Russian Football Union (RFU) v. Association of Football Federations of Azerbaijan, Association Suisse de Football (ASF), Cyprus Football Association (CFA), Dansk Boldspil-Union (DBU), Federação Portuguesa de Futebol (FPF), Federazione Italiana Giuoco Calcio (FIGC), Football Association of Albania (FAA), Football Association of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Football Association of Iceland, Football Association of Ireland (FAI), Football Association of Montenegro, Football Association of Serbia (FAS), Football Association of Wales (FAW), Football Federation of Ukraine (FFU), Gibraltar Football Association (GFA), Hungarian Football Federation, Irish Football Association (IFA), Israel Football Association, Koninklijke Nederlandse Voetbalbond (KNVB), Lithuanian Football Federation (LFF), Malta Football Association (MFA), Norwegian Football Association, Real Federacion Espanola de Futbol (RFEF), Royal Belgian Football Association, Scottish Football Association, Slovak Football Association (SFA), Swedish Football Association, The Football Association (FA), Turkish Football Federation (TFF), Union of European Football Associations (UEFA)

II. INTRODUCTION

34. This is an appeal against several decisions taken by the UEFA Executive Committee on 2 May 2022, which amended the organisation of certain UEFA competitions to exclude Russian teams from participation in UEFA competitions and are recorded at points 1 to 4 and points 6 to 8 of UEFA Circular No. 21/2022 (the “Appealed Participation Decisions”). Circular No. 21/2022 also recorded UEFA’s decision to declare the Appellant’s bid to host the UEFA Euro 2028 or 2032 competitions, ineligible (the “Appealed Ineligibility Decision”). Collectively, the Appealed Participation Decisions and the Appealed Ineligibility Decision are referred to as the Appealed Decisions.

35. Circular No. 21/2022 provided as follows:

“UEFA Executive Committee decisions on the impact and consequences resulting from the ongoing suspension of Russian representative teams and clubs in UEFA competitions and other matters

…

On 28 February 2022, the UEFA Executive Committee (EXCO) decided to suspend all Russian representative teams and clubs from participating in UEFA competition matches until further notice. While this decision is still in force, there was an urgency to address the impact and consequences of this pending suspension on the upcoming UEFA competitions that have not started yet or that will span beyond the current season, such as the UEFA Nations League 2022/23 (UNL) and the UEFA Woman's Euro 2022 (WEURO), in order to ensure the smooth staging of said competitions and a safe and secure environment for all those concerned.

In this regard, several UEFA national associations, including the host association of the WEURO (i.e. the English FA) as well as others which have been drawn in the same group as Russia for a specific competition stage, have publicly voiced their intention not to participate in matches against teams from the Football Union of Russia (FUR), which puts these competitions in disrepute and seriously affects their integrity.

Apart from the national associations, the majority of the governments of European countries have condemned the actions taken by Russia in an unprecedentedly strong and united fashion, not limited to the United Kingdom and the European Union, which have further imposed severe sanctions on a number of Russian individuals. Additionally, the general public's reaction, with protests organised in the majority of European cities against the actions taken by Russia, is causing serious concerns about the ability to ensure the safety and security for the team delegations, supporters and anyone else involved in the preparation and staging of the relevant UEFA competition matches. Furthermore, the travelling constraints caused by the war of Russia in Ukraine, are putting the smooth continuation of the competitions at a high risk. Therefore, on two May 2022, the UEFA EXCO took the following decisions:

1. UEFA Nations League (UNL) 2022/23

o With regards to Group 2 of League B, only the three remaining teams of said Group (i.e. Iceland, Israel and Albania) will be competing against each other. Russia will therefore automatically be ranked fourth in this group and, consequently, be relegated at the end of the UNL group phase. Furthermore, Russia will be ranked in 16th and consequently last place of League B. In this regard, Article 19.02 of the relevant competition regulations shall apply for the overall ranking of League B.

2. UEFA Women’s EURO (WEURO) 2022 (final tournament)

o In application of the sporting principle adopted in other similar cases, Russia will be replaced in Group C of the final tournament with Portugal, the latter having been defeated by Russia in the play-offs of this competition. Group C is therefore composed of the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland and Portugal.

3. European Qualification to the FIFA Women’s World Cup 2023

o With regards to Group E, as the Russian representative team will no longer participate in the remaining matches of this competition, all their results until now are to be considered as

null and void. Consequently, Group E will continue as a group of five teams, i.e. Denmark, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Malta and Azerbaijan.

4. 2021-23 European Under 21 Championship

o With regards to Group C, as the Russian representative team will no longer participate in the remaining matches of this competition, all their results until now are to be considered as null and void. Consequently, Group C will continue as a group of five teams, i.e. Spain, Slovakia, Malta, Lithuania, Northern Ireland.

[…]

6. Futsal Competitions

UEFA Women’s Futsal EURO 2022 (final tournament)

o Russia will be replaced with Hungary in the final tournament, the latter having finished second in Group 1 of the Main Round won by Russia. The four teams participating in the final tournament will therefore be Portugal, Spain, Ukraine and Hungary.

2022/23 UEFA Women’s Futsal EURO

o In the main round, where it had drawn in Group 4, Russia will be replaced with the second best-ranked runner-up of the Preliminary Round.

[…]

European Qualifications to the FIFA Futsal World Cup 2024

o In the Main Round group phase draw, Russia will be replaced with Norway, which was the best third-ranked team of the Preliminary Round.

7. 2022/23 Youth competitions

o Regarding the 2022/23 Under-17 championship Qualifying Round, Group 11 will be played without Russia. Therefore, Serbia, Gibraltar and Cyprus will play in the form of a mini-tournament with three teams. With respect to the 2022/23 Under-19 championship Qualifying Round, Group 7 will be played without Russia. Therefore, Spain, Albania and Belgium will play in the form of a mini-tournament with three teams. As far as the 2022/23 Women's Under-17 and Under-19 Championships are concerned, which are due to commence in August 2022, as none of the relevant Russian teams will participate in any of these competitions, there will be one more three-team mini-tournament in each case.

8. 2022/23 UEFA Regions’ Cup

o With respect to Group 1 of the Intermediate Round, Russia will be replaced with runner-up of the Preliminary Round.

EURO 2028/32 Bid procedure

In addition to the above-mentioned matters which are directly affecting the organisation and staging of the relevant UEFA for competition matches, the FUR has submitted a declaration of interest to bid to host the UEFA EURO 2028 or the UEFA EURO 2032. In accordance with Article 12.03 of the Bid Regulations UEFA Finals and Final Phases (“the Bid Regulations”), UEFA had to review the list of UEFA member associations that have declared an interest and decide on the eligibility.

In this respect, Article 16.02 of the Bid Regulations states that “[e]ach bidder shall ensure that it does not act in a manner that could bring UEFA, the UEFA final or UEFA final phase, any other bidder (or any employee, officer or representative of any of the foregoing), the bidding procedure or European football into disrepute”. In this regard, the contemplated bid submitted by the FUR has already provoked a strong reaction reflected in the media of the vast majority of the European countries.

Moreover, as communicated in Circular Letter no. 87/2021, “[t]he automatic qualification of the host team(s) shall be guaranteed (...) for a single host (...)”. Therefore, given the uncertainty as to when the suspension will be lifted and/or whether even more impacting difficulties will arise, the acceptance of a bid from the FUR goes against the decision of the UEFA EXCO of 28 February 2022, suspending all Russian representative teams and clubs from participating in UEFA competition matches until further notice.

Therefore, it was decided to declare the bid of the FUR as not eligible, since it does not only bring the bidding procedure and European football in its entirety into disrepute but is further in direct contradiction with the decision of the UEFA EXCO of 28 February 2022, if an association, whose teams are currently suspended from participating in any UEFA competition, is allowed to bid for a tournament to be hosted on its territory”.

36. The Appealed Decisions were taken following UEFA’s decision of 28 February 2022 to suspend all Russian representative teams and clubs from participation in UEFA competition matches until further notice (the “Suspension Decision”). The Suspension Decision was the subject of an appeal under CAS 2022/A/8709 Football Union of Russia v. Union of European Football Associations et al. brought by FUR against UEFA and 11 of UEFA’s member associations. Additionally and in separate proceedings, four professional Russian clubs, FC Zenit PFC, FC Sochi, PFC CSKA Moscow and FC Dynamo Moscow, brought appeal proceedings against UEFA under CAS 2022/A/8865-8868 FC Zenit et al. v. Union des Associations Européennes de Football (UEFA), challenging UEFA’s decision, which was recorded at point 5 of Circular No. 21/2022, to remove their participation in certain UEFA club competitions. All appeal procedures were considered by this Panel and dismissed on 15 July 2022 and the decisions were announced publicly by the Court of Arbitration for Sport (“CAS”) on the same date.

37. It is important to highlight that the Suspension Decision was taken in circumstances which the Panel considers merit the descriptive adjectives “extraordinary” and “unforeseen”. The

catalyst for these circumstances was the commencement of a military conflict between Russia and Ukraine on 24 February 2022, and which is continuing at the time of the Panel’s decision. The Panel in so describing the circumstances as extraordinary and unforeseen has in mind: the widespread condemnation of the military conflict by international organisations and governments; the reaction of the international sports community, including the International Olympic Committee (the “IOC”), to the conflict; the imposition of sanctions and travel bans on Russian people and businesses; the uncertainty of the duration and scope of the conflict; and the exceptional and widespread international public reaction against it. In addition, the Panel has been asked to bear in mind, from a football perspective: the increasing number of UEFA national associations publicly stating their intention to not participate in matches against the FUR’s teams; serious concerns about UEFA’s ability to ensure the safety and security for all those who attend its matches; and the impact of travel bans to and from the Russian territory on the organization of UEFA competition matches. All these circumstances provide the background to which the Appealed Decisions were taken and are relevant to the Panel’s analysis.

38. When reaching its decision in the present case, the Panel has not taken a position on the conflict or how it is characterised or otherwise referred to. In its capacity as a Panel, it does not need to do so. The Panel needs to do no more than acknowledge that there are different views as to the nature of the conflict in Ukraine, as illustrated by the different terms in which the Parties themselves have referred to the conflict. The Appellant describes it as “a military conflict”. The First Respondent refers instead to a “war against Ukraine”. Be that as it may, the Panel repeats that it considers it unnecessary in the exercise of its adjudicative role to enter the debate or to offer a view on the nature of the conflict. It is concerned only with the correctness or otherwise of the exercise of a sports federation’s discretion in the circumstances arising from the conflict.

VI. JURISDICTION

75. Article R47 of the Code provides that:

“An appeal against the decision of a federation, association or sports-related body may be filed with the CAS insofar as the statutes or regulations of the said body so provide or as the parties have concluded a specific arbitration agreement and insofar as the Appellant has exhausted the legal remedies available to him prior to the appeal, in accordance with the statutes or regulations of the said sports-related body”.

76. Pursuant to 62.1 of the UEFA Statutes (2021 edition):

“1. Any decision taken by a UEFA organ may be disputed exclusively before the CAS in its capacity as an appeals arbitration body, to the exclusion of any ordinary court or any other Court of Arbitration.

…”.

77. The Appellant relies on Article 62.1 of the UEFA Statutes, as conferring jurisdiction on the CAS. The jurisdiction of the CAS has not been challenged by any of the Respondents and is further confirmed by the Parties who signed the Order of Procedure.

78. Accordingly, on the basis of the above, the Panel is satisfied that it has jurisdiction to adjudicate the present dispute.

VII. ADMISSIBILITY

79. Article R49 of the Code provides as follows:

“In the absence of a time limit set in the statutes or regulations of the federation, association or sports-related body concerned, or in a previous agreement, the time limit for appeal shall be twenty-one days from the receipt of the decision appealed against”.

80. According to Article 62.3 and 62.4 of the UEFA Statutes (2021 edition):

“3. The time limit for appeal to the CAS shall be ten days from the receipt of the decision in question.

4. An appeal before the CAS may only be brought after UEFA’s internal procedures and remedies have been exhausted”.

81. The Appellant submits that the appeal is filed under Article R51 of the Code in due form and time, and is admissible. The First Respondent does not contest the admissibility of the appeal.

82. The Panel observes that the UEFA Executive Committee rendered the Appealed Decisions, including grounds, on 2 May 2022.

83. The Panel notes that the UEFA Statutes prescribe a deadline of 10 days to file an appeal against a decision made by a UEFA organ and therefore the 10-day time limit prevails over the default 21-day time limit provided in Article R49 of the Code. The Panel observes that the Appellant filed its Statement of Appeal on 12 May 2022, within the deadline of 10 days, and that there appears to have been no other channels for appeal internally. The Statement of Appeal also complies with the requirements of Article R48 of the Code.

84. Accordingly, on the basis of the above, the Panel is satisfied that the Appeal was filed in time and is admissible.

VIII. APPLICABLE LAW

85. Pursuant to Article R58 of the Code, the Panel is required to decide the dispute:

“[According] to the applicable regulations and the rules of law chosen by the parties or, in the absence of such a choice, according to the law of the country in which the federation, association or sports-related body which has issued the challenged decision is domiciled or according to the rules of law, the application of which the Panel deems appropriate. In the latter case, the Panel shall give reasons for its decision”.

86. The Appellant submits that the Panel should primarily apply the “the UEFA Statutes and various regulations and subsidiary Swiss law”. The First Respondent submits that the UEFA Statutes and regulations are applicable, with Swiss law applying subsidiarily.

87. The Panel notes that the Appealed Decisions were rendered by the UEFA Executive Committee on 2 May 2022 and that at the time the appeal was filed, the 2021 edition of the UEFA Statutes was in effect. It notes also that the Bid Regulations came into force on 16 December 2021.

88. Accordingly, on the basis of the Parties’ agreement to the applicable law, the Panel considers that the UEFA Statutes (2021 edition) and the Bid Regulations, together with other various UEFA regulations, constitute the applicable law to the matter at hand. Swiss law applies subsidiarily.

IX. MERITS

89. On the basis of the Parties’ respective submissions, the Panel considers that there are three issues for determination:

a. What is the nature of the Appealed Decisions insofar as they affect the scope of the Panel’s review?

b. Did the UEFA Executive Committee have the competence or power to take the Appealed Decisions?

c. If so, were the Appealed Decisions an improper use of power?

A. What is the nature of the Appealed Decisions insofar as they affect the scope of the

Panel’s review?

a) The Nature of the Appealed Decisions

90. The Appellant submits that the Appealed Decisions are a sanction against the Russian Government. It refers to the difference between a priori and a posteriori measures (relying on CAS 2014/A/3625 and CAS 98/200) and submits that while UEFA may have intended to implement a priori administrative measures, the amendments did not deal with conduct on a preventative basis but demonstrated a moral judgment regarding the actions of the Russian Federation in Ukraine. The First Respondent disputes the Appellant’s claims and submits that the Appealed Decisions were taken in light of the Suspension Decision.

91. The Panel observes that the decision of a sports association can be characterised as either an administrative decision or a disciplinary decision (CAS 2007/A/1381, para 55; and CAS 2008/A/1583 & 1584, para 35). Insofar as there is on the part of the Appellant a contention that the Appealed Decisions are a disciplinary sanction, the Panel finds that in the present case, the Appealed Decisions are not a disciplinary sanction imposed on the basis of past conduct. There is indeed no evidence or suggestion that the Appellant breached any UEFA regulation or a provision of the UEFA Statutes or engaged in misconduct such as could attract a disciplinary process or a disciplinary sanction imposed to penalise such conduct. The Panel also notes that the Appealed Decisions were taken by the UEFA Executive Committee, which is UEFA’s executive decision-making body, and not taken by any UEFA judicial body as is normally the case for a disciplinary decision.

92. The Panel considers that the Appellant’s submissions regarding the difference between a priori rules and a posteriori rules and in that context its reliance on CAS 2014/A/3625 and CAS 98/200 are irrelevant to the present case. The Panel recalls that CAS 98/200 concerned a challenge brought by two professional clubs to the validity of a rule regarding the participation of clubs with a common controlling ownership in the same UEFA club competition. The rule provided that only one club could participate in a UEFA club competition and that in cases where two or more clubs with common controlling ownership had qualified for a competition, the club with the highest coefficient would be permitted entry. The challenged rule was

implemented to limit conflicts of interest and remove any adverse public perception regarding the authenticity of match results. CAS 2014/A/3625 involved a challenge to a regulatory measure which main purpose was to exclude from UEFA competitions a UEFA member association or club that had been directly or indirectly involved in any activity aimed at arranging or influencing the outcome of a match at national or international level, without prejudice to any possible disciplinary measures. The Panel accepts that while the challenged measures in CAS 98/200 and CAS 2014/A/3625 had an exclusionary effect, they were implemented to prevent a situation arising that could affect public perception of the authenticity of match results or to respond to and inhibit particular behaviour (i.e. matchfixing). In short, they were precautionary and not penal.

93. The Panel also finds that the Appealed Decisions are not “a moral judgment” adopted by UEFA in response to the military conflict in Ukraine and are clearly not sanctions imposed to enforce compliance with international law obligations, encourage the peaceful settlement of international disputes or to maintain security, as sanctions adopted by governments are typically imposed to achieve. There is simply no evidence before the Panel that the Appealed Decisions were implemented as sanctions against the Russian Federation.

94. The Panel determines that, in the circumstances of the present case, the Appealed Decisions may be properly characterised as administrative decisions taken by the UEFA Executive Committee in consideration of the Suspension Decision.

b) Scope of the Panel’s Review

95. Relying on CAS 98/200, the Appellant alleges that the First Respondent breached principles of natural justice when it adopted the Appealed Decisions because the Appealed Decisions concerned only the Appellant and the First Respondent was obliged to consult with it, which denied the Appellant the opportunity to know the regulatory amendments in advance and to respond to them. The First Respondent disputes the Appellant’s submissions.

96. As the Panel has noted above, CAS 98/200 concerned a challenge to the validity of a regulatory rule regarding the participation of clubs with a common controlling ownership in the same UEFA club competition. In the course of that case, the CAS Panel concluded that in certain limited situations a right to a hearing may exist in respect of “administrative measures or penalties adopted by a sports governing body with regard to a limited and identifiable number of designees” (para 58) and concluded that while advisable for a regulator to hear the views of those affected by a regulatory measure, it was not a legal obligation, and in any event would not invalidate a regulatory measure given that the lawfulness of a regulatory measure must be evaluated on its merits (para 62).

97. The Panel has found above that the Appealed Decisions were administrative decisions taken in consideration of the Suspension Decision. The Panel observes that in view of the Suspension Decision, it was foreseeable that UEFA would need to make amendments to the organisation of its competitions to remove the Appellant’s teams, although it accepts that these proceedings were filed before the decision in CAS 2022/A/8709 was known and that the Appellant may have been protecting its position in the event that the decision in CAS

2022/A/8709 was in its favour. The Panel also notes that there was no evidence put before it of a common, indeed any, practice of consulting associations regarding the potential withdrawal of eligibility for bidding for UEFA competitions. The Panel considers that the Appealed Decisions were not substantive regulatory measures that would normally engage an obligation to consult with a member association.

98. The Appellant submitted that there were a number of other procedural failings, which it identified as: the urgency with which the Appealed Decisions were taken when no new circumstances had arisen; a legitimate expectation that it would not be removed from UEFA’s 2022/2023 competitions pending the appeal outcome of CAS 2022/A/8709; the fact the Suspension Decision had nothing to do with the bid procedure for hosting UEFA EURO 2028/2032; venire contra factum proprium and the prohibition against arbitrary decisions. The Panel finds that the Appellant’s allegations of procedural failings if otherwise sustainable, e.g. a breach of natural justice and the right to be heard, would have been rectified by the present proceedings and would not invalidate the Appealed Decisions: its duty pursuant to Article R57 of the Code is to decide the case de novo, and means that any denial of due process at the lower-level proceedings (if any) is cured by the CAS proceedings, a principle that is wellestablished in CAS jurisprudence (CAS 2016/A/4648, para 74; CAS 2012/A/2913, para 87).

99. The Panel accepts that the administrative decisions of a sports association are not immune to review and observes that under Article 75 of the SCC a decision can be challenged if there is a violation of the association’s statutes or mandatory legal rules. Nonetheless, the Panel recalls that in determining the scope of review for an administrative decision such as the ones in the present case, under Article 69 of the SCC, the board of an association “is entitled and obliged to manage and represent the association”, and that in accordance with the Swiss law of private associations, a sports association has a high degree of autonomy to regulate its own affairs and make decisions that are in line with its statutory objectives and in accordance with its statutes

100. The Panel also notes that when reviewing the decisions of a sports association similar to the ones adopted in the present case, it is not engaged in an exercise of evaluating the merits or the substantive value of the decision, still less of substituting its own view for that of the sports association. The Panel is mindful of the principle well-established in CAS jurisprudence, even taking account of the de novo review enjoyed under Article R57, that a sports association is best placed to make decisions that further its statutory objectives, and that respect for the principle of freedom of association requires a certain level of deference to be afforded to a sports association.

101. CAS jurisprudence establishes that the principle of deference and respect for the autonomy of a sports association is not absolute, and that these principles “may yield when there are exceptional circumstances” such as arbitrariness, a misuse of an association’s discretionary power, discrimination, or breaches of any relevant mandatory legal principle (CAS 2020/A/7090, para 150). Nonetheless, the threshold for determining those exceptional circumstances is set high, and “[the] arbitrariness, discrimination or breach must be blatant and manifest, and offend a basic sense of justice” (CAS 2020/A/7090, para 150).

102. The Panel therefore concludes that in the present case, in which it is reviewing the exercise of a sports association’s discretion, it is concerned not with the merits or substantive value of the decision made but with whether the decision and the measure it imposed violates the association’s statutes or mandatory legal rules or amounts to an improper use of the association’s discretionary power. In weighing up whether the decision amounts to an improper use of the association’s discretion, the Panel considers that the reasonableness and proportionality of the sports association’s actions are also factors for consideration. It addresses the application of such approach to the present appeal in paragraphs 116 to 164 of this Award.

B. Did the UEFA Executive Committee have the competence or power to take the

Appealed Decisions?

103. Having established that the Appealed Decisions were administrative decisions and the nature of the Panel’s scope of review, the Panel now turns to the issue of competence and whether the First Respondent had the power to take the Appealed Decisions.

104. The Appellant did not challenge the competence of the UEFA Executive Committee to take the Appealed Participation Decisions, but submitted that the UEFA Executive Committee did not have the competence to take a decision regarding the Appellant’s eligibility to submit a bid to host EURO 2028/2032 and instead the Appealed Ineligibility Decision ought to have been taken by the UEFA Administration pursuant to Article 26.01 of the Bid Regulations.

105. The First Respondent disputed the Appellant’s submissions and, in particular, relying on Article 23(1) and Article 65 of the UEFA Statutes, submitted that it was appropriate for the UEFA Executive Committee to take the Appealed Ineligibility Decision because an assessment of the Appellant’s bid had to consider the Bid Regulations and the Suspension Decision.

106. The Panel recalls that a private sports association established in Switzerland, such as UEFA, must act within the powers conferred on it by its statutes, and in line with its statutory objectives and mandatory legal rules under Swiss law. In that regard, the Panel notes Article 2 of the UEFA Statutes, which provides as follows:

“1. The objectives of UEFA shall be to:

a) deal with all questions relating to European football;

b) promote football in Europe in a spirit of peace, understanding and fair play, without any discrimination on account of politics, gender, religion, race or any other reason;

…

d) organise and conduct international football competitions and tournaments at European level for every type of football whilst respecting the players’ health;

…

i) promote unity among Member Associations in matters relating to European and world football;

j) safeguard the overall interests of Member Associations;

k) ensure that the needs of different stakeholders in European football (leagues, clubs, players, supporters) are properly taken into account;

l) act as a representative voice for the European football family as a whole;

…

o) respect the interests of Member Associations, settle disputes between Member Associations and assist them in any matter upon request.

2. UEFA shall seek to achieve its objectives by implementing any measures it deems appropriate, such as setting down rules, entering into agreements or conventions, taking decisions or adopting programmes”.

107. The Panel also observes that the UEFA Executive Committee is tasked with managing UEFA and that Article 23.1 of the UEFA Statutes provides it with the power “to adopt regulations and make decisions on all matters which do not fall within the legal or statutory jurisdiction of the Congress or another Organ”. Furthermore, pursuant to Article 65 of the UEFA Statutes, the Executive Committee is empowered to:

“… decide on all matters not covered in these Statutes, such decisions to be made in accordance with relevant FIFA regulations. If no such regulations exist, the Executive Committee shall decide according to right and justice”.

108. The Panel finds that the UEFA Executive Committee was competent on the basis of Article 65 to take the Appealed Participation Decisions in order to further UEFA’s objective of organising and conducting international football competitions and in view of the Suspension Decision which removed the Appellant’s teams from participation in UEFA competitions, a point that is not disputed by the Appellant.

109. The Panel observes that the Bid Regulations outline the bidding procedure and appointment of a host member association for the finals and final phases of UEFA competitions. It notes that the Bidding Procedure, set out in Part II of the Bid Regulations, consists of several stages, the first one of which is the Initiating Phase during which a member association declares its interest in hosting a UEFA competition final or finals phase. The Initiating Phase is described in Article 12 of the Bid Regulations pursuant to which: UEFA invites member associations to declare their interest in bidding to host UEFA finals and UEFA final phases; a member association declares its interest by completing, signing and returning a declaration of interest form by the prescribed deadline; and after the deadline has expired, UEFA reviews the list of UEFA member associations that have declared an interest, and decides which are eligible to bid to host the UEFA final or UEFA final phase. UEFA then notifies the interested member

associations of whether their bid is eligible or ineligible before the process moves to the Bid Dossier Development Phase and then the Evaluation Phase. The host member associations are appointed by a vote of the UEFA Executive Committee following the voting procedure outlined in Annex A of the Bid Regulations.

110. The Panel was not provided with a copy of the declaration of interest form completed by the Appellant, and no party disputed that the form had been submitted. Nevertheless, the Panel accepts that the Appellant submitted an expression of interest to host the UEFA EURO 2028/2032 competitions and notes from publicly available information on UEFA’s website that the deadline for submitting the expression of interest was 23 March 2022. It appears that the UEFA Executive Committee then reviewed the Appellant’s expression of interest in view of the Suspension Decision and declared the Appellant’s bid ineligible.

111. The Panel recalls that pursuant to Article 25 of the UEFA Statutes, the UEFA Executive Committee is empowered to delegate management to, amongst others, the UEFA Administration, and that under Article 81 of the UEFA Organisational Regulations, which, in turn, is based on Article 25 of the UEFA Statutes, the UEFA Administration is empowered to fulfil certain tasks specified in different UEFA Regulations.

112. Pursuant to Article 26.01 of the Bid Regulations:

“The UEFA administration is entrusted with the operational management of the bidding procedure and is therefore entitled to take the decisions and adopt detailed provisions necessary for implementing these regulations”.

113. The Panel finds that although the UEFA Administration is entrusted with the operational management of the bidding procedure and is authorised to take decisions under the Bid Regulations, the UEFA Executive Committee, as the entity “with the power to adopt regulations and make decisions on all matters which do not fall within the legal or statutory jurisdiction of the Congress or another Organ”, is the entity primarily responsible for the management of UEFA and retains the power to take a decision regarding the Appellant’s eligibility even though it may have delegated the task to the UEFA Administration under the Bidding Regulations. The UEFA Administration is not the Congress or a UEFA Organ, as that term is defined in Articles 11 and 32 of the UEFA Statutes, and the Panel finds that the UEFA Executive Committee did not impinge on their authority when taking the Appealed Ineligibility Decision.

114. Furthermore, the Panel observes that the Suspension Decision and the Appealed Participation Decisions were taken by the UEFA Executive Committee, and considers that in view of the extraordinary and unforeseen circumstances that had arisen, it was appropriate for the UEFA Executive Committee also to take the Appealed Ineligibility Decision, for consistency, and because it was the entity with knowledge of all circumstances relevant to the decision.

115. For the foregoing reasons, the Panel finds that the UEFA Executive Committee had the competence, and was the appropriate entity, to take the Appealed Ineligibility Decision.

C. Were the Appealed Decisions an improper use of power?

116. Having found that the Appealed Decisions were within the UEFA Executive Committee’s competence to take, the issue for the Panel to determine is whether the Appealed Decisions violated the UEFA Statutes, mandatory rules of Swiss law or otherwise amounted to an improper use of a sports association’s power, bearing in mind also the sports association’s statutory objectives and the margin of discretion afforded to a sports association’s decisionmaking.

117. The Appellant submitted that the Appealed Decisions:

a. violated a dominant position;

b. breached the principle of equal treatment;

c. breached the principle of political neutrality;

d. discriminated against the Appellant on the basis of nationality;

e. violated the Appellant’s personality rights recognised in Article 28 of the SCC; and

f. was disproportionate.

118. Specifically in relation to the Appealed Ineligibility Decision, the Appellant submitted that the First Respondent breached the Bid Regulations because it failed to treat the Appellant in a fair, transparent and consistent manner as required under Article 15 of the Bid Regulations and Article 27 of the Regulations did not apply to disqualify the Appellant from the bid process.

119. The First Respondent rejected all allegations and submitted that the Appealed Participation Decisions were no longer an issue in view of the Panel’s Awards in CAS 2022/A/8708 and CAS 2022/A/8709. With regards to the Appealed Ineligibility Decision, the First Respondent rejected the Appellant’s submission that the decision breached the principle of political neutrality, was discriminatory and disproportionate, and that it did not breach the Bid Regulations when taking the decision.

a) Alleged Violation of a Dominant Position

120. The Appellant argued that UEFA is the sole governing body of European football and enjoys a dominant market position (Cantonal Court of Vaud’s decision TC VD, CM11.033798 dated 5 October 2011, para.6(c)(bb)). Entities that occupy a dominant position are required to uphold general principles of law to the highest standards and exercise caution when making decisions. It submitted that UEFA abused its regulatory power when it adopted the Appealed Decisions, which in their view were a “back up plan” in case UEFA did not succeed in CAS 2022/A/8709. The principal purpose of the amendments was to prevent the Appellant from

participating in UEFA Competitions irrespective of the Suspension Decision. The First Respondent rejected the Appellant’s claim.

121. The Panel notes that the onus is on the Appellant to establish a breach of a dominant position and that it did not submit any economic or expert evidence to support the existence of a market, UEFA’s dominant position on that market or any of the alleged breaches of Article 7 of the Swiss Cartel Act. Furthermore, the Panel finds that there is simply no evidence to support the Appellant’s contention that the First Respondent adopted the Appealed Decisions as a “back up plan” and with the aim of excluding the Appellant from UEFA competitions irrespective of the outcome in CAS 2022/A/8709.

122. Accordingly, the Panel finds that the Appellant has not established that UEFA violated a dominant position and dismisses the claim.

b) Alleged Breach of the Principle of Equal Treatment

123. The Appellant submitted that measures imposed by associations must comply with the principle of equal treatment and it is especially true in sport where equal treatment is fundamental for any competition (CAS 2005/C/976 & 986, para 137). It contended that the Appealed Decisions breached the principle of equal treatment because UEFA did not exclude Ukraine or Belarus from the competitions and UEFA’s unsubstantiated concerns about safety, security and logistical issues applied equally to Ukraine and Belarus. The First Respondent rejected the Appellant’s claim.

124. The Panel observes that the Suspension Decision removed the right of participation in UEFA competitions from Russian representative teams and clubs. It notes that Belarusian clubs have so far not been suspended from participation in UEFA competitions. Instead, on 3 March 2022, the UEFA Executive Committee decided that all Belarusian clubs and national teams competing in UEFA competitions would be required to play their home matches at neutral venues and that no spectators would attend matches that feature teams from Belarus as host.

125. The Panel considers that, in reality, the military conflict between Russia and Ukraine has elicited an unprecedented global reaction, including amongst the general public, and that the different treatment of the Appellant and the Belarusian FA arose because Belarus’ involvement in the military conflict is different to that of Russia, Belarus has not faced the same degree of backlash regarding the military conflict that Russia has, and because the UEFA Executive Committee considered that implementing such measures were possible for Belarusian teams and clubs. The Panel finds that, in the present case, removing Russian teams from participation in various competitions was a consequence of the Suspension Decision and that since the Belarusian FA, its teams and clubs had not been suspended from participation in UEFA competitions there was no need to issue similar decisions in respect of the Belarusian FA and its teams. Neither for that matter was there a need to remove Ukraine from participation in UEFA competitions. It notes also that neither the Ukrainian FA nor the Belarusian FA appear to have submitted an expression of interest to host either the UEFA EURO 2028 or 2032 competitions.

126. The Panel observes that the Appellant did not submit any evidence to support its claims that the logistical problems “are equally applicable to the situation of Ukraine and Belarus” and from which the Panel could consider whether the principle of equal treatment had been breached.

127. Accordingly, for all these reasons, the Panel finds that the Appealed Decisions do not breach the principle of equal treatment and dismisses the claim.

c) Alleged Breach of the Principle of Political Neutrality

128. The Appellant submitted that the principle of political neutrality requires that no governmental or political influence is exercised on the activities of sports organisations (CAS 2019/A/6500, para 105) and that sports organisations must be free to organise their sport without any political interference. It further contended that UEFA is a member of the Olympic Movement and is committed to adhering to the fundamental principles of political neutrality and non-discrimination, and is bound by the principle of political neutrality. The Appellant contended that UEFA’s justifications for the Appealed Decisions showed that the decisions were a consequence of the reactions of (i) several Member Associations, (ii) the majority of the governments of European countries and (iii) the general public “against the actions taken by Russia” in Ukraine.

129. The Appellant also asserted that UEFA was influenced by the IOC’s political stance because it took the Suspension Decision on the same day as the IOC Resolution was taken and in accordance with that Resolution. In its view, the reported comments of the European Commission Vice-President on 11 May 2022 that, “By refusing to play Russian teams, by imposing other sanctions and by supporting the Ukrainian football community, you have demonstrated the strength of our European unity and values”, and recent decisions taken by other sports against Russian clubs and individuals, confirmed that decisions to exclude Russia from sports, including the Appealed Decisions, were politically motivated. The measures adopted by UEFA were directed against the FUR and Russian clubs only and UEFA has failed to argue convincingly that measures adopted by the UEFA Executive Committee against Russia were about more than a political reaction or statement against the Russian Federation. The First Respondent rejected the Appellant’s claim.

130. The Panel recalls that UEFA is a member of FIFA, which is a part of the Olympic Movement and that its Statutes reflect Articles 5 and 6 of the Fundamental Principles of Olympism regarding political neutrality and non-discrimination. The Panel observes that Article 1.1 of the UEFA Statutes provides:

“The Union des Associations Européennes de Football (UEFA) shall be a society entered into in the register of companies under the terms of Art. 60 et seq. of the Swiss Civil Code. UEFA shall be neutral, politically and religiously”.

131. On the issue of whether by taking the Appealed Decisions, UEFA breached the principle of political neutrality outlined in Article 1 of the UEFA Statutes, the Panel finds that there is no definition of “political neutrality” in the UEFA Statutes, other than the reference in Article 1.1

to the requirement for UEFA to “be neutral politically and religiously”. The Panel recalls the description of political neutrality outlined in CAS 2019/A/6500 & 6580, para 105 as:

“The principle of political neutrality, in the view of the Panel, requires that no political interference whatsoever is exercised on the activities of a sporting organisation. Indeed athletes must be free to exercise their sport without any political interference”.

132. In those cases, the CAS Panel was concerned with specific instructions provided to an Iranian athlete not to compete against an Israeli athlete, that was supported by a government official and accompanied by a personal threat towards the athlete’s family in the event that the athlete did not comply, which the Panel considered demonstrated a political issue interfering with sporting activities and was a clear violation of the principle of political neutrality (ibid, para 105). That is not the situation with which the Panel is concerned in the present case. Based on the information available to it, the Panel finds no evidence that the UEFA Executive Committee arrived at the Appealed Decisions other than by its own independent decisionmaking. There is no evidence, for example, that the UEFA Executive Committee took the Appealed Decisions because of the IOC Resolution or because of a direction from another external third party.

133. The introduction to Circular No. 21/2022 recorded the following:

“On 28 February 2022, the UEFA Executive Committee (EXCO) decided to suspend all Russian representative teams and clubs from participating in UEFA competition matches until further notice. While this decision is still in force, there was an urgency to address the impact and consequences of this pending suspension on the upcoming UEFA competitions that have not started yet or that will span beyond the current season, such as the UEFA Nations League 2022/23 (UNL) and the UEFA Women’s EURO 2022 (WEURO), in order to ensure the smooth staging of said competitions in a safe and secure environment for all those concerned.

In this regard, several UEFA national associations, including the host association of the WEURO (i.e. the English FA) as well as others which have been drawn in the same group as Russia for a specific competition stage, have publicly voiced their intention not to participate in matches against teams from the Football Union of Russia (FUR), which puts these competitions in disrepute and seriously affect their integrity.

Apart from the national associations, the majority of the governments of European countries have condemned the actions taken by Russia in an unprecedentedly strong and united fashion, not limited to the United Kingdom and the European Union, which have further imposed severe sanctions on a number of Russian individuals. Additionally, the general public’s reaction, with protests organised in the majority of European cities against the actions taken by Russia, is causing serious concerns about the ability to ensure the safety and security for the team delegations, supporters and anyone else involved in the preparation and staging of the relevant UEFA competition matches. Furthermore, the travelling constraints caused by the war of Russia in Ukraine, are putting the smooth continuation of the competitions at a high risk”.

134. As the contents of Circular No. 21/2022 show, the UEFA Executive Committee took into consideration a number of factors when taking the Appealed Decisions. Those factors included the Suspension Decision and the “urgency” to make amendments in view of the

impending competitions, the refusal of some member associations to play against the FUR’s teams, security concerns, flight bans, and the widespread public reaction against the military conflict.

135. The Panel accepts that the military conflict in Ukraine undoubtedly raises political issues but that does not lead automatically to the conclusion that any decision taken by a sports organisation that touches on a military conflict breaches the principle of political neutrality. The Panel considers that the military conflict in Ukraine was the catalyst for a series of extraordinary and unforeseen consequences, namely: the widespread condemnation of the military conflict by international organisations and governments; the reaction of the international sports community to the conflict; the imposition of sanctions and travel bans on Russian people and businesses; the uncertainty of the duration and scope of the conflict; and, the exceptional and widespread international public reaction against it. More specifically, from a football perspective: The refusal of certain national associations to play against Russian teams or clubs; the effect that refusals might have for the organisation of events such as UEFA’s competitions or the FIFA World Cup 2022; as well as related security concerns.

136. Whilst the positions adopted by member associations, European governments and the general public were clearly considerations in the UEFA Executive Committee’s decision, the majority accepts the First Respondent’s submission that the UEFA Executive Committee did not arrive at the Appealed Decisions because of pressure from member associations or the views of European governments. The Panel considers that the UEFA Executive Committee acted as it did to implement the Suspension Decision, which in turn was taken in response to a set of extraordinary and unforeseen circumstances, and not because UEFA favoured a particular political position. The Panel accepts that the effect of the Suspension Decision and the Appealed Decisions may lend itself to the perception that UEFA favoured a political position, but that was an unavoidable consequence of the decisions that it took having considered all of the circumstances.

137. The Panel further finds that while the Appealed Decisions may have been consonant with the views implicit in the IOC Resolution or the views of European governments or even the views of the general public, there is no evidence that it was taken only or substantially because of those views or that it was taken in support of those positions or again that they would not have been the same decisions irrespective of those views. In the Panel’s opinion the Appealed Decisions were taken to further UEFA’s statutory objectives, specifically those of Articles 2.1(b) and (d), which, the Panel finds was within the UEFA Executive Committee’s margin of discretion in the situation with which the Executive Committee was faced.

138. For all those reasons, the Panel finds that no breach of the principle of political neutrality occurred and dismisses the claim.

d) Alleged Discrimination Against the Appellant on the Basis of Nationality

139. The Appellant submitted that the Appealed Decisions breached the prohibition of discrimination provided in Article 2.1(b) of the UEFA Statutes on the basis of nationality by taking Russia out of UEFA competitions. Other international federations had not banned

Russian national teams from participating in international tournaments. IBA, FINA and FIG sanctioned only those who supported the military conflict, and the ATP condemned Wimbledon’s ban on Russian and Belarusian players from competing in the United Kingdom this summer as “discrimination”. The First Respondent rejected the Appellant’s claim.

140. The Panel observes that the Suspension Decision related only to FUR, its teams and clubs. The Appealed Participation Decisions implemented the Suspension Decision and therefore applied only to FUR and its representative teams and clubs. The Appealed Ineligibility Decision applied only to the Appellant’s bid. The majority considers that the Appealed Decisions were not taken because of the Appellant’s nationality but because the military conflict in Ukraine has elicited an unprecedented global reaction, including amongst the general public. It was the consequences of that reaction to which UEFA considered it was required to act in order to fulfil its statutory objectives. The Suspension Decision is not at issue in these proceedings and so the Panel makes no finding regarding whether UEFA discriminated on the basis of nationality against the Appellant when it took the Suspension Decision.

141. The Panel was referred to the decisions of the ETTU Board of Appeal dated 26 April 2022 and the FIL Court of Arbitration decision dated 7 April 2022, both of which dealt with the issue of involvement of Russian teams or athletes in their respective sports, and concluded to varying degrees that they should not be so excluded. The Panel was also referred to the Lawn Tennis Association’s decision not to permit Russian tennis players to participate in Wimbledon in 2022, and the Women’s Tennis Association (WTA), ATP and ITF decisions in response, to remove ranking points for the Wimbledon tournament, and it is a matter of public record that World Athletics have suspended Russian teams and athletes (other than so termed neutral athletes) on the basis that according to its President, such sanctions “appear to be the only way to disrupt and disable Russia’s current intentions and restore peace”.

142. The Panel again does not find it helpful in the present case to compare the approaches of other sports federations, whether more or less stringent, to the participation of Russian teams or athletes in their respective competitions. With all respect to the sports involved, they are not of the same global scale as football and their statutes, regulations, and decision-making processes will differ to UEFA’s. There will also be different factors or different weightings applied to certain factors that were considered when each sport responded in the manner in which it did. The Panel considers that comparisons to the decisions of other sports federations taken in materially different circumstances and for different reasons, which the Panel cannot and does not pronounce, do not assist in the present case.

143. Accordingly, for all those reasons, the Panel finds that there was no discrimination on the grounds of nationality and dismisses the claim.

e) Alleged Violation of the Appellant’s Personality Rights

144. The Appellant submitted that UEFA’s discriminatory actions violated the Appellant’s personality rights, specifically its rights to engage in sporting and economic activities through participation in UEFA competitions. It submitted that non-admission to UEFA competitions

deprived it of the related economic benefits that participation provides. Exclusion of FUR prevented it from advancing its international objectives to promote its brands and Russian football as a whole, and impeded its efforts to de-escalate the political tension. The First Respondent rejected the Appellant’s claim.

145. The Panel accepts that the Suspension Decision, and by extension the Appealed Decisions, will have an adverse impact on Russian football, although the extent of that impact was not demonstrated in these proceedings. The Panel was not presented with any evidence that would satisfy it to the appropriate standard that an infringement of the Appellant’s rights to economic development and fulfilment, and to honour had occurred. The Panel, therefore, finds that on the basis of the evidence available to it, no infringement of Article 28 of the SCC has occurred.

146. Accordingly, for those reasons, the Panel finds that there was no unlawful infringement of personality rights and dismisses the claim.

f) Proportionality of the Appealed Decisions

147. The Appellant submitted that the Appealed Decisions were disproportionate because UEFA had experience of dealing with similar situations (e.g. in 2002, 2014 and 2020), and there were many other alternative measures that UEFA could have adopted. For example, UEFA could have: brought disciplinary proceedings if the Appellant’s team was unable to play a match; permitted participation without identifying nationality; required the Appellant to play on a neutral venue; adopted a similar protocol to that adopted in response to COVID-19; or required the UEFA Emergency Panel, UEFA President or the UEFA General Secretary to take the necessary decisions on a case-by-case basis, if problems arose. The Appellant asserted that UEFA had not substantiated its claims concerning travel, safety, and security, but had simply relied on the fact that (i) European governing bodies have adopted sanctions against Russia, (ii) national associations publicly voiced their opinion against FUR and (iii) the general public’s reaction. The Appellant contended that cost and organisational hurdles were insufficient reasons for UEFA to completely exclude its teams. It had received letters from the Russian Ministry of the Interior confirming that the Ministry would ensure safety and security during an international football event. The alternative options available to UEFA supported the Appellant’s view that the Appealed Decisions were disproportionate. The First Respondent rejected the Appellant’s claims.

148. The Panel notes that while the Appealed Decisions are not a disciplinary decision, as it has found above, the Panel is entitled to assess the proportionality of the measures within the scope of its review of the exercise of UEFA’s discretion, and arguments regarding proportionality are relevant. The majority finds that at the time the Appealed Decisions were taken, they were a proportionate and necessary response to implement the Suspension Decision, taking into consideration the Appellant’s interest, UEFA’s interest and the interests of other European football stakeholders.

149. The Panel observes that UEFA had already, on 28 February 2022, taken the Suspension Decision and, in light of that decision, was required to make amendments to its competitions

to progress their efficient organisation. The Panel notes that some of the Appellant’s arguments regarding proportionality and the alternatives to taking the Appealed Decisions (e.g. participation without identifying nationality, playing on neutral venues, or safety and security concerns) are, in fact, more relevant to a challenge against the Suspension Decision, which is not the subject of this appeal, and which the Panel has not been called upon in these proceedings to consider.

150. In any event, the Panel recalls that a sports governing body has a legitimate interest in protecting the integrity and safety of its competitions. The Panel considers that the very presence of the Appellant’s teams (to be distinguished from the presence of Russian individuals in, for example, non-team sports such as tennis) might, in existing circumstances, generate protests that escalate into violence. It observes that unlike some other sports, football, sadly, has proven over the years particularly prone to extreme crowd reactions that are sourced in racism, nationalism or religious differences. It is not unknown for tensions between different groups to spill over into violence at or around football events, creating security and safety concerns inside and outside a stadium. On this issue, however, it is not for the Panel to decide whether it would have reached the same decision, and it defers to UEFA’s expertise when it comes to assessing the security risk and safety concerns of its competitions. The Panel notes also that the option of playing behind closed doors would inconvenience other teams who could reasonably expect to play their matches in front of a crowd but for being drawn against the Appellant’s team. The Panel observes that UEFA’s initial response to the unfolding circumstances, was the First Decision (which was taken on 25 February 2022, before the Suspension Decision) and which required, amongst other things, that no UEFA competition matches were to be played on Russian or Ukrainian territory. This would have enabled the Appellant to participate in UEFA competitions, although outside their own country, and the Appealed Decisions may not have been required. As the circumstances evolved after 25 February 2022, however, the Suspension Decision was adopted and the playing option outlined in the First Decision discarded.

151. The majority considers that the alternatives suggested by the Appellant of resolving any issues that should arise through disciplinary proceedings, or enabling certain UEFA officials to make a decision, are reactive responses, and that it is not disproportionate to adopt a more proactive response to minimise disruption to a sports competition. Although the Russian Ministry of the Interior has provided assurances that it would ensure the security and safety of participants at international matches on its territory, the Panel acknowledges UEFA’s submission that security risks and safety concerns can extend beyond an individual country’s borders. It observes also that many governments in Europe have likely issued travel advisory notices, warning against travel to Russia given the uncertain duration and scope of the existing military conflict, which would prevent the teams and supporters of other member associations, from travelling to Russia, even if matches were permitted to be played there. Finally, regarding the suggestion that UEFA should adopt a similar protocol to that in place for COVID-19, the Panel observes that the global pandemic affected many countries including Russia. The Panel was not provided with evidence of UEFA’s COVID-19 protocol and how it might apply, nevertheless, it considers that a protocol designed to limit the spread of a virus would very likely not limit or remove altogether the security concerns for participants and spectators of a match involving one of the Appellant’s teams.

152. Accordingly, for those reasons, the majority finds that the Appealed Decisions were not disproportionate.

g) Alleged Breach of the Bid Regulations

153. The Appellant submitted that the Appealed Ineligibility Decision breached Article 15.01 and Article 27 of the Bid Regulations because the First Respondent did not treat it in a fair, transparent and consistent manner throughout the bidding procedure, and it itself had done nothing wrong which would justify the ineligibility of its bid to host the UEFA EURO 2028 or 2032 competitions.

154. The First Respondent contended that it did not breach the Bid Regulations. It submitted that when taking the Appealed Ineligibility Decision it “simply applied the relevant regulations to the precise circumstances” by considering Articles 12.03 and 16.02 of the Bid Regulations, and whether the Appellant’s bid in the present context would bring the bidding process and European football into disrepute.

155. The Panel observes that Part III of the Bid Regulations outlines principles of fairness and ethical conduct that apply to the bid process. It includes the following relevant articles:

“15.01 UEFA shall ensure that bidders are treated in a fair, transparent and consistent manner throughout the bidding procedure.

[…]

16.02 Each bidder shall ensure that it does not act in a manner that could bring UEFA, the UEFA final or UEFA final phase, any other bidder (or any employee, officer or representative of any of the foregoing), the bidding procedure or European football into disrepute”.

156. The Panel has previously found above that the Appealed Decisions, including the Appealed Ineligibility Decision, did not breach the principles of equal treatment, political neutrality, and were not discriminatory or disproportionate. It also observes that the Appellant has submitted no additional evidence from which the Panel could consider whether the First Respondent’s treatment of the Appellant during the bid procedure was unfair, non-transparent and inconsistent.

157. The Panel recalls the First Respondent’s reasons for declaring the Appellant’s bid ineligible which are recorded in Circular No. 21/2022:

“Article 16.02 of the Bid Regulations states that “[e]ach bidder shall ensure that it does not act in a manner that could bring UEFA, the UEFA final or UEFA final phase, any other bidder (or any employee, officer or representative of any of the foregoing), the bidding procedure or European football into disrepute”. In this regard, the contemplated bid submitted by the FUR has already provoked a strong reaction reflected in the media of the vast majority of the European countries.

Moreover, as communicated in Circular Letter no. 87/2021, “[t]he automatic qualification of the host team(s) shall be guaranteed (...) for a single host (...)”. Therefore, given the uncertainty as to when the suspension will be lifted and/or whether even more impacting difficulties will arise, the acceptance of a bid from the FUR goes against the decision of the UEFA EXCO of 28 February 2022, suspending all Russian representative teams and clubs from participating in UEFA competition matches until further notice.

Therefore, it was decided to declare the bid of the FUR as not eligible, since it does not only bring the bidding procedure and European football in its entirety into disrepute but is further in direct contradiction with the decision of the UEFA EXCO of 28 February 2022, if an association, whose teams are currently suspended from participating in any UEFA competition, is allowed to bid for a tournament to be hosted on its territory”.

158. The Panel notes also Article 12.03 of the Bid Regulations, which provides:

“After the deadline for declarations of interest, UEFA reviews the list of UEFA member associations that have declared an interest and decides which are eligible to bid to host the UEFA final or UEFA final phase”.

159. The Panel finds that, in accordance with Article 12.03 of the Bid Regulations, UEFA reviewed the Appellant’s bid for eligibility and that at the time it was reviewed, the Suspension Decision was in effect and precluded participation of the Appellant’s teams from UEFA competitions. The Panel observes that none of the other bidders’ teams were in a similar position to that of the Appellant’s team i.e. suspended from participation in UEFA competitions. The Panel considers that the duration of the military conflict, which is continuing, is uncertain, and since the team of the successful host association receives automatic qualification into the relevant UEFA EURO competition, the Suspension Decision would have precluded the Appellant’s team from participating, had the Appellant’s bid been successful and the military conflict been continuing at the time of the competition. As noted in paragraph 37 above, the military conflict between Russia and Ukraine was the catalyst for a set of extraordinary and unforeseen circumstances, which led to the First Respondent implementing the Suspension Decision. These circumstances included an unprecedented global reaction to the military conflict and are in evidence by the public reaction to the inclusion of the Appellant’s bid in the process.

160. The Panel recalls Article 16.02 of the Bid Regulations and accepts the First Respondent’s uncontradicted position that the Appellant’s bid to host the UEFA EURO 2028 or 2032, in the present context, could “bring the bidding procedure and European football in its entirety into disrepute”, although the Panel has not been asked to make a finding as to whether the Appellant breached Article 16.02 and it makes no finding in that regard.

161. The Panel finds that the First Respondent’s treatment of the Appellant’s bid was not unfair, non-transparent and inconsistent, but was rather consonant with, and an extension of, the decisions already taken in light of the extraordinary and unforeseen circumstances that had arisen following the commencement of the military conflict. Accordingly, the Panel finds no breach of Article 15 of the Bid Regulations.

162. The Panel recalls Article 27 of the Bid Regulations which provides that:

“Any UEFA member association found to be in breach of the provisions of these regulations may be disqualified from the bidding procedure by the UEFA Executive Committee and, in addition, may be penalised by UEFA's disciplinary bodies in accordance with the UEFA Disciplinary Regulations”.

163. The Panel finds that there is no evidence that the Appellant was in breach of the Bid Regulations, and furthermore, there is no evidence that the UEFA Executive Committee relied on this provision to “disqualify” the Appellant’s bid, but rather declared the Appellant’s bid “ineligible” under Article 12.03 of the Bid Regulations on the basis of the factors outlined in paragraph 159 above. The Panel finds that no breach of Article 27 occurred.

164. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the Panel finds that the Appealed Ineligibility Decision did not breach the Bid Regulations.

D. Conclusion

165. For the reasons set out above, the Panel finds that in the extraordinary and unprecedented circumstances with which UEFA was faced and to achieve its statutory objectives, the Appealed Decisions were reasonable and proportionate decisions to take. They were required for the efficient and orderly organisation of international football events for European football’s stakeholders. The majority, and in some matters as outlined fully above the Panel, finds that the Appealed Decisions did not breach UEFA Regulations, the principle of political neutrality, nor mandatory provisions of Swiss law, were not disproportionate or discriminatory, and fell within the margin of discretion that UEFA has when making decisions that further its statutory objectives.

166. The Panel notes that it was unfortunate that UEFA was required to take the Suspension Decision, and similarly the Appealed Decisions, for which the FUR, its teams, clubs and players have themselves no responsibility, but which has had, and will likely have, an adverse effect on them. The Panel recalls that the Suspension Decision is a temporary one, and that “Russian representative teams and clubs are suspended from taking part in UEFA competitions until further notice”, and very much hopes, for the benefit of the entire European football community, that circumstances develop in a way that the Suspension Decision can properly be lifted soon.

167. For the reasons set out above, the Panel dismisses the appeal.