with all resulting consequences for the athlete (and, where applicable, any team in which the athlete has competed), including the forfeiture of all titles, awards, medals, points, prize and appearance money…”

223. The Athlete submitted that the above provision meant that all of an athlete’s results obtained between 2008 and today could be taken away and such an automatic forfeiture of medals would constitute a double punishment.

224. The Athlete submitted that it is the opinion of the former judge of the SFT, Prof. Riemer, that such a system violates Article 27 of the Swiss CO. His opinion was supported by the jurisprudence of the SFT in the Matuzalem case and A.______ v. The Football Federation of Ukraine20.

225. The Athlete also submitted that the automatic correction of results is “very similar to a lifelong ban with all the personal and economic consequences attached thereto, albeit without the same kind of legal recourse or opportunity to defend herself. If an athlete is disqualified from an event through no fault of their own, they are still able to rehabilitate themselves in the future. An old athlete who is about to retire will always be tarnished and without an opportunity to clear their good name”.

226. Accordingly, the Athlete submitted that this case “comes extremely close to such an excessive contractual curtailment of economic freedom”21 for the following reasons:

“- The system is clearly arbitrary in two respects: a) there are certainly false positives as in any technical test (the likelihood of which we do not even know) and b) there were no clear predetermined conditions for retroactive testing when she entered into the games;

- The “automatic correction of results” jeopardizes the [Athlete’s] personal and economic existence;

20 A.______ v. The Football Federation of Ukraine,4A_448/2013. 21 Pursuant to Article 27(2) of the Swiss CO.

- The “automatic correction of results” is not simply ensuring the correct course of the Olympic Games but gravely violates the [Athlete’s] privacy and economic pursuits;

- There is no way to defend herself legally and/or factually (violation of art. 6 EHRC) which makes the entire system even more arbitrary and against any legal principle of the Western world;

- The “automatic correction of all results” at the end of a career equals an occupational ban against the Appellant not just in sports but even in many other areas which makes this case even more severe than the worldwide ban in the Matuzalem case;

- The federations’ interests in fighting doping could have been pursued before the London Olympic Games”.

227. Moreover, the Athlete argued that the IOC’s re-testing program in the present case must be considered illegal under the Cartel Act, which prohibits the IOC (a monopoly organisation) from imposing unfair provisions. “Stigmatizing an athlete as [a] fraudster without giving the athlete a real chance to show his or her innocence after eight years is certainly an unfair provision and must not be applied”.

228. Finally, the lack of any real legal and factual possibility to defend oneself was a violation of Article 6(1) of the EHRC.

xii. The IOC’s re-testing program violates its obligation to treat all athletes equally

229. The Athlete noted that it appears that her bronze medal from Beijing 2008 was to be given to the sixth placed athlete. However, that athlete was not subject to any doping control measures. “This shows exemplarily how nonsensical the entire re-analysis program of the Respondent is. In order to show the world (and in particular its sponsors) its endeavours in its fight against doping the Olympic results have now become completely random. The medals are simply give to the first athlete who was not subject to Doping Control”.

230. The Athlete posed the following question to Prof. Riemer:

“According to art. 5.6.1.2.1 Beijing ADR only the five best athletes had to give a urine sample. Giving the Beijing bronze medal to the sixth placed athlete means that an athlete whose urine samples were never subject to any analysis would receive an Olympic medal. Do you consider this as a violation of the mandatory provision of the equal treatment of all athletes through the IOC?”

231. Prof. Dr. Riemer’s response was as follows:

“Indeed it does obviously violate the principle of equal treatment of members, which exists in association law […], when Athletes, who never have been tested, receive an Olympic medal instead of Athletes who were analysed. Had the doping controls been thoroughly conducted during the Olympic Games, then these other Athletes could have been tested as well. Today, this is not possible any more, which demonstrates that the whole system of re-analysis of selective available old doping samples in the current procedure – if not all the Athletes were tested and are tested again – violates the principle of equal treatment”.

232. The Athlete argued that if the IOC wanted to establish a new ranking for the event after 8 years, it would be acting arbitrarily and would not be treating all athletes equally. According to Article 6 of the Cartel Act, monopolies must treat all contracting parties in an equal manner and as the IOC did not carry out doping tests on all the potential medal winners, the IOC had not satisfied its obligations to treat all participants equally. The IOC is therefore prohibited from correcting its results in general.

B. The IOC’s Submissions

In summary, the IOC rejected all the arguments submitted by the Athlete and submitted the following:

233. The Appealed Decision should stand because:

– The IOC Disciplinary Commission correctly applied the applicable rules. Pursuant to Article 6.5 of the Beijing ADR, the IOC had the right to order the re-testing of the Athlete’s sample (No. 1846073) and the re-testing procedure was correctly conducted in accordance with the applicable provisions of ISL 2015/2016.

– In application of Article 5.2.2.12.10 ISL 2015, the IOC conducted a full analysis of the split B-Sample and there was no requirement of notification to, nor attendance by, the Athlete of the B-Sample split, the re-sealing of the B2-Sample and the B1-analysis under the aforementioned Article.

– Even if there was a requirement for her to attend, the Athlete could not claim her rights were violated as the IOC “made more than reasonable efforts to offer convenient alternatives and proposed 7 different dates”. Conversely, the Athlete failed to submit alternative reasonable dates and the explanations provided for not being available on the IOC’s proposed dates (i.e. training, unavailability of Dr. Pachmann etc.) were not valid. Further, the opening and splitting of the B-Sample was effectively attended by a person present on her behalf (i.e. Dr. De Boer), “who was for all purposes her representative. The same person did not attend the B-1 Sample not because he could not have but because he was instructed not to”. Moreover, Dr. De Boer attended the opening and analysis of the B2- Sample, so the Athlete’s representative thus attended the equivalent of what could be attended in a regular process.

– Sample number 1846073 was “unequivocally the Sample of the [Athlete] collected from her on August 24, 2008”. The chain of custody allowed for the tracing of the Athlete’s samples from collection, arrival in the Beijing laboratory and then transfer to the LAD. In any event, the sealed B-Sample ensured the integrity of the sample.

– The presence of a Prohibited Substance was detected in the Athlete’s sample. This substance was a metabolite of turinabol , which is an exogenous anabolic steroid. As such, the objective finding is sufficient to establish an ADRV (presence and/or use)

pursuant to the Beijing ADR and to disqualify the results obtained by the Athlete in Beijing 2008.

– Finally, given the substance at stake and the strong converging contextual evidence existing in this respect, the IOC Disciplinary Commission correctly observed that the ADRV was consistent with intentional use of a Prohibited Substance. Thus, the Appealed Decision referred to both Articles 8.1 of the Beijing ADR (automatic disqualification) and 9.1 (disqualification as sanction).

234. As a direct reply to the arguments made by the Athlete, the IOC submitted the following:

i. The Athlete’s claim that she did not sign the Beijing Entry Form and was therefore not bound by the Beijing ADR

235. The IOC rejected the Athlete’s claim (made at the hearing) that she did not sign the Beijing Entry Form and was therefore not subject to the Beijing ADR. The IOC noted that the Athlete did not raise this argument at any time prior to the hearing at the CAS. In any event, the IOC submitted that irrespective of whether the signature was the Athlete’s or not (and the Panel notes that the IOC did not specifically challenge the Athlete’s allegations in this regard), the fact of the matter was that she had participated in Beijing 2008 and further, she had even won a medal. Moreover, she signed the Doping Control Form (“DCF”) which was provided to her at Beijing 2008.

236. The IOC submitted that the Athlete could not have it both ways; if she wanted to argue that she did not sign the Beijing Entry Form and was not bound by the Beijing ADR, then following that line of reasoning, it meant that she was not entitled to participate in Beijing 2008 at all (as she had no contractual basis for doing so) and was therefore not eligible to claim her bronze medal. Alternatively, if the Athlete argued that she was eligible to participate or has participated in Beijing 2008, then she had implicitly agreed to the conditions of entry into the tournament (i.e. the Beijing Entry Form), and therefore agreed to be bound by the Beijing ADR.

ii. The absence of legal basis to perform the “sample splitting” procedure on the Athlete’s samples

237. The IOC submitted that the applicable ISL was ISL 2015 and 2016. They provided a basis for the procedure which was followed. Regarding the basis for re-testing the Athlete’s samples, this was provided for by Article 6.5 of the Beijing ADR. The Athlete’s argument in reference to Article 404 of the CPC was completely meritless.

238. The re-testing was a specific process in which the laboratory was asked to re-test specifically chosen samples and this re-testing was conducted under the applicable ISL at the time, i.e. at the time of re-testing. There was no link or continuity between the successive processes. The re-resting was “a completely new process, which may or may not develop into disciplinary proceedings”. If disciplinary proceedings were initiated, then a decision was issued that was subject to an

appeal. The re-testing was not an ‘appeal’ against the former analytical process. The IOC rejected the expert opinion provided by Prof. Riemer as not relevant.

239. The arguments based on the application of ISL 2008 had no merit in principle as the applicable ISL 2015 & 2016 did not provide for discretion of the testing authority in the use of the A- Sample. Despite this, the IOC submitted that it effectively and practically provided the Athlete with the same opportunity as she would have had been entitled to if she had been exercising her attendance rights in regard of the B-Sample split under ISL 2008. In particular, the Athlete was given an adequate opportunity to attend and she “effectively exercised it through a representative designated by her, who attended the opening and the split of the B-Sample”.

iii. The lack of an independent witness reviewing the sample opening and splitting procedure

240. The IOC noted that the Athlete questioned the independence of Ms Zimmermann, who is presently a CAS counsel. However, Ms Zimmermann confirmed in a witness statement that she was not employed by the CAS at the relevant time.

iv. The allegations regarding the identity of the Athlete’s samples

241. The IOC rejected the Athlete’s allegations regarding the identity of her samples. The IOC argued that the WADA-accredited LAD was “under no investigations for any impropriety”. Further, “the matter of the sample disposal (55 sample[s] and not 67) has been cleared with WADA. It was not linked to any violation nor failure in compliance on the side of the LAD”.

242. The IOC submitted that in December 2015, a report was issued by the internal audit services of the Lausanne University Hospital (“CHUV”)22, which confirmed that the LAD observed the applicable rules in the conduct of its mission in anti-doping and that this had also, and in particular, been the case in relation with the re-testing of the samples coming from the laboratory in Moscow. The IOC also noted that the Athlete failed to submit any concrete evidence to support her allegations that any of the “extraordinary occurrences of tampering in the laboratory in Sochi could have occurred in Beijing, in Lausanne or in any other laboratory”.

243. The IOC also added that “tampering is logically not applied to render samples positive”. Further, the IOC submitted that “the alleged tampering would have been a particularly improbable one: the metabolite found is a Long Term metabolite, not found outside the body and which forms the end of the process. It would be rather not the most obvious way of tampering samples. In 2008 and in Beijing, this would have even been unthinkable as the metabolite was not even reported yet”.

244. In any event, “the insinuations of tampering are, in this case, completely gratuitous”. The Athlete’s B- Sample was inspected upon opening and the bottle and seal was found intact. Even if no inspection by microscope was performed (which was, and is, not part of the routine

22 In French, the ‘Centre hospitalier universitaire vaudois’, which is one of the five university hospitals in Switzerland.

inspection), there was no basis to assume that it was tampered with or that the identity of the sample was in doubt.

v. The alleged violations of numerous applicable International Standards

245. The IOC acknowledged that the A-Samples were not re-sealed but noted that this was the reason for the choice to rely on the split B-Samples to conduct the re-analysis. At the same time, the IOC always underlined that the individual re-sealing of samples for transport between laboratories was not a requirement under – the then applicable – ISL 2008. The requirement to re-seal the samples or use sealed boxes was only introduced in ISL 2015 (under Article 5.2.2.12.4).

246. The IOC submitted that the Athlete’s samples may be properly traced back from its collection in Beijing, to its transfer to the LAD based on the relevant documentation (which was submitted as evidence). The DCF dated 24 August 2008 unequivocally linked the Athlete’s urine with the sample number 1846073 and the chain of custody documents evidenced the valid transfer to the LAD.

247. In response to the Athlete’s allegations regarding the temperature at which the samples were stored, the IOC referred to the documentation submitted as evidence which the IOC claimed stated, inter alia, that the samples were transported and stored in a freezer.

248. Further, the IOC noted that when the B-Sample was opened, the independent witness (Ms Zimmermann) notably checked whether the bottle was properly closed and sealed and also whether it was intact. Moreover, Dr. De Boer was present as a representative of the Athlete (irrespective of what the Athlete claimed his role was) and “could have inspected the bottle as closely as he would have wished”.

249. The IOC rejected the Athlete’s references to various provisions of the IST as being without relevance. The IOC submitted that the ISTs covered testing and this included the transport of the samples from collection to the (first) laboratory (in Beijing) and not the actions of the laboratory thereafter. Once the samples arrived at the laboratory, their handling fell under the ISL provisions, which governed the processes by the laboratories. At that time, the relevant ISL did not include detailed provisions on the handling of long term storage samples. This is now covered by Article 5.2.2.12 in ISL 2015/2016.

250. The IOC noted that one of the points clarified by ISL 2015/16 was that samples received for long term storage were not subject to individual inspection until they were selected for analysis. The IOC argued that since it is now specified, that removes any doubt as to the proper interpretation of the rules when there was no specific rule about the issue.

251. The IOC submitted that the documentation it submitted as evidence was sufficient to demonstrate both the proper chain of custody and that no violations of ISL 2015 & 2016 occurred. Further, the B-Sample, which was intact, confirmed both the integrity and the identity of the sample. The consistency with the A-Sample results comfort that finding.

252. The IOC submitted that the exact same chain of custody was already verified by the CAS in CAS 2009/A/201823, which dealt with one of the cases subject to the specific limited retesting conducted in 2009. In that case, the A/B-Sample procedure was applied for the retesting. The IOC submitted that the re-testing of the split B-Sample in the present case, in comparison, gave additional security to the sample.

vi. The alleged violations of the Athlete’s right to be heard during the re-testing of her Beijing sample

253. The IOC submitted that since this is not a criminal matter, the Athlete’s references to the Swiss Constitution and to paragraph 6(3) of the EHCR was irrelevant.

254. In relation to the Athlete’s arguments regarding her right to attend the opening and splitting of the B-Sample, the IOC submitted that ISL 2015/16 were clear in that the provisions provided that neither the notification, nor the attendance, was a requirement. The IOC’s position was that the process at stake was a procedural one and did not modify the fundamental obligations of the athletes (i.e. to not commit ADRVs) which remained unchanged. Moreover, the ability to amend an ISL was provided for. In any event, the IOC also noted that the splitting of the B-Sample was already provided for in ISL 2008.

255. The IOC submitted that ISL 2015/16 brought into line the re-testing procedure for what it represented, i.e. a process in which the A-Sample is replaced by the B1-Sample and the B- Sample is replaced by the B2-Sample. Logically in that context, the exercise of rights exercised normally in connection with the B-Sample were exercised at the B2-Sample level.

256. The verification of integrity at the first level of the B1-Sample analysis (corresponding to the A-Sample analysis, which is always conducted without the Athlete) becomes entrusted to an independent witness. The IOC argued that this was an appropriate measure, given that if an A-Sample was not available or insufficient, it avoided the necessity to call an athlete in situations in which the likelihood of a positive outcome could be minimal.

257. The IOC submitted that the issues which arose in connection with the attendance (or lack thereof) of the opening and splitting of the B-Sample should be considered in light of the above. “The decision is then easily made: since there is no right in principle, such right cannot a fortiori be violated in a situation, in which the other party has made every effort to be forthcoming. In addition, Dr. De Boer was present and he did attend”.

258. Even if the Panel were to conclude that the Athlete had a right to attend, the IOC submitted that it did enough to accommodate such a right, which in addition, she exercised through a representative.

259. In relation to the right of the Athlete to attend, the IOC argued that as a matter of principle, the right to attend the process should not be turned into a right to dictate it. It was not up to the Athlete to set the date. She could have asked for alternative dates, if the originally proposed

23 CAS 2009/A/2018, award of 30 July 2010.

dates were truly unsuitable. This meant that “the attendance shall not be the last of the priorities of the Athlete. In particular, training, which a daily activity for a competitor cannot, per se, be a justification to obtain a delay”.

260. The IOC also stated that whilst the Athlete had a right to send a representative to the procedure, “not to accept a date in view of his or her vacation is not a legitimate ground”. Moreover, the Athlete had the responsibility to make sure that her representatives were reasonably available.

261. Regarding how long a process could be delayed, the IOC stated the following (emphasis added by the IOC):

“… whilst there may not exist an absolute answer in specific circumstances, the following elements are to be considered: first, the ISL sets effectively a dead-line, which is quite clear and strictly worded: i.e. maximum 7 working days (5.2.4.3.2), i.e. approx. 9 to 10 days. This dead-line applies in the case of a regular B-Sample analysis and not a B1-Sample. However, if to be applied in this context, there is a second reason for which, the application should be even stricter. Indeed in this case, the B1-Analysis (equivalent to A-Sample) may lead to provisional suspension. An Athlete may have a good (bad) reason to delay the process at any price. It further means that not only the interests of the athlete concerned are at stake but of his competitors. In any event, it is plain and clear that a postponement by one month is completely beyond any reasonable claim an athlete could make”.

262. The Athlete’s proposal to delay the process by a month was in absolute terms not acceptable. This was even more so given that the Athlete was subject to a potential automatic provisional suspension. In such a context, any justification for being unable to attend linked to training and competition was irrelevant.

263. The IOC stated that the other reasons given relating to the unavailability of the Athlete’s counsel were also unacceptable. “In particular a legal counsel cannot ask for his vacations or academical career to be taken into consideration. He has to get organised personally or through somebody else to support his or her client, when needed. As regards, Dr. De Boer, his personal presence might have been more relevant, given his expertise. However and again that would not be a justification for an exaggerated postponement”.

264. Based on the above, the IOC submitted that the Athlete did not propose any reasonable alternative date while the IOC so (i.e. 6, 7 or 8 June 2016). Moreover, even after the Athlete stated that she needed to go to the hospital, the IOC proposed 2 further dates, but never heard a response.

265. The IOC also stated that the Athlete failed to provide any specific details regarding the Athlete’s alleged hospitalisation. The IOC argued that the Athlete could have even attempted to use a deliberate appointment as a justification for her absence. Had the Athlete duly explained her medical condition, the IOC claimed it would have “certainly considered a further postponement” to accommodate her. However, “instead of managing the situation in good faith, it is however all too clear that the [Athlete’s] counsel jumped to the occasion to be in a position to claim that the rights of her poor client lying in the hospital, would have been mercilessly trampled”.

266. The IOC submitted that “what happened with in connection with Dr. De Boer was a pitiful comedy” as Dr. De Boer first arrived unannounced leading to confusion, followed by Dr. Pachmann attempting to claim that Dr. De Boer was somehow not a representative of the Athlete, but was still nevertheless attending on behalf of the Athlete. This led to delays in the procedure. Dr. De Boer nevertheless attended the B-Sample opening and splitting, despite again claiming that he was not acting as the Athlete’s representative. However, Dr. De Boer did not attend the B1-Sample testing as on the morning of 9 June 2016, he stated that he had not received instructions to attend.

267. The IOC argued that it had been forthcoming in attempting to find a solution, while the Athlete was not. She either rejected or did not answer the IOC’s proposals. In addition, a representative attended the B1-Sample opening and splitting and the B2-Sample testing. Dr. De Boer could have attended the B1-Sample testing, but did not as he did not receive appropriate instructions from Dr. Pachmann. The IOC submitted that the Athlete “behaved abusively in claiming that her representative was not representing her”. The IOC concluded that the retesting procedure was properly conducted. To the extent that the Athlete had a right to attend, this was respected as much as could be reasonably expected.

vii. The alleged violations of the Athlete’s right to be heard by not providing her with the requested documentation regarding her A and B samples

268. The IOC submitted that the Athlete was provided with her B1-Sample analytical results on 15 June 2016. The B1-Sample LDP was issued by the laboratory on 29 June 2016 and provided to the Athlete on the same day. The B2-Sample analytical results were notified to the Athlete on 1 July 2016 and the corresponding LDP on 7 July 2016. The IOC noted that there was no specific dead-line applicable to the provision of the LDPs to the Athlete.

269. Article 5.2.6.13 ISL 2016 provided that the LDP “should” be provided within a deadline of 10 working days from a corresponding request of the Result Management Authority. The IOC submitted that given the difficult conditions under which the LAD was then working, the provision of the abovementioned LDPs were completed in an effective manner.

270. The delivery of the B1-Sample LDP occurred within 10 working days from the notification of the results to the Athlete while the B2-Sample LDP was provided within 4 working days. Obtaining documentation from the Beijing laboratory took some time, but was nonetheless provided on 13 July 2016.

271. Regarding the provision of the LDP relating to the A-Sample, the IOC stated that the obligation to provide it was debatable. It nevertheless provided a copy of this in its Answer. Thus, the IOC claimed that all the relevant LDPs had been provided to the Athlete.

viii. The alleged undue imposition of urgency

272. The IOC acknowledged the challenges posed by the scale of the re-testing process and stated that the magnitude of the positive results were indeed unexpected and created a certain time

and work pressure. However, despite this, the procedures were still conducted in an appropriate manner.

273. The IOC claimed that the re-testing process was conducted within specified deadlines and the disciplinary process that followed was conducted within a few months, which was not out of the ordinary. Further, the IOC dismissed the Athlete’s discussions and suggestions as to how the re-testing should have been organised as “simply pointless”.

274. The IOC also rejected the Athlete’s arguments regarding the possibility of applying the retesting method back in 2011. The global re-testing of Olympic samples was a vast logistical exercise mobilising huge resources. It could not be implemented each time a particular new testing method was installed as re-testing cannot, by definition and with the limited amount of urine available be repeated many times. That was the rationale behind re-testing the samples as close to the expiration of the 8 year statute of limitations as possible. That also had the effect of maximising the gap between the initial test and the re-testing.

275. In the case of the Athlete, the IOC argued that no strikingly short deadlines were imposed in any event as it was normal to apply deadlines in days in the analytical process. Assuming that the Athlete had true intentions of attending the process with a scientific expert and a lawyer (which the IOC claimed was not usual), the burden was on the Athlete and the concerned representatives to ensure they made themselves available. It was unacceptable for the Athlete and/or her counsel and/or her scientific expert (or a combination of the 3) to delay the proceedings by over a month due to their own unavailability due to vacations or other professional/academic commitments.

276. Regarding the disciplinary proceedings, the IOC submitted that the deadlines, even if short, were manageable. Moreover, the Athlete had the opportunity to postpone these proceedings, but chose to drop her initial request. On 20 July 2016, the Chairman of the IOC Disciplinary Commission made it clear that the hearing was held “based on the understanding that the request for postponement had not been maintained”. Dr. Pachmann failed to react, and so the Athlete’s claim that the proceedings were conducted in undue haste was abusive.

ix. The alleged negative ‘decision’ not appealed

277. The IOC noted that an analytical report reporting negative analytical results was not a negative decision but a factual statement issued by the LAD and expressing the objective fact that a given sample analysed through the methods applied by the laboratory did not produce positive results. The moment a negative analytical result is issued, that report is normally correct. There is no reason to challenge it, nor ‘appeal’ it.

278. The IOC submitted that the proposition that the IOC or any anti-doping organisation should appeal any negative report or being precluded from ordering later re-testing of the samples as expressly provided by the rules was “simply ludicrous”.

x. The allegation that the IOC had no right to analyse the Athlete’s samples outside Beijing 2008

279. The IOC referred to the wording of Article 6.5 of the Beijing ADR which clearly provided a basis for re-testing of the samples collected during Beijing 2008 over the following 8 years. The IOC submitted that there was no contradiction between Article 6.5 and Articles 5.1 and 5.2 of the Beijing ADR, which dealt with testing.

280. The IOC stated that it “failed to follow” the Athlete’s arguments and complaints regarding the amendments of the respective ADR applicable in each Olympic Games and noted that ADR are issued during each edition of the Olympic Games and “it is only fortunate that improvements are made each time”. Irrespective of this, the IOC noted that Article 6.5 of the Beijing ADR was clear in its meaning that the IOC had the right to re-test samples for 8 years.

xi. The alleged violations of Swiss law

281. The IOC submitted that what the Athlete was challenging here was not the re-testing but rather the principle of automatic disqualification, which is provided for in Article 8 of the Beijing ADR, corresponding to Article 9 of the WADC.

282. The IOC submitted that automatic disqualification means that an objective ADRV automatically leads to a disqualification of the results affected by the violation, and it is not technically a sanction, but rather an eligibility rule which applies retroactively. Whilst it might be harsh in certain cases, the IOC noted that it represented a consensus incorporated in the WADC.

283. The IOC also noted that an athlete found with oral-turinabol in her body might in any event not be the ideal case to seek a precedent in respect of the validity of the principle of automatic disqualification. In her particular case, the Appealed Decision was based on both Articles 8.1 and 9.1 of the Beijing ADR. So the IOC argued that the Athlete first needed to overcome the hurdle of establishing that she bore no fault or negligence. The IOC questioned the Athlete’s ability to do this (irrespective of how much time has elapsed since the sample was taken) as “turinabol does not come in coffee, nor in legitimate supplements”.

284. Finally, the IOC argued that the drawing of a comparison between the disqualification of a single result in the past, and a precedent in which the possibility to exercise an activity and earn a living was at stake, was not convincing.

xii. The alleged violation of the IOC’s obligation to treat all athletes equally

285. The IOC rejected the Athlete’s claims and stated that she was not the bearer of interests of the athletes’ community and moreover, the last people entitled to discuss issues linked with the reallocation of medals were clearly the athletes losing them. The IOC stated that what happens with Olympic medals which are withdrawn as a result of ADRVs and how they are reallocated is an issue which strictly does not concern the Athlete, who has no standing nor legitimacy to make any submissions in this respect.

xiii. The Prohibited Substance found in the Athlete’s sample and comments on Dr. Kopylov’s expert opinion

286. The IOC submitted that aside from the various alleged procedural issues raised by the Athlete, “this matter is in substance a very straightforward and simple one”. A Prohibited Substance, turinabol, was found present in the Athlete’s sample and this was confirmed by an analysis of the Athlete’s B1-Sample and B2-Sample. The “fully consistent and effectively complete results obtained in the A-Sample analysis comfort the validity of the finding”.

287. The IOC stated that the substance found present in the Athlete “is a classical doping substance. It is not one which accidentally contaminates food or supplements (meaning here “legitimate” supplements not supplements, which are deliberately “powered”)”. Further, “exceptionally strong and converging contextual evidence shows that turinabol was a doping substance in high and active use in Russia”.

288. The IOC submitted that new long-term metabolites of turinabol could be identified for the first time in a peer-reviewed publication by Timofei Sobolevsky & Dr. Grigory Rodchenkov in 2012 and the search for these metabolites was progressively implemented by the WADAaccredited laboratories from 2012/13, and it was now part of the routine analytical testing. The Athlete’s positive result was one of over 80 positive cases.

289. The IOC noted that in 4 separate cases, athletes – with the support of their appointed expert Dr. Kopylov – attempted to question the validity of the re-testing method. The IOC rejected Dr. Kopylov’s publication submitted by the Athlete in this case and noted that Dr. Kopylov had previously testified in front of the CAS24 as an independent witness and did not impress the CAS panel with his testimony. Dr. Kopylov eventually turned the expert report he submitted in that case into a publication, which is the one submitted by the Athlete in the present case.

290. In the meantime, the WADA had also published a report25 addressing the validity of the method and the arguments raised by Dr. Kopylov and concluded that “Dr. Kopylov’s comments and criticisms are not supported by facts or objective scientific reasoning and interpretation of data”.

ON THESE GROUNDS

The Court of Arbitration for Sport rules that:

1. The appeal filed on 25 October 2016 by Anna Chicherova against the decision rendered by the International Olympic Committee Disciplinary Commission on 4 October 2016 is dismissed.

2. The decision rendered by the International Olympic Committee Disciplinary Commission on 4 October 2016 is upheld.

3. (…).

4. (…).

5. All other motions or prayers for relief are dismissed.