Akhisar Belediyespor v. Dany Achille Nounkeu Tchounkeu

VI. JURISDICTION

65. Given that CAS has its seat in Switzerland and that when the purported arbitration agreement was executed the Claimant did not have its domicile in this country, this is an international arbitration procedure governed by Chapter 12 of the Swiss Private International Law Act (“PILA”), whose provisions are thus applicable. Art. 186 para. 1 of the PILA states that the arbitral tribunal shall itself decide on its jurisdiction. This general principle of Kompetenz- Kompetenz is a mandatory provision of the lex arbitri and has been recognized by CAS for a

66. Article R47 of the Code provides as follows:

“An appeal against the decision of a federation, association or sports-related body may be filed with CAS if the statutes or regulations of the said body so provide or if the parties have concluded a specific arbitration agreement and if the Appellant has exhausted the legal remedies available to it prior to the appeal, in accordance with the statutes or regulations of that body. […]”.

67. It is undisputed between the Parties that CAS has jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter at hand, which they both confirmed by signature of the Order of Procedure.

68. The Sole Arbitrator is satisfied that, also according to Article 58 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes and Article 49 of the FIFA Disciplinary Code which he considers applicable, CAS has jurisdiction to hear this case and decide on the matter.

VII. ADMISSIBILITY

69. Article R49 of the Code reads as follows:

“In the absence of a time limit set in the statutes or regulations of the federation, association or sports-related body concerned, or in a previous agreement, the time limit for appeal shall be twenty-one days from the receipt of the decision appealed against. […]”.

70. According to Article 67 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, appeals “shall be lodged with CAS within 21 days of notification of the decision in question”.

71. No objections regarding the admissibility of the Appeal have been raised by either Party. The Sole Arbitrator notes that all requirements mentioned in the provision set out above are fulfilled and that the Appeal is therefore admissible.

VIII. APPLICABLE LAW

72. Article R58 of the Code reads as follows:

“The Panel shall decide the dispute according to the applicable regulations and, subsidiarily, to the rules of law

Akhisar Belediye Gençlik ve Spor Kulübü Dernegi v. award of 15 December 2020

chosen by the parties or, in the absence of such a choice, according to the law of the country in which the federation, association or sports-related body which has issued the challenged decision is domiciled or according to the rules of law that the Panel deems appropriate. In the latter case, the Panel shall give reasons for its decision”.

73. According to Article 57 par. 2 of the FIFA Statutes, the provisions of the Code shall apply to the proceedings. CAS shall primarily apply the various regulations of FIFA and additionally, Swiss law.

74. The Sole Arbitrator therefore rules that the present dispute is to be solved according to the corresponding FIFA regulations, in particular the RSTP (in its October 2019 edition, which was when the claim was originally lodged), and that Swiss law shall be applied subsidiarily.

IX. MERITS — A. Issues in dispute

75. According to Article R57 of the Code,

“The Panel shall have full power to review the facts and the law. It may issue a new decision which replaces the decision challenged or annul the decision and refer the case back to the previous instance. […]”.

76. Before addressing the merits of the present case, the Sole Arbitrator recalls that it is undisputed between the Parties that the Contract was unilaterally terminated by the Player, in writing, 13 September 2019, following two prior warnings to the Club dated 11 July 2019 (with a claim of EUR 90,000) and 27 August 2019 (with a claim of EUR 285,000).

77. It is also undisputed that, at the time when the first letter of formal notice was sent, the Club was in default of payment of the outstanding amount of EUR 165,000, corresponding to the Player’s monthly salaries of half of April 2019 (due on 25 April 2019) and a full salary of May 2019 (due on 25 May 2019).

78. It is also undisputed that the Player suffered from a knee injury in October 2018 and was not able to play any matches from that point. Finally, it is undisputed that the Player remained unemployed for the Contract’s remaining period of validity until 31 May 2020.

79. What is disputed in the present case is whether the Player had a just cause or not to unilaterally terminate the Contract on 13 September 2019, which fact is contested by the Appellant.

80. If a just cause should be affirmed, it is furthermore controversial whether the FIFA DRC established an appropriate compensation for the Player as a result of the early termination of the employment. Apart from the outstanding remuneration due to the player, a CAS panel is to consider the question of compensation on a de novo basis, pursuant to Article R57 of the Code and may put itself in the shoes of the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber and apply the applicable law, i.e. the RSTP and in particular Article 17.1.

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81. The Sole Arbitrator observes that the Appellant has not put forward any request regarding a possible compensation owed by the Respondent in case the Sole Arbitrator would come to the conclusion that the Contract had been terminated without just cause. The Sole Arbitrator recalls the well-established principle of “ne ultra petita”, according to which “a CAS Panel is bound to observe the limits of the parties’ motions. Even though the Panel has full power to review the facts and the law of the case, the arbitral nature of CAS proceedings obliges the Panel to decide all claims submitted, but at the same time prevents the Panel from granting more than what the parties are actually asking for” (CAS 2008/A/1644). The Sole Arbitrator would therefore not be in a position to assess the question of such compensation.

82. The main concerns of this case are thus the following:

a) Was the contract terminated with or without just cause?

b) If the contract was terminated with just cause, what is the remuneration owed by the Appellant?

83. The Sole Arbitrator will address said questions in the order set out above.

a. Was the Contract terminated with or without just cause?

84. According to Article 12bis par. 1 and 2 FIFA RSTP, clubs have a duty to fulfil their contractual obligations:

“1. Clubs are required to comply with their financial obligations towards players and other clubs as per the terms stipulated in the contracts signed with their professional players and in the transfer agreements.

2. Any club found to have delayed a due payment for more than 30 days without a prima facie contractual basis may be sanctioned in accordance with paragraph 4 below”.

85. Article 13 FIFA RSTP stipulates the principle of “pacta sunt servanda” and states the following:

“A contract between a professional and a club may only be terminated upon expiry of the term of the contract or by mutual agreement”.

86. One exception to this principle and ground rule is explicitly contained in Article 14bis paras. 1 and 2 FIFA RSTP which read as follows:

“1. In the case of a club unlawfully failing to pay a player at least two monthly salaries on their due dates, the player will be deemed to have a just cause to terminate his contract, provided that he has put the debtor club in default in writing and has granted a deadline of at least 15 days for the debtor club to fully comply with its financial obligation(s). Alternative provisions in contracts existing at the time of this provision coming into force may be considered.

2. For any salaries of a player which are not due on a monthly basis, the pro-rata value corresponding to

Akhisar Belediye Gençlik ve Spor Kulübü Dernegi v. award of 15 December 2020

two months shall be considered. Delayed payment of an amount which is equal to at least two months shall also be deemed a just cause for the player to terminate his contract, subject to him complying with the notice of termination as per paragraph 1 above”.

87. In the matter at hand it is disputed by the Appellant that the Player unilaterally terminated the Contract with just cause. In particular, the Appellant considers that Article 14bis par. 1 FIFA RSTP is not applicable as the delay in payments at the time of the premature unilateral termination of the Contract did not amount to “at least two monthly salaries” but only to one and a half monthly salary, inter alia because the payment of EUR 95,000 due on 25 August 2019 is not to be considered as a salary but as an advance payment of the 2019/2020 season.

88. The Sole Arbitrator thus needs to assess whether the FIFA DRC correctly concluded that the termination of the Contract was made with just cause. The Sole Arbitrator first notes that in the matter at hand, there is no contractual provision addressing the issue of an early termination of the Contract with (or without) just cause, which is why – in principle – Article 14bis FIFA RSTP shall apply. The first question is therefore, how many monthly salaries were due at the time of the unilateral termination of the Contract of the Player.

89. The Sole Arbitrator notes that the Appellant was put in default twice. As the Appellant was granted a second deadline of 15 days to comply with its financial obligations on 27 August 2019 before the Contract was unilaterally terminated on 13 September 2019, the Sole Arbitrator finds that only the circumstances at the time of the second warning letter are relevant.

90. The Sole Arbitrator notes that according to Article 3 of the Contract (“Monthly Payments”), the Parties agreed to break down the players renumeration (in the total amount of EUR 500,000 a year) into ten instalments. Thus, the salaries were not due on a twelve months basis but on ten different occasions. In order to assess whether at least two monthly salaries were due at the time of the unilateral termination of the Contract, the pro-rata value corresponding to two months shall be considered (Article 14bis par. 2 FIFA RSTP).

91. Furthermore, the Sole Arbitrator agrees with the FIFA DRC which implicitly stated that, in the context of Article 14bis FIFA RSTP and its clear wording, only outstanding salaries constitute just cause for the termination of an employment contract by a player, while other amounts such as bonuses, tax contributions and sign-on fees are left outside the scope of said provision.

92. On 27 August 2019, the Respondent put the Appellant in default regarding the payment of EUR 285,000. With regard to the above-stated, the Sole Arbitrator underlines that – contrary to what is stated by the Appellant – any potential outstanding bonus payments cannot be considered here.

93. The Sole Arbitrator notes that the following instalments with respective due dates for the 2018/2019 season respectively the 2019/2020 season were outstanding when the Appellant was reminded of its financial obligations on 27 August 2019.

Akhisar Belediye Gençlik ve Spor Kulübü Dernegi v. award of 15 December 2020

25.04.2019 45.000 Euro 25.05.2019 45.000 Euro

94. However, as a result of the letter sent on 27 August 2019, the Appellant paid half of the amount due in April 2019. Thus, it is undisputed that a salary corresponding to one and a half months for the season 2018/2019 was outstanding and due at the time of the unilateral termination of the Contract on 13 September 2019. For the season 2019/2020 starting in August 2019, it is undisputed that EUR 0 had been paid on or before 13 September 2019.

95. The Sole Arbitrator then observes that according to Article 3 of the Contract, the total value of the Contract for the 2019/2020 season is EUR 500,000. Thus, the pro-rata value of one monthly salary corresponds EUR 41,666.60. When the Respondent unilaterally terminated the Contract on 13 September 2019, at least one monthly salary for the 2019/2020 season, i.e. the one for August 2019 in said amount was due. Therefore, contrary to what is stated by the Appellant, the payment due on 25 August 2019 is not to be considered as an advance payment but – at least partly and in the amount of EUR 41,666.60 – as a “monthly” salary for August 2019.

96. Consequently, the Sole Arbitrator agrees with the FIFA DRC that at least two and a half monthly salaries were due when the Respondent unilaterally terminated the Contract on 13 September 2019.

97. As the Appellant had been given a 15-day written notice as well one extra day to pay the outstanding sum, the requirements of Article 14bis FIFA RSTP were fulfilled and the FIFA DRC correctly found that the Player had just cause to terminate the Contract on 13 September 2019.

98. The Appellant further argues that the circumstances must be taken into account when assessing whether the Contract was terminated with just cause or not. The Sole Arbitrator observes that the FIFA DRC indeed did not evaluate any further arguments of the Appellant in this regard. However, in certain cases the behaviour of the counter-party may have an impact on the assessment whether a contract was terminated with or without just cause which is why the two main arguments of the Appellant will be addressed hereinafter.

99. First, the Sole Arbitrator dismisses the argument of the Appellant put forward in its letter of 25 July 2019, i.e. that it had not paid the outstanding salaries due to financial problems, based on the well-known principle that financial difficulties to satisfy an obligation of payment do not excuse the failure to make a required payment (cf. CAS 2016/A/4402, para 40; CAS 2006/A/1008, para. 19). This is also the case if, as stated by the Appellant, the financial difficulties are only temporary.

100. In said letter, as also in the present proceedings, the Appellant pointed out that the Player’s injury and his negligence in the healing process had caused the Club a big sporting and financial damage. The Sole Arbitrator observes that this argument does not change the fact that the Appellant had failed to compensate the Player according to what was agreed in the Contract.

Akhisar Belediye Gençlik ve Spor Kulübü Dernegi v. award of 15 December 2020

101. It needs to be noted that the Contract was concluded for a fixed period of two and a half years, i.e. until 31 May 2020 (Article 2 of the Contract). When the Appellant states that it did not and would not have had any benefit of the Player even in the upcoming 2019/2020 season as he was and would still be injured and unable to play, the Sole Arbitrator understands the Appellant’s concerns. However, the Appellant needs to be reminded that – apart from this argument being partly very hypothetical – poor sporting performance, for whatever reason, thus also because of tedious injuries, is the inherent risk for any club concluding long-term football contracts. This is especially true for cases as the present one where there is no explicit contractual clause that would provide the Club a possibility for an early termination due to lacking sporting results or the event that a player is injured for a long time.

102. The longstanding CAS jurisprudence is very clear on this point:

“The Club may have been legitimately disappointed with the performance of the Player, especially since they made an investment of a reasonable size. However, nothing in the Contract justifies termination of contract based on sporting performance. Moreover, it happens quite frequently that clubs sign players who subsequently disappoint with their sporting performance. In the absence of strict contractual language, inadequate sporting performance can hardly constitute a legitimate breach of contract. This is not to say that the Club cannot terminate the contract in such cases, provided of course, that it has reached an agreement with the Player in this regard. This has not been the case here. For these reasons, this plea must be rejected as well” (CAS 2010/A/2049).

103. The Sole Arbitrator notes that the Appellant indeed tried to solve the matter amicably and – in its letter of 25 July 2019 – offered to pay the outstanding salaries of the 2018/2019 season and to mutually terminate the Contract. However, no agreement was reached. The Appellant even fails to demonstrate that the Parties ever entered into any negotiations. The Respondent wanted to continue the employment relationship. Also, he wanted to receive the contractually guaranteed compensation as an employee.

104. Furthermore, the Appellant fails to demonstrate that the Player showed any bad faith or acted fraudulent, with the consequence that the Appellant rightly withheld payments. The Player’s injury and the fact that he did not have any surgery seemed to concern the Appellant only after the Respondent first claimed outstanding remuneration on 11 July 2019. The Appellant has not put forward any evidence that there had been earlier discussions between the Club and the Player regarding this surgery that undisputedly never happened and, in particular, that the Player had been made aware that the Club expected him to undergo such surgery. The Appellant could not specify if and when it gave the player any specific instructions regarding the cure of his injury which he would then have potentially ignored.

105. The Sole Arbitrator finds that the Appellant has not substantiated in what way the Player should have violated its duty to keep himself “physically fit” as agreed in the Contract. The Player undisputedly attended training sessions and, apart from the Appellant’s general allegations, there is no indication that he would have opposed to recommendations of the medical team. Therefore, the behaviour of the Player certainly does not amount to a contractual violation that would justify withholding monthly payments or even the termination of the contract from the Appellant’s side – at least not without any prior warning. Injuries that occur during matches and

Akhisar Belediye Gençlik ve Spor Kulübü Dernegi v. award of 15 December 2020

might affect the Player’s performance simply fall within the Club’s sphere of risk. The Sole Arbitrator therefore agrees with the FIFA DRC that the Respondent was entitled to the monthly payments as set out in the Contract.

106. Therefore, the Sole Arbitrator holds that the Respondent terminated the Contract on 13 September 2019 with just cause and that the Appellant is to be held liable for not complying with its contractual duties.

b. If the contract was terminated with just cause, what is the remuneration owed by the Appellant?

107. The Sole Arbitrator notes that the FIFA DRC then assessed the amount of the remuneration owed by the Appellant, which conforms to standard CAS practice. A club in breach of its financial obligation shall pay the player the outstanding remuneration owed at the time of the termination of the contract (see e.g. CAS 2016/A/4623 & 4624, award of 15 March 2017).

i. Outstanding remuneration

108. The Sole Arbitrator agrees with the FIFA DRC that the outstanding remuneration still due at the time of the termination of the Contract needs to be addressed first.

109. It is undisputed that the monthly payments for April 2019 in the amount of EUR 22,500 as well as for May 2019 in the amount of EUR 45,000 were owed at the time of the termination of the Contract. Furthermore, the Sole Arbitrator agrees with the FIFA DRC that the payment due on 25 August 2019 in the amount of EUR 95,000 was outstanding – notwithstanding whether it is to be characterised as a salary or an advance payment.

110. Also, it is undisputed that only a part of the bonus for the 2018/2019 season, i.e. EUR 40,783.37, had been paid at the time of the termination of the Contract in September 2019. The Appellant states that said bonus is not owed as it was designed as a “reward bonus” and the Player was undisputedly not able to play for the biggest part of the 2018/2019 season. The Respondent on the other hand refers to the wording of the bonus provision in Article 3 of the Contract stating that the bonus of EUR 100,000 is to be considered as a “minimum guarantee amount” and infers therefrom that the Player is entitled to a bonus payment, no matter whether he played any match or not.

111. The relevant provision in the Contract reads as follows:

“For 2018/2019 Season, Player will receive team/win bonuses which will be decided by the Board in the minimum guarantee amount of 100.000 Euros net. In this context, if the total amount of the team/win bonuses which will be decided by the Board is less than 100,000 Euros in 2018/2019 Season, the Club will pay the difference between 100.000 Euros and the total team/win bonuses until 15th of June, 2019”.

112. In order to assess whether the bonus clause in the Contract is to be considered as a “reward” in the sense of a performance bonus or not, the Sole Arbitrator notes that by applying article

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18 para. 1 of the Swiss Code of Obligations (SCO), the true and mutual intention of the parties should be sought, when a contract needs interpretation.

113. When assessing first the wording of the clause, the Sole Arbitrator notices that the Parties indeed mention a “team/win” bonus. However, they also mention a “minimum guarantee amount”. The question is thus, also based on the circumstances, whether the relevant clause is a performance incentive clause or not.

114. The Sole Arbitrator observes in this context that usually, a bonus scheme is set up to with the goal of motivating the team to achieve the desired results. As set out in CAS 2009/A/1874:

“For incentive schemes of this kind to provide the necessary motivation, those striving to achieve this goal must be able to expect that payment of the bonus must be certain upon obtention of the result. Presumably the higher the expected payment is, the greater the degree of motivation to achieve the identified goal. It is therefore essential that the objectives be clearly defined, and that the expected reward for reaching it also be clear”.

115. However, the Sole Arbitrator also notes that in the matter at hand, no bonus scheme was set up. There is no indication in the Contract that payment of the bonus would be subject to any conditions, neither in the relevant clause itself nor in any Annex to the Contract. The Appellant does not claim such requirement either. Much more so, the clause itself states that the Player will receive bonuses in the minimum guarantee amount of EUR 100,000. In case the Board decides on a lower bonus, the clause stipulates that the Club itself will – similar to a joint and several guarantee – ensure that the whole bonus is paid by assuming the difference.

116. Therefore, the Sole Arbitrator concludes that the bonus clause was not drafted as an incentive clause and that therefore, the fact that the Player was not able to play for most of the season 2018/2019 does not matter and the Respondent is entitled to the payment of the whole sum.

117. As the FIFA DRC correctly calculated, the outstanding bonus for the 2018/2019 corresponded EUR 59,216.63.

118. The Sole Arbitrator therefore supports the calculation of the FIFA DRC regarding the outstanding payments at the time of the termination of the Contract and does not see any reason to depart from said decision. The outstanding remuneration to be paid by the Appellant thus amounts to EUR 221,716.63 plus an interest of 5% p.a. as from the due dates until the effective date of payment.

ii. Residual value of the Contract

119. The Sole Arbitrator then addresses, as did the FIFA DRC, the further consequences of the termination with just cause which the Appellant is to be held liable for.

120. The FIFA DRC applied Article 17 par. 1 FIFA RSTP which states the following:

“In all cases, the party in breach shall pay compensation. Subject to the provisions of article 20 and Annexe 4

Akhisar Belediye Gençlik ve Spor Kulübü Dernegi v. award of 15 December 2020

in relation to training compensation, and unless otherwise provided for in the contract, compensation for the breach shall be calculated with due consideration for the law of the country concerned, the specificity of sport, and any other objective criteria. These criteria shall include, in particular, the remuneration and other benefits due to the player under the existing contract and/or the new contract, the time remaining on the existing contract up to a maximum of five years, the fees and expenses paid or incurred by the former club (amortised over the term of the contract) and whether the contractual breach falls within a protected period”.

121. The Sole Arbitrator notes that said provision is applied on a regular basis by CAS Panels in order to calculate the compensation owed in case a Club “forced” a Player to prematurely terminate the Contract by not making any payments, thus breaching the contract (see e.g. CAS

122. The FIFA DRC thus correctly assessed in a first step whether the Contract itself contains any provision by means of which the Parties had beforehand agreed upon an amount of compensation payable in the event of breach of contract. The Sole Arbitrator agrees with the FIFA DRC that this is not the case.

123. He further notes that where the termination of the employment contract was due to a breach by the club, the “remuneration” factor, together with “the time remaining” factor – both parameters from the non-exhaustive list set out in Article 17 par. 1 FIFA RSTP, play a major role (see CAS 2017/A/5111, paras. 137-138). In the matter at hand, the other parameters such as the law of the country concerned, the fees and expenses paid for the Player and the protected period seem to have little relevance. Further, there seems to be no place for the specificity of sport either – the breach did not preclude the Player from finding a new club.

124. In the matter at hand, the residual value of the Contract, concluded for a period until 31 May 2020, is calculated based on the monthly payments for the season 2019/2020 as set out in Article 3 of the Contract. The Sole Arbitrator observes that from said amounts, the payment due 25 August 2019 in the amount of EUR 95,000 is already included in the outstanding remuneration. Therefore, these EUR 95,000 need to be deducted from the over-all residual value of the Contract in the amount of EUR 500,000. This results in a residual value of the Contract of EUR 405,000.

125. The Sole Arbitrator therefore agrees with the Appellant that the basis for the final determination of the amount of compensation for breach of contract needs to be amended accordingly by comparison to what was calculated by the FIFA DRC in the Appealed Decision.

126. The FIFA DRC then recalled that, according to the Contract, the Respondent was entitled to an annual bonus even for the 2019/2020 season. The Sole Arbitrator notes that what was elaborated above and in the context with the annual bonus for the 2018/2019 season also applies here. The Contract stipulates a “minimum guarantee amount of 100,000 Euros net”, which is why said sum needs to be added to the residual value of the Contract.

127. The Sole Arbitrator therefore concludes that the total residual value of the Contract amounts to EUR 505,000 which is therefore owed by the Appellant.

Akhisar Belediye Gençlik ve Spor Kulübü Dernegi v. award of 15 December 2020

iii. Duty to mitigate the damage

128. Finally, the Sole Arbitrator addresses the Appellant’s argument that the Respondent did not fulfil his duty to mitigate the damage. The Sole Arbitrator notes the lack of any detailed reasoning in the Appealed Decision in this regard.

129. The Sole Arbitrator notes that in fact, Article 17 par. 1 FIFA RSTP foresees that any new employment contract needs to be taken into consideration. Furthermore, it is long-standing CAS practice that Swiss law and, in particular and as invoked by the Appellant, Article 337c SCO can be applied subisdiarily. Said provision reads as follows:

“1 Where the employer dismisses the employee with immediate effect without good cause, the employee is entitled to damages in the amount he would have earned had the employment relationship ended after the required notice period or on expiry of its agreed duration.

2 Such damages are reduced by any amounts that the employee saved as a result of the termination of the employment relationship or that he earned by performing other work or would have earned had he not intentionally foregone such work. […]”.

130. The Sole Arbitrator notes that it is undisputed that the Player remained unemployed until the end of the contractual period, i.e. 31 May 2020. More so, the Player was still unemployed when the hearing was held. The Respondent stated that he did not intentionally remain unemployed but that the Contract ended in September 2019 just after the national transfer window had closed. Since then, there was only one transfer window in January, during which he did not succeed in finding any new club.

131. The Sole Arbitrator first notes that, according to Swiss law, the employer bears the burden of proof in such constellations (see PORTMANN/RUDOLPH, BSK OR-I, Article 337c, N3). The Sole Arbitrator notes that the Appellant has not provided any evidence that rebuts the statements made by the Respondent. Its allegation remained very general and unsubstantiated.

132. Furthermore, the Sole Arbitrator observes that, according to Swiss jurisprudence, the circumstances of the job market or the personal conditions need to be taken into consideration – if it then turns out as little probable that the employee could have found an appropriate job, it may not even be concluded from the fact alone that an employee did not look for a job that he deliberately did forego a possible work income (see OGer ZH, JAR 2015, 641).

133. In the matter at hand, the Respondent actually did try to find a job. Furthermore, his rather difficult situation as a long-time injured player with very little match practice at the age of 34, as well as the fact that there were only few transfer windows need to be kept in mind. Also, the job market became much more unpredictable as of March 2020 when the COVID-19 pandemic started to hit. Thus, finding employment may not have been that easy for the Player. In any event, there is no indication that he intentionally omitted to find a job. The Respondent can therefore not be made liable for his failure to find a new employer.

Akhisar Belediye Gençlik ve Spor Kulübü Dernegi v. award of 15 December 2020

134. Therefore, the Sole Arbitrator does not see any reason to conclude that the Respondent failed to meet his duty to mitigate the damage and reduce the compensation calculated above as requested by the Appellant.

B. Further Issues

135. Finally, the Sole Arbitrator notes that the Appellant challenged the Appealed Decision in its entirety – thus also the potential consequences in case the Club does not comply with the FIFA DRC decision (such as bans according to Article 24bis FIFA RSTP).

136. However, there is no reason to amend said rulings by the FIFA DRC as the Appealed Decision is only amended in a minor way and is upheld particularly in the sense that the Appellant needs to pay the Respondent a certain amount of money.

C. Conclusion

137. In light of the foregoing, the Sole Arbitrator holds that the Appeal brought by the Appellant against the Appealed Decision is to be partially admitted.

138. Whereas the outstanding remuneration owed by the Club was correctly calculated and quantified at EUR 221,716.63 plus an interest of 5% p.a. as from the due dates until the effective date of payment, the additional compensation owed by the Club is to be amended and quantified at EUR 505,000.