Boris Galchev v. SC Dinamo 1948 SA

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND — A. Facts

3. Below is a summary of the relevant facts and allegations based on the Parties’ written submissions and evidence filed. While the Sole Arbitrator has considered all the facts, allegations, legal arguments and evidence submitted by the Parties in the present proceedings, he refers in his Award only to the submissions and evidence he considers necessa ry to explain his reasoning.

4. On 12 July 2012, the Parties signed an employment contract (the “Employment Contract”), valid as from 12 July 2012 until 30 June 2014. According to Article J para. 1 and 4 of the Employment Contract, the Player was entitled to receive from the Club the following monthly net salary, payable until the 5 th day of the following month:

a. EUR 11,000 for the period of 12 July 2012 until 30 June 2013;

b. EUR 12,000 for the period of 1 July 2013 until 30 June 2014.

5. In addition to the Employment Contract, the Parties signed on 16 July 2012 a financial addendum to the contract (the “Addendum”). According to para. 1 of this Addendum, the Club agreed to pay the Player the following net bonuses for his sport performance:

a. EUR 900 for participating in a home match won in League I competition;

b. EUR 400 for each point won as a player in every away matches in League I competition;

Only 50% of the above mentioned bonus will be paid if the Player performed as reserve field player. Payment will be made monthly, until the 25 th of the next month.

6. On 1 and 15 November 2012, the Player’s agent, L., sent a reminder to the Club and put the Club in default regarding the payment of the Player’s salaries for August and September 2012 as well as match bonuses.

7. On 9 November 2012, the Club sent its answer to the Player asserting that the Club would pay the outstanding amounts to the Player as soon as possible.

8. On 15 November 2012, the Player informed the Club in writing that the term “as soon as possible” does not satisfy him; he, therefore, urged the Club to pay the outstanding dues until 26 November 2012. The Club did not answer to this letter.

9. On 4 January 2013, the Player unilaterally terminated the Employment Contract with the Club with immediate effect in writing, invoking just cause.

10. From 7 January 2013 until 6 January 2014, the Player was employed by PFC Botev Plovdiv in Bulgaria. He received a monthly salary of EUR 7,000. The contract did foresee a duration until 30 June 2014, but the Player left early.

11. From 6 January until 30 June 2014, the Player was employed by PFC CSKA Sofia, Bulgaria where he received a total amount of EUR 32’520 (BGN 10’600 per month).

B. Proceedings before FIFA’s Dispute Resolution Chamber (“DRC”)

12. On 7 January 2013, the Player lodged a claim before the DRC claiming the payment of a total of EUR 259’700, broken down as follows:

a) EUR 47’500 (4x EUR 11’000 plus EUR 2’000 and EUR 1’500) as outstanding salaries corresponding to the period of 12 August 2012 to 3 January 2013 plus 5% interests p.a.;

b) EUR 3’700 as match participation and performance bonuses plus 5% interests p.a.;

c) EUR 208’500 as compensation for breach of contract, corresponding to the remaining salaries from 4 January 2013 to 30 June 2014;

13. On 31 January 2013, the Club contested the competence of FIFA to deal with the present matter. As to the substance, the Club admitted that there had been delays in the payment of some amounts due to the Player, due of the general economic situation of the Club. For this reason, and due to the fact that the Player had some difficulties to adapt to the team’s game, the Club and the Player agreed on 13 December 2012 to terminate the Employment Contract (the “Termination Agreement”), with effect as of 20 December 2012. According to this Termination Agreement, the Player declared having no more financial claims against the Club.

14. Based on the file provided by FIFA, the Sole Arbitrator has seen that the Player requested the DRC from 7 March 2013 until 20 November 2014 to send the Club’s answer to his claim for which the DRC set a deadline on 31 January 2013.

15. On 23 October 2014, the Club requested the DRC to send the original of the Termination Agreement back in order for the Club to send this document to an expert to verify the original signature of the Player.

16. On 28 November 2014, FIFA sent the original of the Termination Agreement back to the Club.

17. On 19 December 2014, the Player filed his comments regarding FIFA’s competence do deal with the present matter. Further, the Player contested the identity of the Termination Agreement and denied having signed such document.

18. On 9 February 2015, the Club reaffirmed its arguments that the DRC is not competent to decide this case, respectively maintained that the Termination Agreement is valid and that it was ready to submit the document to an expert to attest whether the signature of the Player had been forged or not.

19. On 14 May 2015, the Club sent the original of the Termination Agreement back to FIFA.

20. On 4 June 2015, FIFA sent the DRC decision, dated 21 May 2015, to the Parties:

“1. The claim of the Claimant, Boris Galchev, is admissible. 2. The claim of the Claimant is rejected”.

21. On 12 June 2015, the Player asked FIFA to notify the grounds of the Decision.

22. On 28 October 2015, the reasoning of the Decision was notified to the Parties. It can be summarized as follows:

- The DRC stated that it is competent to decide on employment-related disputes between clubs and players with an international dimension, like in the present matter, involving a Bulgarian player and a Romanian club, based on Article 22 lit. b) Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, edition 2012 (“RSTP”). Regarding the Club’s objection that the DRC was not competent to decide upon the present matter, it emphasised that the Employment Contract, in Article O, does not make a clear reference to one specific national dispute resolution chamber. Therefore, this Article O cannot be considered as a clear arbitration clause in favour of the national deciding bodies of the RFF or the RPFL; further even FIFA is mentioned as competent authority;

- The RSTP, edition 2012, shall be applicable as to the substance of the matter due to the fact that the claim was lodged with FIFA on 7 January 2013;

- It was undisputed by the Parties that they signed an employment contract valid as from 12 July 2012 until 30 June 2014;

- The core document in the present dispute is the Termination Agreement, apparently signed by both Parties on 13 December 2012. The Player stated that he did not sign this document. Based on Article 12 para. 3 of the Procedural Rules “Any party claiming a right on the basis of an alleged fact shall carry the burden of proof”;

- The Termination Agreement bears the signature of the Respondent and the alleged signature of the Player; further the Respondent was able to provide the original of this Termination Agreement;

- The members of the DRC compared the relevant signatures of the Player and they had no other option but to conclude that, for a layman, the signatures on these documents, including the Termination Agreement, appear to be the same. For this reason, the Player’s allegation of counterfeit cannot be upheld;

- By signing the Termination Agreement, the Player had agreed to terminate the Employment Contract with the Club and declared not to have any pending financial claims towards the Club;

- Based on the case file, including the documents filed as proofs, the DRC concluded that the Player’s claim had to be rejected, the Parties have amicably agreed upon the termination of the Employment Contract and the Club does not have any pending financial obligations towards the Player.

III. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE CAS

23. On 17 November 2015, the Player filed his Statement of Appeal regarding the Decision, pursuant to Articles R47 et seq. of the Code of Sports-related Arbitration (the “Code”). The Appellant requested a Sole Arbitrator to be appointed by the Appeals Arbitrat ion Division pursuant to Article R50 of the Code.

24. On 27 November 2015, the Respondent requested the CAS Court Office to submit the present dispute to a panel of three arbitrators.

25. On 3 December 2015, FIFA informed the CAS that it renounces to its right to intervene in the present arbitration, pursuant to Articles R54 and R41.3 of the Code.

26. On 8 December 2015, the CAS Court Office informed the Parties that the President of the CAS Appeals Arbitration Division or her Deputy will decide on the number of arbitrators and the requested extension of the Appellant’s time limit to file the Appeal Brief. Further the Appellant was informed that the Respondent will not pay its advance of costs in this matter.

27. On 11 December 2015, the CAS Court Office informed the Parties about the decision of the President of the CAS Appeals Arbitration Division to submit the present proceedings to a Sole Arbitrator. Further it informed about the extension of the Appellant’s time limit to file the Appeal Brief until 16 December 2015.

28. On 16 December 2015, the Appellant filed his Appeal Brief, according to Article R51 of the Code.

29. On 28 December 2015, the Respondent requested the CAS Court Office that the time limit for filing its Answer shall only be fixed after the payment of the advance of costs by the Appellant.

30. On 11 January 2016, the Appellant filed an application for legal aid and requested assistance for the CAS arbitration costs as well as assistance for his own costs.

31. On 12 January 2016, the CAS Court Office suspended the Appellant’s deadline to pay his advance of costs.

32. On 28 January 2016, the President of the International Council of Arbitration for Sport (ICAS) issued the order on request for legal aid. The Appellant’s application for Legal Aid was dismissed.

33. On 17 February 2016, the CAS Court Office informed the Parties that the President of the CAS Appeals Arbitration Division had appointed Mr. Bernhard Welten, attorney-at-law in Berne,

Switzerland, as Sole Arbitrator to decide the matter at hand.

34. On 11 March 2016, the Respondent filed its Answer pursuant to Article R55 of the Code.

35. On 17 respectively 22 March 2016, the Appellant stated his favour for a hearing to be hold; respectively the Respondent, waived his right for a hearing to be hold.

36. On 31 March 2016, the Sole Arbitrator decided to appoint an independent graphologist expert and he, therefore, asked the Parties to produce the originals of all contracts, addendums, annexes and agreements allegedly signed by the Appellant.

37. On 12 April 2016, FIFA sent a copy of the complete file of the DRC to the CAS.

38. On 12 July 2016, an independent expert was appointed by the Sole Arbitrator as independent expert pursuant to Article R44.3 of the Code.

39. On 21 July 2016, the Appellant requested that the independent expert shall esta blish the authenticity of the Appellant’s alleged signature and compare the ink paste with the printed text, the handwritten date on the Termination Agreement and the Appellant’s signature in order to establish whether the Agreement was really signed on or around 13 December 2012.

40. On 2 September 2016, the CAS Court Office informed the Parties that the expert is generally only able to date an ink entry when comparing a very fresh (weeks or a few months old) entry with an older one. Otherwise such dating methods are unreliable and, therefore, he recommends restricting his mission to the question regarding the authenticity of the Appellant’s signature.

41. On 8 September 2016, the CAS Court Office informed the Parties about the Appellant’s nonagreement to limit the expert’s mission and, therefore, the Sole Arbitrator’s decision to appoint another expert.

42. On 15 September 2016, the Parties were informed about the new expert being Dr. Audrey Giles. On the same day, the Appellant sent a fax letter and gave his agreement to the appointment of Mrs. Giles as new independent expert respectively to get the microscope examination instead of the dating of the ink.

43. On 4 October 2016, the CAS Court Office sent the requested documents to the independent expert with the instruction to additionally carry out the microscopic examination of the pen lines in the handwritings on the Termination Agreement.

44. On 21 October 2016, the report of the independent expert was sent to the Parties. They were both given the possibility to comment on the report. The report can be summarized in essence as follows:

- The expert found on the Termination Agreement impressions which have been produced as a result of hand writings on a blue post-it note attached to it, a signature she could not determine the name of, but not matching that of either Mr. Nicolai Badea or the Player, a signature which appears similar in style to the signature of the Player - this presence

suggests that the Player may have signed another document whilst that document was resting directly on top of the Termination Agreement - and an impression appearing to be the name Giles as well as further impressions which she cannot interpret.

- The signatures of the Player and of Mr. Nicolai Badea are made with different pencil; the date “13.12.2012” and the Player’s signature on the Termination Agreement are indistinguishable from each other; the microscopic examination shows that they are written with different pressures, the signature being very lightly written and the pen lines of the date much more firmly. The expert is not able to determine whether the Player’s signature and the date were made at the same time or on different occasions.

- The expert states that comparing the Player’s signatures, it appears that there are some differences. The Player’s signature on the Termination Agreement starts with a similar structure as seen in the compared signatures. The following tall structure, however, appears simplified compared to the other signatures; however, the expert states that she has seen some considerable variation in this area of the Player’s signature. The vertical stroke in this tall structure is longer than that seen in the majority of the Player’s signatures. Nevertheless, the expert concludes that she has strong positive evidence to support the view that the questioned signature on the Termination Agreement is a genuine signature of the Player. She cannot exclude the possibility that this signature is an extremely sophisticated simulation, however, she considered this to be unlikely. Her summary of findings is:

“1. Microscopic examination of the signature in the name Galchev and the date 13.12.2012 on the questioned Agreement are made in similar ink but are written with different pressures. It is not possible on the basis of these examinations to determine whether the questioned signature in the name Galchev and the date were made at the same time or on different occasions.

2. My examinations of the signatures, and therefore the conclusions which can be drawn from them, have been limited by the fact that the signatures of Mr. Galchev provided for my examination may not represent the full range of variation to be seen in his signature at the relevant time. Further Mr. Galchev’s signatures do demonstrate substantial variation.

3. The questioned signature is freely and fluently executed, and demonstrates no evidence of simulation. This signature shows close similarity to the signatures of Mr. Galchev provided for my examination, although there are some differences present.

4. Taking all of these factors into account I have concluded that there is a strong positive evidence to support the view that the questioned signature on the Agreement dated 13th December 2012 is a genuine signature of Boris Galchev”.

45. On 28 October 2016, the Appellant sent his statement to the expert report. This statement may be summarized as follows:

- He does not object to the findings of the expert;

- As he does not speak and understand Romanian and English, he could possibly have signed the Agreement by mistake or maybe having being induced to entering into it by the wilful deception of the Respondent;

- He is convinced that he did not sign the Agreement on 13 December 2012, as he was not in Romania on this date;

- The expert’s statement that there were impressions of other signatures on the Termination Agreement, possibly coming from other documents being signed on top of the Termination Agreement, corroborates the Appellant’s statement that he was induced to sign the Agreement by the wilful deception of the Respondent at an earlier date;

- He did not sign any document with the Respondent in December 2012; the last document he signed with the Respondent was in November 2012, in the presence of the team’s goalkeeper K., who acted as interpreter for the Appellant. In November 2012, B. signed for the Respondent; therefore, the impression found by the expert could be from B.

For these reasons, the Appellant requests the Sole Arbitrator to order the Respondent to produce the original document signed by this third person which was signed when resting on top of the Termination Agreement and to allow K. to give oral testimony.

46. On 7 November 2016, the Respondent filed its statement to the expert report which can be summarized as follows:

- It agrees with the conclusions 1 and 4 of the independent expert, which does not mean that it agrees with the conclusions 2 and 3;

- The expert responded to points not being asked by the CAS; therefore the impressions found on the Agreement cannot be taken into account. One of the impressions “appears to be the name Giles” which is the name of the independent expert. The impression “Boris Galchev” did not undergo the same examination as the ink signature on the Termination Agreement, however it “appears similar in style” based on the expert’s statement;

- The Appellant’s argument that he signed the Agreement by mistake or because he had been misled cannot be taken into account as any evidence for this is missing;

- As the expert states that it cannot be precisely determined whether the date and signature were made at the same time, the expert also clearly explained that the opposite pretention is impossible to prove (date and signature made on different occasions).

The Respondent objects to the Appellant’s requests for new evidence as K. could have been named as witness even in the Statement of Appeal and no exceptional circumstances exist. Further, the Appellant is unable to state what exact document he requests from the Respondent; the Appellant should possess the documents he has signed and no exceptional circumstances are given to justify the request to produce such proofs only now.

47. On 5 December 2016, the Sole Arbitrator decided to reject the Appellant’s requests to order

the Respondent to produce the original of the document signed by a third party when resting on top of the Termination Agreement respectively to listen to K. as witness.

48. On 7 December 2016, the Appellant has withdrawn the prayers 1 to 5 of his Appeal Brief being:

“1. To set aside and annul the entire decision passed on 21 May 2015 by the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber.

2. To establish that the Appellant has unilaterally terminated the employment relationship with the Respondent for just cause, on 4 January 2013.

3. To order the Respondent to pay the Appellant outstanding salaries in the amount of EUR 46’000 net, plus interest of 5% per annum as follows:

a) On EUR 2’000 as from 6 September 2012;

b) On EUR 11’000 as from 6 October 2012;

c) On EUR 11’000 as from 6 November 2012;

d) On EUR 11’000 as from 6 December 2012; and

e) On EUR 11’000 as from 5 January 2013.

4. To order the Respondent to pay the Appellant outstanding match bonuses in the amount of EUR 2’400 net, plus interest of 5% per annum as follows:

a) On EUR 1’100 (i.e. EUR 200 + EUR 900) as from 26 September 2012; and

b) On EUR 1’300 (i.e. EUR 900 + EUR 400) as from 5 January 2013.

5. To order the Respondent to pay the Appellant compensation for breach of contract in the amount of EUR 93’480 net, plus interest of 5% per annum as from 5 January 2013”.

49. Further the Appellant agreed that the Sole Arbitrator could render his decision based on the Parties’ arguments and no hearing shall be held. The Appellant, therefore, adhered to his alternative prayers 6 to 10:

“6. To set aside and annul the entire decision passed on 21 May 2015 by the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber.

7. To order the Respondent to pay the Appellant outstanding salaries in the amount of EUR 46’000 net, plus interest of 5% per annum as follows:

a) On EUR 2’000 as from 6 September 2012;

b) On EUR 11’000 as from 6 October 2012;

c) On EUR 11’000 as from 6 November 2012;

d) On EUR 11’000 as from 6 December 2012; and

e) On EUR 11’000 as from 5 January 2013.

8. To order the Respondent to pay the Appellant outstanding match bonuses in the amount of EUR 2’400 net, plus interest of 5% per annum as follows:

a) On EUR 1’100 (i.e. EUR 200 + EUR 900) as from 26 September 2012; and

b) On EUR 1’300 (i.e. EUR 900 + EUR 400) as from 5 January 2013.

In any event

9. To order the Respondent to bear all the costs incurred with the present procedure.

10. To order the Respondent to pay the Appellant a contribution towards its legal and other costs, in an amount to be determined at the discretion of the panel”.

50. On 12 December 2016, the Respondent confirmed its view that no hearing is necessary in this case. Therefore, the Sole Arbitrator decided to cancel the hearing which was foreseen for 20 December 2016.

51. On 13 December 2016, the Appellant respectively the Respondent signed the Order of Procedure.

IV. SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES

52. In the following summaries, the Sole Arbitrator will not include every argument put forward to support the Parties’ claims. Nevertheless, the Sole Arbitrator has carefully considered and taken into account all of the evidence and arguments submitted by the Parties, but limits his explicit references to those arguments that are necessary in order to justify his decision.

A. Appellant’s Submissions and Requests for Relief

53. The Appellant’s submissions, in essence, may be summarized as follows:

- During the FIFA proceedings, the Respondent did not dispute the validity of the Employment Contract and the Addendum nor the amounts claimed by the Appellant as outstanding. Disputed is, whether the Appellant has signed the Termination Agreement on 13 December 2012 or not and if he validly waived his financial rights. Before the DRC, the Respondent’s only argument was based on the Termination Agreement being signed by both Parties. However, the Appellant vehemently denies having signed the Termination Agreement. He therefore asks for an expertise by a graphologist.

- If the Appellant did not sign the Termination Agreement, this Termination Agreement is not legally binding and does not have any effect on the relation between the Parties. In such case, the Appellant had just cause to terminate the Employment Contract according to Article 14 RSTP and Article 337 para. 2 Swiss Code of Obligations (“CO”). The Respondent is then liable to pay the outstanding salary and bonus until 4 January 2013 (EUR 48’400) and a compensation based on Article 17 para. 1 RSTP, calculated based on the remaining contract period, reduced by the salary received from Plovdiv and CSKA Sofia until 30 June 2014 being EUR 93’480. In addition to these amounts an interest of 5% p.a. is due, starting on the due date of the salary, respectively on 5 January 2013 for the compensation.

- In case the Appellant’s signature under the Termination Agreement is not a forgery, the Appellant invokes Articles 23 and 24 para. 1 CO, a material error, leading to the consequence that the Termination Agreement is not binding on him. He was asked by the Respondent to sign various documents at the beginning of the employment relationship and within the following couple of months. He therefore beliefs, having signed such document much earlier than on 13 December 2012. On this date, he was not in Romania and could therefore not sign the Termination Agreement at this date; all players were released on annual leave on 11 December 2012 as no other match was played until the end of the year. The Respondent was in arrears of payments of the Appellant’s salary for August (EUR 2’000) and September to November (EUR 11’000 x 3). It makes no sense for the Appellant to sign such Termination Agreement in view of the outstanding amounts. Further he submitted the termination notice to the Respondent on 4 January 2013 and filed the claim with FIFA on 7 January 2013. If he had known about the Termination Agreement, it would not make sense to act in this way.

- Several indications prove that the Termination Agreement was pre-drafted, e.g. the signing date not being printed, but left open to be inserted by hand writing and the termination in accordance to the Termination Agreement should enter into force on 20 December 2012 only. Further indications prove that the Appellant did not intend to sign a termination agreement.

- The termination of the Employment Contract was announced on the Respondent’s website and in the press only on 5 January 2013, once the Appellant has signed for PVC Potev Plovdiv. If the Termination Agreement would have been signed on 13 December 2012, this would certainly have been announced by the Respondent immediately. Further, the mutual termination was not acknowledged by the competent committee of the RPFL (see Article 18 of the Regulations for the Status and Transfer of Players of the RFF). The Appellant was never summoned or informed about any such proceedings.

- After having received the termination notice of 4 January 2013, the Respondent did not reply and point out to this Termination Agreement with the alleged signature of the Appellant. This Termination Agreement was invoked and adduced by the Respondent, for the very first time, in front of the DRC.

- In case the Sole Arbitrator concludes that the Termination Agreement was effectively

signed by the Appellant, clause 2 seems to be unclear; what is the term “financial claims” referring to? The Appellant is of the opinion that this term only refers to “performance bonuses” but not to “salaries”. The Player is, under Swiss law, not allowed to waive his right to be paid his remuneration for the activities already performed at the date of termination. The Respondent did not pay any part of the unpaid due amount.

- In view of Article 341 para. 1 CO the Appellant cannot waive in a legally binding way any claims against the Respondent resulting from mandatory provisions of law during the course of the Employment Contract and for one month after its termination. As the Appellant has not obtained any adequate consideration whatsoever from the Respondent in exchange for the alleged waiver of his rights to be paid, the Respondent is still obliged to pay at least the outstanding salaries and match bonuses for activities already performed (EUR 48’400). Therefore, the alleged waiver of the Appellant’s claim to salary until 20 December 2012 is null and void in any case.

- Even under Romanian law, the Player has a fundamental legal right to the salary for the work already performed with the consequence that he cannot waive such salary rights. Therefore, the Termination Agreement has to be considered null and void as far as it is aimed at the limitation of the Player’s rights granted under Romanian law.

54. Following the withdrawal of points 1 to 5 of his initial prayers for relief, the Appellant requests as follows:

- To set aside and annul the entire decision passed on 21 May 2015 by the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber.

- To order the Respondent to pay the Appellant outstanding salaries in the amount of EUR 46,000 net, plus interest of 5% per annum as follows:

a. On EUR 2,000 as from 6 September 2012;

b. On EUR 11,000 as from 6 October 2012;

c. On EUR 11,000 as from 6 November 2012;

d. On EUR 11,000 as from 6 December 2012; and

e. On EUR 11,000 as from 5 January 2013.

- To order the Respondent to pay the Appellant outstanding match bonuses in the amount of EUR 2,400 net, plus interest of 5% per annum as follows:

a. On EUR 1,100 (i.e. EUR 200 plus EUR 900) as from 26 September 2012; and

b. On EUR1,300 (i.e. EUR 900 plus EUR 400) as from 5 January 2013.

In any event

- To order the Respondent to bear all the costs incurred with the present procedure.

- To order the Respondent to pay the Appellant a contribution towards its legal and other costs, in an amount to be determined at the discretion of the Panel”.

B. Respondent’s Submissions and Requests for Relief

55. The Respondent’s submissions, in essence, may be summarized as follows:

- The Respondent asked the National Dispute Resolution Chamber of the RFF to issue a decision declaring the termination of the Employment Contract on 7 January 2013. In decision no. 814/6 February 2013, the National Dispute Resolution Chamber of the RFF upheld the Respondent’s claim and declared the termination by mutual agreement of the Employment Contract.

- The Respondent was not satisfied with the Player’s performance in the first team and before terminating the Employment Contract the Parties corresponded in writing and orally, especially regarding the financial hardship of the Respondent and the Player’s performance. The solution was that the Respondent paid a part of the unpaid due amount and in return the Player waived any other claims against the Respondent.

- On 13 December 2012, the first team of the Respondent, including the Player, were training at the Club. The Player was then in the office of the Respondent, located in Soseaua Stefan cel Mare to discuss with the Respondent’s representatives which resulted in signing the Termination Agreement. He apparently left Romania in the evening of 13 December 2012.

- The Player had a right for two air tickets per season, round-trip, Bucharest-Sofia. However, the Respondent did not buy any plain tickets for the Player for his flight in December 2012. Without having signed the Termination Agreement, the Player would certainly have asked the Respondent to purchase him a flight ticket.

- In December 2012, the Respondent had financial arears, not only towards the Player but also towards other players of the team. Therefore, the Respondent agreed with several players under contract to terminate the employment contracts. The Player had the opportunity to not sign the Termination Agreement. Such termination agreements were also used in other cases; therefore, there was no printed signing date, but an empty space to put the date in by hand writing. Also the Employment Contract as well as the Addendum do not contain a printed signing date.

- Since 13 December 2012 (date of signing the Termination Agreement) and 21 May 2015, delivery of the Decision, no new facts or evidence arose. The Player asked for the first time for the annulment of the Termination Agreement respectively clause 2 of the Termination Agreement in these appeal proceedings; such request is inadmissible.

- The Player did not consider himself bound under the Employment Contract after 13 December 2012 as he negotiated a new contract with a new club, where he started on 7 January 2013, only three days after having sent his termination notice.

- In the Termination Agreement the Player waived the payment of the amounts due by the Respondent and in return, the Respondent waived its federative rights over the Player. Further the Respondent waived the repayment of the maintenance costs of the apartment from 12 July to 13 December 2012 which should have been paid by the Player.

- On 11 June 2014, the Respondent was placed under judicial administration due to insolvency/bankruptcy. At this date, the Player was not a creditor of the Respondent. If the Player wanted to seek any money from the Respondent, he should have filed his claim in the Respondent’s insolvency/bankruptcy proceedings. However, he did not file any such request.

- On 23 September 2015, the Bucharest District Court closed the insolvency proceedings against the Respondent. As the Player was not an employee on 11 June 2014, he was not notified by the judicial administrator to file any claim he had against the Respondent. However, in February/March 2015 the latest, the Player knew about the Respondent ’s insolvency proceedings.

56. In its prayers for relief, the Respondent requests as follows:

“1. To dismiss the appeal filed by the player Boris Galchev against Decision p assed by the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber on 21 May 2015 and to uphold the appealed decision as founded and legal.

2. Pursuant to art. R 64.5 of the CAS Code we ask you to compel the Appellant to pay the costs generated to S.C. Dinamo 1948 S.A., as Respondent in this case, representing arbitration costs and attorney fee”.