Parma FC v. Federazione Italiana Giuoco Calcio (FIGC), Torino FC

II. FACTS

4. In the season 2013/2014, the Appellant finished sixth in Lega Serie A. Consequently, the Appellant qualified for the UEFA Europa League season 2014/2015. The Second Respondent

finished seventh in Lega Serie A, position which does not give the right to participate in the European competitions.

5. On May 12, 2014, the First Instance Licensing Committee of the First Respondent refused to issue the UEFA licence for the 2014/2015 season in favour of the Appellant, pursuant to § 14.7.5 of the Italian UEFA Club Licensing Manual (the “Manual”). The First Instance Licensing Committee found that the Appellant had not paid personal income tax deductions on payments from October and November 2013 to ten of its players and therefore the Appellant did not fulfil the requirement set forth in § 14.7 – F04 of the Manual.

6. On May 15 and 16, 2014, the ten players declared in writing that the payment from October and November 2013 had been a loan from a “voluntary redundancy package”. They had requested the loan for personal reasons.

7. By decision of May 19, 2014, the UEFA Club Licensing Appeals Committee of the First Respondent confirmed the first instance decision dated May 12, 2014.

8. Against this decision, Parma appealed on May 22, 2014 before the Alta Corte di Giustizia Sportiva, the Italian High Court of Sport Justice (the “Alta Corte”) in accordance with Article 4.21 of the Manual. By decision of May 28, 2014, the Alta Corte upheld the decision of the First Respondent.

III. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE CAS

9. On June 10, 2014, pursuant to Article R48 of the Code of Sports-related Arbitration, 2013 Edition (the “Code”), the Appellant filed a Statement of Appeal before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (the “CAS”) with the following requests for relief:

1) To accept the present appeal against the challenged decision;

2) To set aside the challenged decision;

3) To establish that the Appellant shall be granted the UEFA licence for participating in the 2014/2015 UEFA competitions and to take any other measure necessary for ensuring the participation of the Appellant in the 2014/2015 UEFA competitions;

4) To condemn the respondents to the payment in the favour of the Appellant of the legal expenses incurred;

5) To establish that the costs of the arbitration procedure shall be borne by the respondents.

10. The Appellant did not propose to proceed in an expedite manner pursuant to Article R44.4 of the Code and, on June 16, 2014, it requested a ten-day extension to submit the Appeal Brief.

11. By letter of June 19, 2014, the Appellant emphasized the necessity to receive an award in short time in light of the beginning of the UEFA Europa League scheduled on September 18, 2014.

12. Also on June 19, 2014, pursuant to Article R29 of the Code, the Second Respondent objected this appeal being conducted in Italian, which had been asked so by the Appellant in their Statement of Appeal. Furthermore, they did not agree with an expedited procedure, which had been proposed by the CAS Court Office. However, both Respondents agreed with the ten-day extension of the Appellant’s deadline for filing its appeal brief.

13. On June 27, 2014, the Appellant filed its appeal brief.

14. On July 28, 2014, CAS acknowledged receipt of the advanced costs from the Appellant and notified the Parties that, pursuant to Article R54 of the Code, the Panel had been constituted as follows: Mr. Romano Subiotto QC (President), Mr. Patrick Lafranchi and Dr. Dirk-Reiner Martens (arbitrators).

15. On 3 September 2014, the CAS Court Office informed the parties that pursuant to Art. R55 of the Code, the Panel had decided to rule on its jurisdiction in a preliminary decision. Furthermore, the CAS Court Office invited the parties to inform whether they would have preferred a hearing to be held (limited to jurisdiction) or for the Panel to render a preliminary award on jurisdiction on the sole basis of the parties’ written submissions. Thereafter, all the parties informed that they preferred a preliminary award on jurisdiction to be rendered on the sole basis of the parties’ written submission.

16. On 6 October 2014, the CAS Court Office informed the parties that the Panel deemed itself sufficiently well informed with the parties’ written submissions and, consequently, it decided not to hold a hearing pursuant to Art. R57 of the Code.

IV. SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES AS TO THE ISSUE OF CAS JURISDICTION

17. The jurisdiction of the CAS was contested by the Second Respondent by letter of July 11, 2014 and by the First Respondent by letter of July 15, 2014. It was argued that, contrary to Article R47 of the Code, the Manual set forth in Article 13 L.01 A, last bullet point, the exclusive jurisdiction of the Alta Corte. Accordingly, the licence applicant must declare that it undertakes to accept the jurisdiction of the Alta Corte to settle any controversy regarding the interpretation and application of the Manual in relation to the refusal of the licence. Both First and Second Respondent requested the Panel to render a preliminary award on jurisdiction.

18. By letter of July 18, 2014, the Appellant agreed with the request of the First and Second Respondent that the Panel renders a preliminary award on jurisdiction. However, the Appellant argued, pursuant to Article 13 L.01 A, first bullet point, of the Manual, that every licence applicant must declare to recognise the jurisdiction of the CAS. Moreover, in accordance with Article 43 of the UEFA Club Licensing and Financial Fair Play Regulations (the “UEFA Fair Play Regulations”), the Licence applicant must submit a legally valid

declaration confirming that it recognizes as legally valid the jurisdiction of the CAS as provided in the relevant articles of the UEFA Statutes.

19. The Applicant further argued that Article 59 UEFA Statutes provides that each Member Association shall include in its statutes a provision whereby it agrees to recognise the jurisdiction of the CAS, adding that, according to the case law of the Swiss Federal Tribunal (“SFT”), such general reference to the right to appeal is sufficient to establish the jurisdiction of the CAS.

20. By the abovementioned letter of July 11, 2014, the Second Respondent requested a deferral of its time limit for filing its answer on the merits until there was a decision on CAS jurisdiction. On July 18, 2014, the Appellant agreed with the Second Respondent’s request related to the deferral of its time limit for filing its answer on the merits.