Adem Kart v. Samir Nasri

III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

5. Below is a summary of the main relevant facts and allegations based on the Parties’ oral and written submissions on the file and relevant documentation produced in these appeal proceedings. Additional facts and allegations may be set out, where relevant, in connection with the further legal discussion. While the Panel has considered all the facts, allegations, legal arguments and evidence submitted by the Parties in the present proceedings, it refers in this award only to the submissions and evidence it considers necessary to explain its reasoning.

6. On 21 August 2017, the Player and the Club signed an employment contract valid for two sporting seasons, as from the date of signing until 31 May 2019 (the “Employment Contract”).

7. According to Article 3 of the Employment Contract, for the sporting season 2017/2018, the Player was entitled to receive the following amounts:

- EUR […] net, as sign-on fee, payable in two instalments of EUR […] each, respectively due within 20 days upon signing and on 31 July 2018;

- EUR […] as net salary, payable in ten equal instalments of EUR […] each on a monthly basis from August 2017 until May 2018;

- EUR […], as guaranteed net allowance fee for accommodation and travel expenses, payable in two equal instalments,

as well as other benefits and bonuses, including a temporary car allowance and a variable bonus in case of transfer or loan to any other professional club by 31 August 2018.

8. For the sporting season 2018/2019, the Club also undertook to pay to the Player the amount of EUR […] as net salary in ten equal instalments of EUR […] each, on a monthly basis, as well as a guaranteed net allowance of EUR […] in two equal instalments.

9. The Player was also entitled to receive additional variable bonuses adding up to an overall amount of EUR […] for each sporting season of the Employment Contract, depending on the Player’s performance and on the Club’s sports achievement.

10. On the same date of signing of the Employment Contract, the Parties also concluded an amendment agreement (the “Amendment Agreement”) whereby, inter alia, Article 3, paragraph 17, of the Employment Contract was amended. As a consequence, a new set of rules was stipulated, in the event that the Player would be sanctioned with a suspension for more than four months by a final decision of the competent disciplinary body (FIFA, UEFA, WADA) as a result of the conclusion of an ongoing investigation proceedings. In essence, the relevant provision set forth the option for the Club, under certain conditions, to early terminate the

Employment Contract and the obligation for the Player to reimburse to the Club part of the sign-on fee of […], depending on the starting date of the suspension, if any. The relevant amendment also specified that the EUR […] signing fee “is due for the whole term of this contract”.

11. On 14 January 2018, the Player put the Club in default of payment of the amount of EUR […] corresponding to the salaries for November and December 2017, granting the Club a time limit of ten days to remedy the breach.

12. On 29 January 2018, the Parties entered into an agreement for the early termination of the Employment Contract (the “Mutual Termination Agreement”).

13. Under Article 1.3 of the Mutual Termination Agreement, the Parties acknowledged that the Club was in default of payment of the total amount of EUR […], corresponding to the Player’s salaries for November 2017, December 2017 and January 2018 and other expenses.

14. On the assumption of the above, the Parties mutually terminated the Employment Contract with immediate effect, provided that the following conditions were fulfilled:

- the Club agreed to pay to the Player the amount of EUR […] net, corresponding to outstanding salaries as to EUR […]; net allowance for accommodation, travel and other expenses as to EUR […]; compensation for the early termination of the Employment Contract and the Amendment Contract as to EUR […] net.

15. The Parties agreed that the Club shall pay the abovementioned amount in 6 equal instalments according the following schedule:

- EUR […] net on the date of signing of the Mutual Termination Agreement,

- EUR […] net on 28 February 2018;

- EUR […] net on 30 March 2018;

- EUR […] net on 30 April 2018;

- EUR […] net on 31 May 2018;

- EUR […] net on 29 June 2018.

16. Moreover, in order to guarantee the payment of the amounts above, the Club agreed to provide the Player with 5 bank cheques for the remaining instalments, on the date of signing of the Mutual Termination Agreement.

17. Under Article 2.4 of the Mutual Termination Agreement, the Parties stipulated as follows:

“Antalyaspor agrees and accepts that the receipt of the abovementioned amount by the Player timely and without delay is the key component of this Mutual Termination Agreement. Subject to the conditions the checks are still at the possession of the Player and submitted to the bank duly, in case Antalyaspor has insufficient funds in its bank account at the payment date of the bank cheques which causes the Player not to collect any of the instalments, the Player shall have the right to notify Antalyaspor in writing (facsimile accepted) and request the payment of the overdue instalments within 7 (seven) days. In case Antalyaspor fails to pay the Player the overdue instalments within the deadline of 7 (seven) days, Antalyaspor agrees and accepts that the monetary conditions of this Mutual Termination Agreement will immediately become null and void without any requirement for another notice and the Player’s guaranteed salary from Antalyaspor between November 2017 and May 2018 under the Contract will be due and payable by Antalyaspor to the Player effective immediately. In such case, Antalyaspor irrevocably agrees and accepts to immediately pay the Player his guaranteed salary from November 2017 and May 2018 under the Contract in the total amount of net […] EUR after deducting the payment that is already paid to the Player according to this Agreement, if any”.

18. Moreover, according to Article 2.5. of the Mutual Termination Agreement “The Parties hereby agreed to release each other from any financial responsibilities, except the payment determined above, thus the Player will not claim any amount (transfer fee, monthly wages, compensation etc.) from the Club whatsoever as well as the Club will not claim any amounts from the Player provided that the above determined payments are made in full and on time to the Player by the Club. Player hereby accepts that have been waived his all contractual rights (transfer fee, monthly wages, compensation fee, salary etc.) from Club”.

19. On 31 January 2018, the first instalment of EUR […] was paid by the Club to the Player via wire transfer.

20. On 28 February 2018, the Club only made a partial payment of the second instalment, in the amount of […], via wire transfer.

21. On 1 March 2018, the Player sent a warning letter to the Club requesting payment of the balance of the second instalment within the next seven days, in accordance with Article 2.4 of the Mutual Termination Agreement, failing which, he reserved the right to terminate the Mutual Termination Agreement and initiate legal proceedings to seek compensation in accordance with Article 2.4 of the Mutual Termination Agreement.

22. On 7 March 2018, the Club paid the overdue amount of EUR […] corresponding to the balance of the second instalment.

23. As the third instalment became due on 30 March 2018, the Player could not cash the relevant cheque which was refused due to insufficient funds in the Club’s bank account. The fourth, fifth and sixth instalment also remained unpaid.

24. On 23 July 2018, the Player sent a formal notice to the Club, requesting the payment of the overdue instalments in the amount of EUR […] within the next seven days, in accordance with Article 2.4 of the Mutual Termination Agreement, warning the Club that in case of failure, he would be entitled to receive the amount of EUR […], deducted the sum already paid.

25. On 1 August 2018, failing any payment by the Club, the Player sent a new formal notice to the latter, assuming that the Mutual Termination Agreement had become null and void because of the non-fulfilment of its financial conditions and requested the Club to immediately pay the amount of EUR […] within the next three days.

26. In the absence of any payment or response by the Club, the Player sent a final warning on 19 September 2018, setting a time limit of 10 more days in order for the Club to remedy its debt.

27. On 19 October 2018, the Player lodged a claim before the FIFA DRC against the Club, pursuant to Article 2.4 of the Mutual Termination Agreement, due to the failure by the Club to fulfil its financial obligations, requesting as follows:

- EUR […] as outstanding amounts due by virtue of the Mutual Termination Agreement, plus 5% interest as from 2 August 2018, i.e. one day after the requested sum in the Player’s default notice on 23 July 2018 became due;

- Sporting sanctions to be imposed on the Club.

28. In its response before the FIFA DRC, the Club challenged the FIFA’s competence to adjudicate the present matter, in favour of the CAS, referring to Article 3 of the Mutual Termination Agreement, according to which: “The disputes arising from the present contract may be referred to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) Ordinary Arbitration in Lausanne. The parties agree than any CAS Ordinary arbitration shall be held in expedited manner before a Sole Arbitrator. The language of arbitration will be English”.

29. On the contrary, the Player maintained that the word “may” in the relevant arbitration clause indicates that CAS jurisdiction was a mere option, as an alternative to FIFA’s competence.

30. As to the substance, the Club did not provide any further arguments.

31. On 5 November 2019, the FIFA DRC rendered the Appealed Decision, by which the Player’s claim was partially accepted, as follows:

1. “The claim of the Claimant, Samir Nasri, is admissible.

2. The claim of the Claimant is accepted.

3. The Respondent, Antalyaspor, has to pay to the Claimant outstanding remuneration in the amount of EUR […], plus interest at the rate of 5% as from 2 August 2018 until the date of effective payment.

4. The Claimant is directed to inform the Respondent, immediately and directly, preferably to the e-mail address as indicated on the cover letter of the present decision, of the relevant bank account to which the Respondent must pay the amount mentioned under point 3. above.

5. The Respondent shall provide evidence of payment of the due amount in accordance with point 3. above to FIFA to the e-mail address psdfifa@fifa.org, duly translated, if need be, into one of the official FIFA languages (English, French, German, Spanish).

6. In the event that the amount due plus interest in accordance with point 3. above is not paid by the Respondent within 45 days as from the notification by the Claimant of the relevant bank details to the Respondent, the Respondent shall be banned from registering any new players, either nationally or internationally, up until the due amount plus interest is paid and for the maximum duration of three entire and consecutive registration periods (cf. Art. 24bis of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players).

7. The ban mentioned in point 6. above will be lifted immediately and prior to its complete serving, once the due amount plus interest is paid.

8. In the event that the aforementioned sum plus interest is still not paid by the end of the ban of three entire and consecutive registration periods, the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to FIFA’s Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal decision”.

32. The grounds of the Appealed Decision were served by facsimile to the Parties on 7 February 2020.

V. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT

42. On 28 February 2020, the Appellant filed its Statement of Appeal with the Court of Arbitration for Sport (the “CAS”) against the Respondent with respect to the Appealed Decision, in accordance with Articles R47 and R48 of the Code of Sports-related Arbitration, 2019 edition (the “CAS Code”). The Appellant chose English as the language of the arbitration and requested that the present case be submitted to a sole arbitrator.

43. On 9 March 2020, the Respondent objected to the Appellant’s request to appoint a sole arbitrator and requested that the present case be submitted to a panel of three arbitrators in accordance with Article R50 of the CAS Code.

44. On the same day, the Appellant filed its Appeal Brief in accordance with Article R51 of the CAS Code.

45. On 16 March 2020, the CAS Court Office informed the Parties that the Deputy President of the Appeals Arbitration Division had decided to submit the present matter to a three-member panel and invited the Appellant and the Respondent to respectively nominate their arbitrator from the relevant list of CAS arbitrators.

46. On 16 March 2020, FIFA informed the CAS Court Office that it renounced its right to request its possible intervention in the present arbitration proceedings.

47. On 20 March 2020, the Respondent requested the CAS Court Office a 20-day extension of the time limit to file his Answer.

48. On 25 March 2020, the Appellant nominated Mr Emin Özkurt, Attorney-at-Law in Istanbul, Turkey, as an arbitrator in the present proceedings.

49. On the same day, the CAS Court Office informed the Parties that the Respondent’s request for an extension of 20 days of the time limit to file his Answer, had been granted.

50. On 2 April 2020, the Respondent nominated Mr Olivier Carrard, Attorney-at-Law in Geneva, Switzerland, as an arbitrator in this procedure.

51. In accordance with Article R55 of the CAS Code, the Respondent filed his Answer on 17 April 2020 and requested the Panel to decide on the basis of the Parties’ written submissions, or, alternatively, that the hearing, if any, be conducted by video-conference.

52. On 21 April 2020, the CAS Court Office invited the Appellant to state whether it preferred a hearing to be held in the present matter or for the Panel to render a decision based solely on the Parties written submissions. On the same day, the Appellant informed the CAS Court Office that, in regard of the hearing, it left the relevant decision to the discretion of the Panel.

53. On 8 May 2020, the CAS Court Office informed the Parties that the Panel appointed to decide the present case had been constituted as follows:

President: Mr Fabio Iudica, Attorney-at-Law in Milan, Italy;

Arbitrators: Mr Emin Özkurt, Attorney-at-Law in Istanbul, Turkey; Mr Olivier Carrard, Attorney-at-Law in Geneva, Switzerland.

54. On 12 May 2020, the CAS Court Office informed the Parties that the Panel had decided to hold a hearing in the present proceedings.

55. On 22 May 2020, the Appellant stated its preference for an in-person hearing.

56. On 25 May 2020, the Parties were informed that a hearing would take place on 23 June 2020 and that the modalities of the hearing (whether in persona in Lausanne, or by videoconference) would be defined at a later stage.

57. On 11 June 2020, the CAS Court Office informed the Parties that the Swiss immigration authorities issued the necessary permits to allow the Appellant to enter Switzerland despite the travel restrictions related to the COVID-19 pandemic, and thus to attend the hearing in person, as per its preference. Consequently, the CAS informed the Parties that the hearing scheduled on 23 June 2020 would take place in person in Lausanne, Switzerland.

58. On 16 June 2020, unexpectedly, the Appellant informed the CAS Court Office that it would not be able to attend the hearing in Lausanne while it remained available for a hearing to be held by videoconference.

59. On 18 June 2020, the CAS Court Office informed the Parties that the hearing would take place in Lausanne on 23 June 2020 as planned, with the Respondent and his representative to be heard in person and the Appellant to be heard via video-conferencing.

60. On the same day, the CAS Court Office forwarded the Order of Procedure to the Parties which was returned in duly signed copy by the Respondent on 22 June 2020 and by the Appellant on 23 June 2020. By signing the Order of Procedure, the Parties expressly agreed to the partial use of videoconferencing as the means for conducting the arbitral hearing, pursuant to Article R44.2 of the CAS Code.

61. On 23 June 2020, a hearing took place at the CAS Court Office in Lausanne, Switzerland.

62. At the hearing, besides the Panel and Mr Giovanni Maria Fares, Counsel to the CAS, the following persons were present:

For the Appellant: Mr Cenk Soyer, Counsel, attending by video conference.

For the Respondent: Mr Samir Nasri; Mr Micha Bühler, Mr Pierre-Alain Guillaume, Counsels; Mr Alain Migliaccio, personal advisor; Mr Naïm Aalai, witness.

63. At the outset of the hearing, the Parties confirmed that they had no objections in respect to the composition of the Arbitral Tribunal and that the Panel has jurisdiction over the present dispute. In their opening statements, the Parties reiterated the arguments already put forward in their respective written submissions. The Appellant, inter alia, confirmed its objection to the FIFA’s jurisdiction in the first instance proceedings.

64. Before the hearing was concluded, the Parties expressly stated that they did not have any objection with the procedure adopted by the Panel and that their rights to be heard and to be treated equally had been duly respected.

65. On 23 June 2020, the Appellant also provided the CAS Court Office with a copy of the “Check Receipt Document” confirming that the Respondent received a total of 5 bank cheques from the Club, pursuant to Article 2.3 of the Mutual Termination Agreement. Since the fact that the cheques have been handed over to the Respondent was undisputed between the Parties – and, therefore, this element has no particular relevance for the outcome of the present dispute – the Panel did not consider the “Check Receipt Document” as a new evidence or fact pursuant to Article R56 of the Code and thus it considered not necessary to ask the Respondent to comment on its admissibility.

66. On 25 June 2020, as requested by the Respondent and agreed at the end of the hearing, the CAS Court Office invited the Parties to file their Submission on Costs within the next 10 days.

67. On 6 July 2020, the Parties respectively provided the CAS Court Office with their Submission on Costs. Furthermore, the Respondent also briefly commented the “Check Receipt Document” submitted by the Appellant and contested its admissibility and relevance.

VI. SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES

68. The following outline is a summary of the Parties’ arguments and submissions which the Panel considers relevant to decide the present dispute and does not necessarily comprise each and every contention put forward by the Parties. The Panel has nonetheless carefully considered all the submissions made by the Parties, even if no explicit reference has been made in the following summary. The Parties’ written and oral submissions, documentary evidence and the content of the Appealed Decision were all taken into consideration.

A. The Appellant’s submissions and requests for relief

69. The Appellant’s submissions in its Statement of Appeal and in its Appeal Brief may be summarized as follows.

70. First of all, the Appellant objected that FIFA was not competent to decide the present matter in the first instance.

71. According to Article 3 of the Mutual Termination Agreement, in fact, any dispute arising between the Parties from the same contract shall be referred to CAS.

72. Contrary to the Player’s interpretation of the word “may” in the relevant arbitration clause, the choice of forum in favour of the CAS was not optional in the intent of the Parties. While the term “may” would suggest a mere possibility in daily language, in legal context, a careful analysis is needed in order to establish whether a specified act is an option, or it is mandatory for the parties.

73. If the Parties had intended the arbitration clause to be optional, they simply would have not included it in the Mutual Termination Agreement and, as a consequence, the competence of FIFA would be established by default.

74. Moreover, it is noteworthy that both in the Employment Contract and in the Amendment Agreement, the relevant arbitration clause makes reference to the FIFA DRC as the competent body to adjudicate over the dispute, instead of the CAS, which is a sign that under the Mutual Termination Agreement the Parties deliberately established a different choice of forum in favour of the CAS.

75. As to the substance of the matter, the Appellant claimed that Article 2.4 of the Mutual Termination Agreement, by envisaging the Club’s obligation to pay the amount of EUR […] (deducted the amounts already paid) to the Player as a consequence of the failure by the Club to fulfil the payment deadlines set forth under Article 2.3, actually represents a penalty clause.

76. As such, the amount of EUR […] is disproportionate and must be reduced according to Article 163(3) of the Swiss Code of Obligations (the “Swiss CO”). In fact, considering that the original debt under article 2.3 amounted to EUR […] and that the first two instalments due had been

paid, the penalty in the amount of EUR […] corresponds to […]% of the remaining amount due (i.e. EUR […]) which is clearly excessive.

77. Even considering the amount in question as the residual value of the Employment Contract, assuming that the Club committed breach, the amount of EUR […] would still be excessive. In that case, in fact, the compensation payable to the Player would be reduced by the alternative salaries that he earned by performing other work or he would have earned had he not intentionally foregone such work, in accordance with Article 337c of the Swiss CO. Since the Player was sanctioned with a ban from football activities for disciplinary reasons, the Club asserted that, as a consequence, the Player failed to mitigate his damages, either intentionally or based on his fault, within the meaning and for the purpose of Article 337c of the Swiss CO.

78. In addition, the Appellant pointed out that, since the disciplinary sanction of six-month ban was later extended to eighteen months, the Club had the option to terminate the Employment Contract pursuant to the Amendment Agreement. In such event, the Player would only have been entitled to 50% of the first instalment of the signing fee and to no further amount.

79. Finally, considering that the Club paid to the Player an overall amount of EUR […] under the Employment Contract and the Mutual Termination Agreement (EUR […] as signing fee under the Employment Contract + EUR […] as salaries + EUR […] as first and second instalment under the Mutual Termination Agreement), and only benefited from the Player’s services in relation to only eight league matches during the sporting season 2017/2018, it is neither just nor proportionate to condemn the Club to pay an additional amount of EUR […].

80. The Appellant submitted the following requests for relief:

“a. to set aside the challenged decision of the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber in its entirety and to adjudicate that the Respondent is not entitled to any amount for the premature termination of the employment agreement between the Parties,

b. subsidiarily, to adjudicate that the Respondent may only be entitled to the maximum amount of […].- Euro as the original amount agreed under the Mutual Termination,

c. to condemn the Respondent to pay the Appellant the legal fees and other expenses in connection with the proceedings”.

B. The Respondent’s submissions and requests for relief

81. The position of the Respondent is set forth in his Answer and can be summarized as follows.

82. With regard to the Appellant’s preliminary objection to FIFA’s jurisdiction in the first instance proceedings, the Club failed to submit the relevant request for relief to the CAS and therefore, it forfeited its right to challenge FIFA’s competence.

83. In fact, the Player argued that according to Article 186(2) of the Federal Statute of Private International Law (the “PILA”) the plea of lack of jurisdiction must be raised before any defence on the merits. Beside the foregoing, the arbitration clause in the Mutual Termination Agreement only contains an option for the Parties to refer the dispute directly to the CAS, with no exclusion to the general competence of the FIFA DRC, as it results from the use of the term “may”, instead of “must” or “shall” in the relevant provision. In addition, under Article 22 lit. b of the FIFA RSTP and consistent with the jurisprudence of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court (cf.4A_492/2016), the competence of FIFA DRC can only be excluded in favour of an independent arbitration tribunal “established at national level” which is not the case of CAS.

84. As to the facts of the present case, the Player maintained that under the (amended) Employment Contract he would have been entitled to a total fixed remuneration of EUR […] and that, considering the further variable benefits and performance bonuses, the total value of the Employment Contract over its entire duration would have reached the amount of EUR […].

85. The Appellant fulfilled its financial obligations under the Employment Contract only with respect to three monthly salaries (August, September and October 2017) as well as 50% of the signing fee, for a total amount of EUR […]. In this regard, the Appellant’s assertion that the Player received the amount of EUR […] corresponding to the entire signing fee is untrue as it also results from Article 1.3 of the Mutual Termination Agreement and, in any event, the Club did not provide any evidence in support of its allegation to the contrary.

86. In this framework, the Respondent stressed that, pursuant to the Mutual Termination Agreement, he agreed to renounce a large part of his remuneration, in exchange of EUR […], corresponding to the overdue salaries for November 2017, December 2017 and January 2018, plus a termination fee of EUR […], and also accepted an instalment payment. The Player’s renunciation was subject to the condition that the Appellant would pay each instalment on time in accordance with the payment schedule set forth under Article 2.3 of the Mutual Termination Agreement.

87. However, as it is also undisputed, the Appellant failed to comply with its financial obligations under the Mutual Termination Agreement since, when the third instalment became due on 30 March 2018, the Player could not cash the relevant cheque because of the lack of sufficient funds in the Appellant’s bank account which finally results in the application of Article 2.4.

88. In regard to the law, Article 2.4 of the Mutual Termination Agreement is not a penalty clause in the meaning of Article 160 of the Swiss CO as alleged by the Appellant, but rather, a conditional renouncement by the Respondent which entails a smaller renouncement in case of non-compliance by the Club.

89. Even assuming that Article 2.4 was a penalty clause (quod non), it would not be excessive within the meaning of Article 163 of the Swiss CO, failing any “glaring disproportion” between the amount of the penalty and the amount of damages occurred, which has not been demonstrated by the Appellant.

90. Moreover, the Respondent argued that comparing the amount of compensation under Article 2.4 of the Mutual Termination Agreement in case of failure by the Club (EUR […]) with the lower original debt (EUR […] or EUR […] if considering the amount already paid) is irrelevant for the purpose of establishing the alleged disproportion of the awarded amount. In fact, the compensation envisaged under Article 2.4 in case of the Club’s failure to comply with the payment schedule should rather be compared with the overall remuneration to which the Player would have been entitled, had the Employment Contract not been early terminated. In such context, the compensation fee corresponds roughly to […] % of the total fixed salary due to the Player for the entire duration of the Employment Contract, excluding bonuses and, therefore, it is neither disproportionate, nor unjust.

91. Likewise, the objection to the proportionality of the clause based on the Player’s ban from football activities is wrong and inconsistent because Article 337c of the Swiss CO does not apply to a mutual termination of an employment contract, as is the present case and moreover, because the amount agreed by the Parties was meant to be a comprehensive lump-sum, and each Party waived any further claim against the other Party except for the payment of the agreed amount.

92. In addition, the Appellant was aware of the pending disciplinary proceedings and of the risk of a ban on the Player when the Employment Contract was concluded. In fact, the Parties set forth specific provisions for the different possible case scenario of a ban. On the contrary, the Mutual Termination Agreement did not envisage the possibility for a possible suspension of the Player to affect the Appellant’s financial obligations thereunder. Therefore, the Parties considered the ongoing disciplinary proceedings as irrelevant to the purpose of the Mutual Termination Agreement.

93. This is also corroborated by the Appellant’s subsequent conduct after the imposition of the ban on the Player, as it was for the first time in its Appeal Brief that the Appellant argues that the financial obligations under the Mutual Termination Agreement should be reduced due to the (later) ban.

94. Therefore, the Appellant’s arguments are specious, since the obligation to pay EUR […] to the Respondent according to Article 2.4 of the Mutual Termination Agreement is valid and binding and the Appealed Decision is to be upheld.

95. In conclusion, the Respondent submitted the following requests for relief:

1. “Dismiss the appeal of the Appellant;

2. confirm the decision of the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber dated 5 November 2019 and order the Appellant to pay to the Respondent EUR […] plus interest at the rate of 5% p.a. as from 2 August 2018 until the date of effective payment;

3. confirm that the Appellant shall be banned from registering any new players, either nationally or internationally, up until the due amount plus interest is paid in full and for the maximum duration of

three entire and consecutive registration periods as provided for in point 6 of the dispotive [sic] part of the decision of the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber dated 5 November 2019;

4. order the Appellant to bear all costs of these arbitral proceedings, including the arbitrators’ fees and expenses, the CAS costs, the expenses and costs of witnesses and/or experts, as well as all costs incurred by the Claimant, such as but not limited to attorney’s fees, out-of-pocket expenses, related to these proceedings, plus interest at a rate of 5%per annum as the date of the award until full and final payment;

5. other such further and other relief as the Appeal Panel may deem just and appropriate”.